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The Subjective Organization of Personal Consciousness: A Concept of Conscious Personality

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A concept of conscious personality is introduced and defined as the unique subjective organization of a person's personal consciousness. Five dimensions or factors of subjective organization, in this sense, are discussed: (a) identification and externality, (b) functional attitude toward one's mental life, (c) isolation and communicability, (d) inner perspicacity, and (e) the subjective commitment to truth. With regard to each of these, individuals differ, and are susceptible to improvement in their conscious personality.

The purpose of this article is to discuss a concept of *conscious personality* and to illustrate its application. This concept is analogous to a very basic concept of *personality* that was proposed by a prominent theorist known for his unconventional and imaginative approach to psychological issues, namely, Henry A. Murray (Shneidman, 1981; Natsoulas, in press-c). Therefore, a brief consideration of Murray's concept is useful for purposes of introducing the present topic.

When Murray (e.g., 1936, 1968/1981) referred to a person's personality, he meant to refer to all the internal factors—and especially the dispositions, capacities, "establishments," and other enduring factors—that function to determine, to organize, and to give a distinctive personal character to the flow of the "ceaseless, kinetic processes of personality . . . in the head" (Murray, 1951, p. 268). Explicitly, Murray and Kluckholm (1953/1981) defined personality as the "organization of all the integrative (regnant) processes in the brain" (p. 210). The kinetic processes of personality are those (regnant) processes in the brain whose mutual interactions constitute no less than the person's stream of "regnancies," which is the person's mental life and "the most concrete actual thing" for a psychologist (Murray, 1936, quoting Whitehead, 1927). Thus, in speaking of personality processes or regnant processes in the brain, Murray meant to speak at once of both (a) the highest control level of the human nervous system (i.e., the top of the command hierarchy of levels of control: Sperry, 1970; cf. Murray, 1938/1981, p. 131;

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Murray, 1959/1981, p. 16) and (b) the level of biological organization at which we, as self-consciously conscious beings, may be said to participate in our own lives (cf. Sperry, 1969, 1976, 1980).

On the one hand, Murray (1936, 1938/1981) characterized the regnant processes as "mutually dependent processes that constitute dominant configurations," namely, a succession of momentary regnant states (regnancies) that *exercise a determining influence on those of a person's activities that have a "total" character*; the regnancy flow dominates or governs the activities of the person in which he or she engages "as a unit" (Murray, 1936). On the other hand, the flow of regnant states and the processes at the same molar level that constitute them were held by Murray to be *all that to which we may have a degree of reflective access*. Accordingly, personality processes are those kinetic processes in the brain that are "capable of becoming conscious (experientially discriminated) in the natural course of events or when existing resistances are overcome" (Murray, 1968/1981, p. 251). Whereas there are unconscious regnant processes that may never become conscious, these are of the same kind as conscious regnant processes and have, therefore, the potential for consciousness.

Being concerned, as I am, with the person's own perspective on his or her mental life (Natsoulas, 1979), Murray's treatment of personality suggested a conceptual approach to the person's perspective that I might usefully take (Natsoulas, in press-c). This approach is consistent with Murray's view of personality as I adumbrated it above, and focuses upon differences among people with regard to a relatively stable set of characteristics of their consciousness in one sense of the word ("consciousness$_5$": see Natsoulas, 1978a, 1979, 1983a, 1983c). Just as Murray considered *personality* to be all of the personal factors that organize mental life in a distinctive way, I propose the adoption of a concept of *conscious personality*. Psychologists would use this concept to refer in a general way to *the conscious or subjective organization of* (what I call) *personal consciousness*, which is a *further* organization of mental life and distinguishes each person from all other people.

As already indicated above, the regnancy is the fundamental unit of mental life, according to Murray's theory. The regnancy is, as it were, the "concrete distillate" of human life as this proceeds from moment to moment:

> A regnancy, I believe, should be regarded as a single complex temporal gestalt, a "drop of experience," to use William James's phrase. (Murray, 1936, p. 255) We must remember that, if there were no organization [of experience], there would be no organism. (Murray, 1936, p. 255; cf. Mead, 1934, 1938) A man's life is a long history of successive regnancies. (Murray, 1936, p. 265)

Quite naturally, it is in relation to this same regnancy flow that I define the concept of conscious personality. I want to distinguish (as James, 1890, did) a part of the regnancy flow that (a) works to make the succession of regnant

states personal and (b) gives to the flow its subjectively organized character. The subjective organization of the regnancy flow is, as I have already indicated, *over and above* its being an objective flow of dominant brain-process configurations, with all the structure and individual distinctiveness that this implies.

Important to note, however, the present article is not addressed to any dimension of the mind-body problem. Other articles of mine have been so addressed (Natsoulas, 1974, 1978b, in press-b). Here, I simply assume along with Murray (and Sperry, e.g., 1980) that the regnancies are wholly physiological states. For being that, they are no less "drops of experience" in my view. How experiences are constituted by mutally interacting regnant processes is not known. I do not believe, however, that any argument or evidence has been provided as yet that effectively rules out the physical-monist hypothesis that the mind is part of the brain's functioning and nothing more. I hold the regnancy flow to be at the same time physiological and psychological (cf. Freud, 1895/1966; Natsoulas, in press-a), but I shall not reconcile these characterizations here.

Instead, my purpose is to address the person's own perspective on the regnancy flow, that is, the perspective taken by an extraordinary organism upon a unique, central, crucial part of itself. In James's (1890) words, the human mind plays psychologist upon itself. While it may proceed objectively, in part, using behavioral evidence from which to infer what is going on therein (cf. Natsoulas, 1977, 1978c, 1983b), the human mind also possesses a degree of immediate (reflective) access to some of its regnant processes. Our conscious regnant processes are those to which we have such access. We have such access to them at least to the degree that we can often tell that something of a certain kind is transpiring in our mind or has just now occurred there. This direct, reflective power of the mind is the referent of a common use of the word *consciousness* (cf. Natsoulas, 1978a, 1983a, 1983c). That is, we exemplify consciousness in one ordinary sense insofar as we have direct (reflective) awareness of a part of the regnancy flow when it occurs (cf. Natsoulas, 1970, 1973, 1978c, 1981, 1983b).

Recently (Natsoulas, in press-c), Murray's conception of the regnancy flow and his treatment, in particular, of unconscious regnant processes have been interpreted as implying that the kind of consciousness I have just been mentioning is due to the occurrence of a "consciousness process," which interacts with the regnant processes that, at the moment, are constituting the flow of configural regnant states (cf. the discussion, following Freud, of "appendage" theories of consciousness in Natsoulas, in press-a). From this interpretation of Murray, as it pertains to the integration of the consciousness process with the other regnant processes, a set of extrapolations about direct (reflective) consciousness were drawn. One example of these extrapolations must suffice here:

> When the consciousness process is dissociated from the remainder of the operative regnant processes, it is as though one's mind were a blank; one is aware of having no perception, no thought, no desire, no inclination, and so on; one has introspective awareness that is analogous to perceptions of absence, or silence after sound, that is, of something's not being were it just was or was expected to be. (Natsoulas, in press-c)

However, the basic consciousness process is not of focal concern in the present article. Except perhaps in abnormal, limiting cases, the person's personal consciousness does not amount merely to isolated direct (reflective) awarenesses of individual regnant processes or the immediate segment of the regnancy flow.

