

The Concept of Puzzle: Unrecognized Root Metaphor in Analytical Aesthetics

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Pepper's method of placing discrete arguments within aesthetics in relation to a "root metaphor" may be applied to current practice and theory in analytical aesthetics. The root metaphor of the "puzzle," with its minimal sub-categories of "looking at" and "solving," accounts for the major direction and limitations of analytical aesthetics, and does so more precisely than a typical characterization of such aesthetics as "the determination of presuppositions to be found in language use." The work of Goodman, among others, is subject to the root metaphor of puzzle, with detrimental effect on the affective side of aesthetic experience, despite sincere denials by Goodman. Kivy's recent attack on Pepper's early book, *Aesthetic Quality*, shows in some detail what issues are at stake. Analytical aesthetics is furthermore typical of a strong predisposition now in force within philosophy to regard all problems and all experiences as if they were rooted within a metaphor of the puzzle.

Analysis as Puzzle

My intention in this paper is a critical one: I do not think puzzle is a good root metaphor for analytical aesthetics to follow, but I do think it is the metaphor effectively at work in the field. Earlier in the present volume, Professor Andrew Reck quoted something of Pepper's *World Hypotheses* (1942, p. viii): if what the philosopher is dealing with is the whole problem of truth and with the justification of human values, then there are certain philosophers who do not seem to have "ever fully felt the problem." Feeling is made an issue here by Pepper. Feeling is still very much the issue in analytical aesthetics. "To think that this question could be met in the manner of a puzzle," Pepper went on to say, "and in terms of correlations, statistics, mathematics, and language, struck me as fantastic" (Pepper, 1942, pp. viii-ix). Of Pepper's list of areas, it is *language* that is important for analytical aesthetics. By focusing on language in this paper I hope to avoid a problem that I have encountered, namely that it now seems to be the case that no one really wants to be called an analytical philosopher, much less an analytical aesthetician. Peter Kivy, one of the philosophers I will be discussing, has advised that I drop the term altogether (Kivy, Note 1). But I propose to use it here without, I hope, overestimating what it can be made to do. I will use it in the sense defined by the aesthetician Harrell (1980, p. 198): "Logical inquiry in aesthetics may not

now be so much restricted to strict logical entailment as to determination of presuppositions to be found in language use."

I will conclude with a consideration of Kivy's own analytical practice, significantly entitled "Reconsiderations" (Kivy, 1981), on Pepper's *Aesthetic Quality: A Contextualistic Theory of Beauty* (Pepper, 1938). I will first develop the theory of puzzle as metaphor by examining statements by several theorists. All of these theorists are analytical, in the sense defined by Harrell. In order of presentation, the theorists in question are: Margolis, who actually engaged in a spirited exchange with Pepper over philosophical method and value (Margolis, 1969; Pepper, 1969a, 1969b); Sircello (1978), an aesthetician who has been described by Kivy (Note 2) as a Romantic rather than analytic philosopher, by virtue of Sircello's defense of "expression" and emotion in the arts; Beardsley (1958); Bouwsma (1954); Cioffi (1978); and Goodman (1968, 1972, 1981). I will also discuss a significantly ignored English writer on aesthetics, Elliott (1972, 1978). In all of these writers except the last, Elliott, I propose that the root metaphor in which they are working is that of the puzzle.

If my proposal has merit, then one of the first things that it would mean is that the kind of "logical argument" referred to by Harrell is actually an argument rooted in the common occurrence of that which is puzzling. As a field for possible aesthetic inquiry, the puzzling, whether with regard to aesthetic works of art, or to theoretical constructs concerning art, has the attractiveness initially needed to make it seem nothing more than good common sense for an entire program in aesthetics, and one that may even be expanded into the total range of philosophy. Listen, for example, to this statement by one of the central figures in analytical aesthetics, Joseph Margolis. It comes from the preface to his new edition of the important anthology, *Philosophy Looks At The Arts*:

In fact, there is reason to think that the *conceptual puzzles of aesthetics*—centered as they are on the activities of human persons and the peculiar properties of culture, language, intention, history and tradition—may yet be discovered to hold the most promising clue to an adequate philosophical synthesis.

