

Bealer to Kripke, On Mental Properties

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Bealer's argument against Kripke is presented. We then show how Kripke could counteract it. Our idea that the identity materialist may have the possibility of explaining why type psychophysical identities only appear to be contingent (but are necessary), because we confuse the exemplified properties (one property) with the concepts that subsume them (two distinct concepts), is supported by McGinn's and Nagel's materialistic intuitions. It remains to be seen whether a critique of Kripke like that of Bealer runs counter to the exemplified properties and the concepts that subsume them. We argue that Bealer's criticism of Kripke does not contradict it. McGinn's and Nagel's intuitions support our idea. What we want to show is that, even if, from the anti-materialist side of the debate about the mind-body identity thesis, Bealer and Kripke agree on the general anti-materialist strategy but not on the strategies of phenomenological explanation (which for Bealer, Kripke neglects) and descriptivist explanation (which for Bealer is wrong), the disagreement between Bealer and Kripke still leaves open the materialist explanation of one property and two concepts. If there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, it is quite possible that these type psychophysical identities are indeed necessary.

Keywords: body, descriptivism, essentialism, mind

Let us examine Kripke's argument discussed by Bealer and a possible reply from Kripke to Bealer. Bealer's argument against Kripke is summarised as follows. There are two anti-materialist strategies available to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions and to explain the illusion of contingency in the case of theoretical identities (which differs from the case of psychophysical identities, in which an

Acknowledgements. *In memoriam*, Armando Amado, Pedro Monteiro. Thanks to some neighbours and my neighbourhood administration, they know why. My mother, Maria Dulce. My aunt, Maria Ivone. Joaquim Teixeira, Susana Lourenço, Gonçalo Miguel, Adriana Gomes, and Neuza Gonçalves. The anonymous reviewer. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vitor Pereira, Universidade de Lisboa, Alameda da Universidade, 1600–214 Lisboa, Portugal. Email: vpereira1@campus.ul.pt

analogous explanation is not available): the phenomenological and the descriptivist. The phenomenological strategy, Bealer argues, is the only one adequate to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions and comes to save Kripke's anti-materialist argument, as it makes reasonable the mismatch between the mental case and the physical case. However, Kripke neglects the phenomenological strategy. Kripke is based on the descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions. However, Kripke's descriptive strategy, Bealer argues, is wrong; it's out of place. With this strategy, Kripke proposes that when we make use of a proper name in ordinary conversation, we have in mind something descriptive. However, of all persons, Kripke is the one who should not make such proposals. Thus, according to Bealer, Kripke's argument against type identity materialism (ahead referred to as "K") needs to be reformulated (ahead referred to as "RK").

The argument K (of Kripke) is against materialism, just as the argument RK (of Bealer) is against materialism. What Bealer says is that the K (Kripke) argument is not a good argument to show that, in the case of type psychophysical identities, there is no explanation for the illusion of contingency. What Bealer proposes is a better argument.

Both Kripke and Bealer argue that there is no way to explain the illusion of contingency in the case of pain. The disagreement between them is that the phenomenological strategy is different from the descriptive strategy, and, for Bealer, Kripke confuses the two. Kripke could claim that the K argument does not need to be reformulated. In any case, the argument K (of Kripke) is against materialism, just as the argument RK (of Bealer) is against materialism.

The Two Anti-Materialist Strategies

Kripke uses the following two strategies to defend essentialism, to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions such as that water might not have been H_2O , and to explain the illusion of contingency in the case of theoretical identities such as "water = H_2O ." The first is based on the idea of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation. This strategy, the phenomenological, consists of the following. Consider a community of competent language users in an epistemic situation that is qualitatively identical to ours (whose total state of knowledge and information is indiscernible from ours). They use the same words as we do, but their words differ semantically from ours: their words are the same as ours, but they differ in the fact that the extension of our words is not in some cases the same as the extension of their words. The term "water," as used by them, refers to something other than water; the term "hydrogen," as used by them, refers to something other than hydrogen.

Notwithstanding the fact that the term "water" as used by them can refer to something other than water and the term "hydrogen" as used by them can refer to something other than hydrogen, it doesn't follow that water is not H_2O or

that hydrogen does not have the molecular structure that it actually has. Could “water” not designate H_2O ? Yes, because the question is about the term “water” and not about water. Could water not be H_2O ? No, because the question is about water and not about the term by which we designate it, “water” or another term. Competent users of language, in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation with the same kind of epistemic relationship with a colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes, etc., may use the term “water” to refer to XYZ, but it does not follow that water is not H_2O . It follows that it seems that water might not have been H_2O , but it does not follow that water is not H_2O . An identity such as “water = H_2O ” seems contingent because it is possible for a liquid designated by “water” and indiscernible from water not to be H_2O : the epistemic access to that liquid by competent users of the term is qualitatively identical to our epistemic access to water, but because this liquid is phenomenologically indiscernible from water, it does not follow that water is not H_2O .

Kripke, in using the phenomenological strategy, argues that the property of being H_2O is an essential property of water. While water has other properties, such as the contingent properties of being a colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes, etc., the properties discovered by science are trivially essential properties of water. Scientific research has not discovered the essence of water. The passage to the idea of essence depends on the fact that in any possible world, anything that is not H_2O , even if superficially similar, does not count as the same substance, unlike what happens with something that is H_2O . This distinction brings us to a broader classification of necessary truths: logical, physical, and metaphysical. Logical truths include statements like “If Socrates is Greek, he is Greek.” Physical truths, on the other hand, encompass statements such as “No object can exceed the speed of light.” Finally, within the realm of metaphysical truths, we find assertions like “Water is H_2O .” As Hill writes, “As I see it, there is a fairly strong tendency to fail to appreciate the metaphysical implications in question — a tendency that can only be fully eradicated by considering the Marcus/Kripke argument for the necessity of identity. This is why twentieth century philosophers have sometimes experienced intuitions to the effect that heat is separable from molecular motion” (1997, p. 84, note 14). Kripke uses the phenomenological strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, for example, that water might not have been H_2O , and to explain the illusion of contingency of theoretical identities such as “water = H_2O .”

An example that Kripke gives is the following. When someone says, inaccurately, that it could have resulted that heat is not average molecular motion, what is true is that one could feel a phenomenon in the same way as we feel heat, that is, one could feel a phenomenon through the production of the sensation we call “the sensation of heat,” and yet this phenomenon is not average molecular motion. In addition, when someone inaccurately says that heat might not have been the average molecular motion, it means that it could have happened that the planet was

inhabited by creatures that do not feel heat in the presence of the average molecular motion, although they feel warmth in the presence of something else. Such creatures could be, in some qualitative sense, in the same epistemic situation as ourselves and could use a rigid designator for the phenomenon that causes them the sensation of heat (this designator might even be “heat”), but the phenomenon in question would not be the average molecular motion (and therefore not being heat), being only the phenomenon that causes them the sensation of heat.