The concept of *personal consciousness* is intended to refer to a certain totality or collection of occurrences of regnant processes. This totality belongs, of course, to one person, and it has one of a great variety of possible subjective organizations. The elements of a person's personal consciousness constitute a small subset of the grand totality whose unique, objective organization is the persons's personality according to Murray and Kluckhohn (1953/1981; see above quotation from them). Personal consciousness consists of those occurrences of regnant processes or segments of the regnancy flow that are now accessible to the person, either through (a) the operations of, presumably, Murray's consciousness process or through (b) something like this process operating now on past segments of the person's mental life and thereby including them in the person's present personal consciousness.

My source of the concept of personal consciousness is, in the first place, Locke's (1706/1975) famous discussion of personal identity. According to his discussion, the mind's innate power of reflection (also called consciousness) includes, as it were, a kind of inner memory along with a kind of inner sense. Thus, the consciousness process is extended to past mental states and events, in addition to giving access to present ones: "This personality extends it *self* beyond present *Existence* to what is past, only by consciousness" (Locke, 1706/1975, p. 346). Similarly, James (1890) included in the stream of mental life a *reflective constituent* that accomplishes the subjective collection and self-appropriation of parts of the stream, thus constituting a personal consciousness.

The nature of the inner memory by which personal consciousness is constituted has received some recent comment. For example: "There is a kind of memory which one may have of doing things and having experiences, and which consists partly of a faint copy of fragments of the earlier experience still seen from the inside" (Mackie, 1976, p. 178; cf. Natsoulas, 1979, p. 51; Shoemaker, 1970, e.g., p. 273; Wollheim, 1979). James (1890) himself stated that "remembrance" is like "direct feeling," that is, something like re-experiencing one's past mental happening. And Locke (1706/1975), too, held that, in order to appropriate past experiences to oneself, one must extend to them "the same consciousness" that one has of one's present experiences.

Because personal consciousness includes more than the immediate part of the person's regnancy flow, his or her mental life normally acquires some degree of subjective organization. We may speak of this organization (which is what I mean by a person's conscious personality) as an "appearance." That is, it is a *seeming* to the person as regards the character of his or her mental life. There is, on the one hand, the objective regnancy flow; this goes on even when the consciousness process is stopped or fully dissociated from the other regnant processes (i.e., the regnancy flow goes on even when it does not "appear"). On the other hand, parts of this flow are incorporated into a subjective mental life or personal consciousness.

To speak of personal consciousness as subjective, an "appearance," and subjectively organized, is not, however, to depreciate its importance in people's lives. My contention shall be that psychology cannot view personal consciousness merely as an *outcome* of one's existence and activity. That is, what I am calling conscious personality is *not epiphenomenal* relative to the person's engagements in the world. Personal consciousness is among the determinants of what we do; we often act *with reference to* our personal consciousness. A related, further contention is that our personal consciousness is the basis on which we may have, as it were, a say or a hand (O'Shaughnessy, 1972, 1974) in our mental life, intervening in it as only our privileged access to it allows.

I hope to make these and other claims about personal consciousness and its subjective organization more persuasive as I examine in the five succeeding sections five dimensions or factors of conscious personality. These are five respects in which the totality that comprises a person's personal consciousness may be differentially organized from the person's own perspective. The five main sections of the article, prior to the concluding section, have as their purpose a more concrete and detailed explication of the concept of conscious personality, which I have now introduced in a preliminary way (see also Natsoulas, in press-c).

Identification and Externality

There are individual differences in how people are related subjectively to their regnancy flow; they are related differently to corresponding parts of their respective flow and to the various categories of regnant processes; thus, they vary in their conscious personality as this was defined above. The first aspect of conscious personality that I discuss pertains to *the pattern of a person's identifications with his or her mental life.* By way of introducing this aspect, I focus briefly on a kind of "internality" that has been proposed in the literature for one's relation to *all* one's mental states and events. It has been proposed that a person is necessarily the "subject" of *any* mental occurrence that transpires in him or her (e.g., Bieri, 1982; Nagel, 1965; cf. Natsoulas, 1978b, 1983e).

A mental occurrence's *subjectivity*, in this sense, has been interpreted as *someone's special ownership of the mental occurrence*, where "special ownership" is a more intimate ("internal") relation than *someone's having the mental occurrence as a part of him or her*. Accordingly, Bieri (1982) expressed the proposed "subjective character" of all mental happenings as their being something *for* someone and not simply something *of* someone:

> Unlike physical states, mental states are not just *there*. They are not just *at hand*. They are not simply *presented* in front of us. Unlike physical events, changes in mental state do not just *happen*. In other words, mental states and events are not just simply *contained* in the world. We want to say that *more* is the case than this. For this "more" that is the case, we have the formulation: Mental states and events are something *for* somebody. They are *pour-soi*. The question "What is it like to be in that state?" is an incomplete question. In its completed form it runs: "What is it like *for me* to be in that state?" (pp. 79-80)

One's being a state's subject requires more than the state's being one's own. Think of the many states of one's many bodily organs. All of these, too, are one's own states. Yet one is not considered their subject in the unique sense that one is the subject of one's mental states. Bieri tried to capture *the more* that is involved in the latter case with his formulation that mental states and events are something *for* somebody. This formulation is obviously vague, however, and it quickly leads to the question whether, for example, the state of one's stomach, too, may not be, in the same sense, something *for* one when one has interoceptive perceptual awarenesses of it.

Perhaps the view is that mental states and events are such (in contrast) that one *must* be aware of their occurrence in oneself. Bieri (1982) did say that "at the moment when the pain is no longer something for me, it has ceased" (p. 80). But he also stated that the mental states and events of animals and human infants are something *for* them as well, notwithstanding their being unable to ascribe the states and events to themselves. In any case, the stomach-state example shows that an immediate (perceptual) awareness of a state does not suffice to make a state something *for* someone. Even a state or event of which one is necessarily aware, whenever it occurs, would not qualify *ipso facto* as a state or event *for* one, unless this necessity imported with it *something else* that made one's relation to one's state or event a more intimate, internal relation than that in which one stands to any part of oneself of which one is aware.