I sincerely believe it will. (1978, p. vii; emphasis added)

The "conceptual puzzles of aesthetics" came to include, rather early, virtually all the concepts of traditional aesthetics, such as "expression" or "intuition." These concepts were perceived as puzzles, though as puzzles clumsily constructed and with their solutions made impossible by their clumsiness, but this was not solely because there was much that was unclear within them; finally they were and are perceived as puzzling because the controlling root metaphor is that of puzzle. Sircello knows that in order to now defend and clarify one of the traditional concepts in aesthetics, the concept of expression, he has to take up the topic where it has been placed by recent discussions of how puzzling expression is. Expression, Sircello explains, comes out of the

tradition of Romanticism. Part of Sircello's book, *Mind and Art: An Essay on the Varieties of Expression*, is reprinted in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts* (1978). Sircello has in it this passage, to which I call attention because of its unacknowledged metaphor of the puzzle:

But to many . . . twentieth-century philosophers, especially those working in various "analytical" styles whose intellectual ancestry was anything but Romantic, those philosophical discussions of expression in art were puzzling. This puzzlement can best be seen in the work of Monroe Beardsley and O.K. Bouwsma, philosophers who represent two distinct strains in recent analytic philosophy.

I think it is fair to understand the puzzlement of both Beardsley and Bouwsma in the following way . . . (Sircello, 1978, p. 325)

I break the quotation here, since my point is made: Sircello feels he has to argue within the terms of puzzles and puzzlement, *even to construct a counter-argument within the mainstream of analytical aesthetics*. After all, why does one need to say that the historical situation in which Romanticism became incomprehensible was a matter of puzzlement? A better metaphor, or one that is at least as adequate, would be just that, *situation*. But *puzzle* is more loaded, and is all the more effective because it appears to be innocent, or no metaphor at all.

If puzzle is indeed the root metaphor of analytical aesthetics, then a series of categories has been "generated," as Pepper would say, off of this root. I will suggest only two of these categories: "looking at," or imagined visual inspection, and of course "solving." Philosophy, Margolis has told us in the very selection of his title, "looks at" the arts. The idea of visual inspection here should not be confused with the power of the visual sense as such. Looking at, in analytical aesthetics, is much like the visual sense as it was described by Schachtel (1959). In adult life, and within modern civilization, sight is usually one of the "distance senses." That is, sight is considerably removed from, and insulated against, emotional immediacy. A very different sense of the visual, and one that I take as essential to aesthetic experience, is given in the work of Wilhelm Reich, namely, that sight, functioning in the "ocular" area of the body, is a matter of waves of feeling; these waves potentially may move through the whole body (Efron, 1980a; Reich, 1973). The distinction asks us, how do we actually view a painting, or for that matter, how do we listen to music? For the analytic philosopher, music also is "looked at," in terms of the metaphor of puzzle. Thus Bouwsma (1954) argued that we can perceive sadness in music without feeling sad: this is the kind of "looking at" that is proper to the root metaphor of the puzzle. Margolis (1965, p. 107) similarly places great stock in the proposition that we "notice" emotional qualities "whether or not" we feel them. This sort of perceiving and noting is what I call *looking at*. "Solving" means arriving at such conclusions of linguistic usage regarding the puzzles of aesthetics which would enable us to answer to the requirement, modelled by Cioffi (1978, p. 351) after Wittgenstein, of "putting

into order our notions as to what can be said about works of art." Wittgenstein certainly worked on linguistic situations whose contexts are troublesomely unclear, but which may be clarified or solved, by being put in order through certain kinds of analyses that he practiced.