However, as Kripke explains, there is a contrast between heat and pain: “The trouble is that the notion of an epistemic situation qualitatively identical to one in which the observer had a sensation *S* simply *is* one in which the observer had that sensation. The same point can be made in terms of the notion of what picks out the reference of a rigid designator. In the case of the identity of heat with molecular motion the important consideration was that although ‘heat’ is a rigid designator, the reference of that designator was determined by an accidental property of the referent, namely the property of producing in us the sensation *S*. It is thus possible that a phenomenon should have been rigidly designated in the same way as a phenomenon of heat, with its reference also picked out by means of sensation *S*, without that phenomenon being heat and therefore without its being molecular motion. Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly designated by ‘pain’ but the reference of the designator is determined by an essential property of the referent” (1980, pp. 152–153).

The second Kripkean strategy is the descriptive strategy. It includes the following. Let *R1* and *R2* be co-referential rigid designators of a certain object, and *D1* and *D2* be descriptions that fix the reference, respectively, of *R1* and *R2*. So, even though the identity “*R1* = *R2*” is necessary, the identity “*D1* = *D2*” can be contingent (it is enough that the descriptions are not rigid). And this is to confuse “*R1* = *R2*” with “*D1* = *D2*,” which leads to the erroneous view that *R1* = *R2* may not be necessary.

R1 is, for example, the term “water.” *R2* is, for example, the term “ H_2O .” *D1* is, for example, the defined description “the colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes.” *D2* is, for example, the defined description “the liquid observed under the microscope, which at this moment is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid.” Thus, “water = H_2O ” is a necessary truth, but it does not appear to be so because it is confused with the contingent truth “the colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes = the liquid observed under the microscope, which at this moment is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid.” This is Kripke’s descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions.

The reference to the rigid designator “water” is fixed by the defined description “the colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes,” but properties such as being a colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes

are contingent properties of water. On the other hand, the reference to the rigid designator "H₂O" is fixed by the defined description "the liquid observed under the microscope, which at this moment is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid," but properties such as being a liquid observed under the microscope, which at this moment is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid, are contingent properties of H₂O because it is contingent that this liquid, now observed but not at another time, produces that sensation in me.

Although an identity as "water = H₂O," if true, is necessary, an identity formulated in terms of the defined description that mentions contingent properties of water as "the colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes" and of the defined description that mentions contingent properties of water as "the liquid observed under the microscope, which at this moment is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid" is contingently true. And this is to confuse the two identities, which leads to the erroneous view that "water = H₂O" may not be necessary.

Another example that Kripke gives is the following. In spite of an identity as "Hesperus = Phosphorus," if true, it is necessary, but the associated identity "the celestial body that appears to the West when the Sun sets = the celestial body that appears to the East when the Sun rises" is only contingently true. The reference to the rigid designator "Hesperus" is fixed by the definite description "the celestial body that appears to the West when the Sun sets," but properties such as being a celestial body that appears to the West when the Sun sets are contingent properties of Venus. On the other hand, the reference to the rigid designator "Phosphorus" is fixed by the definite description "the celestial body that appears to the East when the Sun rises," but properties such as being a celestial body that appears to the East when the Sun rises are contingent properties of Venus. In spite of the identity "Hesperus = Phosphorus," if true, is necessary, an identity formulated in terms of the definite description that mentions contingent properties of Venus as "the celestial body that appears to the West when the Sun sets" and of the defined description that mentions contingent properties of Venus as "the celestial body that appears to the East when the Sun rises" is contingent. And this is to confuse the two identities, which leads to the erroneous view that "Hesperus = Phosphorus" may not be necessary.

Bealer is generally in accordance with Kripke's anti-materialist strategy, but in particular, Bealer makes three criticisms.

1. The phenomenological strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions is neglected by Kripke and is adequate.

2. Kripke is based on the descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, but this strategy is wrong and misplaced.

3. With the descriptive strategy, Kripke proposes that when we make use of a proper name in an ordinary conversation, we have in mind something descriptive, but for Bealer, of all persons, Kripke is that person who should not make such proposals.

Bealer's goal is to strengthen Kripke's modal argument against type identity materialism. Our aim in what follows is to show how Bealer succeeds.

Having presented the anti-materialist strategies in the way we have just done, we begin by presenting Bealer's formulation of Kripke's argument against type identity materialism, showing Bealer's reasons for favouring the phenomenological strategy (the satisfiability of two conditions required by any anti-materialist strategy) neglected by Kripke (according to Bealer), and we turn to the errors of the descriptive strategy on which Kripke is based (according to Bealer). Finally, we conclude the present work by examining a possible Kripke reply to each of those three Bealer's critiques.

According to Bealer (1994, pp. 185–186), Kripke's (K) modal argument against type identity materialism is the following:¹

1. If the property of being a pain = the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers, then it is necessary that for every x , x feels pain if and only if x has the stimulated C-fibers.

2. It is possible for a creature to feel pain without the corresponding stimulation of the C-fibers (and vice versa).

3. So, the property of being a pain \neq the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers.

The two conditions that an explanatory strategy must satisfy in order to break the impasse between seemingly conflicting pro- and anti-essentialism intuitions and dispel anti-essentialist intuitions (for example, that water might not have been H₂O and, by analogy with the psychophysical identities, that pain might not have been stimulation of the C-fibers) are, according to Bealer, the following:

(C1) essentialist intuitions must retain (= cannot lose) their original strength;

(C2) anti-essentialist intuitions must lose (= cannot retain) their original strength.

Kripke's phenomenological strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, for example, that water might not have been H₂O, depends on how the contingent properties of water appear to us, and Kripke's descriptive strategy for dispelling anti-essentialist intuitions depends on how these contingent properties of water are described by us.

Kripke uses either the phenomenological strategy or the descriptive strategy to defend premise 2 of the K argument and argues against type identity materialism:

¹ What we offer here is not the exact terms in which Bealer formulates it. Kripke applies the results of the two previous lectures on *Naming and Necessity*, in particular the idea that there are *a posteriori* necessary truths, to the debate of the thesis of mind–body identity from pages 134 to 155. This debate is characterised, at least at the time of Kripke's lectures in the 1970s, by identities such as “pain is the stimulation of C-fibers” (p. 144). As we expected (or so we hope) the reader to recognise, the discussion of Kripke's and Bealer's arguments is independent of the terms that mind–body identity theorists may use. The reader may choose the term that is more comfortable for him, for example, “an oscillation in the cortical thalamus or a firing of such and such neurons.” The condition is that their use refers to a physical state.

for example, the possibility that water is not H_2O is only apparent, but the possibility that pain is not stimulation of the C-fibers (and vice versa) is not only apparent. Conflicting intuitions about water can be solved by saying that water is in fact H_2O , but it does not appear to be; but conflicting intuitions about pain cannot be resolved by saying that pain is the stimulation of the C-fibers, but it does not appear to be.