The following interpretation of the subjective character of mental states and events will allow recognition of a source of variation (within and among people's conscious personalities) that may be obscured by the thesis that mental states and events necessarily have a subject. According to this interpretation, a person can have mental states and events of which he or she is aware *and not be their subject*. Such a mental state would be no more "for" the person, in Bieri's intended sense, than those nonmental bodily states and events of which the person is perceptually aware. Our relation to our regnancy flow can be subjectively more and less "intimate," more and less "internal." In the case

of some of our mental states and events, we may be related to them consciously in an "external" way that is like our conscious relation to the state of our stomach when we are aware of it.

Frankfurt (1976) argued, "A person is no more to be identified with everything that goes on in his mind . . . than he is to be identified with everything that goes on in his body" (p. 242). This statement does not reiterate Freud's important point about the unconscious. When I refer to "external" parts of someone's personal consciousness, I do not mean to speak of unconscious psychical processes in Freud's sense (i.e., those processes of the psychical apparatus that are psychical despite their lacking a "subjective side" of consciousness; see Natsoulas, in press-a). My reference continues to pertain to conscious personality, to the conscious organization of personal consciousness; by definition, *all members* of the totality of personal consciousness are accessible to direct (reflective) consciousness or first-person memory of the kind Locke discussed. A mental happening that is a part of a person's personal consciousness may or may not, as it were, find therein an "internal" location. It may or may not have the person as subject, though the person be directly aware of its occurrence to him or her or remember its occurrence "from the inside," that is, somewhat as though he or she were experiencing it again.

Thus, this notion of internality-externality requires an interpretation of a mental state or event's *having a subject* that goes beyond Bieri's formulation. James (1890) wrote of the present segment of the stream of consciousness (and of any past segment that is "remembered") as possessing an immediacy, an intimacy, and a warmth that causes it to be appropriated to oneself. The present "thought" urges itself upon one, forces one to identify with it, by its own qualities or those that accompany its occurrence. Not only is my mental state mine—it is *me*. More perhaps than any other part of me, the part of my personal consciousness with which I identify is me.

Therefore, I might apply to a future governmental agency or corporation for a complete reconstitution of myself (the organism that I am) from fresh materials (as a purported means of overcoming death) if I was convinced that the new physical being would have "the same consciousness" as the old one (cf. Natsoulas, 1979, pp. 46-47, where variation among people was anticipated as regards willingness to be reconstituted). The same consciousness means, of course, the same personal consciousness (cf. Locke, 1706/1975, where he discussed the hypothetical transferral of the same consciousness from one "thinking substance" to another). Yet, I do not identify with all of my personal consciousness; there are parts of it that do not seem "to be me" in the way that other parts are. This is to say that people experience a kind of "externality" (Frankfurt, 1976), relative to parts of their conscious regnancy flow, that varies among people (cf. e.g., Landis, 1964; Reed, 1972) as well as among the constituents of a single personal consciousness.

I need to mention at some point in the article that whereas I am concerned throughout with the conscious organization of personal consciousness, I do not mean necessarily to imply that the person deliberately adopts, arranges, or fashions this organization. Of course, *some* deliberate influences on conscious personality do occur. For example, a person may take up a spiritual practice that has the effect of "distancing" him or her from his or her conscious mental activities for a period of time (cf. "depersonalization" Jaspers, 1959/1963, p. 121), in order perhaps to "stop" them or to render them less clamorous of overt expression. Or, one might attempt to "expand" one's personal consciousness by systematic efforts to remember past experiences from the inside, in order that one's personal consciousness may become more complete and coherent (see below). Indeed, deliberate influences on personal consciousness do occur; but also, without special efforts, one possesses a subjective organization of personal consciousness and a distinctive conscious personality, which includes a variable distribution of identifications with the segments of one's regnancy flow.

As Freud (1917/1955) stated, "Thoughts emerge suddenly without one's knowing where they come from, nor can one do anything to drive them away. These alien guests even seem to be more powerful than those which are at the ego's command" (p. 141). Also relevantly to the internality-externality aspect of conscious personality, Wollheim (1969) argued, in effect, that our stream of consciousness is such that when we introspectively report a thought only by reference to its content (e.g., the thought that it is now raining in London), we do not give thereby a complete description of our thought as we are aware of it: "Where a mental state has a 'how' as well as a 'that' we must report both if we are to report the state" (p. 211). The "how" of a thought, according to Wollheim, is (or includes) its merely occurring to one as opposed to its "being thought" by one (or vice versa).

Although our subjective relation to the thoughts that rise up in our mind, or pour in upon us, differs from the "thoughts that we think," Wollheim did not conceive of their difference, in the first place, in terms of whether or not one is self-identified with them. He distinguished them in terms of passivity and activity, suggesting that only some thoughts are products or components of a person's performances; that is, some thoughts are "the results of contrivance, of [the person's] putting them together—in other words . . . [the person] *thinks* them" (Wollheim, 1969, p. 211). Similarly, Frankfurt (1976) divided thoughts into those that are in some sense chosen by the person and those that are thrust upon him or her: "In our intellectual processes, we may be either active or passive" (p. 240).

Admittedly, internality and activity may be associated, and passivity may be correlated with externality. However, it is clear that their relations are not simple. Many of our conscious thoughts are neither active nor passive in the sense that these authors portray. Much of our thought is neither performed when it does not seem to arrive from elsewhere nor is it seemingly alien in

source when it is not performed. We identify with many of our thoughts that we do not seem to perform, and we may fail to do so in the case of some that we consciously perform. For example, you may experience your mind's "clicking away" on a problem that you have lost interest in or want to set aside. You are still actively thinking your thoughts about the problem, but they now seem external to you as you identify perhaps entirely with the reflective perspective on them and on your continued performance. This occurs also when one becomes depersonalized in very dangerous situations. While feeling oneself far away from the situation and one's thinking about it (as though it were happening to someone else), one continues to think what to do about the danger. Furthermore, there are kinds of mental occurrence that we are not said to perform (i.e., passions; cf. Frankfurt, 1976) and these, too, may be internal or external in the present sense. A desire is often identified with; it is one's own desire; one is its subject. But, in some instances, the desire may be felt in disbelief to be occurring to one. Even one's pains may be, on rare occasion, as though they were occurring to someone else, though one may have no real doubt about their being one's own.

I stated in the present article's introductory section that, whereas the organization of personal consciousness is an "appearance," it is not epiphenomenal relative to the causation of behavior. Some contemporary psychologists (e.g., Skinner, 1974) would disagree with me, since they hold that the main causal line to behavior does not run through consciousness (cf. Natsoulas, 1983d; see, however, later in the present article for an important qualification of Skinner's view). My view is that one often acts *with reference to* one's mental life and, therefore, its subjective organization is consequential. Effects on behavior are surely probable at the extreme—where one's mental life proceeds twice removed from one: once removed qua object of awareness and again removed because it seems to be occurring to someone else (Natsoulas, 1983e).

