

On the Appearance and Reality of Mind

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According to what I will call the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind,” conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I also defend the doctrine from some objections. Finally, I spell out the important metaphysical and epistemological implications of the appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind.

Keywords: appearance, reality, conscious mental state, phenomenology

When I am pained, I cannot say that the pain I feel is one thing, and that my feeling it is another thing. They are one and the same thing, and cannot be disjoined even in imagination. Pain, when it is not felt, has no existence.

Thomas Reid, 1855

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man

[T]he correspondence between a brain state and a mental state seems to have a certain obvious element of contingency. We have seen that identity is not a relation which can hold contingently between objects. Therefore, if the identity thesis were correct, the element of contingency would not lie, as in the case of heat and molecular motion, in the relation between the phenomenon (= heat = molecular motion) and the way it is felt or appears (sensation S), since in the case of mental phenomena there is no ‘appearance’ beyond the mental phenomena itself.

Saul Kripke, 1980

Naming and Necessity

It is sometimes held that there is no distinction between a conscious mental state and the way it is felt or appears. For instance, on this view the subjective appearance of pain — pain’s “painful” or “hurty” feel, in other words — *is* pain.

Many thanks to Paul Gilbert, Nick Zangwill, Raymond Russ, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Demian Whiting, Ph.D., School of Politics, Philosophy and International Studies, University of Hull, Kingston-upon-Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. Email: d.whiting@hull.ac.uk

I will call this the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind” or the “appearance-is-reality doctrine” for short. The appearance-is-reality doctrine is a striking thesis regarding the nature of conscious mental states, not least because there seem to be no other cases where the relationship between appearance and reality is one of identity. And as we will come to see, the implications of such a doctrine for metaphysics and epistemology are profound — so profound, in my view, that the appearance-is-reality doctrine is one of the most important theses in the philosophy of mind. So it is surprising that the doctrine has not received more explanation and defence from its supporters than it has to date. True the doctrine finds support with respect to at least some conscious states such as bodily sensations (see, for instance: Gertler, 2005; Horgan, 2012; James, 1890; Kripke, 1980; McGinn, 2004; Nagel, 1974; Reid, 1855; Searle, 1992, 1997). Moreover, it is a doctrine that is sometimes appealed to in defence of particular philosophical positions. Consider, for instance, Saul Kripke’s use of the doctrine when seeking to show that mind–brain identity theory is false. Nevertheless I am not aware of the doctrine, including its key features, having anywhere been spelt out in a systematic and comprehensive way. This is unfortunate because until this is done the doctrine risks being misunderstood and its philosophical implications are unlikely to be understood properly. Neither, in my view, has the reason for accepting the doctrine been explained very well. Is it a conceptual truism, so-to-speak, that pain, for instance, is its subjective appearance, or should we believe the doctrine for some other reason? Also the appearance-is-reality doctrine invites various objections that need answering (although as we will see, some of these rest on faulty understandings of the doctrine — another reason for getting clear on the details of the doctrine to begin with of course). And finally, it is my view that the philosophical implications of the appearance-is-reality doctrine have not been spelt out as well as they might be. The point of this paper, then, is to formulate and defend the appearance-is-reality doctrine, as well as outline its metaphysical and epistemological implications, and in the process show why that doctrine really is as important as some of us might think.

The Appearance-Is-Reality Doctrine of Mind

In its most concise form the appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind holds that all phenomenally conscious mental states are their appearances. Or, to put the point in another way, the doctrine holds that all phenomenally conscious mental states are the appearances of those mental states. I will now spell out four key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine as just formulated.

The Doctrine Concerns Conscious Mental States

The appearance-is-reality doctrine concerns those mental states that we commonly think of as being phenomenally conscious — where a mental

state is phenomenally conscious if the mental state feels a certain way to us or if there is something that it is like to undergo that mental state. On my list I include sensory states such as pains, itches, tingles, emotions, and moods, but also more complex episodic intentional mental states, including conscious thoughts, desires, perceptual experiences, and imaginings.

It follows that the appearance-is-reality doctrine is not concerned with *non*-conscious mental states, if there are such things. I say “if there are such things” because, first, it is controversial whether some putative non-conscious mental states lack a phenomenology. For instance, not everyone thinks episodic thoughts are phenomenally conscious, whereas I along with a number of others take the view that thoughts are phenomenally conscious and, what is more, possess a distinctive phenomenology, one that is not to be described in terms of phenomenal properties associated with other mental states such as perceptual imagery (cp. Pitt, 2004; Strawson, 1994; see Bayne and Montague, 2011 for a summary of recent work on cognitive phenomenology) — and for that reason will speak of thoughts and thought-like states as being conscious.

Moreover, with respect to those states that are less controversially regarded as non-conscious, it seems to me unresolved as to whether such states are properly to be regarded as being mental by nature. For instance, should so-called dispositional states, such as dispositional beliefs, desires, and long-standing fears, be described as bona-fide mental states (cp. Strawson, 1994; see also Gertler, 2007)? The question is well-motivated because on the face of it, if to suffer a fear of dogs, for instance, is to be disposed to respond to dogs with episodic fear, then a fear of dogs does not look like a mental state as such, but only a disposition to undergo one, namely episodic fear (where episodic fear does have a phenomenology). Also and more intuitively, if we think there can be non-conscious mental states then we seem committed to the view that a mind can exist but for which everything is “dark” and that is an uncomfortable view to accept; for intuitively, a world in which consciousness does not exist is a world in which a mind does not exist, or, in other words, is a world in which that thing that makes the mental *mental* does not exist (cp. Kim, 1996, p. 237).

Still more will need to be said to satisfy everyone that all mental states are conscious and that is not the purpose of this paper. For that reason my position will be only that the appearance-is-reality doctrine concerns all conscious mental states, thus leaving for another time proper consideration of whether that doctrine ends up saying that *all* mental states are their appearances.

