

Is Any State of Consciousness Self-Intimating?

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While it may be true that (a) not all mental states are components of the stream of consciousness, (b) not all components of the stream of consciousness are intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness, and (c) not all directly (reflectively) conscious components of the stream of consciousness are self-intimately so, the question remains whether any components of the stream of consciousness are self-intimating. A component of the stream of consciousness is self-intimating if the owner of the stream is not only aware of each occurrence of the component but also aware of it simply because the component occurs, that is, without the owner's having direct (reflective) awareness of the component that is distinct from the component itself.

A previous article addressed a variety of basic problems of consciousness—namely, the problems of conscious experience, intentionality, imagination, awareness, introspection, personal unity, the subject, “consciousness” (as more or less), the normal waking state, conscious behavior, and explicit consciousness—and argued that to speak of “the problem of consciousness,” as psychologists have been doing for some time, is a misleading practice; rather, there are a number of problems of consciousness that psychologists must address if the science of psychology is ever to explain specifically human existence (Natsoulas, 1981).

Since publication of that argument, articles have appeared on various specific problems of consciousness (Natsoulas, e.g., 1983c, 1983d, 1984b, 1985a), and a particular crucial problem has surfaced repeatedly, albeit without the detailed examination that the problem obviously requires and deserves. This problem (of the present article) is *whether any durational components of the stream of consciousness are “self-intimating.”* (At various points below, these components are called, also, “states of consciousness,” “subjective states,” and, following Sigmund Freud, “conscious psychical processes.”)

A component of the stream of consciousness is self-intimating if the owner of the stream is not only aware of the present occurrence of the component but also aware of it *simply because the component occurs*, that is, without the

owner's having awareness (of the component) that is distinct from the component. The term *self-intimating* in the present use comes from a well-known discussion in which Ryle (1949) attacked the notion that any of the states or operations of the mind are self-intimating. Here is how he presented the self-intimational view that he was rejecting:

The things that a mind does or experiences are self-intimating, and this is supposed to be a feature which characterizes these acts and feelings not just sometimes but always. . . . If I think, hope, remember, will, regret, hear a noise, or feel a pain, I must, *ipso facto*, know that I do so. Even if I dream that I see a dragon, I must be apprised of my dragon-seeing, though, it is often conceded, I may not know that I am dreaming. . . . According to the theory, mental processes are conscious, not in the sense that we do or could report on them *post mortem*, but in the sense that their intimations of their own occurrences are properties of those occurrences and so are not posterior to them. (pp. 158-160)

The occurrence of a self-intimating mental process is, *ipso facto*, the person's immediate awareness of the process.

While it may be true that (a) not all components of the stream of consciousness are conscious and (b) it is wrong to hold that all those components that are conscious are self-intimationally so, the question remains whether *any* components of the stream are self-intimating. It shall emerge, as the present discussion proceeds, how this question is an important one for the psychology of consciousness.

For purposes of introducing and further identifying the problem of consciousness of the present article, it will be useful to return to the basic thinking on the topic of consciousness of two great scientific pioneers, two intellectual giants of psychology's first century, who represent contrasting perspectives in the present context. The two psychologists are none other than James (1890, 1892/1963) and Freud (e.g., 1900/1953, 1915/1957, 1938/1964). The familiarity, influence, and importance of the contributions of these very major figures will help to make the present discussion more vivid and relevant to contemporary psychological concerns. However, before the discussion proceeds, one matter requires comment, namely, the treatment in the present article of Freud's conception of consciousness.

Although much of Freud's work is highly familiar to contemporary psychologists (cf. Gilgen, 1982), his conception of consciousness is a part of his general theory which psychologists, with very rare exceptions, have not discussed or studied closely. Quite naturally, in view of their purposes, students of Freud's work have concentrated heavily on what he proposed concerning the functioning of the psychical apparatus in the form of psychical processes that are not conscious psychical processes.

Consequently, the present treatment of Freud's conception of consciousness may result in certain objections coming to mind. For this reason, the reader should consult three previous articles that exclusively address Freud's conception of consciousness, in order to determine how, in a larger space, objections to the present treatment would be met (Natsoulas, 1984a, 1985b, in press).