Neither the root metaphor of puzzle itself, nor any of its further categories such as solving, are neutral, innocent or self-evident. Quite the contrary. Imagine, for example, how the processes of puzzlement would fare under the judgment of Dewey, who wrote in *Art As Experience* that "since art is the most direct and complete manifestation there is of experience as experience, it provides a unique control for the imaginative ventures of philosophy" (Dewey, 1934, p. 297). The puzzle metaphor cannot allow such control, however faithfully its practitioners may wish it, since puzzle implies in itself a need to exert control over the perplexities of aesthetic experience. To puzzle is to "exercise (oneself or one's mind) over some problem or matter"; it is "to ponder or study over some perplexing problem or matter" (Random House College Dictionary, 1975). The status of being "over" or looking at the object studied is consequential. It might barely be possible to discuss "an experience" (in Dewey's sense) from this position, but only if there were first "an immersion so complete that the qualities of the object and the emotions it arouses have no separate existence" (Dewey, 1934, p. 276). Such immersion is foreign to the root metaphor of the puzzle; one can be "involved" in a puzzle, but hardly "immersed." Indeed the word immersed would make no sense, and would at once be ridiculed away, as it has been by Goodman (1972, p. 94), although its only fault is that it is no part of the root metaphor of puzzle.

The Basic Issues

Dewey's concept of "The Challenge to Philosophy," which he used for the title of the chapter from which his statements quoted above were taken, is something more than the recognition that aesthetics presents an ideal field where philosophers may find "conceptual puzzles." Aesthetics is not merely more complex or more purely revelatory of experience, in Dewey's view; it calls for different behavior than is suitable for the performance of other kinds of philosophical work. But the difference is not an absolute one, nor does it imply any purely aesthetic categories or concepts. Because there are no conceptually clear boundaries in Dewey's theory, he has automatically fallen on the wrong side of "puzzle," that is, he has been taken to have constructed a confused one. But it is confused only within the metaphor, which demands that it be looked at, and solved by being put in order. A felt difference in emphasis will not appear to be a proper order, if you are thinking of a puzzle.

By now we are talking about the root metaphor of puzzle not in aesthetic experience alone, but in the discourses of aesthetics. Surely there is a difference? On the contrary, those who have understood the metaphor most deeply

seem to realize that there is no fundamental difference in the analytic schools between ways of confronting aesthetic experience and ways of confronting aesthetics, or any other problem area, for all are basically puzzles. Aesthetics merely has the greatest and most typical puzzles to work on. As Goodman has said, in a book excellently titled *The Languages of Art*, perhaps for this whole school of the analytic (though he did not mean to extend his reference so widely): "... aesthetic and scientific experience alike are seen to be fundamentally cognitive in character." Anyone who refers to differences between knowing and feeling thus immediately looks "especially puzzling" . . . to Goodman (Goodman, 1968, p. 245).

Goodman has been concerned to meet and dispose of the accusation that he slights feeling at the expense of looking. Recently, he replied to that accusation in the context of a discussion of his influential book, *Ways of Worldmaking* (1978), by seven different commentators gathered together by the editor of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (Ackerman, et al., 1981). Goodman explains, as he already had explained many times, that he means to suggest no denial of the feelings. His explanation is almost convincing. Again, it is necessary to consider the words themselves. Admittedly, no obvious error appears in the following defense of his position by Goodman:

Emotions and feelings are, I agree, required for aesthetic experience; but they are not separable from or in addition to the cognitive aspect of that experience. They are among the primary means of making the discriminations and the connections that enter into an understanding of art. Emotion and feeling, I must repeat once more, function cognitively in aesthetic and in much other experience. We do not discern stylistic affinities and differences, for example, by "rational analysis," but by sensations, perceptions, feelings, emotions (Goodman, 1981, p. 274)

I have stopped quoting from this statement of Goodman's in the midst of one of his sentences, but will complete that sentence in a moment. It is well to pause here, because possibly what Goodman means by the cognitive is so complex and comprehensive that any accusation of slighting the emotions and feelings falls away. But now the completion: we discern stylistic affinities and difference, Goodman (1981) was saying, by means of "sensations, perceptions, feelings, emotions, sharpened in practice like the eye of a gemologist or the fingers of an inspector of machined parts" (p. 274). The eye of a gemologist? The inspector of machined parts? I could not have asked for a better illustration of the proposed category of "looking at," or imagined visual inspection!