The Doctrine Concerns Phenomenal Appearances

By “appearance” (or equivalently “way of appearing”) I mean the *phenomenal* or *subjective appearance* of something, or, in other words, the way something feels or subjectively appears or manifests itself to mind — the *painful appearance*

or *feel* of pain, the *itchiness* of an itch, the *visual appearance* (or *look*) of a table,¹ and the *visual-like appearance* of an after-image, for instance. Intuitively and consistent with the appearance-is-reality doctrine, subjective appearances have the following two features. First, they have the property of being felt or appearing in a certain way. In what-it-is-likeness terms we might say there is *something that it is like* to have a painful or itchy feel, for instance — which is just to say these subjective feels or appearances are felt or have a certain feel to them. Second, phenomenal appearances have the property of being felt *in their entirety*. There is no part of a subjective appearance that does not feel a certain way or for which there is not something that it is like to undergo it. Again consider a painful or itchy feel. Notice how there is no part of the subjective appearance in question that does not have a certain feel to it. The painfulness of pain and the itchiness of an itch are felt in their entirety, so-to-speak.

There are a number of other things to be said here. First, the claim that subjective appearances are felt in their entirety does not entail on the appearance-is-reality doctrine that we have infallible knowledge of the nature of our conscious mental states. Although that claim has some positive epistemological implications (about which more later), it does not mean that we cannot be mistaken about how phenomenal appearances (and by implication the conscious mental states with which they are identical) feel in our experience of them. Pain's painful appearance might be apparent to us in all its phenomenal richness, but if, for instance, we are poor at describing the phenomenology, then we can still be led to form false judgments about pain's way of appearing (and, by implication, pain) — again I return to this point in the last section of the paper.

Second, it is important to distinguish phenomenal or subjective appearance from (what is commonly called) *epistemic seeming*, which is the way in which we might think or be inclined to think about something (see Chalmers, 1996, p. 190; Horgan, 2012; Schwitzgebel, 2008). Phenomenal appearances might provide evidential grounds for thinking or being disposed to think something is the case. For example, I might say that from the way the table looks I am inclined to think the table is rectangular in shape or that from the painful feel of pain

¹In fact, with respect to mind-independent objects, there are two meanings of the term “appearance” (or “look” or “taste” and so on) that it might be useful to distinguish here. First, there is the meaning intended in the text, where to talk about an object's appearance is to talk about the way an object feels or subjectively appears in our experience of it. This is the phenomenal sense of “appearance.” But second, there is a sense of “appearance” where to talk about the appearance of an object is to talk about the way the object would feel or subjectively appear in our experience of it if the object were perceived. This latter sense of “appearance” is what we have in mind when we say that an object has an appearance even though it is not being perceived by anyone (consider how we might speak of the “look” of the watch hidden in my drawer). But note it is with respect to mind-independent objects only that “appearance” can have these two meanings. Assuming the truth of the doctrine, the reason for this is straightforward. If pain is the way it subjectively feels or appears to us, then it makes no sense to speak about the way pain would feel if it were experienced, as that would imply that pain can exist when it is not being experienced (which it cannot if pain is its subjective appearance).

I am inclined to judge that pain is a raw feeling (on this point, see Horgan, 2012, p. 407). But phenomenal appearances are not epistemic seemings. Indeed, the examples just given are saying something informative only because phenomenal appearance and epistemic seeming have different meanings. It follows that the appearance-is-reality doctrine is not the thesis that for a person to undergo a conscious mental state is for that person to think or be disposed to think he or she is undergoing a conscious mental state. The reason why this distinction is important will become evident later when I address certain objections to the doctrine.

Third, it is important to recognise that to talk about the phenomenal appearance of something is not the same as talking about the way something appears to us to be, or, what I take to mean the same thing, the properties something appears to us to have (on this point, see Thompson, 2009). For instance, to speak about the subjective feel or appearance of a table — the table looking rectangular from here, say — is not the same as talking about the properties a table appears to me to have. One way of coming to see the difference between phenomenal appearance and the way something appears to be is by considering what each would entail if objects commonly thought to be non-mental admitted of no appearance/reality distinction. Now, if that were the case and “appearance” were read as “phenomenal appearance” then it would follow that all of reality is *mental* reality. If we can say of worldly objects — say concrete tables and chairs — that to be is to appear in the phenomenal sense of “appear” (that is to say, if we can say of worldly objects that to be is for them to be *felt*), then the result is idealism of one variety or other. But the same is not true if “appearance” were taken to mean “the way something appears to be.” For then, although it would follow that we have certain insight into the nature of the world (since we are supposing the world just as it appears to us to be), it would not follow that all of reality is mental reality; for it might be the case that worldly objects appear to us to be mind-independent — indeed, I believe I speak accurately in saying that worldly objects do appear to most people to be mind-independent — and, therefore, *are* mind-independent if they just are as they appear to us to be.

Another way of coming to see the distinction between phenomenal appearance and the way something appears to be is simply by noting that the claim that pain appears to be the way that pain feels, promises to tell us something about the nature of pain or the sort of thing pain is, namely that pain is its subjective feel or way of appearing. But that claim could not promise to tell us any such thing if there were no distinction between the two senses of “appearance” in question; for then that claim would be saying that pain appears to be the way pain appears to be, which although trivially true would in itself tell us nothing about what pain might actually be.

It follows that the appearance-is-reality doctrine is not the thesis that conscious mental states are the way they appear to be. The point is important because it

means that the appearance-is-reality doctrine is to be seen as a metaphysical thesis (that is, a thesis about what conscious mental states are, namely their subjective appearances) and not an epistemological thesis regarding the status of our knowledge of a mental state (which that thesis would seem to be if were taken to be saying that conscious mental states are the way they appear to us to be). Moreover, once we recognise the distinction just drawn, we will be able to understand much better the implications the appearance-is-reality doctrine has for mind-brain identity theory; for it is as a metaphysical thesis that the appearance-is-reality doctrine causes serious difficulties for that theory.

The Doctrine Concerns the Phenomenal Appearances of the Mental States in Question

To say that conscious mental states are their appearances or ways of appearing is to say the subjective appearances with which conscious mental states are identical are none other than their own appearances or ways of appearing. Now of course this is consistent with holding that different conscious mental states manifest themselves subjectively in different ways. And that there is variation in how different conscious mental states feel or subjectively appear to us is made evident when we reflect on the phenomenology of different conscious mental states. For instance, we come to see that pains, visual experiences, thoughts, imaginings, and emotions differ from one another in terms of how they feel. For example, whereas some conscious mental states seem to phenomenally manifest a non-intentional or non-object-directed nature (pains, itches, and moods perhaps), other conscious mental states (thoughts, imaginings, and perceptual experiences, for instance) manifest an object-directed nature.