The ready availability of these materials justifies the present article's moving along to its main issue with less preparation than would otherwise be necessary.

Also available elsewhere are discussions of James's conception of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1985-1986, 1986-1987). James's conception may well be, for obvious reasons, more familiar than Freud's conception is at the present time (though perhaps not later on).

What the Basic Sense Is of a Psychological Process's Being Conscious

Freud proposed that, among the parts of a person's psychical apparatus, there exists a *literally anatomical, physiological, psychological system* that can properly claim the name "the perception-consciousness system." Early on, Freud (e.g., 1900/1953) had distinguished a consciousness system from a perception system, but after a point he combined the functions of these two systems and assigned these functions to a single unified system for the rest of his career. For example, Freud (1917/1957) stated, "In *The Interpretation of Dreams* we were already led to the decision to regard conscious perception as the function of a special system. . . . We may regard this system, which there is called *Pcpt.*, as coinciding with the system *Cs.*" (p. 232; see Natsoulas, in press).

All those psychical processes that are processes of the perception-consciousness system, Freud held to be *conscious occurrences* in all their particular instances. Clearly, more needs to be said concerning the sense of "conscious occurrence," or a psychical process's being conscious whenever it occurs. (As will be seen in a later section, there is more to Freud's sense of *conscious* than what is stated in the present section. However, reference is made here to a no less essential ingredient.)

The possessor of the psychical apparatus in which any occurrence of a conscious psychical process takes place is aware immediately (i.e., noninferentially) of the occurrence, and not by using his or her sense organs or through stimulation of his or her sense receptors. That is, the *immediate* awareness that is essentially involved in a psychical process's being conscious is *nonperceptual*, on the usual understanding of perceptual awareness: of which typical forms are (a) being aware of a tree by means of one's eyes, (b) hearing the sound of a police car siren, and (c) being interoceptively aware of a state of one's stomach. The occurrence of a conscious psychical process may be a result of the stimulation of receptors or nerve endings; that is not denied, of course. But no additional stimulation plays the role of causing the possessor of the psychical apparatus to have immediate awareness of the occurrence of the psychical process.

Henceforth, in the present article, the kind of immediate awareness that constitutes a psychical process being conscious shall be designated "direct (reflective) awareness" or "direct (reflective) consciousness." And a psychical process of which its possessor has direct (reflective) awareness shall be called

a "directly (reflectively) conscious psychical process" or, simply, a "conscious psychical process" (cf. Natsoulas, 1977a, 1978, 1983a, 1986a). The present usage is consistent with Freud's passive usage, as the editors of the *Standard Edition* (see Freud, 1915/1957, p. 165, 1923/1961, p. 3) explained it.

In the passive sense of *conscious*, conscious psychical processes are, in each of their occurrences, "intentional objects" (Bergmann, 1960; Føllesdal, 1974; Natsoulas, 1977b) of direct (reflective) consciousness. The latter is the active sense of the owner's apprehending his or her conscious psychical processes immediately, without the mediation of his or her being aware of something other than the particular psychical process (cf. Brentano, 1911/1973, p. 102).¹ An intentional object is that which a person's having an awareness makes the person aware of, when it makes the person aware of something (cf. Mulligan and Smith, 1986, p. 121; Natsoulas, 1980, 1982).

According to Freud, the person is in the indicated direct way aware of the occurrence to him or her of a certain particular thought, for example, or a certain particular emotion. This direct (reflective) awareness, in effect, brings the respective occurrence of a psychical process under a heading. Which may not be an entirely correct heading; for example, one may directly (reflectively) mistake for agitation or anxiety the anger that really is there in one's stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, all psychical processes of the perception-consciousness system were held to be intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness in any instance of their occurrence.

Our Common Understanding of Experiences as Unconditionally Conscious

In contrast, psychical processes of the person's psychical apparatus that occur *outside* the perception-conscious system, according to Freud's theory, are unconditionally lacking the attribute of consciousness of the previous section. Therefore, they shall be called here "nonconscious psychical processes." In designating these processes, the word *nonconscious* is more suitable than the word *unconscious* because the present reference is to a descriptive rather than a psychodynamic fact. Accordingly, nonconscious psychical processes include both Freud's preconscious and unconscious processes.