Goodman is deep within the metaphor, after all. Which leads to the obvious comments we must make if we take root metaphor seriously: uninnocent though it is, puzzling can give the practitioner of theory and analysis the deceptive feeling of "only" trying to solve (or dissolve) linguistic difficulties. And who could object to that? There is a dearth, in the vast analytic literature,

however, of any treatment of "puzzle" itself as a possible Wittgensteinian bewitchment of intellect by language, precisely because no one regards this as a serious possibility. Although puzzlement might be considered basic to philosophical activity, as Fisher (Note 3), a philosopher who edits the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* has stated, it is still the case that no entry on puzzle, puzzlement or puzzling, occurs in the standard reference work, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Edwards, 1967); indeed there is not so much as an index reference to these terms in the entire eight volumes.

As a verb, "puzzle" is commonly taken by philosophers as a term interchangeable with "argue," "inquire," "investigate," "probe," or "examine," although it probably would not be confused with "meditate." When analytic philosophers "argue," however, they do not simply argue in the general sense of the word. To refer back to Harrell's definition, they "examine" linguistic presuppositions, at least, but not in a Deweyan experiential context; they "argue" only within the logic permitted by the underlying metaphor of the puzzle. Some may even subscribe to a theory of art as an "open" concept, formally renouncing any attempt to solve the problem of defining it, but still restrict themselves in practice to questions about art that presuppose a puzzle that can be looked at and either solved, or be pronounced a defective puzzle and hence not worth putting into further order. I take it as most revealing that Beardsley (1958, p. 3) in the introduction to his textbook on aesthetics, despite his usual choice of the term "problem," stated that "It is such puzzles" as may be found in certain typical confused commentaries on the arts "that give rise to the subject of aesthetics." This is entirely different than saying that aesthetic experience is what underlies aesthetics.

Even the most careful "attention" to the conceptual puzzles of aesthetic experience, in which analysis is carried only so far as "the presuppositions to be found in language use" will allow and no further, cannot avoid the implication that the work of art is itself a puzzle to be solved, as far as this is possible, and to be avoided to the extent that such solving may not be possible. In other words, if you concentrate on conceptual puzzles you eventually will be drawn into regarding the work or art as a conceptual puzzle. We may suppose, in fact, that whole great ranges of aesthetic experience which do not appear amenable to looking at or solving, will receive little or no attention. Within the metaphor of puzzle, it is feasible to ask, as Cioffi does, "Whether we are meant to reflect that Othello becomes jealous very quickly on very little provocation" (Cioffi, 1978, p. 306). That is something of a puzzle, intrinsic to Shakespeare's play, and worth solving if possible. But it is not feasible to ask, in the manner of Pepper in his article on "Emotional Distance in Art" (Pepper, 1946), how the feelings of jealousy that Shakespeare evokes are related to feelings of jealousy we may have elsewhere. This cannot be a "puzzle," or at least not a puzzle of linguistic usage, but an inquiry that will require an intimate, sometimes distraught self-contact incompatible with the

category of "looking at."

Consider also how statements which do not fit within the metaphor of the puzzle have no future even when they are made in the course of an "analytical" argument. Thus Elliott, a writer on aesthetics who actually refers to experiencing music "as if from the heart" (Elliott, 1978, p. 53), is included in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, but the denial of the category of "looking at" that is implicit in this phrase almost guarantees that it has not drawn attention from others who have written analytic aesthetics in the 15 years since Elliott's essay was first published. In fact, Elliott has published half a dozen articles, trying through various arguments, to change the puzzling ways of analytic aesthetics (Elliott, Note 4), but he has not been able to get a receptive hearing. He can only be "noticed."

Kivy Versus the Early Pepper: The Puzzle Metaphor in Action

Elliott appears to be the token anti-analytic presence, included to give Margolis' anthology a kind of balance. Kivy is not included in the anthology, and as I have said, he has preferred to disown the name "analytic." I find a major ambiguity in Kivy's work. His book, *The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression* (1980), is an attempt to show that emotion *should* be discussed, described and even regarded as the basis for making value judgments about music. A reviewer for the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* places Kivy in debt to Sircello, with the aesthetics of Romanticism, in other words; the reviewer also says that "The theory of beauty that Kivy espouses—the theory that understands beauty in terms of degree or vividness of quality [is] descended from Dewey and Pepper . . ." (Price, 1981, p. 46). Such descent would be hard to deny. Yet Kivy's recent "Reconsideration" of Pepper's *Aesthetic Quality: A Contextualistic Theory of Beauty*, where exactly that argument from vividness of quality is made, is strongly negative, not to say condescending.