But extreme cases are not the only ones in which one acts with reference to one's mental life. Whereas some of one's behavior is produced unselfconsciously by the regnancy flow, other behaviors *depend on one's taking note that, for example, one has seen a particular something, arrived at a certain conclusion in thought, or developed an urge to do a particular thing.* Depending on other conditions that one assesses, one may decide to act (or not to act) in accordance with one's conscious state—in terms of what one takes oneself to be perceiving, thinking, or desiring. One does not, at such times, *merely respond* to one's mental life *but in terms* of it; one is not "immersed" (Grene, 1968) in the world, as are those animals who have no personal consciousness because they cannot differentiate themselves from their mental life and use what they learn about it for their purposes. (Therefore, animals could be said, with Bieri, to be subjects of their mental states and events, though only by default, so to speak; there is no "distance" possible between an animal—though perhaps not all animals—and its mental life, and thus it is "identified"

with its mental life but not in the sense of identifying itself with it.)

If indeed human beings respond with reference to their own mental life, the subjective organization of mental life and the internality-externality factor, in particular, should make a difference. However, what the effects will be is very difficult to say in general. Even a part of one's mental life with which one does not identify (which is "alien" to one) may guide one's behavior (in the sense of one's acting with reference to it) depending on its strength (e.g., a powerful desire), its compellingness (e.g., a vivid image that purports to derive from a perilous future), and its credentials (e.g., a supernatural or deep creative source). Perhaps it is safe to say that, otherwise, people tend to credit those parts of their personal consciousness that have the proper internality, and they find it difficult to base their deliberate actions on parts of their mental life that lack the credentials of being theirs qua subject. However, here as elsewhere, we must recognize that people may do whatever it is possible to do, including the choice of actions as dictated by an inner voice that they are conscious of "hearing."

What Is One's Mental Life For?

Since my present topic is the subjective organization of personal consciousness (conscious personality), the title of this secion *does not refer* to that which is accomplished by the interaction of regnant processes, that is, to the *objective* facts of the matter concerning the functions of one's mental life. The title refers to what *the person* takes his or her mental life to be for, in the sense of its use, purpose, or causal role. I speak in this section of the person's more or less complex and otherwise distinct "functional attitude" toward his or her mental life. I consider the person's functional attitude (in this sense) to be a factor of conscious personality, because this attitude affects how personal consciousness is organized subjectively, that is, the structures and patterns that the person's mental life will seem to take.

At an extreme regarding functional attitude, would be people who consider all of their mental life as essentially efficacious, even usable by them as a kind of instrument in the achievement of certain of their purposes. At the other extreme would be people who consider their mental life to consist of the modes of receptivity, feeling, and contemplation. Whereas the latter group of people would be consciously receptive and find themselves acting, conscious mental life at the first extreme would consist of impulses, intentions, inclinations, tendencies, incipient behaviors, and, in general, mental causes of behavior. By exemplifying such a functional attitude, a person would be in virtual agreement with Armstrong's (1968) conception of the mind (see below).

Being as we are self-conscious, goal-oriented organisms, we view each part of us in relation to what it can provide, its function in our lives—be this function "merely" aesthetic or the elimination of life-endangering circumstances and conditions. Our functional attitude toward our own mental life is

an aspect of what Plessner (1961/1970) called "man's eccentric positionality." In his view, the primary source of the latter is the self-consciously instrumental relation in which we stand to our body:

> The human being is an "eccentric" kind of subject. Plessner (1961/1970) wrote of the "brokenness of man's relation to his body" (p. 32) . . . . Animals may distinguish themselves from their environments and respond to their bodies differently from how they respond to other things, but [according to Plessner] they do not use their bodies selfconsciously for the achievement of their purposes (Plessner, 1961/1970). And it is with the latter kind of self-awareness that a reference to the "I" or inner self appears on the scene. There occurs "a singular withdrawal . . . which makes it possible for man to say 'I' to himself" (Plessner, 1961/1970, p. 41). (Natsoulas, 1983e, p. 465)

This singular withdrawal occurs relative not only to the perceivable bodily parts that can be put to use. It occurs as well relative to (a) those parts of the body that cannot be put to use but are taken, anyway, to serve the purposes of life and (b) those parts of us that we cannot literally perceive though we can be active with respect to them (Grene, 1968, p. 105). The latter category consists of interactions among the regnant processes of our brain (which will require an "autocerebroscope" if we are someday literally to perceive them).

Armstrong (1968) would surely say that, given the direct (reflective) access that we have to our mental life, the application of a functional attitude to it is only to be expected. That is, our mental life readily lends itself to a functional understanding, because of what these episodes in fact are and how, consequently, we introspectively find them to be. Our introspections are immediate, noninferential awarenesses of segments of the regnancy flow *as causes* of our behavior, Armstrong would say. Our direct (reflective) awareness characterizes our mental states and events strictly in terms of the respective behaviors that they are, in Armstrong's words, "apt for bringing about" either directly or indirectly through the production of other mental states or events. Although we are immediately aware of happenings that go on in our mind (brain), we are aware of them, in Armstrong's view, *not in terms of their intrinsic properties*; rather, we are always aware of them, when we are, in respect to certain of their relational properties, namely, as causes of or "aptnesses for" specific behaviors and other mental happenings. To be aware of a mental happening *merely* as a cause is to be aware only of a relation in which it participates. However, Armstrong (1968, p. 98) did not intend to imply that one must be aware of the actual taking place of a behavioral effect in order to be aware of its mental cause as such. In a particular instance, a mental cause is "recognizable" as such, whether or not it brings about its distinguishing behavioral effect.

Functional organization does not exclude, of course, other kinds of subjective organizaion such as identification and externality. Consistently, Grene (1968) suggested that the human being's eccentric positionality, specifically one's standing over against one's mental life, gives rise to a radical uncertainty

about the intentions that determine one's behavior, concerning whether these intentions are one's own. She wrote of "the inevitability . . . of that strange but central fact . . . that, for all my actions, even the most considered or the most self-consciously responsible of them, I never really know whether it is *I* who performs them or something in me that is not 'really' I" (p. 106). We may read Grene's statement as a conclusion she has drawn from many of her introspective awarenesses. We have it, therefore, from this highly sophisticated informant that there occur conscious mental causes of behavior that are "external" in the sense of the previous section.

Internal or external, however, mental states and events would be organized subjectively in terms of *what they effect or influence*—if Armstrong was correct about them and about how they seem to us firsthand. If he was correct, then one's conscious personality should reflect *the distinctive patterns of use to which one puts one's body*, since such use depends causally on mental occurrences of which one is often aware as causes of one's behavior. However, this difference in the constituent mental episodes would simply make *likely* a difference in the organization of personal consciousness. Of greater interest here is that differences in conscious personality will *reflect* differences among people's functional attitudes toward their mental life.