Though nonconscious psychical processes are no less psychical than conscious psychical processes are, they cannot be (as the latter always are whenever they occur) intentional objects of direct (reflective) consciousness; they cannot be cognitively grasped in this sense. In addition to this essential difference between conscious and nonconscious psychical processes, accor-

¹Needless to say, the conscious psychical process may itself be an awareness of something. As will be seen below, conscious psychical processes are experiences, including perceptual experiences wherein one has awareness of a part of the external environment. Cf. Gibson (1979, p. 239) on "the experiencing of things," and awareness as "awareness-of"; but note that, as explained in Natsoulas (1984a, 1985b, in press), Freud was an indirect realist.

ding to Freud, how else are the two large categories of psychical processes different from each other?

A certain difference between them that does not normally receive mention may help to understand why Freud took the view that psychical processes of the perception-consciousness system are *unconditionally* conscious if and when they occur. This difference is: all of Freud's conscious psychical processes would seem to be *experiences*, whereas none of the nonconscious psychical processes are experiences (Natsoulas, 1984a).

Among the familiar categories of experience are perceptual experiences, dream experiences, hallucinatory experiences, emotional experiences, bodily experiences (sensations and feelings), memory experiences and imaginal experiences. An experience can even be a verbal kind of thought, as when one "hears" with the mind's ear or otherwise "senses" (in the mind) the sentence expressing a certain thought. Every last one of the experiences that have just been listed, and all others, take place in the perception-consciousness system and are, therefore, conscious psychical processes. (See Natsoulas, 1984a, 1985b, in press, for Freud's grounds in holding that conscious psychical processes are and nonconscious psychical processes are not experiences.)

Now, direct (reflective) awareness seems to be part of our ordinary understanding of experience. Consequently, we find it difficult to grasp, for example, Mead's (1932, 1934, 1938) revisionary concept of experience, according to which the possessor of the experience *has no awareness of it until he or she becomes "a self"* (Natsoulas, 1985c). Such basic experiences are not themselves awarenesses of anything (Mead, 1932, p. 4), nor need their owner be aware of them (Mead, 1938, p. 656). To say that it is difficult to grasp Mead's concept of experience is not to suggest that the concept is incoherent or fails of reference. It is merely to make a point about how we normally think of experience: If we say that someone experienced such and such, do we not mean that the individual was immediately aware of so experiencing?

The *Oxford English Dictionary* provides a positive reply: the relevant definition for the word *experience* says, "The fact of being consciously the subject of a state or condition, or of being consciously affected by an event. Also, an instance of this; a state or condition so viewed; an event by which one is [consciously] affected." This is the common understanding that we have of experiences and it seems unequivocally to rule out their nonconscious occurrence.

Insofar as one conceives of experiences as the (only) sort of psychical process that a person must consciously undergo, Freud's view will strike one as eminently reasonable. One would already think as Freud (1915/1957) stated: "It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e., that it should become known to consciousness" (p. 177). And since one cannot be aware, in the same sense, of nonconscious psychical processes, it would be natural to hold with Freud that nonconscious psychical processes are not experiences.

Myers (1986) stated that many have asked, against Freud's view, "What can be the point of calling something both unconscious and mental if it is not felt or experienced to some degree, that is, if it is not impressed upon someone's consciousness at least a little bit" (p. 60)? Clearly, people who make this objection equate not only the mental with experiences but also require experiences to be conscious: Or else, how could experiences be experiences? The experiences of infants and animals are ones that, many hold, must be "impressed upon their consciousness at least a little bit." As Bieri (1982) wrote: "For example, [infants and animals] have pain and fear, and in attributing these states to them, we assume that they know what it is like to be in them, even if they cannot *identify* their states. . . . They know this, we say in our language-game, because they *experience* their pain [and fear] in exactly the same way as we do" (p. 79).

James's Components of the Stream Not Self-Intimating

One wants to say integratively that the psychical processes of Freud's perception-consciousness system *completely constitute* James's (1890, Ch. 9) famous stream of thought or consciousness.