Moreover, corresponding to differences in the feel or subjective appearances of different conscious mental types, we find differences in the feel or appearances of token instances of the same mental types. For instance, my thought that Paris is the capital of France shares with my thought that Smith is a salesman, an object-directed feel or appearance. However, the object-directed appearances of those thoughts differ in terms of how the world is presented in mind; whereas the first thought presents *Paris as being the capital of France*, the second presents *Smith as being a salesman*.

It is not always easy to describe how different conscious mental states feel or subjectively appear to us. Some conscious mental states have appearances that are so fine-grained or elusive that they fail to admit of easy description (consider the phenomenology involved in the visual experience of a complex landscape). But this is not to say these mental states do not admit of differences in subjective appearance (and indeed we are often able to know this even in cases where we find it difficult to say what characterises a given appearance or distinguishes it from other appearances). Again the implications that this has for the epistemology of mind are explored more fully below.

Does the claim that conscious mental states are the subjective appearances of those mental states threaten regress? On a superficial reading of that claim it might be thought to threaten regress because if conscious mental states are their appearances, then the appearances with which conscious mental states are identical must be identical to *their* appearances, and so on ad infinitum. But the worry of regress could be well-founded only if it were supposed that conscious mental states were somehow distinct from the way they subjectively appear to us, as then it would be the case that appearances will proliferate. But of course, the appearance-is-reality doctrine denies this. Since, according to that doctrine, the relationship between the conscious mental state and its way of appearing is one of strict identity (as I spell out in more detail, below) the threat of regress does not arise.

The Doctrine Holds that Conscious Mental States Are Nothing More than Their Phenomenal Appearances

To say that something *is* its subjective appearance is to say that that thing is *nothing more than* its subjective appearance or that it is *exhausted by* its subjective appearance. So, for instance, to say that pain is its painful feel or appearance is to say that pain is nothing more than its painful feel or way of appearing or that pain is exhausted by its painful feel or way of appearing.² According to the appearance-is-reality doctrine the relationship between conscious mental states and their subjective appearances is one of strict identity.

This is a striking feature of the doctrine. In no other case is the relationship between object and appearance normally considered to be one of identity. Tables and chairs, for instance, are not normally considered to be identical to the way they look or smell or feel in our experience of them. In their case, the relationship between the appearance and reality seems to be a non-constitutive, probably causal one. Thus we might say that tables and chairs are causally responsible for the way they feel or subjectively appear to us but they are not composed of or identical to their appearances. But the appearance-is-reality doctrine holds the same is not true in the case of phenomenally conscious mental states and their subjective appearances. That thesis holds that in the case of a conscious mental state the appearance really *is* the reality.

²I recognise not everyone thinks pain is its painful feel. For instance, it might be held that when we introspect pain we find that pain comprises (also) certain emotions such as anger and displeasure, or that pain has a motivational nature — so perhaps pain is the imperative "behave differently!" (see, Klein, 2015). Personally I think any account that does not identify pain with its painful feel fails to be faithful to the phenomenology of pain, and for this reason I will continue to talk about pain in the way I do. But note, that as it stands, the disagreement is solely one regarding the nature of pain's appearance — as to whether, for instance, pain presents itself as a painful feeling or as an emotion or as an imperative to behave some way (or perhaps as a compound of all three). It is not a disagreement regarding the claim that pain is its subjective appearance (whatever the nature of that appearance might be), which is the claim that principally concerns us.

It follows the appearance-is-reality doctrine is at odds with any theory of phenomenal appearance that identifies the way a mental state feels with that mental state's external relational properties. Consider Michael Tye's theory of phenomenal content, which holds that a mental state's phenomenal properties are its representational properties, where by "representational properties" Tye means a mental state's causal-convariational properties (see, for instance, Tye, 2000, 2005). Tye thinks that pain's feel or phenomenal character is just a matter of pain representing some bodily condition, where that is a matter of pain standing in the right causal relation with the bodily condition that it represents. According to Tye it is because pain causally correlates with bodily damage (or more precisely, causally correlates with bodily damage in optimal conditions) that pain represents bodily damage, and it is the representing of bodily damage that *is* pain's phenomenal character.

But this is at odds with the appearance-is-reality doctrine because if the way pain feels is a causal relation holding between pain and some bodily condition, then the way pain feels can be no part of pain itself. Indeed, on a causal/functional story pain itself might turn out to be nothing more than a physiological state (a firing of C-fibres say) albeit one standing in the right causal relations with other physiological activity (for instance, states of bodily damage) and/or bodily behaviour. If the appearance-is-reality doctrine is true then the appearance of a conscious mental state cannot be a causal/functional property because the appearance could not then *be* that conscious mental state.

Can this be made consistent with the claim that a mental state's intentional properties are themselves phenomenal properties? The claim that they are phenomenal properties was made above where it was held that the possession of an intentional or object-directed nature seems constitutive of the phenomenology of many conscious mental states, for instance, my thought that Paris is the capital of France. I think the right thing to say here is that if by a mental state's intentional properties we mean "representational" in the causal/functional sense of "representation," then on the appearance-is-reality doctrine a mental state's representational properties could not be part of its appearance (as this would prevent us from identifying mental states with their appearances). But I along with other philosophers (for instance, Chalmers, 2003, 2004a; Horgan and Tienson, 2002), take the view that this is not the only way of understanding "representation." Although there is a non-phenomenal sense of "represent" that picks out a mental state's causal/functional properties, there is another *phenomenal* sense — "phenomenal intentionality," as it is sometimes called — that picks out *the way in which the mind presents the world to itself*. This latter sense of "represent" picks out not a causal-functional property but rather a property that is phenomenally manifest in episodic thoughts and some other conscious mental states and thus a property that *is* constitutive of some ways of appearing, namely those ways of appearing that possess an intentional or object-directed nature.

The Case for the Appearance-Is-Reality Doctrine

What is the argument for the appearance-is-reality doctrine? Is it a conceptual truism that conscious mental states are indistinguishable from the way they feel? Certainly many people's concept or idea of a conscious mental state is consistent with the appearance-is-reality doctrine. For instance, it does seem to be part of many people's idea of pain that pain has a painful feel and is indistinguishable from the way it feels. This provides some support for the doctrine. In particular, any account of a conscious mental state that does too much violence to commonly held intuitions regarding a conscious mental state is likely to raise serious doubts as to whether it is still a conscious mental state about which we are speaking.