Such variation is responsible, no doubt, for the spontaneous skepticism that Armstrong's major claim evokes. Do we really find introspectively that all our mental episodes are either indirect or direct causes of behavior? Are we immediately aware of them as causes? Admittedly, we are aware of many of our mental occurrences as efficacious, as affecting our body, behaviors, and environments through our behaviors (cf. Feigl, 1981, p. 345). But Armstrong's claim is a surprising one because we find some of our mental states and events to be otherwise than Armstrong proposed.

Again, some of the regnant processes or regnancies that comprise one's mental life are indeed subjectively identified in terms of their consequences in behavior or in the effects of behavior. One is aware of them directly as having a content that refers to the outcome that they help to produce. There is, therefore, a good amount of truth in Armstrong's major claim. However: "We have direct awarenesses of mental episodes that seem to us to have *no relation* to the one body (or to any body). This is not to question some relation to this body; rather it is to argue that such a relation does not unify them subjectively" (Natsoulas, 1979, p. 58). That is, we may appropriate some of our mental occurrences, making them part of our personal consciousness, though they do not have an apparent relation to the body in which they in fact occur or to its behavior. For example, in any period of passive meditation, numerous mental occurrences simply pass through one's mind. A psychologist who asked a meditating subject to report what behavior each mental occurrence was an aptness for would have difficulty in having his or her instructions followed or even in being understood in regard to many mental occurrences.

Here are two examples of mental happenings that we introspectively characterize, it would seem, otherwise than as causes of behavior. (a) If you have an image of someone's face, you are not aware of its occurrence to you as a cause or potential cause of your behavior. You are aware of it as a visual experiential state; that is, the face seems to be present to you qualitatively. It is in terms of the face's qualitative presence to you that you are aware of the mental state, rather than in terms of what you might do were the imagined person actually here. In fact, you might do any number of very different things depending on further conditions than his or her physical presence. (b) Some of my wishes are pointless; that is, they are wishes, sometimes longstanding, for situations that I cannot produce no matter what I do (e.g., that someone still be alive). Therefore, a defining link to behavior could not have developed. Yet these wishes can be quite specific, and they do not refer to activities that they may in fact produce (e.g., tears of sorrow, a curse thrown at no one particular). Armstrong (1968) discussed such wishes and stated that they *would* produce relevant behavior if one believed it might be effective. The question is, however, whether pointless wishes are introspectively characterized in terms of behavior. Are we aware of *longing for the impossible* as an aptness for producing hypothetical behavior? Or, are we aware of it as a painful apprehension of a lack or absence in the world?

Many people's personal consciousness includes a group of mental occurrences whose evident function is not that they cause behavior. These mental occurrences include aesthetic and consummatory experiences or feelings, which make mental life more than just a means—also *an end in itself*. Our mental episodes often seem to us to be effects; and we are often aware of them as that for which we have behaved (e.g., instrumental use of perceptual systems to produce a stream of experiences of the environment: Gibson, 1966, 1979; cf. Natsoulas, 1983f, in press-d). Or, at least, we are aware of them not as causes but as occurrences with *their own* qualities and values (cf. Mead, 1938, pp. 25 and 451).

However, I gather from the writings on this topic of some authors that not all people subjectively organize their personal consciousness in a way that includes a category of experiences as such. The unwillingness of Armstrong and others (e.g., Dennett, 1979) to countenance the introspective awareness of mental episodes that possess a qualitative character strongly suggests this. In their view, all that we are ever aware of in this way are inner causes or dispositions to behave; our mental life is said to consist entirely of these. Everything else that others consider part of their mental life is located by these theorists in the environment or in the body outside the nervous system. For example, when I selfconsciously see something red, I am not (and cannot be) aware of having an experience of red. I am only aware that I acquire the belief or inclination to believe (or tend to utter certain sentences to the effect) that something red is there in the environment before me and stimulating my visual receptors.

This theoretical position may reflect the conscious personality of the theorists who propose it. The following psychological explanation of their position may apply. (The position may also be explained nonpsychologically, perhaps more properly.) In brief, a part of such theorists' personal consciousness has been exteriorized. They have no fewer experiences of red than other people have, and they are no less capable of becoming aware of the occurrence to them of these experiences. But their direct (reflective) awarenesses characterize their experiences in such a way that the experiences are radically externalized. Due to the theorists' functional attitude toward their mental life, as consisting entirely of aptnesses for behavior or the like, a part of their personal consciousness is located by them in the environment or body outside the nervous system. The constituents of this part of their personal consciousness do not seem to them to be mental occurrences because these constituents are not in fact aptnesses for behavior. Therefore, the theorists consistently take their experiences of red, for example, to be simply whatever object is looking red to them, and their experiences of pain to be a disturbed state of their organs or limbs that they detect.

Isolation and Communicability

Among its organizational features, personal consciousness will include not only causal relations of the regnancy flow to behavior and to conditions external to mental life, but also causal relations among the mental episodes that constitute a personal consciousness. Not only will particular mental states and events be acknowledged as belonging to the identical whole of one's consciousness, some of them will seem to form patterns in which an earlier mental episode is a cause of the occurrence or character of a subsequent mental episode. That is, in the person's view, a subsequent part of the regnancy flow will have occurred as it did because of the occurrence of the earlier episode. Also, personal consciousness may well be subjectvely organized around key parts of the regnancy flow, parts that the person holds to have large causal implications. For example, if I had not suffered as I did on a certain past occasion, my thoughts, feelings, and desires would not be as they now are whenever I must associate with a certain category of person.

In addition, there are consciously recognized repetitive patterns of mental happenings that recur in a person's life. Although subjectively grouped as instances of the same pattern, the successive instances of the same pattern may not be taken as causally related. Instead, the sameness of pattern is accounted for as due to recurring environmental causes. Such an account would provide an inductive basis for predictions to future segments of the regnancy flow.

I should mention also temporal relations among parts of the regnancy flow. Obviously, a subjective causal organization of parts of one's mental life requires that one be able to tell that one part of the regnancy flow occurred prior to another part. In this among other regards, Federn (1952) described as

"uncanny" the experiences of depersonalized patients who exhibit an inaccurate feeling for time and, in particular, "uncertainty as to the historical sequence of memories" (p. 249). Interestingly, this kind of temporal disorientation is often accompanied by an alienation of experiences. It would seem that an inability to subjectively organize experiences in time results in their externalization, as though a basis for their subjective unity were removed.

The subjective organization of personal consciousness in terms of temporal, similarity, and causal relations depends on the "communicability" of the respective mental occurrences: "Think of being able to recall your experiences, but never being able to relate them to each other not even with regard to which came before the other" (Natsoulas, 1979, p. 60). The notion of "communicability" (which is an extension from Locke, 1706/1975) needs to be explained.