However, James was a mind-body dualist at the time (see Myers, 1986, pp. 55-59; Natsoulas, 1986-1987), whereas Freud, for a large portion of his career, was a physical monist with regard to the relation of the mental to the physical (see Solomon, 1974; Wollheim, 1982). Freud's physical monism may explain his characterization of the components of the stream as "processes" though he held that individual conscious psychical processes were "highly fugitive," fleeting and momentary, albeit immediately repeatable (Freud, 1938/1964, p. 159). Whereas James (1890) held that each state of consciousness was unitary, Freud (1895/1964) considered psychical processes to consist of organized patterns of neuronal activity (however, see James, 1895).

In addition, James (1890, pp. 272-275) differed from Freud in allowing that a component of the stream need not be directly (reflectively) conscious; although James asserted that "habitually" the components of an adult human being's stream of consciousness are "more or less explicitly" directly (reflectively) conscious. Presumably, when it happens that a part of the stream is not the intentional object of direct (reflective) awareness in any of its components, its character is such, anyway, that the very same components *could have been* such objects, given certain different conditions. James (1890) argued as follows against those who

hold that the reflective consciousness of the self is essential to the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know a thing at all, must expressly distinguish between the thing and its own self. This is a perfectly wanton assumption, and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing it true. As well might I contend that I cannot dream without dreaming that I dream, swear without swearing that

I swear, deny without denying that I deny, or maintain that I cannot know without knowing that I know. I may have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about, an object O without thinking about myself at all. . . . To conclude, then, *thought may but need not, in knowing, discriminate between its object and itself.* (pp. 274-275)

The present characterization of James's components of the stream stands in contrast to all those psychical processes that Freud located outside the perception-consciousness system. One can put the point by saying that Freud's conscious and unconscious psychical processes are unconditionally so, whereas James's stream consists of conditionally conscious psychical processes.

That conscious psychical processes are merely conditionally so was a theoretical consequence of James's separation of every component of the stream from (if it occurs) the person's direct (reflective) awareness of it (cf. Rosenthal, 1986, e.g., p. 338). Though temporally adjacent parts of the stream, these were held to be distinct occurrences: first, the intentional object-to-be occurs and then, upon its heels, the direct (reflective) awareness of this object, which is, of course, a component of the same stream to which the direct (reflective) awareness belongs. (Cf. Sellars, 1968, p. 11: "The apperception of a representing always involves a conceptual act which, however intimately related to the apperceived representing, is numerically distinct from the latter.")

In James's view, there is a very intimate relation between a component of the stream and, when it occurs, the person's direct (reflective) awareness of it. A "state of consciousness" (cf. Natsoulas, 1977a, p. 29) and direct (reflective) awareness of it are successive very short phases or moments of a single stream. As the stream expands in the dimension of time, each basic unit of the stream (each "drop" of experience, in James's, 1909, later thinking) succeeds the previous basic unit, and so on; thus, each component of the stream is, as it were, transformed into or smoothly replaced by the succeeding component. Among other such successions, the conscious occurrence of a psychical process is one that "turns into" the occurrence of a psychical process that is the direct (reflective) awareness of the component of the stream that is succeeded.

According to James (1890), the successive states of the stream of consciousness each are one undivided thought or feeling. Thinking of the breadth of the stream at any point as the number of thoughts or feelings the stream consists in, we may say that James's stream is minimally broad at every point. In this, James differed from Brentano (1911/1973), who wrote, "It frequently happens . . . that we have a rather large number of objects before our minds simultaneously, with which we enter into many diverse relations of consciousness" (p. 155). Broadbent (1984) would agree:

Many people are on record [to the effect that] in their experience, they are *not* "forced to have one thought after another." They may think in a less detailed way when they have multiple strands, but that is different. Experimental studies of their overt behaviour have similarly shown little sign of a limit in the number of "things" they can do at the

same time; rather of a trade-off between the number of "things" and the amount of discrimination they can do in each "thing" within a given period. (pp. 677-678)

Evidently, direct (reflective) awareness is not, according to James's account, so intimate as to make the person aware of the component simply by virtue of the component's constitution, as was the case in Freud's account of direct (reflective) consciousness. When, as is habitual in the adult human, the (subsequent) immediate awareness of the component of the stream does occur, the component cannot be considered as self-intimating since it does not include in itself the individual's direct (reflective) consciousness of it.