Nevertheless, there is reason not to rely solely on people's concepts or intuitions when seeking to understand what something is. These can be incomplete or mistaken with respect to how they represent something. Even if many people's concept or idea of pain is that pain is its painful feel, it is an open question as to whether the referent of the term "pain" is the way many people conceive pain to be (and not, for instance, the way someone who does not share that view conceives pain to be).

A more compelling argument, then, for the appearance-is-reality doctrine and one that vindicates commonly held intuitions, appeals directly to our experience or observation of a mental state. That is to say, I think we are justified in claiming that conscious mental states are the way they feel because that is evident from our experience of those mental states. One way of coming to see this is by reflecting on what remains when a pain ceases to be painful as might happen if an analgesic is taken. I think it is evident from our experience or observation of the pain in question that we are left with *nothing at all*, in much the same way that it is evident from our experience or observation of some physical object that if we remove certain of its physical properties — its spatial properties, for instance — the object itself ceases to be.³ Another way is by reflecting on what experience tells us when there is a change in how a conscious mental episode feels, when, for instance, an episode of pain feels very painful to begin with but less so as time goes on. Again I think it is evident from observing a mental state that when there is a change in how a mental state *feels*, the nature of the *mental state* itself changes. In much the same way it is evident from our observation of some physical object that if we alter certain of its physical properties the nature of the object changes also.

³This is why we are justified in thinking there are no such things as unfelt pains (or unfelt feelings) — for again, observation of pain makes evident for us the fact that pain when it is not felt simply ceases to be or is no pain at all.

And here it is useful to contrast the case of conscious mental states with other items in the world. Thus it is in no way evident from our observation of tables and chairs or water and heat, for instance, that what we are observing are the ways these things feel to us in our experience of them. Indeed, I think it is evident from our experience of other items in the world that they are *not* their ways of appearing; for it is evident from our observations of such items that they are part of a mind-independent world. Thus we come to see that these items are self-subsistent entities, so-to-speak, entities that can endure when not felt by us and which do not undergo change in virtue of change to the way they feel to us in our experience of them.

Now, to be clear, the argument is not we are justified in thinking conscious mental states are the way they feel because that is evident from the way they feel. This is no argument of course because we cannot tell on the basis of how a mental state feels whether the mental state *is* the way it feels. Rather, the argument is that it is on the basis of our *experience or observation of a conscious mental state* that we come to see that the mental state and its way of appearing are one and the same. Or equivalently, the argument is that it is on the basis of our *experience of the way a conscious mental state feels* — as opposed to the way a mental state feels — that we come to see that the mental state and its way of appearing are one and the same.

We need to distinguish, then, between “an experience of a conscious mental state” (or “an experience of the way a conscious mental state feels”) and “the way a conscious mental state feels.” An experience or observation of a mental state comprises an *introspective representation* of a mental state, whereas the way a mental state feels is a property of the mental state that is part of an experience of the mental state (hence the locution: the way a mental state feels in our experience of it) but is not a representation of the mental state.

The appearance-is-reality doctrine holds that conscious mental states are the way they feel in our experience of them, not that mental states are our experiences of them. This is a good thing too; for as I explained above it is evident from the subjective appearance of some conscious mental states that those mental states lack intentional objects, whereas those mental states could not be without objects if they *are* mental representations. However, it is the observation or experience of a conscious mental state and not the way a conscious mental state feels in our experience of it that justifies thinking a conscious mental state *is* the way it feels; for again, when we experience or introspectively observe a conscious mental state we are able to see by means of our encounter with or direct cognitive access to the mental state in question that the thing we are observing (or “looking at,” so-to-speak) is nothing other than its own manner or way of appearing.

The argument, then, is not that conscious mental states are the way they feel because that is evident from the way they feel; for our experience of a mental state is not the same as the way it feels. Nevertheless, we might wish to inquire further

into what it is that justifies thinking the experience of a conscious mental state delivers to us truths about that mental state; for even if the experience of a mental state is not the same as how the mental state feels, what is to say the experience does not tell us truths only about how the mental state feels? Now, if it were the case that the experience tells us truths only about the way conscious mental states feel then by the same token we ought to say our experience of other items in the world tells us truths only about the way those items feel — and that is clearly mistaken. For instance, my experience of water tells me truths about *water* — including the fact of water being a watery substance — and not truths about water's way of appearing. What then justifies thinking an experience of a mental state tells us truths about the mental state? The answer must be that it is the mental state that is being represented by us when we experience it. Thus our experience of pain gives us information about pain — including the fact of pain being its own way of appearing — because it is pain we are observing when we experience pain; hence it is pain we glean certain truths about.

And if it is asked what justifies thinking that it is *pain* we are observing and not pain's way of appearing? Of course if the appearance-is-reality doctrine is true, the answer is: nothing justifies thinking this. Pain is its own way of appearing; therefore, to experience pain is to experience pain's way of appearing. But suppose we take the question to be probing the assumption that what we are observing is pain and not pain's way of appearing *only*? In fact it does not matter much whether what we are observing is pain; for the argument seeks to show only that whatever it is we are observing that thing is its own way of appearing. Suppose the thing we are observing is pain's way of appearing but not pain. In that case the argument would be that it is evident from our observation of the thing that is pain's way of appearing that that thing is its own way of appearing. This would give us the appearance-is-reality doctrine with respect to the subjective appearance — where the reality is the subjective appearance and the appearance is the subjective appearance's way of appearing. [And it is only a small step from there to say that really it is pain's way of appearing that is the conscious mental state, not pain itself.] Nevertheless I do not think the appearance-is-reality doctrine is true for pain's way of appearing but not for pain, since I think we are wholly right to think it is pain we are observing, not pain's way of appearing only. The question is: How can we be confident that what we are observing is *pain*? And the answer has to be: because the thing we are observing is what picks out the referent of the term "pain." And we know this because we have been taught to use the term "pain" to refer to that thing which we find on experiencing or observing it to be its own manner of appearing — in much the same way that we know what we are observing is *water* because we have been taught to use the term "water" to refer to that which we find when observing it to be a watery substance.

Objections and Replies

In what follows I address two types of objection to the appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind. First, there are those objections that provide positive reasons for denying that conscious mental states are their subjective appearances. These objections proceed by describing counter-examples to that doctrine or by seeking to show the doctrine is false for conceptual reasons. The second type of objection does not seek to show that the doctrine is false, but questions our confidence in the grounds for accepting the doctrine in the first place, the implication being that if there is reason to doubt those grounds, then even if the doctrine is true we may still lack justification for believing it to be true.