I tried to learn something of how this happened by calling Kivy himself. He very candidly informed me that he had never read *Aesthetic Quality* prior to accepting the task of composing a "reconsideration" for the *Journal of Aesthetics* (Kivy, Note 5). Unfortunately, he was also unaware that *Aesthetic Quality and Art Criticism* was designed by Pepper to supply a better contextualistic aesthetics than that of Dewey's *Art As Experience*, a fact which has become a matter of record in Pepper scholarship. Actually, Pepper states clearly in *Aesthetic Quality* that there has yet to be "a contextualistic book as consistently worked out in its way" as are Santayana's mechanistic aesthetics in *The Sense of Beauty* or Bosanquet's organistic aesthetic in his *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*, although, Pepper notes, "Dewey's *Art As Experience* comes very near being such a book" (Pepper, 1938, pp. 4-7). It is Pepper's goal to write just such a contextualistic book. Pepper also says plainly that he much prefers the

consistent views of a Santayana or a Bosanquet to the views of I.A. Richards, for example, whose *Principles of Literary Criticism* is eclectic and therefore confusing (Pepper, 1938, p. 5). Incredibly, Kivy ignores all this, ignores even Pepper's subtitle, "A Contextualistic Theory of Beauty," makes no mention of the central position of Dewey's *Art As Experience*, and assumes that Pepper was blind to the issue of eclecticism. Kivy (1981, p. 205) charges Pepper with exactly that, eclecticism, and backs this up mainly by quoting from Pepper's preface (1938, p. viii), where acknowledgment is made to some dozen aestheticians of various schools who have provided "materials" and "insights" for his book. One result of Kivy's strategy is that it allows Kivy to carry on a naive, self-satisfied critique of Pepper's theory of knowledge, implied in *Aesthetic Quality*, without noticing that he is bringing up charges that have always been made against—and have often been answered from within—the world hypothesis of contextualism. Another result is that Kivy, after listing the dozen writers to whom Pepper paid homage in aesthetics, now goes on to pick out two of those writers, namely Bergson and Collingwood, as the key influences. Bergson and Collingwood are "the villain of the piece," says Kivy, and especially Bergson (Kivy, 1981, pp. 205-206).

Pepper's definition of the aesthetic field did prominently feature intuition, a concept not in good standing in analytical aesthetics. It is closely associated with the claims of feeling, an alliance that has much to do with its being made into a puzzle.

Nonetheless, Pepper's use of the concept intuition was different from that of Bergson, who tended to set up a simple opposition of the analytical and the intuitive, and of thought versus feeling. It is against that position, ascribed with some justice to Bergson, that Kivy argues, but he believes he is arguing against Pepper. He believes for example that Pepper advocates "expunging analysis" from aesthetic experience, and that, for Pepper, "analysis and the aesthetic are incompatible" (Kivy, 1981, pp. 201-202), formulations which are caricatures of Pepper. As Kivy well knows (and even produces a quotation to show), Pepper held in *Aesthetic Quality* that intuition is one of two ways we can know an event, the other being analysis, and while Pepper plainly said that analysis can become destructive of aesthetic experience, he does not try to eradicate it. He tries to control it so that it actually enhances the experience.

Pepper had no difficulty in accepting the basic necessity within philosophy—or within thought—for the functions of analysis. His own works are full of instances of the analytical; he spent a chapter of his book, *The Work of Art* (1955), for example, analyzing the concept of "fusion" in Dewey's aesthetic theory. The fact that Kivy can mistake Pepper's reservations about an all-embracing, ubiquitous role for analysis for a rejection of analysis itself, tells us much about present-day philosophy but nothing about Pepper.