For Bealer, according to Kripke's phenomenological strategy, the way to weaken the intuition expressed by [It could have turned out that A] (ahead referred to as "I1"), when [it is necessary that A] is True, it is to show that this statement can be rephrased as "it is possible that a community of competent users of language, in an epistemic situation that is qualitatively identical to ours, expresses a truth asserting [A] with the normally intended literal sense" (ahead referred to as "I2").

For example, the difference between the use of quotes "" and the use of para-quotes $\ulcorner \urcorner$ can be illustrated by the difference between making a quotation and specifying the general form of all English phrases consisting, for example, in belief attributions. In the latter case, the specification is made through the phrasic scheme $\ulcorner s$ believes that $p \urcorner$ where s is a schematic letter replaceable by an English designator of a person or organism and where p is a schematic letter replaceable by an English phrase.

The anti-essentialist intuition expressed by (I1) is, for example, "Could it have turned out that water $\neq H_2O$ " and, by analogy with the psychophysical identities of types, for example, "Could it have turned out that pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers." According to the phenomenological strategy, the statement "Could it have turned out that water $\neq H_2O$ " can be rephrased as "It is possible that a community of competent language users, in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, expresses a truth asserting 'Water is not H_2O ' with the normally intended literal sense."

From the materialist point of view, by analogy, the statement "Could it have resulted that pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers" can be rephrased, according to the phenomenological strategy, as "It is possible that a community of competent users of language, in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, expresses a truth asserting 'Pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers' with the normally intended literal sense."

What is necessary but seems contingent in case I2 is that water is H_2O , and, from the materialist point of view, by analogy with psychophysical type identities, what is necessary but seems contingent is that pain is the stimulation of the C-fibers. If the analogy between Kripkean intuitions and materialistic intuitions runs in the manner just described, then, as it is counter-intuitive to say, for example, that XYZ is water, it should be counter-intuitive to say, for example, that a case of Z-fiber stimulation is a pain. But it is not counter-intuitive to say that, for example, Z-fiber stimulation is a pain. Therefore, there is no analogy between the case of water and the case of pain, as well as between Kripkean intuitions and materialistic intuitions.

In an epistemic situation that is qualitatively identical to ours, is it possible to use “pain” so that “pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers” expresses a truth: for example, in a Twin Earth (Putnam, 1973) where there is no pain but a different phenomenological property, and in which the word “pain” refers to that property. Thus, Bealer argues, the phenomenological strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions satisfies conditions C1 and C2.

The materialist cannot use Kripke’s phenomenological strategy to explain the illusion of contingency: a qualitatively identical epistemic situation in which it is possible to use “pain” so that “pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers” expresses a truth, it is a situation in which there is no pain but a different phenomenological property. However, this sensation must be indistinguishable from pain. But what seems to be a pain is a pain; there are no indiscernible sensations of pain other than pains. Hence the disanalogy. There can be no state with the phenomenology of pain other than pain: the phenomenology of pain is essential to pain.

However, Kripke, according to Bealer, neglects the phenomenological strategy to defend premise 2 of the K argument and argues against type identity materialism based on the descriptivist strategy. However, for Bealer, Kripke’s descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions is wrong and out of place (as we shall see below).

The Errors of the Descriptive Strategy

Let us then examine Kripke’s descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, what Bealer says about Kripke’s descriptive strategy, why, for Bealer, Kripke’s descriptive strategy is wrong and out of place, and why, for Bealer, with this strategy, what Kripke proposes, as we use a proper name in an ordinary conversation, is that we have in mind something descriptive.

Kripke’s descriptive strategy is wrong and out of place in describing mental states and physical states because, according to Bealer, the materialist can invoke the descriptivist strategy in defence of type psychophysical identities, dissipating anti-essentialist intuitions such as that a pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers.

The descriptivist strategy is wrong in describing mental states because, according to Bealer, Kripke invokes essential properties of mental states but should invoke contingent properties of mental states; for example, descriptions such as “the feeling to which I am more adverse” or “the sensation by which I spontaneously harbour greater hatred” could both designate pain or nausea.

The descriptivist strategy is wrong in describing physical states because, according to Bealer, Kripke invokes essential properties of physical states but should invoke contingent properties of physical states; for example, any set of nerve cells in a possible world different from the actual world may appear to have the same configuration as C-fiber stimulations have in this world, or there

may be indications of stimulation when in reality the C-fibers are not being stimulated.

The first error concerns the description of the mental state. Consider the alleged identity “pain = stimulation of the C-fibers.” If the description of pain that the type identity theorist needs to argue in favour of the psychophysical identity of types is a description of the contingent properties of pain, Kripke cannot argue by invoking essential properties of pain, such as being a sensation of pain.

Type psychophysical identities are, for the type identity theorist, analogous to the theoretical identities of physics and chemistry, such as “water = H₂O.” If the erroneous confusion of essential properties of water with contingent properties explains why these identities, although necessary (if true), seem contingent, then to the type identity theorist, an alleged misunderstanding of essential pain properties with contingent properties would also explain why these identities are only apparently contingent.

Descriptions such as “the sensation to which I am most adverse” or “the sensation by which I spontaneously harbour the greatest hatred” — accept Kripke’s conditions to adequately respond to Cartesian intuitions and, for argumentation purposes, accept the analogy advocated by the type identity theorist with identities such as “water = H₂O” — could have been used by Kripke as non-rigid descriptions of pain, as both can designate pain or nausea.

However, Kripke invokes only essential properties of pain — such as being a sensation of pain — when he argues that if in scientific identities (for example, heat is molecular motion) there is a gap between the external phenomenon and the observer (for example, the sensation of heat); in the type psychophysical identities there is no gap between the external phenomenon and the observer because the external phenomenon is the inner phenomenon itself — the sensation of heat. Or when Kripke argues that if the external phenomenon is the sensation itself, then sensation cannot mediate between the thing that has physical properties, such as the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers (an oscillation in the cortical thalamus or a firing of such and such neurons), and the thing that has mental properties, such as the property of being a pain.