Before this section concludes, two comments are necessary:

1. The main point of this section, which is conveyed in its title, is not ambiguous in James. However, James's denial of and arguments against non-conscious components of the stream have been translated here into the proposition that James (1890) rejected only nonconscious mental states that were unconditionally so. However, where he discussed (Ch. 8) the existence of non-conscious components of the stream, it seems very much as though he was objecting to any nonconscious occurrence of any mental state. This was later contradicted in the same book (pp. 272-275; see above long quotation), and the present discussion is based on the idea of a conditional direct (reflective) awareness (cf. Myers, 1986, pp. 59-60, for another effort to render James's view in this matter consistent).

2. Myers (1986, pp. 65-67) has provided an interpretation of James's conception of consciousness that differs from the one presented in the present section. Myers based his interpretation on James's (1890, p. 189) having drawn a distinction between "the feltness of a feeling" and the person's being directly (reflectively) aware of the feeling. This was, indeed, an important distinction for James, and forms a basis for the present discussion; however, Myers saw in the distinction the implication that *more* is involved in the feltness of a feeling than *the mere having of it*. That is, the feeling felt is thereby an intentional object of a nonconceptual "preintrospective" awareness, before it is the intentional object of a conceptual introspective awareness. The difference in interpretations shall be discussed in a future article on James. The same pages cited by Myers seem to identify the feltness of a feeling with the mere having of the feeling (without any awareness of it).

Myers (1986, p. 67) did not suggest that either the preintrospective or introspective awareness is intrinsic to a feeling. Therefore, these kinds of awareness remind one of Churchland's (1984)

innate mechanisms for discriminating the occurrence of some of [a large variety of internal] states and processes from their nonoccurrence, and for discriminating them one from another. And when we invoke and attend to that discriminatory activity, we can respond to it with explicitly conceptual moves—that is, with more or less appropriate *judgments* about those internal states and processes, judgments framed in the familiar concepts of common sense: "I have a sensation of pink," "I feel dizzy," "I have a pain," and so forth. (p. 158)

This seems to be very much of a perceptual model for direct (reflective) awareness. Possibly, the "discriminatory activity" mentioned is a kind of experiencing of brain states and processes, analogous to the perceptual experiencing of environmental objects that permits us to make judgments about them (cf. Hart, 1982, p. 200).

No Less than Objective Constituents of an Objective Stream

Consistently with the discussion of the previous section, James (1890) stated, "No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else" (p. 190). James's reference to "subjective states" was a reference to all of the components of the stream of consciousness, which have already entered the present discussion. James was saying, in this statement, that, contrary to how it may seem to you or what you may think concerning the component of your stream that occurs right now, this component is not a conscious occurrence simply because it constitutes your stream of consciousness at the present moment. Your "living" your subjective state, as it were, is not the equivalent of your being directly (reflectively) aware of it. The same applies, of course, to those (reflective) components of the stream that are instances of your being directly (reflectively) aware of other components.

Freud's contrasting view was that conscious psychological processes (which are for Freud all the constituents of the stream of consciousness and vice versa) are such that their mere occurrence, without their evoking an "appendage," as Freud (1895/1964) expressed it, entails their possessing a "subjective side."

With only a seeming paradox, it is safe to say that James's subjective states are *not themselves subjective in any sense* other than that they are intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness; and the latter only means that they produce an immediate awareness of themselves. Therefore, they are *as non-subjective as the large tree is that I am now looking at through the window next to me*. The tree, too, produces in me immediate awareness of it, albeit of the visual rather than the reflective type. The so-called subjective states are, in fact, *objective constituents of an objective stream of consciousness* (cf. Nat-soulas, 1985-1986, on the "objective stream"). The existence and character of the components of the stream are not dependent on the person's present direct (reflective) awareness of them.

Note that this is not to deny that the person has influence on what the components of his or her stream will be. For example, not having looked out the window for the last several minutes, I may choose to look again at the large tree in the courtyard; consequent to the looking, my stream of consciousness will become "occupied" by visual experiences of and thoughts about the tree, among other unforeseen components (cf. Linton, 1986, p. 53).