To begin with, it might be held that cases can be described where the putative identity between a mental state and the subjective appearance of that mental state does not exist. First, there are those cases in which there is the subjective appearance but no conscious mental state. For instance, Rosenthal (2005) observes that some dental patients report themselves to be in pain (owing to such things as anxiety and the non-painful sensation of vibration) but where physiological factors make it clear that no pain can be present (we might imagine patients have been anaesthetised, for instance; see also Brown, 2010; Churchland, 1988).

One response to such cases is disbelief: if it seems to us that we are in pain then we must be in pain! I have some sympathy with this response. In the normal case we should take people's sincere reports to be in pain at face value. But there is another reply available to us, which can allow that in exceptional cases we can be mistaken about whether we are in pain (say owing to unusual cognitive pressures) but which does not mean rejecting the appearance-is-reality doctrine. This is because it can be argued that such counter-examples equivocate between epistemic seeming and subjective appearance, a distinction that was made earlier in the paper. In other words, when we imagine such cases we imagine people who, despite thinking themselves to be in pain, do not experience anything pain-like, and, therefore, if the appearance-is-reality doctrine is true, are *not* in pain, just as Rosenthal holds.

Other counter-examples argue to the opposite view, namely that there can be a conscious mental state but no appearance. For instance, some have the intuition that one can have a headache all day but only be intermittently aware of it. But in reply, it is not clear what to say about such cases. With respect to the all day headache example, if the claim is that one can have a headache without *thinking one has a headache* then that is not a problem for the appearance-is-reality doctrine because that doctrine is not saying that to have a headache is to think one is having a headache. As we have seen, that would confuse the epistemic use of "appear" with the phenomenal use

of “appear.” It would also have other unattractive implications; for instance, it would seem to mean that young children cannot have headaches since they lack the conceptual abilities needed to think they are having a headache.

On the other hand, if by an unfelt headache we mean a headache that lacks the characteristic headache phenomenology, then the intuition there can be pain without subjective appearance looks question-begging. Of course, we sometimes speak of having a headache all day, which might seem to suggest that our heads can ache when there is no pain phenomenology, but it is difficult to interpret such speech to be saying anything other than that our heads were aching off and on all day (compare, people sometimes say they have not stopped eating when what they usually mean is they have eaten at regular intervals, not that they have eaten *non-stop!*) Barring further argument, counter-examples such as the all day headache one, end up begging the relevant questions (for useful discussion of the all day headache example, see Robinson, 2004).

A final counter-example makes appeal to the so-called “transparency thesis” that many philosophers of perception accept (for a summary and discussion of the relevant literature, see Kind, 2003). For that thesis might be taken to threaten the claim that conscious mental states are their appearances, since the transparency thesis might seem to suggest that what is apparent to us when we have a perceptual experience is *that which we perceive* and not the experience itself. Now if this is correct then perceptual experience is a counter-example to the appearance-is-reality doctrine. This is because it would follow that perceptual experiences cannot be how they subjectively appear to us, since such experiences do not appear to us in any way whatsoever (for again it would be the objects and their properties that appear to us, not the experiences themselves).

But I think we should reject the claim that perceptual experiences do not subjectively appear to us. Of course it is the object and its properties that are apparent to us *in* our experience of the object, so-to-speak. For instance, when I perceive a red ball, it is the ball and its redness — and not my experience of the ball and its redness — that are apparent to me in the experience of the red ball. However that is not to say that when I perceive a red ball, the experience of a red ball is not apparent to me. For there is a distinction to be drawn between the object of perception, on the one hand, and the perceptual experience itself, on the other — and although the latter is not apparent in my perceptual experience of the object (hence it is not the object being visually perceived) it might appear to me all the same. And indeed I think that when I visually perceive a red ball the experience of the red ball is apparent to me. For my visual experience of the red ball comprises the *red ball visually appearing or looking some way* to me (on this point, see Siewert, 2004), and the red ball looking some way to me is no less evident to me when visually experiencing the red ball than the red ball itself. But if that is the case then we do not have a counter-example to the doctrine;

for it follows that our perceptual experiences are apparent to us in addition to the things being represented in those experiences.⁴

The view that conscious mental states are the way they feel faces a conceptual objection. The objection is that this view has to be false because to speak about the way something feels is to speak of a *relation* — call it the “feeling-a-certain-way relation” — that holds between the mental state and the subject of the mental state in question. But it might be claimed that no relation can be identical with one or more of its relata. In reply I agree that to speak of the way something feels is to speak of a relation but think this would disprove the appearance-is-reality doctrine only if the relation in question were an external one, that is to say, a relation that is external to or not identical with one or more of the relata. In the case of mind-independent objects and the way they feel, it is clear the relation is an external one. For instance, the coin I am visually experiencing is independent of its looking elliptical to me — where a justification for saying this, is that it is possible for the coin to enter into a different relation (for it to look different from the way it does look to me) from the one it does in fact enter.

However, in the case of mental states and their ways of appearing, the relation in question seems to be an *internal* not external relation. This is because conscious mental states do not seem to be able to exist independently of or prior to the way they feel to us. For instance, the pain I feel in my hand does not exist independently of or prior to the way my pain feels to me — where a justification for saying this is that it is not possible for my pain to enter into a different relation (that is, for my pain not to feel the way it does feel to me) from the one that my pain does in fact enter. The conceptual objection would succeed only if there were reason to hold that all relations must be external relations. But although many relations are external it is not clear why all relations must be external. Indeed, the appearance-is-reality doctrine is one counter-example to the thesis that all relations are external; for that doctrine holds plausibly that in the case of a conscious mental state the feeling relation *is* constitutive of one of the relata, namely the conscious mental state that feels a certain way to us. Therefore, unless a compelling case can be given for holding that all relations are external, the conceptual objection also ends up begging the question.

⁴One way of building on this point is by considering what Amy Kind calls “exotic cases” such as blurry vision and after-images (see Kind, 2008 for a detailed discussion). Suppose I have poor vision but am looking at a red ball whilst wearing glasses. Due to the power of the lenses my visual experience of the red ball is crystal clear. Now suppose I remove the glasses resulting in the red ball looking blurry to me. The red ball looking blurry is something that is now apparent to me, and this differs from what was apparent to me when I was wearing glasses. Is what is apparent to me here the thing that I am visually experiencing? The answer seems to be negative; for the thing that I am visually experiencing — namely the red ball — does not seem to change after I remove my glasses, whereas what is apparent to me here — namely the red ball looking blurry to me — differs from what was apparent to me before removing my glasses. So what is it that is apparent to me? Again the answer seems to be: my experience of the red ball, or, the red ball looking some way to me.