According to Bealer, given the descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, Kripke should have used descriptions of the contingent properties of pain. Kripke’s argument demands them but does not exclude them. If the materialist uses non-rigid descriptions of pain (for now, leaving aside descriptions of the contingent properties of C-fiber stimulation for the purpose of distinguishing the error in describing the mental state from the error in describing the physical state), mental and certain identical physical types are necessary, but it is possible to explain why they appear contingent.

The materialist can defend the psychophysical identity of types as follows. If the reference to rigid designators as “pain” is fixed by contingent properties of pain, then, according to the type identity theorist, an identity such as “water = H₂O”

seems contingent because it is mistaken for an identity as “the colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes = H_2O ” and the identity “pain = stimulation of the C-fibers” seems contingent because it is mistaken for an identity as (for example) “the sensation to which I am most adverse = stimulation of the C-fibers.”

Barnes (2002) argues against an alleged explanation of the illusion of contingency of psychophysical type identities. This explanation would develop as follows. Levine (1998, p. 457) distinguishes attributive presentation modes from non-attributive ones. A mode of presentation is the medium through which a representation attaches itself to its referent. We can say that if the fixers of the reference are non-contingent, the mode of presentation is attributive, and if they are contingent, the mode of presentation is non-attributive. Suppose that the reference to the term “pain” is fixed by the defined description “the sensation to which I am most adverse,” the property thus described is a contingent property of pain. Levine, according to Barnes (2002, pp. 335–336), would then argue that the non-attributivity of our representations of pain does not imply the possibility of pain without the stimulation of the C-fibers (and vice versa) and that it is this non-attributivity that accounts for the apparent conceivability of pain without stimulation of the C-fibers (and vice versa). If it were there, this would be an explanation for the illusion of contingency of psychophysical type identities (as we see in the text), but it cannot be (as we will see in particular in the next section, an informal discussion of criticism from Bealer to Kripke). Levine, in the essay to which Barnes refers, cannot be arguing that there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency of psychophysical type identities since Levine argues against identitativist materialism.

Contrary to what Kripke advocates, according to the descriptivist strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions (which, in the case of identities such as “water = H_2O ,” explains the illusion of contingency by the contingent properties of water to be mistaken for essential properties of water), and by analogy with the explanation for the illusion of contingency of theoretical identities, an explanation is available for the illusion of contingency of identities between mental and physical types.

If Kripke says that an explanation for the illusion of contingency of the identities between mental and physical types is not available, it is because he uses rigid descriptions of pain (such as “this sensation of pain”) rather than non-rigid descriptions of pain (such as “the sensation to which I am most adverse”). However, Bealer argues, this use of rigid descriptions of pain is nothing more than an expedient, a trick, or a magic spell. For Kripke, the anti-essentialist intuitions to be dispelled by the descriptive strategy are, for example, that a pain might not have been a pain; but for the type identitativist materialist, the anti-essentialist intuitions to be dispelled by the descriptive strategy are that a pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers. Why should Kripke’s intuitions be

the correct anti-essentialist intuitions? The materialist can also declare that his anti-essentialist intuitions are the correct anti-essentialist intuitions and turn against Kripke's own descriptive strategy. There is, as Bealer argues, a stalemate. Let's say something else about this impasse a little further on. Now let's go to the second mistake.

The second error (Boyd, 1980, p. 84) concerns the description of the physical state. According to the descriptivist strategy in the hands of the materialist, identities such as "pain = stimulation of the C-fibers," if true, are necessary, but they seem contingent because if we use descriptions of contingent properties of C-fiber stimulation, we can defend the identity between mental and physical types and still accommodate the anti-essentialist intuition that apparently pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers.

Suppose we use descriptions of contingent properties of C-fiber stimulation, such as the idea that any set of nerve cells in a possible world different from the actual world may appear to have the same configuration as C-fiber stimulations have in this world, or there may be indications of stimulation when in reality the C-fibers are not being stimulated. From the materialist point of view, it seems that pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers, but in reality, pain is the stimulation of the C-fibers and it is not the configuration of the set of nerve cells that, in this possible world different from the actual world, appears to have the same configuration as the C-fiber stimuli have in the actual world. It seems that pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers, but in reality the pain is the stimulation of the C-fibers, as there may be indications of stimulation when in reality the C-fibers are not being stimulated.

Kripke, according to Bealer, only considers the designator R1, that is, "pain" (and its description D1). However, Kripke could rather consider R2, that is, "stimulation of the C-fibers" (and the respective description D2). Or Kripke could consider both. However, Kripke does not consider R2. Instead of a description D1 that contingently fixes the R1 reference, Kripke could have used a description D2 that contingently fixes the R2 reference.

A rigid description of C-fiber stimulation is, for example, "the configuration of the brain cells whose presence at a given moment constitutes the presence of C-fiber stimulation at that time." This configuration of brain cells is an essential property of C-fiber stimulation because, in the absence of this configuration of brain cells, C-fibers would not be stimulated.

A non-rigid description of C-fiber stimulation is, for example, "the phenomenon shown by positron emission tomography, which at this time is associated with the sensation of pain." Here we have a contingent property of the stimulation of the C-fibers; it is contingent that the phenomenon shown in this way is at present associated with the sensation of pain.

If the materialist uses non-rigid C-fiber stimulation descriptions (given the distinction between the error in describing the mental state and the error in

describing the physical state, we can now consider non-rigid descriptions of pain and non-rigid descriptions of C-fiber stimulation), it is explained why mental type identities with certain physical types are necessary, but they seem contingent.

The materialist can defend the psychophysical identity of types as follows. If the reference to rigid designators such as “pain” and “stimulation of the C-fibers” is fixed by contingent properties of pain and stimulation of the C-fibers, it then follows, according to the type identity theorist, such as “water = H₂O” seems contingent because it is mistaken for an identity as “the colorless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes = the liquid observed under the microscope which at this moment it is associated with my sensation of aqueous liquid,” the identity “pain = stimulation of the C-fibers” seems contingent because it is mistaken for an identity as “the sensation to which I am most adverse = the phenomenon shown by a positron emission tomography which at present is associated with the sensation of pain.”

The assumption that a designator such as “C-fiber stimulation” is rigid is, according to Kripke, risky. However, for argumentation purposes, let’s suppose that a designator such as “C-fiber stimulation” is rigid (Kripke, 1980, p. 149). If Kripke says that an explanation for the illusion of contingency of identities between mental and physical types is not available, it is because the use of descriptions of essential properties of C-fiber stimulation rather than descriptions of contingent properties of C-fiber stimulation (such as the use of descriptions of the essential properties of pain rather than descriptions of the contingent properties of pain), according to Bealer, is nothing more than an expedient, a trick, or a magic spell. The impasse is complete. The descriptivist strategy dissipates, for Kripke, anti-essentialist intuitions different from those that, for the materialist, this same descriptivist strategy dissipates. Having analysed the two errors of the descriptivist strategy and the possibility of the materialist invoking it in defence of the psychophysical identities of types, we want to say something more about the impasse to which this strategy leads us.