There are major issues at stake, to be sure, in any discussion of the relations of analysis and intuition, in aesthetics or elsewhere. I do not wish to imply that

Pepper's book is foolproof. In fact, I have suggested elsewhere that were the language of *Aesthetic Quality* to be examined in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, it would surely "be shaken apart and forced to reveal ambiguities, vague spots, and other inadequacies After all, the language of 1938 can hardly be the language of philosophy now" (Efron, 1980, p. 19). Kivy has now done that shaking, but he has not advanced the issues. Instead, he has obscured them. Pepper's use of "the elusive quality of intuition" is excessively "special," Kivy claims; it is too much like placing aesthetic experience "in heaven." Kivy declares that his "own philosophical tastes are on the side of the 'ordinary'" (Kivy, 1981, p. 206). The statement is a declaration of personal taste, not one of theoretical argument.

The best method of argument to follow at this point is to quote Kivy himself. Here he is refuting Pepper, or so he thinks, on the proposition that "analysis and the aesthetic are incompatible." Kivy finds that when he listens to a piece of music, analysis is not extraneous to or destructive of the aesthetic experience; it is "part of its very being."

For example, I am listening to Haydn's *Harmoniemesse* for the first time. My mind is absolutely teeming with analytic conjectures. (Where is that clarinet passage going? Isn't this more elaborate writing for the instrument than Haydn had indulged heretofore? Mozart's influence? Beethoven's even, with his "heavy" orchestration for winds in the First Symphony? Good grief: the chorus is not entering on the tonic! What chord is that? It has a d-flat in it. I'll bet that chord is going to have implications later on. Where? In the return of "Kyrie," of course. But in a coda, perhaps? . . . And so on).

That is what goes on in my mind when I listen to music. (Kivy, 1981, p. 202)

When Kivy places the event, metaphorically, in his *mind*, that may also be a way of saying that he *feels* the event thoroughly. "Mind" is an ambiguous word. In discussing Goodman I argued, however, that the largeness of the term "cognitive" finally did not protect Goodman against the accusation of slighting the felt-ness of quality. So here with Kivy. The whole list of "conjectures" is devoid of feeling, notwithstanding the effort to show how breathlessly exciting these conjectures must be to have, by using italics, question marks, exclamation points, and the expression "good grief." There is no grief to be heard in this mass, as Kivy hears it here, nor is there any primary use of emotions and feelings, such as Goodman claimed to be the practice of analytic aesthetics in making its discriminations. Not that the questions Kivy is asking are irrelevant. They could fit somewhere into the experience; indeed, an aesthetic must find ways to incorporate such considerations. But as they are presented by Kivy, they are just what he calls them, "analytic conjectures," and I would agree with Pepper (1938, p. 130) in regarding them as "explicit disruptive analysis."

Kivy never admits what almost anyone has found out in life: namely that in some moments, analysis can be terribly out of place. By failing to admit this

possibility, Kivy fails to confront Pepper's argument. He thus leaves himself open to the objection that the quoted passage would suggest: he treats a piece of music as if it were a set of conceptually exciting puzzle-qualities which exist simply in order to be solved, right before your ears. Not only are there micro-elements to piece together, such as the chord that will no doubt appear later, there are also the macro-puzzle segments of musical history to which you may attend: will it be Haydn with Beethoven, or Haydn with Mozart, or all three in one great intricate solution?

As for the specific problems of intuition, Kivy runs from those rather than trying to confront them. He runs, by never reporting in his reconsideration the specific example that Pepper was talking about. In the passage Kivy takes up in *Aesthetic Quality*, Pepper was discussing a painting by Hiroshige, one of the Tokaido series. The relevant aspect of Pepper's discussion of that print, which would have to be confronted in any reconsideration, is that when we start to look at that print, a "given event" occurs, and we have something that we can call "trees bending in the wind" (Pepper, 1938, p. 24). Pepper argues that it is useless, within contextualism, to try to "look at" those trees bending in the wind as separate elements to be described one by one, for if we did resort to such a description, it would necessarily lose the fused quality of the perception.

The perception in which the trees bending in the wind is an instance of "fusion," in aesthetic experience, and "fusion" is a serious category within contextualistic aesthetics—indeed within the contextualistic world hypothesis. Fusion cannot be treated intelligently by handling it as if it meant about the same thing as "intuition." But that is exactly Kivy's procedure: "When does 'fusion' occur? Or—what amounts to the same thing—what kind of an event can be intuited as a whole to reveal its 'quality'?" (Kivy, 1981, p. 201). Pepper takes intuition as the basic underlying method of aesthetic perception, while "fusion" may occur to greater or lesser degree among the elements of a work. They are not the same thing. As Pepper (1942, p. 245) was to write a few years later in *World Hypotheses*, "Contextualism is the only theory that takes fusion seriously. In other theories it is interpreted away as vagueness, confusion, failure to discriminate, muddledness." Kivy neatly proves that point.