In the introduction to this article, I stated that the totality constituting a personal consciousness consists of all those regnant processes or segments of the regnancy flow now accessible to the person "from the inside"—that is, either by direct awareness of them at the time of their occurrence or by remembrance of them from a first-person perspective (i.e., not as though one had learned of their occurrence from a third-person perspective of observation, inference, or hearsay). However, such accessibility does not imply either that one relates or can relate one's mental episodes to each other. In addition to accessibility, I am suggesting that there is a further factor called communicability that contributes to conscious personality. Stated negatively, the degree of internal isolation among the constituents of a personal consciousness varies between and within personal consciousnesses. In an important sense, a personal consciousness with perfect internal isolation would be no personal consciousness at all, because it would be a mere statistical totality rather than forming any kind of unity. Although we could speak, anyway, of the person's conscious personality in terms of other factors (e.g., identification and externality), the application of the concept of a personal consciousness would be endangered.

Perfect communicability lies at the other extreme from perfect isolation. Mackie (1976) described such an ideal condition as follows: "Any later phase of such a consciousness could remember, in this special way, from the inside, all and only earlier items belonging to the same unit, that is, that any earlier item could be made co-conscious by memory with any later item in that same unit" (pp. 178-179). Communicability, or the variable ability to relate the parts of one's personal consciousness to each other, depends on their not being isolated, that is, on bringing them to mind together (= co-consciousness). The "units" of consciousness are indeed, as Mackie (1976) wrote, "untidy." For one thing, the communicability of their constituents is less than it could be in extent or depth. What is accessible may never be related to other accessible parts of the regnancy flow, or related to them more or less superficially. Even as we are aware of particular parts of our mental life, we may make

little organized sense of the totality that is accessible to us. For the most part, it may be for us just one thing after another, a mental life responsive to the world but which subjectively lacks patterns, other than those entrained by the environment in process.

The failure to relate the parts of one's mental life to each other will mean that something having discoverable internal structure will not be known as such. This something is, moreover, the part of us with which we often most closely identify ourselves. Our mental life or part of it is we ourselves—as is witnessed by the thought, which has crossed all our minds, that we might go on without a body after we die. And, if Murray and Sperry are right about our mental life, that it amounts to activity at the highest control level of the nervous system, our identification with our mental life is not misplaced.

Isolation, in the present sense, means a limit to self-knowledge, and should be of major interest to the personality psychologist. It will be important to study, as well, people who lie closer to the other extreme, in the direction of perfect communicability of their personal consciousness. Their conscious mental life can possess a coherence, a thematic structure over time, being more like a musical composition to their ear than a cacophany of independent sounds. A new, conscious part of their regnancy flow will fall into place relative to previous segments, since their personal consciousness possesses, no doubt, a subjective structure that has been tried and improved over considerable time through co-consciousness in Mackie's sense.

A clear contrast here is provided by the so-called borderline patient as characterized by Frances, Sacks, and Aronoff (1977): "His ongoing experience of himself contains continuous potential newness, unfamiliarity and dissonance" (p. 328). The person with an integrated conscious personality will not greet new parts of the regnancy flow with surprise, will not as often find them novel and perhaps unmanageable. In psychotherapy, this person will not be consciously as though beginning afresh in each new session, as though the work of previous sessions had not taken place. Co-consciousness of the present experience with relevant past ones, to which it is then related, should help in the progress of psychotherapy, assuming that the latter seeks to understand the patterns of mental life over the person's life.

Someone may argue that our past has its effects whether or not we are now aware of it and whether or not past experiences are co-conscious with present experiences. But nonconscious effects of the past on our current behavior are not the only way in which the past effects what we do now. Again, I want to emphasize that people behave *with reference to* their personal consciousness. Consciously relating our present regnancy flow to a past segment of it can result in behavior that otherwise would not occur under the same external circumstances. For example, we may gather courage from successes in our past though these have not diminished our present fear to the point where we respond spontaneously in the way that worked before. Remembering how afraid we were just before a previous success may diminish our reluctance to

engage in the behavior, which is not "at strength." Skinner (1969, p. 159) has usefully discussed what he called "awareness," stating that this helps to produce behavior that would not otherwise occur because it has grown "weak." We become aware of the behavior's appropriateness to the conditions that we now face and "mand" its occurrence, thus causing ourselves to perform an improbable response. Similarly, my present point is that a communicable personal consciousness will allow one to behave in ways that take advantage of past experiences when the latter have not been effective in determining present behavior without a detour through personal consciousness.

Inner Perspicacity

I mentioned earlier a hypothetical "consciousness process" that is consistent with Murray's (1936, 1951; Shneidman, 1981) largely implicit conception of consciousness. This consciousness process, too, would be a regnant process as he defined the latter. However, the consciousness process should not be confused with the processes that are properly referred to as conscious regnant processes, for it is a conscious-making regnant process. It is supposed to render conscious other regnant processes during its interaction with them.

I have not treated of the consciousness process itself in the present article (see Natsoulas, 1970, 1973, 1977, 1978c, 1983b, in press-c). However, personal consciousness has been defined here (as well as by Locke, 1706/1975, and James, 1890) partly in terms of direct (reflective) awareness, which the consciousness process produces. That is, the integrated (i.e., nondissociated) functioning of the consciousness process provides new constituents for one's personal consciousness in the form of conscious mental episodes. (By the way, these new constituents may or may not be retained, i.e., what we are able to remember from the inside is far less than what we have been directly, reflectively aware of.)

Moreover, personal consciousness would seem to depend on the rudimentary consciousness process in another way, namely, for its accuracy and discriminativenesss. This has implications, of course, for conscious personality; how one's personal consciousness is consciously organized will surely depend on the categorial system that one applies to one's mental life, including how well different kinds of mental occurrences are brought under distinctive descriptions. Some people's personal consciousness is more poorly organized than it could be because they do not adequately tell apart their different mental occurrences. For example, all their moods may subjectively consist of "feeling good" or "feeling bad" and vary only in degree.

Direct awareness typically involves categorization of a mental occurrence in two respects or more. The consciousness process will categorize a mental occurrence both in terms of kind and in terms of content. For example, I may become aware of having a visual awareness or series of them, and that the

awareness or series has as its content something about the tree at which I am looking (e.g., that its leaves are many shades of green). Or, I may become aware of a mental occurrence of the passing-thought kind with the content that it is raining in London right now.

There is much reason to suppose that people differ in their "inner perspicacity," in how discerning they are about the kind and content of the mental occurrences of which they become immediately aware by means of the consciousness process. In this regard, they differ both among themselves and, as we say, within themselves—that is, relative to different parts or categories of their mental life. This conclusion has been reached repeatedly in this century, based on the collective psychoanalytic experience. Innumerable times, it has been concluded not only that (a) behavior requires unconscious psychical processes for its explanation, but also that (b) the person may be aware of a (conscious) mental occurrence without being clear or correct concerning which one it is.