Kripke argues that the property of being a pain is an essential property of pain and, to undermine the materialistic analogy with identities such as “water = H₂O,” argues that the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers is not an essential property of pain: a pain could not stop being a pain, but a pain might not be a C-fiber stimulation. However, the materialist argues that the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers is an essential property of pain: a pain could not stop being a stimulation of the C-fibers.

Kripke is an essentialist about pain and argues, on the other hand, that pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers; but, in the sense that for the type identity materialist, the propriety of being a C-fiber stimulation is an essential property of every pain, the type identity materialist is equally essentialist in regard to pain. The materialist may argue that, since, from his point of view, mental properties are identical with physical properties (for example, “pain = C-fiber stimulation”),

the anti-essentialist intuition that pain might not have been stimulation of the C-fibers can be dissipated in the same way as the anti-essentialist intuition that the pain might not have been pain. How? We have already seen it through the descriptive strategy. The use of this strategy does not discriminate between the correct anti-essentialist intuitions, whether they are those of the materialist or those of Kripke.

Kripke, as it were, according to Bealer, simply states that the correct intuitions are his own intuitions: an anti-essentialist intuition is, for example, that a pain might not have been a pain, and an essentialist intuition is, for example, that a pain is a pain and could not be anything else; but the materialist can simply answer that the correct intuitions are his own intuitions: an anti-essentialist intuition is, for example, that a pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers and an essentialist intuition is, for example, that a pain is a stimulation of the C-fibers and could not be anything else. The impasse is complete, and it is not Kripke's descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions that breaks it down.

The impasse, for example, between anti-essentialist intuitions such as that water might not have been H₂O and, from the materialistic point of view, by analogy with psychophysical type identities such as pain might not have been stimulation of C-fibers, is accentuated by the materialist's use of Kripke's descriptive strategy to dispel the materialist intuition that a pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers, and to defend the identity "pain = stimulation of the C-fibers." What Bealer argues is that Kripke should consider materialist anti-essentialist intuitions (such as "possibly, pain ≠ stimulation of the C-fibers") rather than anti-essentialist intuitions such as that a pain might not have been a pain. If Kripke considers anti-essentialist intuitions such as that a pain might not have been a pain instead of considering materialistic anti-essentialist intuitions (such as "possibly, pain ≠ stimulation of the C-fibers"), then, Bealer argues, it is not surprising that the materialist can invoke the descriptivist strategy in defense of the psychophysical identity of types dissipating anti-essentialist intuitions such as that a pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers. And it is for this reason that, for Bealer, Kripke's descriptive strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions is out of place, and K's argument needs to be reformulated.

Without considering the phenomenological strategy, we rely solely on Kripke's descriptive strategy. It aims to address anti-essentialist intuitions and explain why theoretical identities seem contingent but are, in fact, necessary. Yet Bealer disagrees, deeming Kripke's descriptive strategy wrong and misplaced.

If Kripke, in arguing against type-type identititative materialism, bases the defence of premise 2 on the K argument in descriptive strategy, and this is wrong and misplaced, then, Bealer argues, the K argument needs to be reformulated. In arguing against type-type identititative materialism, Kripke bases his defence of premise 2 on the K argument in descriptive strategy, and with this, what Kripke proposes is that when we make use of a proper name in ordinary conversation, we have in mind

something descriptive. However, for Bealer, of all persons, Kripke is the one who should not make such proposals. Therefore, argument K needs to be reformulated.

The phenomenological strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, Bealer argues, satisfies the following two conditions: (C1) essentialist intuitions must retain (= cannot lose) their original strength; (C2) anti-essentialist intuitions must lose (= cannot retain) their original strength. However, Kripke neglects this strategy by retaining only the descriptive strategy. Nevertheless, the descriptivist strategy, Bealer argues, does not satisfy condition C2, for it can be used in a way that Kripkean anti-essentialist intuitions, such as that a pain might not have been a pain, retain their original force, and Kripkean essentialist intuitions, such as that a pain is a pain and could not be anything else, lose their original strength. Therefore, the K argument needs to be reformulated.

The idea is that Kripke's phenomenological strategy is the adequate strategy to dispel anti-essentialist intuitions, and this phenomenological strategy suffices to save Kripke's anti-materialist argument because there is a disanalogy between the mental (pain) case and the physical case. Kripke's strategy is the proper strategy because the materialist cannot in this case explain the illusion of contingency: an epistemic situation that is qualitatively identical to ours and in which it is possible to use the term "pain" so that the statement "pain \neq C-fiber stimulation" expresses a truth; it is a situation in which there is no pain, but a different phenomenological property.

However, Kripke's argument (K) is not adequate because, despite refuting the idea that pain is the stimulation of the C-fibers, it does not refute the idea that pain is a disjunctive property of physical states, for example, the disjunctive property of being or the stimulation of the C-fibers or the stimulation of Ct-fibers (which, unlike C-fibers, are not composed of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon but of X, Y, Z, and W) or a certain silicone state.

Crucial to Bealer's argument is the distinction between the rigidity of a term and the semantic stability of that term. Let's introduce it right away. If we consider a word as used by other people in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, semantic stability is held at the same reference. For example, the word "pain" is semantically stable and rigid, but the word "water" is semantically unstable and rigid. In my mouth, "water" always refers to H₂O, but this is compatible with semantic instability: with the fact that a community of competent language users, in a similar epistemic situation, with the same kind of epistemic relation with a colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which one bathes, etc., use the word "water" to refer to XYZ, not to refer to water. Thus, rigidity is not sufficient for semantic stability. The Kripke (K) argument is weak because the term "C-fiber stimulation" is semantically unstable (the term "pain," on the contrary, for Kripke, is semantically stable).

However, if we substitute in the Kripke (K) argument the term "stimulation of the C-fibers" by the term "parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional

parts connected in a certain way,” which denotes a functional property and is semantically stable, then the conclusion of the Kripke (K) argument is that pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers. The property of having a pain is different from the functional property denoted by “having parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way.” And if pain is not this functional property, pain is not any physical realizer of that property. However, the stimulation of the C-fibers is a physical realizer of this functional property. Therefore, by *modus tollens*, pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers.

The argument RK is the reformulated Kripke (K) argument (though in terms different from Bealer’s) and, according to the considerations just made, runs as follows.