Also, direct (reflective) awareness of a subjective state or component of the stream is itself a subjective state or component of the stream and may affect

what happens further on in the stream. For example, directly (reflectively) aware of one's current wishes as not worthy of the person one wants to be, one may manage to cause the stream to take, as it were, a different direction, and thus to give one more acceptable thoughts (cf. James, 1890, Ch. 10, discussion of the "self of all other selves;" Natsoulas, 1986-1987). Of course, direct (reflective) awareness of the occurrence of a component of the stream and whatever thereupon ensues as a result of the direct (reflective) awareness does not affect the particular occurrence, according to James's account, since this conscious occurrence is already past even as it is becoming conscious by means of the succeeding direct (reflective) awareness of it.

In fact, pursuing the implications of this account, one soon arrives at the question whether the components of the stream are any more properly described as subjective than the states of the body to which we have perceptual access from inside the body. Surely, no one would suggest that the particular present state of a person's stomach is subjective simply because only the person can have interoceptive awareness of this state. The access of other people to this state of the person is otherwise perceptual and inferential. However, such a difference in how something is known does not make the something known subjective. Analogously, James's kind of direct (reflective) awareness, which takes place from outside the "subjective state" itself, does not seem to give to the components of the stream *any kind of special subjective status that is not also bestowed on states of the body outside the brain.*

"Present to Our Consciousness and of Which We Are Aware"

In contrast to the relative externalism, shall we say, of James's conception of direct (reflective) consciousness, Freud's notion of a subjective side that belongs to each instance of all psychical processes that occur in the perception-consciousness system implies that each such instance possesses *an intrinsic subjectivity*, which is a property that the state of one's stomach, for example, does not possess (cf. Nagel, 1974, 1974/1979). Identification of this property can begin by saying that the person's conscious psychical processes are "given" to the person in their very occurrence.

To this point of the present article, direct (reflective) awareness has been treated entirely in terms of a subjective state's or a conscious psychical process's being *taken* as occurring or having occurred, at a minimum. Clearly, there is more to direct (reflective) awareness, according to Freud's understanding, than the immediate awareness of a subjective state. In the effort to say what more is involved, one can say that conscious psychical processes are "given" and not merely "taken" (which, also, states of one's stomach are, as are James's conscious occurrences of components of the stream). In other words, Freud's conscious psychical processes were supposed to have a subjective "presence" for their owner, which James's immediately retrospectively con-

scious states of consciousness do not and cannot have (cf. Hoy, 1985; Smith, 1986, p. 150).

Note this first use of the word *retrospectively* in the present article. Though it is at once that the person has direct (reflective) consciousness of components of James's stream, the components are individually gone by that point in time.

This contrast between Freud and James gives sense to what Freud (1895/1964) had in mind when he described conscious psychological processes as having *a subjective side*.² In this connection, note as well how Freud (1912/1958) later explicitly defined what it is for a "conception" or "any psychological element" to be conscious (in the passive sense, of course). He stated that the particular occurrence of any conscious psychological process is one that is "present to our consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning of the term 'conscious'" (p. 260). This says that direct (reflective) awareness involves two aspects (of which James included only one). In being conscious (passive sense), the occurrence of a psychological process (a) has personal presence for us. It presents itself to us. Some authors would say that a subjective state is one that "comes before the mind." And (b) we take the occurrence in some way.

For Freud, both of these (presenting itself and being taken) are intrinsic characterizations of a conscious psychological process, and not characterizations of the process in relation to an "appendage," which succeeds it. Therefore, it is a reasonable inference from this understanding of Freud's direct (reflective) consciousness to the likelihood that Freud would have considered James's stream, as James described it, *not to consist of conscious components* (cf. next section), since none of the components are, according to James's account, "given" or "present" to our consciousness when we are directly (reflectively) aware of them.