To score a real, not a fabricated point against Pepper here, Kivy would have to argue, in the fashion of his own example from the music of Haydn, that when he looks at the Hiroshige print, he does not see trees bending in the wind, but trees a, b, c, d, and the spatial relation of "bending," and then (to avoid the imputation of a loss of aesthetic quality) that he also notes the other qualitative features mentioned by Pepper, such as the "associations of wind and leaves and stems," and the placement of these trees within a driving rainstrom that is "becoming dimmer and dimmer in the distance" (Pepper, 1938, pp. 19-24). Kivy, again in the manner of his Haydn example, would have to say that he sees all of this without the serious use of "intuition" or any term

substitutive for it, and that his *preoccupation* with the details of element analysis (even analysis of art history and the development of specific artists) that Pepper finds so disruptive of aesthetic experience actually does no damage to the feeling quality of Kivy's own perception.

As I implied earlier, analytical aesthetics cannot lead to an appreciation of qualities that do not fit the root metaphor of puzzle and its sub-categories. Pepper's inclusion of associations that are "relevant" to the experience of a work of art would automatically be subject to ridicule, because there is no puzzle, once it is solved, put into order, that can include the indefinite field of associations. It is significant that Kivy refuses even to consider the problem. He merely gives the example of someone who looked at ("gazed upon") the *Laocoon*, and was reminded somehow of "Steak-and-kidney pie." "Is it 'relevant'? Need we stay for an answer?" (Kivy, 1981, p. 205). From within analytic aesthetics, we need not stay for an answer, but within contextualistic aesthetics, we had better. As a matter of fact, Pepper is not unaware of nor helpless before the problem of drawing some distinctions between the relevant and the irrelevant in aesthetic experience; in *Aesthetic Quality* (1938, pp. 236-237) he deals with this problem in an account of his own experience of the quality of one line in Keats' "To Autumn." I find Pepper's exploration of the problem worthy of reconsideration, but Kivy does not even mention it. I do not find Kivy's avoidance of the problem useful. But caught as he is, within the root metaphor of puzzle, he can only struggle to avoid all that the root does not generate.

In Conclusion

Kivy's analysis of Pepper's contextualistic aesthetic at least permits us to notice what happens when analytic aesthetics confronts one of its major rivals. Goodman's more famous work does not give so clear a view of the confrontation. But Kivy's "Reconsideration" brings out forcefully what I have maintained at the outset: that the root metaphor of the puzzle is woefully inadequate for aesthetics. We have only to suppose, for example, that there is something to be said for the concept of fusion, or that the individual field of associations is *essential* in the psychological construction of an aesthetic experience. We may reasonably suppose that it is necessary to "have" (in Dewey's sense) the emotional qualities implicit in aesthetic experience, and that analysis, unless it is brought under control, can seriously interfere with that process. The analytic aesthetician will unhesitatingly admit that analysis is fallible and often unsatisfactory—which is to say that it is often genuinely difficult—but never that analysis can be harmful. I have tried also to convey that the root metaphor of puzzle is not merely limited in what it can do in aesthetics, but that it is inappropriate to it: works of art are not puzzles nor are they sufficiently like puzzles or that which is commonsensically puzzling to

warrant the analytic project I have been describing. The few examples I have given from Margolis and Beardsley suggest that in their theorizing, they are not really attending to the work of art but to the arguably disordered linguistic presuppositions of those who discuss the work of art. There is a difference, and it is fatal.

Reference Notes

- Note 1. Kivy, P. Personal communication, March 1982.
 Note 2. Kivy, P. Personal communication, March, 1982.
 Note 3. Fisher, J. Personal communication, July 7, 1982.
 Note 4. Elliott, R.K. Personal communication, November 1980.
 Note 5. Kivy, P. Personal communication, March, 1982.

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