1. If the property of being a pain = the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers, then it is necessary that for every x , x feels pain if and only if x has the C-fibers stimulated.

2. Necessarily, for every x , if x has the C-fibers stimulated, then x has parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way.

3. It is possible that a creature feels pain but has no parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way (and vice versa).

4. So, the property of having a pain \neq the functional property denoted by “having parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way.”

5. So, the property of being a pain \neq the property of being a stimulation of the C-fibers.

Premise 1 of the RK argument is the materialist thesis, so the materialists accept it. Premise 2 of the RK argument — necessarily, for every x , if x has the C-fibers stimulated, then x has parts with 74 million (Bealer, 1994, p. 201: “74,985,263”) or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way — is a concession to the materialist and is itself a materialistic premise.

The term “parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way” is a completely arbitrary term; it is a way of speaking in concatenation, in a connection of things. If the stimulation of the C-fibers is to have parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way, it is from a materialistic point of view. The materialist cannot fail to agree that the semantically unstable term “stimulation of the C-fibers” is semantically stabilised by the term “parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way.” The materialist cannot fail to accept premise 2.

However, if the materialist accepts premise 2 of the RK argument and if terms like “pain” and “parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way” are all understood in the same way, even by a community of competent language users in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation to ours (whose total state of knowledge and information

is indiscernible from ours), then the materialist has no way of reformulating materialistic anti-essentialist intuitions such as that “possibly, pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers.”

Once a term has been semantically stabilised, such as “stimulation of the C-fibers,” there is no recasting strategy. The materialist is bound to recognise that, according to the phenomenological strategy, the statement “Could it have resulted that pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers” cannot be rephrased as “It is possible that a community of competent users of language, in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, expresses a truth asserting ‘Pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers’ with the normally intended literal sense.”

The materialist is obliged to recognise that, in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, it is impossible to use “pain” so that “pain \neq stimulation of the C-fibers” expresses a truth. The materialist no longer can reject premise 3 of the RK argument. For the materialist, too, it is possible that a creature can feel pain without 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way (and vice versa). The materialist will have to accept everything, premises 1–3, and then will have to accept the conclusion, will have to accept that the property of being a pain \neq the functional property denoted by “parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way.”

Informal Discussion of Criticism from Bealer to Kripke

The idea is to argue against Kripke’s general strategy, with which Bealer agrees, as follows: if there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency in the case of pain — that it is to confuse the exemplified properties (one) with subsumed concepts (two distinct concepts) — it is quite possible that type psychophysical identities are necessary.

In this regard, it is useful to make a synopsis of the discussion of Kripke’s and Bealer’s argument against the identity of mental types with physical types. Following are some exegetical considerations from Hughes (2004). They are as exegetical as some of Bealer’s are (for example, in Bealer’s critique of Kripke, Kripke neglects the phenomenological strategy). Hughes and Bealer disagree: for the first of these, Kripke’s argument is not weak, but for the second, Kripke’s argument is weak. Exegesis is not, again, conclusive.

If the materialist of type identities is right, the theoretical identities of physics and chemistry are analogous to the type psychophysical identities. For example, consider the identity “pain = stimulation of the C-fibers.” This is supposed to be analogous to the identity “water = H₂O.” However, Kripke argues that there is no analogy: an explanation is available for the illusion of contingency of identities such as “water = H₂O” but unavailable for the illusion of contingency of alleged identities such as “pain = stimulation of the C-fibers.”

The phenomenological strategy and the descriptive strategy are, for Kripke, the two ways of explaining this illusion. They are available in the first case (theoretical identities) but not in the latter case (type psychophysical identities).

We start with the phenomenological strategy, and then we go on to summarise what we have said about the descriptive strategy. On the phenomenological strategy, we have said that it allows itself to be characterised by the notion of a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, for example, the one we have in relation to water being H_2O , but in which the confusion of water phenomenology (which is not essential) with water's essential properties explains that identities such as this only seem contingent, though they are necessary. This would have to be the case, by analogy, in relation to alleged identities such as "pain = stimulation of the C-fibers"; but it is not, because the phenomenology of pain is its essential property.

However, we can accept, so to speak, the essentiality of phenomenology and still argue that we can explain why type psychophysical identities only appear to be contingent, though necessary. We can defend with Nagel (1998) a tripartite essence of pain: phenomenological, physiological, and functional characteristics, and say that it is a difference between functional characteristics that explains why the identity of pain with C-fiber stimulation seems contingent but is not.

On the other hand, concerning the descriptive strategy, we said that it is characterised by the notion of a fixer of the reference. In the case of theoretical identities, the reference to the terms that occur in them, for example "water," is fixed by descriptions that mention contingent properties of the thing, such as being a colourless, transparent, drinkable liquid in which to bathe, etc. What exemplifies these characteristics may not be water but an aqueous liquid that we mistakenly identify as water ($= H_2O$). This explains the apparent contingency of water's identity with H_2O . However, in the case of alleged psychophysical identities, Kripke replies to Bealer's criticism that reference fixers that mention contingent properties (descriptions such as Bealer's example, "the sensation to which I am most adverse") could be used to fix the reference of terms such as "pain," the only way to fix its reference is through a description that mentions essential properties of pain. If descriptions such as "the sensation to which I am most adverse" or "the feeling for which I harbour the greatest hatred" are contingently designating pain (these descriptions can both designate pain and nausea), it is impossible for rigid descriptions to designate anything other than pain, for example, nausea (Kripke may argue against Bealer). This makes any explanation of the alleged apparent contingency of pain identity with the stimulation of the C-fibers unavailable.

Alleged identities such as "pain = stimulation of the C-fibers," for Kripke, are not necessary and therefore are not identities. It is conceivable that pain is not the stimulation of the C-fibers; because, contrary to the case of water, what exemplifies the property of being a pain is not a contingent property of pain but an essential property of pain.