Although Myers (1986) proposed to find in James (1890) a "preintrospective awareness" of a feeling, even this nonconceptual grasp of the feeling was supposed to occur *subsequently* to the feeling: "Because each mental state is a phase or 'pulse' (temporary wavelet) in a stream of consciousness, any one pulse has already been succeeded by another in the onrushing stream by the time we can train introspective attention upon it. Thus even a preconceptualizing introspective look is inevitably tardy" (p. 67). As James (1890) himself

²It should be mentioned at some point that Freud conceived of all conscious psychological processes as possessing qualities while no nonconscious psychological processes do. Presumably, this enables conscious psychological processes to be "present to our consciousness" (see below in the text). The importance of qualities in Freud's conception of consciousness is brought out in Natsoulas (1984a). Qualia play a very similar role in Smith's (1986) recent account: In his view, all conscious mental states have qualia, which correspond to how the state "appears" in consciousness. Addis (1983) has argued that the intentional properties of states of consciousness are also given in direct (reflective) awareness, for example, the property that by its very nature is *of* or *about* the fact that Sirius has ten planets.

emphasized, "Comte is quite right in laying stress on the fact that a feeling to be named, judged, or perceived, must be already past" (p. 190).

As Indirect as the "Becoming-Conscious" of Nonconscious Psychological Processes

Besides psychical processes that are intrinsically conscious—conscious simply by virtue of their constitution—there are, according to Freud, other psychical processes that do not have the same intrinsic constitution and may only "become-conscious" derivatively (Natsoulas, 1985b), which is a matter of getting connected with preconscious psychical processes (i.e., psychical processes that themselves can readily "become-conscious"). Preconscious psychical processes perform the function of producing "conscious representatives," which occur in the perception-consciousness system. Accordingly, the "becoming-conscious" of nonconscious psychical processes (which cannot themselves be conscious) is derivative rather than intrinsic, and depends on something that may justifiably be described as the acquiring of an appendage, that is, the ability to evoke a conscious representative.

Freud saw the "becoming-conscious" of a nonconscious psychical process as, at most, an indirect apprehension of the process. The causal relation between a nonconscious psychical process and its conscious representative cannot somehow *convert* the nonconscious psychical process into a conscious one, or make one directly (reflectively) aware of it. In Freud's conception of consciousness, *no amount of interaction between nonconscious psychical processes or between these and conscious psychical processes can cause the attribute of consciousness to be exemplified where it would not be otherwise exemplified.*

Contrast Rosenthal's (1986) description of his own view: "The present account is reductionist, since it seeks to explain conscious mental states ultimately in terms of mental states that are not conscious" (p. 352). Consistently with Freud's view, Smith (1986) recently argued that if it is supposed that a concurrent judgment makes a visual experience conscious, it is difficult to see how this could be done unless the judgment (e.g., the person's judgment that he or she sees a frog) was itself conscious; however, this would result in an infinite regress, with each judgment requiring a further judgment to make it conscious. (Cf. Wollheim, 1984, p. 47: "We can ask of the knowledge that allegedly makes all the difference whether it itself is conscious or unconscious. If it is unconscious, how could it make the difference expected of it?")

According to Freud's theory, what one has direct (reflective) awareness of when a nonconscious psychical process "becomes-conscious" is the conscious representative of that process. Only the latter occurs in the perception-consciousness system and is, therefore, constituted in such a way as to be conscious when it occurs. The respective nonconscious psychical process that occurs at the same time and in special relation to its conscious representative

does not thereby acquire the necessary constitution to be conscious, nor can it acquire this in any other way.

Freud's (1923/1961) approach to consciousness of the direct (reflective) kind can be seen from the following statement: "Even when [feelings] are attached to word-presentations, their being conscious is not due to that circumstance, but they become so directly" (p. 23). That is, whether or not feelings produce conscious verbal processes, that express the fact of a feeling's occurrence and identify the feeling, the feelings are *present* or *given* to their owner.

It follows that Freud would understand James's direct (reflective) consciousness as a matter of the stream's components having an appendage (i.e., the immediate retrospective awareness of them). Freud would interpret this as a form of *indirect apprehending*, since it is a matter of an appendage. From Freud's perspective, in order for James's direct (reflective) awareness to do the job that James assigned to it, which is to make something else "become-conscious," the direct (reflective) awareness would have itself to be a conscious psychical process, which means that *the person would have self-intimational awareness of it*. On that basis, the person could infer, or take for granted, that the stream's component (which itself does not bodily include direct, reflective awareness) took place and was of a certain kind.

Can Tertiary Consciousness (James) Account for Presence?