A second type of objection allows that for all we know, conscious mental states might be their subjective appearances, but complains that the grounds for accepting that doctrine — namely that that doctrine is vindicated by our experience or observation of conscious mental states — are unstable or inconclusive. Although this type of objection does not seek to show the doctrine is false, it does try to demonstrate that agnosticism regarding the truth of the doctrine is the only justified position to adopt (at least until a better argument for thinking the doctrine is true can be given).

To begin with, one might doubt the reliability of forming beliefs about the nature of mental states on the basis of our experience of them. Such a doubt might be motivated by consideration of the following cases. First, there are those cases where, owing to unusual cognitive pressures, people are led into forming erroneous beliefs on the basis of their experience of a mental state. Consider the dental case described already, where due to anxiety and the non-painful sensation of vibration people are led to believe erroneously that they are in pain (Rosenthal, 2005; see also Churchland, 1988). But although such cases pose a challenge to the view that we are infallible regarding our knowledge of our mental states (and it is the infallibility thesis to which such cases are normally cited as an objection), it is difficult to see how such cases show that we are not justified in claiming that conscious mental states are the way they feel on the basis of our experience of them. After all, when we judge from our experience of pain that pain is the way it feels, we will normally be making that judgement when there are no unusual cognitive pressures that could risk leading us into error.

Other reasons for doubt appeal to less out of the ordinary cases. For instance, some commonly had mental states are very detailed in their presentation and others are short-lived or have rapidly changing natures; such features can create difficulties when reflecting on our experience of a mental state for the purpose of gaining a deeper understanding of that mental state (see Schwitzgebel, 2008). I suggest later in the paper that with respect to such mental states we can often attain good insights into what they are like. But even in cases where reflecting on our experience of a mental state delivers us limited knowledge about that mental state, such cases seem to pose little threat here. This is because, first, when we say it is evident from an experience of a mental state that the mental state in question is the way it feels, we will normally be basing what we say on the experience of a mental state the phenomenology of which is relatively easy to grasp — the painful feel of pain, for instance. But second, even with respect to mental states that are more complex in terms of how they feel, it seems to me that we are normally able to see that the mental state in question *is* the way it feels, even if we cannot say fully *how* it feels. I might not be able to describe very well how a pang of nostalgia feels, for instance, but that does not stop me from being able to see from my experience or observation of an episode of nostalgia that that mental episode is its way of appearing.

Another objection also questions the grounds for accepting the appearance-is-reality doctrine but not because of doubts regarding our ability to make accurate judgments about what the experience of a conscious mental state might be telling us, but rather because of concerns regarding the possible limitations of the experience or observation itself with regards to what it is able to tell us about our conscious mental states. There are two forms this objection might take.

First, it might be held that even if our experience of a mental state can tell us about *that which we can experience*, still it might not be able to tell us everything about a mental state, including, for instance, the mental state's neural-physiological properties. This seems to be what Patricia Churchland has in mind when she says that “not *everything* about the nature of pain is revealed in introspection — its neural substrate, for example, is not so revealed” (Churchland, 1998, p. 117; italics in original). Now, in reply, if by “neural substrate” Churchland means something on which a mental state *depends* then even if our experience of a mental state can tell us nothing about *that*, this would be no objection to the view that it is our experience of a mental state that justifies us holding that mental states are their ways of appearing; for on that view there is no reason to suppose our experience of a mental state is able to tell us anything about that which is not part of a mental state, including anything about that on which a mental state might depend. But if as seems more likely by “neural substrate” Churchland means something that constitutes a mental state, then how we reply will depend on the nature of the constitution-relation in question. Thus if the view is that pain, for instance, might be composed in part of how it feels and in part of a neural state — a neural-phenomenal compound, so-to-speak — then it is difficult to avoid the worry that anyone who holds that view fails to understand accurately the referent of the term “pain.” It would be similar to thinking that water comprises more than a watery substance, a watery substance plus something else. To believe that would be to fail to understand that “water” picks out that which we can see from our experience or observation of it to be a watery substance only. Similarly if someone held that pain comprises more than the way it feels — the way it feels plus a neural state — then we would be right to complain that the individual fails to understand that “pain” refers only to that which we can see from our experience or observation of it to be pain's way of appearing.⁵

On the other hand, if the view is that a conscious mental state is indeed nothing more than the way it feels, but qua the way it feels that mental state is a neural state, then although I think the appearance-is-reality doctrine rules that idea out (as I will argue in the next section), it suffices to point out that that view does not

⁵It is worth remarking that such a view still gives us the appearance-is-reality doctrine with respect to the conscious parts of conscious mental states. That would also be a striking doctrine and would have much the same metaphysical and epistemological implications as the ones I outline later in the paper (which makes the motivation for endorsing this view, as opposed to the view that conscious mental states in their entirety are the way they feel, even more puzzling).

undermine the appearance-is-reality doctrine nor the grounds for thinking that doctrine is true. This is because even if it were the case that mental states qua their subjective appearances are neural states (as a mind–brain identity theorist might hold), it would still be the case that conscious mental states are nothing more than the way they feel, and it would still be the case that we are justified in thinking this because the truth of that claim is evident from our experience or introspective observation of our mental states.

The other form of the objection under consideration holds that for all we know the experience is unable to tell us anything about our mental states; for it might be claimed that it is possible the nature of a mental state is wholly unavailable to experience — in much the same way, for instance, it might be held the atomic or molecular nature of water is not evident to us when we observe water. But, in response, to say the nature of water is not evident to us when we experience water is not the same as saying that our observation of water tells us nothing about water. Although the experience is unable to tell us about water's atomic structure it is able to tell us certain important truths about water. For instance, it is able to tell us that water is a watery substance. And likewise I have argued the experience is able to tell us certain important truths about our conscious mental states, including the fact that our mental states are their ways of appearing.

Implications of the Appearance-Is-Reality Doctrine of Mind

Metaphysical Implications

It might be held that the appearance-is-reality doctrine need not threaten mind–brain identity theory because even if pain, for instance, is identical to its painful feel, this is consistent with holding that pain qua the way it feels is a neural or physiological state, a firing of C-fibres, say. But I want to now show why mind–brain identity theory is not sustainable if we accept the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with a plausible thesis regarding the nature of neural–physiological states.