Think, for example, of the Twin Earth. The superficial properties, contingents, exemplified by the aqueous liquid existing there, are the superficial properties, contingents, exemplified by the aqueous liquid existing on Earth; but, while on Twin Earth, the aqueous liquid is XYZ, on Earth, the aqueous liquid is H₂O. Thus, on Twin Earth, there is no water. If there were water there, the Twin Earth would not be Earth's Twin, but it would be Earth, and "water = H₂O" would be true there. Instead of properties such as the property of being water, if we now consider properties such as the property of being a pain and the same example, that of Twin Earth, theoretical identities and psychophysical type identities are not analogous (for Kripke and Bealer). What, in the case of pain, would be equivalent to an aqueous liquid in the case of water? A painful sensation? But a painful sensation is a sensation of pain, and it is impossible that a sensation of pain is not pain. If something is a pain on the Twin Earth, then it is impossible that the very sensation that the pain is, is different from the sensation it is. The pain sensation is not a contingent property of pain; it is an essential property of pain. If there are pains in Twin Earth, the pain felt by the Twin Earth creatures exemplifies the essential property of being a pain; it does not exemplify contingent properties of the kind that the aqueous liquid exemplifies.²

There is something that differentiates the water sensation from the water, but there is nothing that differentiates the pain sensation from the pain. So to speak, sensations of water are not themselves water, but pain sensations are pain. It is counter-intuitive that a sample of XYZ on Twin Earth be a sample of water, but it is not counter-intuitive to attribute pain to Twin Earth creatures. The sensation of water is the intermediary between the external phenomenon and the observer. Conversely, if something is pain on the Twin Earth, then it is felt as pain, and if it is felt as pain, there is nothing between the pain and its sensation that is the intermediary between the external phenomenon and the observer.

Water = H₂O and could not be anything else, but pain could be something else, namely: stimulation of Ct-fibers (which, unlike C-fibers, are not composed of hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon but of XYZ, and W). Contrary to theoretical identities, in the case of alleged (for Kripke and Bealer) identities such as "pain = stimulation of the C-fibers," it is not necessary that what exemplifies the property of being a pain exemplifies the property of being a stimulation of C-fibers, and therefore these properties are not identical and the type identity materialism is false.

After this synopsis, some exegetical considerations of Hughes are now followed. Hughes, after discussing the arguments of the third lecture of *Naming and Necessity*, concludes that Kripke does not refute type-type identity materialism.

²"Human Doppelgängers" (Bealer, 1994, p. 199). "Doppelgängers [...] derives from German mythology" (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 1998, p. 271) and is used in the sense of something that is intrinsically a duplicate of something else. For example, a person's doppelgänger is a duplicate "molecule-for-molecule" (p. 271) of that person.

Kripke applies the results of the two previous lectures, in particular the idea that there are a posteriori necessary truths, to the debate of the thesis of mind–body identity from pages 134 to 155.

As Kripke himself acknowledges in the third lecture of *Naming and Necessity*, identity theorists present arguments in favour of the identification between mental and physical types, but Kripke does not respond to these arguments. What Kripke shows, according to Hughes, in a way generally not appreciated, is that type–type identity materialism is modally problematic. Hughes says that the theory of type identity is in some sense the target of the third lecture, but that it is in a different sense from that in which the descriptive theory of reference is the target of the first two lectures of *Naming and Necessity*: in these, according to Hughes, Kripke's aim is to show that the general picture given by the descriptive theory of how the reference is determined seems to be wrong in its very foundations; but in the third lecture, still according to Hughes, Kripke's aim is only to raise doubts about the type identity theory (and about the token identity theory).

Hughes argues that, in relation to type identity theory, the doubts that Kripke raises can be summarised in the following three points:

1. A theory that identifies pain with a certain neuronal state (for example, the stimulation of the C-fibers) has modal consequences that are, at least at first sight, profoundly counter-intuitive.

2. The type identity theorist should show why we should accept his theory despite such apparently counter-intuitive consequences (for example, by showing that, after reflection, such consequences are not as counter-intuitive as they seem at first sight).

3. The type identity theorist de facto does not show why we should accept his theory.

According to Hughes, Kripke argues convincingly about 1 (the type identity theory de facto has deeply counter-intuitive modal consequences) and 2 (the type identity theorist de facto has to show why such modal consequences are not counter-intuitive if he wants to defend his theory), but not in relation to 3.

Bealer, we can say, agrees with Hughes. Kripke argues convincingly about 1: theoretical identities have apparently deeply counter-intuitive modal consequences (for example, that water is not H₂O). In this, both the type identity materialist and anti-materialists such as Kripke and Bealer agree. He, the theorist of type identity, cannot avoid being in agreement with them since, for him, those identities are analogous to type psychophysical identities, and if they are, they too have apparently deeply counter-intuitive modal consequences (for example, that pain is not stimulation of the C-fibers).

However, for Bealer, about point number 2, Kripke does not argue convincingly: after reflection, such modal consequences are not as counter-intuitive as they seem at first sight; it is counter-intuitive that water is not H₂O, but it is not counter-intuitive that pain is not stimulation of the C-fibers. Kripke speaks, on

the one hand, of an epistemic situation that is qualitatively identical to ours and, on the other hand, of the rigidity of mental terms; but, Bealer claims, Kripke confuses the two. Rigidity is not sufficient for semantic stability. What Bealer does is retouch Kripke's argument so as to make him invulnerable to the objection that the materialist ultimately has an explanation for the illusion of contingency (more details below).

The argument K (of Kripke) is against materialism, just as the argument RK (of Bealer) is against materialism. What Bealer says is that the K (Kripke) argument is not a good argument to show that, in the case of type psychophysical identities, there is no explanation for the illusion of contingency. What Bealer proposes is a better argument.

Both Kripke and Bealer argue that there is no way to explain the illusion of contingency in the case of pain. The disagreement between them is that the phenomenological strategy is different from the descriptive strategy, and, for Bealer, Kripke confuses the two. Kripke could argue that the K argument does not need to be reformulated.

For all that Kripke shows, Hughes argues that point number 3 may be false. The type identity theorist can demonstrate why we should accept their theory because, for Bealer, the only strategy on which Kripke bases his defense of premise 2 of argument K (the thesis that it is possible for a creature to feel pain without the corresponding stimulation of the C-fibers, and vice versa) is wrong and out of place. It is wrong in describing mental states and physical states, and it is displaced because the materialist can invoke the descriptivist strategy in defense of the alleged type psychophysical identity, dissipating anti-essentialist intuitions, such as the idea that pain might not have been a stimulation of the C-fibers. Regarding number 3, for Bealer, Kripke does not argue convincingly. Against type-type identitativism, Kripke only uses the descriptive strategy, but this strategy is wrong and misplaced. Therefore, the K argument needs to be reformulated.

This result, according to Hughes, does not show a weakness in Kripke's argument, since perhaps Kripke's intention in the third lecture of *Naming and Necessity* is to argue in favour of 1 and 2 and only register his belief in number 3 without arguing in favour of 3. However, for Bealer, this shows a weakness in Kripke's argument (as we saw in the three previous sections). The Kripke (K) argument is weak because the term "stimulation of the C-fibers" is semantically unstable (the term "pain," on the contrary, for Kripke, is semantically stable). However, if we replace in Kripke's (K) argument the term "stimulation of the C-fibers" by the term "parts with 74 million or more non-conscious functional parts connected in a certain way" (which denotes a functional property and is semantically stable), then the conclusion of the Kripke (K) argument is that pain is not stimulation of the C-fibers.