For example, the psychoanalyst Luborsky (1967) has informatively discussed certain elusive conscious thoughts that his patients have during their sessions with him. According to his interpretation, these thoughts "have temporarily broken loose from defensive protection" (p. 213). However, although one is aware of their occurrence during free association, one finds oneself unable to tell what the thought was just as soon as it occurs. No doubt, the same thing occurs as well in remembering from the inside past segments of one's regnancy flow; that is, one may remember that "something happened," something distinctive, yet one may be unable to tell what feeling or state of mind it was that happened in that past situation.

Freud (1895/1966, 1915/1957, 1923/1961, 1938/1964) was sensitive to the point that a mental occurrence could be conscious and yet poorly grasped. He held, first of all, that all kinds of experience (i.e., qualitative psychical processes) are necessarily conscious because of their intrinsic qualitative nature (see Natsoulas, in press-a). All experiences were supposed to take place in the perception-consciousness system of the psychical apparatus, and to involve in each case "omega" processes, that is, processes constituted of "omega" neurones, a kind of neurone that somehow makes the processes that it constitutes conscious. Thus, all qualitative processes (i.e., experiences) have "a subjective side." They are conscious processes by their own intrinsic nature, and not by the action of an "appendage," a further process somehow attached to them (e.g., Murray's consciousness process). Among intrinsically conscious processes are bodily experiences (sensations and feelings), sensory experiences, perceptual experiences, hallucinatory experiences, affective experiences, and emotional experiences. Although Freud suggested that these processes were conscious whenever they occurred, he held also that this does not mean that they are not frequently misconstrued. They are taken by the person in one way or another for what they are not, or taken in a vague or uninformed way.

According to Freud (1915/1957), psychoanalysis speaks sometimes, not quite properly, of unconscious emotions. These cannot be, in his view, literally unconscious because they are experiences; they are qualitative and have a subjective side in every instance. One such case of "unconscious" emotion occurs when the person takes the emotion for a different emotion or for an emotion of the same kind but elsewhere directed and having a different reason. But the emotion is not, in Freud's view, truly unconscious; rather, something about how one is aware of it has gone wrong, presumably for psychodynamic reasons.

Psychologists have often spoken with methodological authority concerning the limitations of direct (reflective) awareness. However, it is not clear what these limitations ultimately may be. With regard to their regnancy flow, how perspicacious *can* people be? We cannot answer this question from our present knowledge of the consciousness process. The answer depends on the nature of this process and the degree to which its function can be improved. Skinner has been optimistic about the improvement of our direct access to our "private events." At the same time, he expressed a theoretically grounded skepticism concerning the present usefulness of introspection in giving us information about events inside the skin:

> The deficiencies which generate public *mistrust* lead, in the case of the individual himself, to simple *ignorance*. There appears to be no way in which the individual may sharpen the reference of his own verbal repertoire in this respect. This is particularly unfortunate because he probably has many reasons for distorting his own report to himself. (Skinner, 1953, p. 261)

Skinner's optimism in the face of the present situation arises from the assured progress that we will make, through technology, in getting information about the processes that go on inside the bodies of other people, including their feelings, thoughts, and perceptions. Once these private events are made readily accessible to the verbal community, then the consciousness process will be shaped by operant conditioning of self-descriptive vocabulary in such a way that it will be suitably discriminative and informative. Our being poor introspectors now amounts to not being able to properly describe ourselves with respect to the occurrence and category of many happenings within us that could serve as, or provide, a stimulational basis for introspective responses.

This is a view that Skinner (1945a, 1945b, 1953, 1957, 1969, 1974) has presented and developed over a long period of time. The following passage comes from Skinner's part of a debate about consciousness held in the mid-1960's. The passage is explicit about differences among people in their inner perspicacity.

> Ideas, motives, and feelings are more important to Professor Blanshard's argument than pain, and they are by no means so self-evidently perceived. The processes or states which such terms describe acquire control very slowly. Only a long and complicated history of

> reinforcement leads one to speak of sensations, images, and thoughts. Such a history is characteristic only of certain cultures. Our own culture shows wide variations—it produces a thoroughgoing extravert on the one hand and the introspective psychologist and philosopher on the other. (Blanshard and Skinner, 1966-1967, p. 329)

If the consciousness process is a learned process, as Skinner suggested, then we can expect differences among people, as a result of different patterns of learning, in the subjective organization of their personal consciousness. One might begin to point out how people differ by giving attention to how the person groups his or her various mental occurrences, which of them constitute for the person a single class.

The Subjective Commitment to Truth

The factor of conscious personality to be discussed next does not round out the set. There are surely many more factors than the five briefly discussed in this article. It remains to be determined how many of them there are and how best to reduce them in depicting a person's conscious personality. I include here, finally, the variable, subjective commitment to truth as a factor affecting the subjective organization of personal consciousness because it allows me to make evident a function of personal consciousness that psychologists do not normally appreciate. This is *the involvement of personal consciousness in our acquisition of knowledge about the world.*

Also, I want to suggest that *our mental life may exhibit recurring concerns about its own meaning* in the sense of how a part of it is related representationally to states of affairs outside it. For example, a person may be more or less committed to determining the truth-status of segments of his or her regnancy flow, that is, to determining whether that of which he or she is aware is a fact. The subjective commitment to truth is what O'Shaugnessy (1972) called an "epistemological posture." This posture will characterize different people to a greater or lesser extent, and will vary from time to time and situationally.

A different epistemological posture does not imply, necessarily, any less awareness of one's mental life. For example, consider the posture of suspending one's subjective commitment to truth about the world in order to try to say just how one finds the regnancy flow itself to be, independently of what the world beyond it may actually be like. Or, think of luxuriating in one's high fidelity, auditory, musical experiences, fully aware of them and that one is enjoying them, while unconcerned about their ultimate source or how they are now being produced.

Another posture is one of reduced skepticism; truth is relevant but one takes pretty much for granted what one's mental life informs about its referents or apparent referents. In contrast, a consistently active role in the establishment of one's beliefs, by interrogating one's awarenesses for their truth, would represent a large subjective commitment to truth. By the interro-

gation of one's awarenesses for their truth is meant their evaluation by reference to other awarenesses, particularly perceptual ones, memories, and thoughts that draw on one's knowledge system. Even our perceptual awarenesses do not carry their veridicality as an emblem on their sleeve:

> We cannot tell from the occurrence to us of a perception whether it is veridical, that its propositional content is a fact. We must assess its content against what we have learned or will learn. The process involves a drawing out of implications. I perceive that such and such is the case. What should follow? Does it? We check these implications against further perceptions or against what we already know. (Natsoulas, 1977b, p. 81)

The subjective commitment to truth cannot help but have, depending on its degree and extent, effects on the subjective organization of personal consciousness. By categorizing and evaluating the accessible segments of one's regnancy flow in terms of their veridicality, we distribute an importance or relevance to different parts of our mental life. Even awarenesses that are far off the mark may be cherished for their bizarreness by some people, or it may be difficult for people to shake them off. The normal pattern will be to externalize bizarre awarenesses as alien guests of the mind; in time, they may seem not actually to have transpired in one. Similarly, having worked out a problem in thought, one probably will not remember from the inside many experiences that pertain to various false leads that were immediately abandoned.