The argument for holding that conscious mental states are not identical to neural or physiological states or activity is as follows.

1. Every phenomenally conscious mental state is the subjective appearance of that state
2. No neural state is the subjective appearance of that state

Conclusion: No phenomenally conscious mental state is a neural state

The first premise is a statement of the appearance-is-reality doctrine. I explained that the primary justification for thinking that conscious mental states are indistinguishable from their subjective appearances is that this is evident to us from our experience or observation of them. In support of premise 2, the view might

be advanced that neural states do not subjectively appear to us in any way; for if that view is true then it cannot be the case that neural states *are* how they appear to us.⁶ But for the sake of argument, suppose that the neural states in question do subjectively appear to us in some way. For instance, let us suppose that the feeling associated with pain captures how the firing of C-fibres subjectively appears to us (in much the same way that it might be held that a feeling of heat, for instance, captures the way in which heat feels or appears to us).

Nevertheless, a strong argument can be given for thinking that the second premise is still true, which is as follows. If a neural state is its subjective appearance — for instance, if C-fibre firing is the way it feels when we are in pain — then it cannot have a nature that is not apparent to us in the experience of that state. This is because to describe the way something feels is to describe a property that is apparent to us in the experience of the thing. Therefore, if something is the way it feels or subjectively appears to us — *exhausted by* its appearance, *nothing more than* the way it feels or subjectively appears to us — then the nature of that thing must be apparent to us in our experience of it. But in the case of neural states, we find they possess a microphysical nature that is not apparent to us in the experience of those states. Although we can theorize about the microphysical properties or structure of a neural state, that structure is not evident to us in our experience of that state (in much the same way that the microphysical properties of heat and water are not evident to us in our experience of heat and water). But then it follows that it cannot be the case that a neural state is its subjective appearance. For that to be the case its nature would need to be apparent to us.

And it will not help to respond that neural states might be identical to their subjective appearances because the subjective appearances with which neural states are identical might have a nature that is not evident to us. If something *is* a property that it possesses and which is apparent to us — for instance, if a neural state is the way it feels in our experience of that state — then the nature of the property with which the thing is identical will be apparent or evident to us as well (for the thing and its property are one and the same, and, therefore, their natures, the properties composing them, must be the same also). Neither will it help the mind-brain identity theorist to reply that the microphysical properties of a neural state are apparent to us in our experience of a neural state albeit under

⁶In fact, it would be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of premise 2 to show only that neural states are not necessarily felt (see Kripke, 1980, pp. 152–154; Nagel, 1974), a view I sympathise with, since I sympathise with the stronger claim (namely that neural states are not felt at all) which entails the weaker one (namely that neural states are not necessarily felt). However, neither the stronger nor weaker claim on its own is likely to worry much the mind-brain identity theorists, since they are likely to argue that both claims express nothing more than certain modal intuitions, which might be in error. The argument I go on to give in the main text then seeks to show the truth of premise 2 in a way that does not appeal to such intuitions (although that argument is clearly consistent with, and, if successful, possibly explains and justifies commonly-held intuitions regarding the relationship between mind and brain).

a phenomenal mode of presentation. If the microphysical properties of a neural state are apparent to us, then it should be possible to know those properties just by attending to our experience of the neural state; otherwise it would not be the case that those properties are apparent (or evident) to us. But again, that information is not evident to us in our experience of a neural state (or any other physical state, for that matter) — for instance, the number of atoms that make up a neural state is not evident from our experience of a neural state — and for that reason the present reply will not succeed either.

The conclusion is an application of Leibniz's law. If conscious mental states but not neural states are comprised of how they feel or subjectively appear, then it follows that conscious mental states have different properties from neural states and, therefore, are not neural states. And the argument goes through even assuming a functionalist view of mind. This is because most functionalists claim that mental states are neural states that possess the right causal/functional properties. But that is not to say that mental states are not neural states; rather it is to say that the neural states with which mental states are identical qualify as mental states only if they possess the right functional properties. Thus most functionalists are committed to a mind–brain identity theory (for instance, the view that pain is C-fibres firing) and, therefore, open to the objection just outlined.⁷ We can state the objection to functionalism as follows:

1. Every phenomenally conscious mental state is the subjective appearance of that state
 2. No functional state (= neural state with causal/functional properties) is the subjective appearance of that state
- Conclusion: No functional state is a phenomenally conscious mental state

As the quotation at the beginning of the paper shows, Kripke draws also on the appearance-is-reality doctrine when arguing against mind–brain identity theory. However, it is clear that what is supposed to be doing most of the work in Kripke's argument is the modal intuition that the relation between mind and brain is contingent, hence not one of identity. The reason Kripke appeals to the lack of an appearance/reality distinction in the case of a mental state and its appearance

⁷Of course, functionalism does not require the relevant states to be physical (cp. Levin, 2009). What matters is the functional role played by those states and not the nature of the states themselves. Thus for the functionalist a non-physical state could qualify as a mental state if it has the right causal/functional properties. Now, there would be something odd about a type of functionalism that sought to identify the relevant states with something non-physical, as that would remove the motivation for adopting a functionalist view in the first place (which I take to be its pretension to describe mental states in a purely physical way). But setting that issue aside, it suffices to say that the sort of functionalism with which I am concerned is the sort that does consider the functional states in question to be physical, as I am concerned only to show why the appearance-is-reality doctrine entails that mind–brain identity theory is false.

is to ward-off an objection, which tries to explain away the modal intuition by appealing to the idea that that intuition is motivated by a failure to distinguish the appearance from the mental state itself — in much the same way the intuition that the relation between water and its microphysical properties is contingent is (arguably) based also on a failure to distinguish water from its appearance (the way it looks or feels). But if the relation between appearance and reality is one of identity, as Kripke thinks, then the element of contingency cannot be eliminated in this way, and, therefore, the inference from the modal intuition to the claim that mind-brain identity theory is false is not blocked.