Conclusion

Our interest is not exegetical. Bealer may or may not read Kripke well; there may or may not be a phenomenological strategy. Our interest here is that, regardless of exegesis, there is a way of explaining the illusion of contingency in the case of pain: different concepts can have equal properties. The dialectic is this: if one defends materialism and argues that there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, then, contrary to what Kripke and Bealer say, there are indeed illusions of contingency. If there are illusions of contingency, it is because there are such things that just seem to be contingently identical. In this case, there are no alleged identities; there are identities.

If we say that there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, there are illusions of contingency. If there are illusions of contingency, there is no contingency; there is necessity. If there is necessity, there is materialism.

The idea is to say that Kripke has at his disposal the phenomenological strategy, but this is badly read by Bealer. Bealer talks about people in a counterfactual situation who would use our words with a different reference, and that's not what it should be. We have to be ourselves when describing a counterfactual situation, using words. The right idea here is rigidity. However, this is not a phenomenological strategy. The phenomenological strategy, as found in Kripke (it seems to be present on pp. 148–154 of *Naming and Necessity*) and in Bealer, has nothing to do with rigidity. It has to do with the distinctive feature of semantic stability. It is not the words in our mouth that could have a different reference. They are the words in their mouths, the inhabitants of counterfactual situations, using them as the same means of fixing the reference that we use. That's the whole difference.

However, to say that Bealer reads badly is a criticism that does not seem to reap. This criticism would be correct if the idea of phenomenological strategy were based on rigidity. However, the idea of phenomenological strategy is not rigidity.

The idea of phenomenological strategy, as it is described by Bealer, is not this. The strategy of rigidity is that theoretical identities seem contingent, but they are not contingent because they are confused with others in which rigid designators are replaced by flexible designators, by flexible descriptions. This concerns the way we use words to describe counterfactual situations. However, the strategy of phenomenology is that we share with these creatures, who use the same language as ourselves, an epistemic situation (but the words' extensions do not coincide).

Fundamentally, for the purposes of the present discussion, it is to distinguish "be semantically stable" from "be rigid." For example, the word "water" is semantically unstable but rigid. What is semantic stability? If I consider the word as used by other people in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation, it has the same reference. The word "pain" is semantically stable and rigid, but the word "water" is semantically unstable and rigid. In my usage, "water" always refers to H₂O. However, this doesn't

rule out semantic instability. In a community of competent users in the same epistemic situation, the word “water” in their usage might refer to XYZ.

We insist that rigidity is not sufficient for semantic stability. This is why the phenomenological strategy is different from the descriptive strategy. Because otherwise, this is Bealer’s point (it may be that Bealer is wrong in this, but this is the fundamental point): there are no two anti-materialist strategies; there is only one. What Bealer does is accuse Kripke of confusing the two: speaking on the one hand in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation to ours, and on the other hand speaking on the rigidity of mental terms and confusing the two.

The sharing of the epistemic situation gives us the same means of fixing the reference. It seems that water is not H₂O because there is a community of competent users of the word “water” who are in the same epistemic situation as us and who use the word “water” to refer to a liquid other than water. This is part of the description of the phenomenological strategy.

Bealer is right: in fact, one must distinguish one strategy from the other, the rigidity from the phenomenology; one is not to be confused with the other. There is the strategy of rigidity, in which words are considered to be used by us to describe actual or counterfactual situations. That is what rigidity is (if there is the same reference). And then there is the phenomenological strategy, where words are considered to be used by competent people in counterfactual situations epistemically identical to ours.

Water is H₂O, but it does not seem to be, because there is a group of competent users of the word “water” who use the word “water” to refer to a different liquid. However, the epistemic access, the contact, and the epistemic apprehension of the liquid of these people are completely analogous to our epistemic access to that liquid. From the point of view of epistemology, it is all the same. On Twin Earth, people use the word “water” to refer to XYZ; the counterpart of the person on Earth uses the word “water” to refer to a liquid (XYZ) that is superficially indistinguishable from the water. He, my counterpart, is in the same epistemic situation as me, except that the word “water” is in his mouth, not mine. The word “water” in my mouth always designates H₂O in relation to any counterfactual situation. In his mouth, the word “water” designates something else. The only thing that is invariant is the fixer of the reference: as it is the same epistemic situation, the fixer of the reference is the same, “aqueous liquid, in which I bathe, etc.” This is the description that captures the epistemic and superficial properties of water.

Kripke says (and Bealer cannot agree more): “That the usual moves and analogies are not available to solve the problems of the identity theorist is, of course, no proof that no moves are available. I certainly cannot discuss all the possibilities here. I suspect, however, that the present considerations tell heavily against the usual forms of materialism. Materialism, I think, must hold that a physical description of the world is a *complete* description of it, that any mental facts are ‘ontologically dependent’ on physical facts in the straightforward sense of

following from them by necessity. No identity theorist seems to me to have made a convincing argument against the intuitive view that this is not the case” (1980, p. 155). Accordingly, theoretical identities only appear to be contingent (since they are necessary), and the alleged psychophysical identities are not necessary and hence are not identities. Thus, there is no analogy between alleged type psychophysical identities and theoretical identities. However, if there is an explanation for the illusion of contingency, it is that the space is open for necessary identities. There is no need for another argument to defend materialism; the explanation for the illusion of contingency suffices.

The property of being a pain is in fact the property of being a stimulation of C-fibers; it is in fact, and it is necessarily so. So how do you explain the intuition that there can be pain without stimulation of the C-fibers (and vice versa)? Because we are confusing the exemplified properties with the subsumed concepts, we have two distinct concepts: different concepts can be concepts of one and the same property. The difference between concepts of mental states and concepts of physical states can even be formulated in terms of the difference between semantically stable concepts (the concept of pain) and semantically unstable concepts (the concept of C-fiber stimulation).

We cannot say that there is an illusion of contingency and that we will still have to establish the identity of properties. If we are to say that there is an illusion of contingency and that it is explained, then the properties are indeed identical; concepts are what make them distinct.³

If there is an illusion of contingency, there is no contingency. If there is no contingency, there is necessity. If the illusion of contingency is explained, then the type–type psychophysical identities are not alleged; they are real.

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³ According to Hill, “When J.J.C. Smart and other materialists of the 1950s and early 1960s set out to defend their favorite doctrines, they were typically more concerned to answer objections than to construct positive supporting arguments” (1991, p. 19). For a discussion of positive versus negative arguments in favour of type–type identititative materialism, see, for example, Kim (2005, pp. 121–148).

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