Given a very much reduced commitment to truth, one will treat the constituents of one's personal consciousness as lying on much the same level insofar as representing the world is concerned. This would tend toward the truly naive realist extreme, where whatever has, so to speak, sufficient "substance" to be caught by one's awareness has equal status as real. We are all acquainted with people who will insist that something is "real for them," implying that this is the ultimate court of appeal for veridicality. What they experience, because they experience it, is equally as valid (however unlikely) as anything another approach may provide. Thus, given a very much reduced commitment to truth over a significant amount of time, one's personal consciousness should become populated with a greater range of constituents; and a consequence will be a differently organized personal consciousness.

Psychologists have not yet appreciated that one's taking a hand in the establishment of one's beliefs involves interrogating one's awarenesses for their truth (cf. O'Shaughnessy, 1972). Interrogating a perception or cognition for its correspondence to how things are, we must have access to this awareness and compare it with other awarenesses. A simple example: I see this and think that something else is true. Which is correct? I know something else—my poor eyesight; therefore, I may be right in what I think, and so on.

The reason we want to intervene in our mental life in this way is to ensure that we do not acquire beliefs that are based on illusory or delusional awarenesses. We do not want such awarenesses to have an equal effect on our knowledge system as the veridical ones do. O'Shaughnessy (1972) has written

persuasively of the "freedom of believing" as being "central to a properly human status." About cognitive attitudes and perceptual impressions that are not interrogated, O'Shaughnessy (1972) stated,

> The truly important point here is the fact that delusive beliefs are installed as alien or foreign bodies in the mind, and take possession of it. They constitute an enslavement, through alienation, as can occur in no animal. For they are not cognitive delegates or representatives of the person, being installed without consultation with *him*! (p. 57)

This kind of enslavement cannot occur in other animals, because only we, according to O'Shaughnessy, can exercise the freedom of believing by interrogating our awarenesses for their truth and thereby controlling to a degree their effects on our knowledge system.

Yet, we must recognize that the subjective commitment to truth is also capable of exaggeration and maladaptiveness. A person who has such an exaggerated commitment devotes extraordinary time and energy to the inprovement of his or her knowledge system, to the point where life may become a continuous inquiry into the nature of things. In my view, such a life requires not only a great deal of observation of the world, first and second hand, and the study of theories about the world, but also great efforts of interrogation directed upon one's perceptions, memories, and cognitions for their truth. The maladaptiveness of this commitment would depend on whether one was led to ignore those parts of one's mental life that do not have a primarily representational function, with the consequence that one does not know, for one thing, what to expect of oneself (cf. Armstrong's, 1968, function of introspection as giving information about causes of behavior).

The subjective commitment to truth would also be maladaptive if the person's interrogations of his or her awarenesses were systematically biased in the direction of a particular theory of knowledge. For example (see Hebb, 1946), a chief primate psychologist prevents his staff from spontaneously forming relatively true beliefs, during observation of the animals, by insisting that all beliefs acquired be based on behaviorist translations of the staff's perceptions of the animals. The firsthand awarenesses ascribing human emotions to the animals are rejected in favor of cognitions that mention only the animals' observable responses. It turns out that the beliefs about the animals acquired in this way are neither coherent nor useful, though all of them were based, presumably, on accurate perceptions of the animals' behaviors.

Conclusion: The Improvement of Conscious Personality

This final section is a short recapitulation of some of the points made or implied in the body of the article, specifically, points that pertain to the improvement of the subjective organization of personal consciousness.

1. In general, it is better to identify with the constituents of one's personal consciousness than to be estranged from them, since they are one's own and

may have important effects on one's behavior. Yet externality also may have its uses, since externalized wishes, emotions, patterns of thought, and so on, are not unconscious. Externality does not mean denial of their occurrence in one, but that one does not grant to them the special credential of one's being their subject. Therefore, they are less likely to have the effects that they may have when one identifies with them. Externality may be useful in trying to change one's mental life, and in having a greater say about which parts of it determine one's behavior.

2. Conscious personality may be improved by the application of a suitable functional attitude to the constituents of one's personal consciousness. Whereas a functional attitude toward one's mental life that treats it as an experiential effect of circumstances and conditions may enhance one's enjoyment of it, there will be many occasions on which a more differentiated functional attitude will have adaptational advantages. The latter would include standing over against parts of one's mental life in a way that allows one to put one's mental life to use. Recognition of mental episodes as consistent causes of particular behaviors can be used in preventing, modifying, and amplifying the occurrence of the latter. One may also discern a hierarchy of mental states and events according to how effective they are in the determination of a particular kind of behavior; for example, a particular person's performance in tennis or chess may vary depending on his or her emotional state.

3. A subjective commitment to the unity or integration of personal consciousness will likely result in an improved conscious personality. As was suggested, a sufficiently greater communicability among the constituents of a personal consciousness will make it possible for the person better to benefit from psychotherapy. A person with a highly integrated personal consciousness will have access to, for purposes of interpretation, the patterns that his or her personal consciousness contains. The integration of personal consciousness may be pursued, for example, by keeping a journal that records significant segments of the daily regnancy flow.

4. The subtle differentiation of mental states and events will be useful in the prediction of one's behavior and in the understanding of how circumstances and conditions affect one's mental life, making it more or less satisfactory. Inner perspicacity depends on both the possession of an adequate categorial scheme, which appropriately differentiates and characterizes the segments of one's regnancy flow, and the coordination of the scheme with the mental occurrences to which it potentially refers, so that one applies the appropriate category in being directly (reflectively) aware or having "remembrance" of them. An increase in inner perspicacity should count as an improvement of conscious personality because it makes possible, among other things, the adjustment to, and of, the conditions of daily life in the direction of a more enjoyable, acceptable, or tolerable mental life.

5. When strengthened, the subjective commitment to the truth of one's mental life may or may not improve the conscious personality. On the one

hand, parts of one's mental life would gain importance, namely, the primarily representational parts, thus making new differentiated recruits available for personal consciousness. However, on the other hand, the subjective commitment to truth can result in a tendency to ignore parts of one's mental life that have a function other than to reflect reality. It is important to include in one's personal consciousness (in a communicable, perspicaciously characterized form) parts of one's mental life bearing on how one is made to feel by what happens to one and how one behaves.

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