My argument against mind–brain identity theory differs from Kripke’s argument since I do not appeal to modal intuitions. Modal intuitions are not mentioned in either premise and the considerations offered in support of those premises make no reference to modal intuitions. Indeed, it seems to me that both premises are true for a posteriori reasons. So on my view, once we accept the appearance-is-reality doctrine (on the grounds that its truth is evident to us from our experience of conscious mental states), we need only make the plausible (again empirically motivated) opposite claim about the nature of neural activity (namely that neural activity is *not* its appearance) to show that mind–brain identity theory is false. Now, it is not possible here to say whether the argument I give is more successful than Kripke’s argument or other arguments against mind–brain identity theory that rely on modal intuitions (see, for instance, Chalmers, 1996, 2003). Nevertheless, it might be pointed out that because my argument does not rely on modal intuitions then it cannot be objected that that argument is unstable because it derives substantive metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premises (see, for instance, Loar, 1990; Papineau, 2002), and in that respect at least, the argument I give seems to be in a dialectically stronger position than arguments that appeal to modal intuitions.

Epistemological Implications

In what follows, I spell out two epistemological implications of the appearance-is-reality doctrine. To begin with, let us recap something that was said above, namely that although the appearance-is-reality doctrine entails that conscious mental states are felt in their entirety — and that, therefore, their natures are laid bare for us — this is consistent with holding that we might describe them incorrectly when reflecting on them, and as a result have false beliefs regarding those mental states. The appearance-is-reality doctrine, then, does not entail that we have infallible knowledge of our mental states, and in that respect our epistemic position with respect to mental states seems no better-off than our epistemic position with respect to other things. And yet, that conscious mental states are their subjective appearances has at least one positive epistemological implication. Although that feature of a mental state does not entail that we

might never be mistaken about the mental state that feature does entail that if we describe the appearance correctly then necessarily we describe the reality correctly (for again the appearance is the reality). And in this respect our epistemic position with respect to mental states seems a lot better-off than our epistemic position with respect to other things; for unless we are idealists about the physical world we will hold that physical objects are distinct from the way they feel and that although the appearances of physical objects gives us grounds for thinking objects have certain properties (for instance, a table looking rectangular to us in our experience of the table gives us reason to think the table is rectangular), those appearances do not legitimize the logical inferences we are entitled to make in the case of conscious mental states and the way they feel (thus it might turn out the table is not rectangular).

In other words then, if the appearance-is-reality doctrine is true, whereas we can say that we are able to know with certainty that if something has a painful way of appearing (or, in other words, feels the way pain feels to us) then that thing *is* pain or that if something has a thought-like way of appearing (or, in other words, feels the way a thought feels to us) then that thing *is* a thought, we cannot say that we know with complete certainty that if something visually appears to us as water visually appears to us, then that thing must be water, or that if something feels the way heat feels to us then it must be heat (as the examples of “twin-water” and “twin-heat” attest). In the case of water and heat (and all other non-conscious phenomena) there exists forever an ontological gap between the object and the appearance and along with that there exists forever the possibility that the subjective appearance might not correspond to or be a true measure of the reality.

The second epistemological implication is that the lack of an appearance/reality distinction entails that attention to the phenomenology will be inescapable if we wish to understand the nature of conscious mental states. Our concepts of a mental state seem inadequate to that task because these can be mistaken or incomplete regarding how they represent the mental state. And neither, if the argument I spelt-out against mind-brain identity theory is successful, can empirical methods of inquiry that investigate the brain and its neural activity tell us much if anything about the nature of mental states (though they might tell us important things about the physical states or properties on which mental states depend in some way). Phenomenology as a method of enquiry into the nature of a mental state is inescapable because it is only by reflecting on how a mental state feels in our experience of the mental state that we are able to examine the nature of the mental state itself (and by so doing be in a position to vindicate or develop or reject outright a concept or belief about that mental state).

This gives rise to the question of whether the indispensability of phenomenology as a method of inquiry into the nature of our mental states is something that should concern us. Certainly it is likely some philosophers will think it should (see, for instance, Dennett, 1991; Schwitzgebel, 2008, 2011). This is because there

are a number of obstacles to describing the phenomenology, including but not limited to: difficulties in isolating mental states or attending to them properly (owing to such things as their short-lived and changeable natures); the concern that people's descriptions are vulnerable to bias or conceptual incompetence (Horgan, 2012); and the concern that some mental states might be ineffable or indescribable (see Chalmers, 2004b; Schwitzgebel, 2008, 2011).

These concerns succeed in showing that we need to proceed with care when seeking to understand our conscious mental states and to be mindful of the obstacles that can exist. And, crucially, we need to be aware of the fact that our descriptions (and especially those of our more complex or elusive or not so commonly had mental states) can be inadequate or incomplete and in need of revision. But phenomenology is a justified form of inquiry for all that (as well as being the only form of inquiry into the nature of mental states that we have available to us). Although there are a number of things that can interfere with our ability to describe the appearance of conscious mental states, it is difficult to see how these need always or even typically undermine this ability. To begin with, many conscious mental states are so familiar and pervasive in everyday waking-life or so obvious in their presentation that it seems unjustified to state that our descriptions of them are unreliable. Does anyone really think we have reason to doubt that pain manifests a feeling quality, or that a greenish visual-appearance presents differently from a reddish visual-appearance, or that an episode of anxiety feels different from an episode of sadness?

Furthermore, even in cases where it is difficult to describe the way a mental state subjectively appears there are a number of tools available to help facilitate sound phenomenological insights. For instance, if we are having difficulty in describing the subjective appearance owing to theoretical bias or an inability to isolate a mental state, then discussion with others can go some way to overcome such obstacles. X says an episodic fear of an object presents as a feeling that is directed at an object. Y questions this, stating she thinks an episodic fear of an object manifests as a non-intentional feeling *along with* a thought directed at an object. Y is raising the possibility that X has failed to notice that the mental state in question is compound, comprising a non-intentional feeling *and* a thought. This disagreement can prompt both to revisit the subjective appearance and evaluate which of the two descriptions is more faithful to the phenomenology. I wish not to adjudicate between X and Y here (but for my way of treating such mental states, see Whiting, 2011, 2012), but indicate only how discussion with others can help us to attain better phenomenological insights. Or if the reason why we cannot describe the phenomenology is owing to our limited powers of description, then there are various linguistic tools and methods (such as the use of metaphor) that can go some way to overcome that problem, not to mention non-linguistic forms of representation, such as painting and music. Of course it might be the case that philosophers are not always the most skilful at providing the words or

forms of pictorial representation that best describe the phenomenology of our more ineffable human experiences, but then I take it no one thought the task of describing complex human experience is one for philosophy alone anyway.

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