Let us assume with Freud, for a moment, that the mode of occurrence of a conscious psychical process is always such that it occurs with a subjective side. That is, none of the psychical processes of the perception-consciousness system can ever occur as intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness (which they always occur as) without their having subjective presence for their owner. Accordingly, the concept of *subjective presence* requires explanation.

For this purpose, one might try to apply an idea that the *Oxford English Dictionary* provides in its definitions for the word *experience*. As already noted, the most relevant definition of this word states that to have an experience is to be "consciously the subject of a state or condition." The idea this definition suggests is that, perhaps, *being consciously the subject of a state or condition is all that "presence" amounts to*, all that the state or condition's subjective presence to one amounts to. To decide whether this might help, it is necessary to give an interpretation of what it is to be consciously the subject of a state or condition. Two such interpretations shall be considered: in this section, an understanding of being consciously the subject that would seem to be contained in James's view of direct (reflective) awareness.

Might it be possible to reduce "presence" to the causal and intentional sort of pattern among components of the stream that James had in mind, in particular a pattern that would constitute being consciously the subject of a component of the stream of consciousness? The following is the most likely such

pattern (cf. Natsoulas, in press, on tertiary consciousness). Whenever one is consciously the subject of a component of the stream, there occurs in the stream (a) that ("primary") component followed immediately by (b) a ("secondary") component of the same stream that is a direct (reflective) awareness of the primary component, and this is followed immediately by (c) a further ("tertiary") component that is also a direct (reflective) awareness but with the secondary component as its intentional object.

It is helpful to compare the previous sentence with a statement by Rosenthal (1986) which is consistent with James's view and brings tertiary consciousness into the picture: "Although we are usually, when awake, in some conscious mental state or other, we rarely notice having any higher-order thoughts of the sort this explanation postulates" (p. 336). We sometimes do "notice" such secondary thoughts which render, whenever they occur, the respective primary mental state conscious. And when we do "notice" them, it is this "noticing," our tertiary consciousness, that renders the secondary thoughts conscious in turn. Whatever is "rendered" conscious is rendered so by the simple fact that one has immediate awareness of it.

Loosening the immediacy requirement just a little, one might even suppose that the tertiary component is a direct (reflective) awareness of both the respective primary and secondary component. For example, with the tertiary "level" brought into play, the person would be aware directly (without inference) of undergoing a certain emotion which causes him to be aware of it. Think here of repeated tertiary consciousness in which the emotion "reasserts" itself upon one's ceasing to be aware of it (James, 1890, p. 190), and then one is aware of it again, and so on (recall: all this within James's scheme). This repeated access to the emotion may well seem to the person (who has direct, reflective awareness of the access) to reflect the emotion's *continuous* presence in his or her stream of consciousness. After all, the person is consciously aware of the emotion again and again, at will, one might say.

However, unless the theorist assumes, as James (1890, p. 190) did not, that the emotion persists (in its participation in the stream) through the momentary phases of direct (reflective) awareness of it, the emotion must be described as merely seeming to be "present" or "given" at those points when we are aware of it. In fact, according to James, at the moment when it is occurring, we are not directly (reflectively) aware of it; and at the moment when we are directly (reflectively) aware of it, it is not "given" to us. It seems that to be consciously the subject of a state or condition is to live through it consciously at least part of the time. But one cannot live through it consciously if direct (reflective) awareness of it is even minimally retrospective, as in James's view.

One should hastily add that these comments do not imply that (as James conceived them) secondary and tertiary awareness *overlapping in time* with the respective primary components of the stream of consciousness, would suffice for these components to be subjectively present to the owner of the stream.

A Relevant-to-“Presence” Understanding of Being Consciously the Subject

The present section considers an understanding of someone’s being consciously the subject of states of consciousness that does not rely on the individual’s tertiary consciousness; that is, this interpretation does not require that the individual have any awareness at all of being directly (reflectively) conscious of the state. As Husserl (1913/1983) stated,

We can define a “waking” Ego as one which, within its stream of mental processes, continuously affects consciousness in the specific form act of the cogito; which naturally does not mean that it continually gives, or is able to give at all, predicative expression to these mental processes. There are, after all, brute animal Ego-subjects. (p. 72)

As will be seen, an organism that does not possess the capability for tertiary consciousness is, nevertheless, consciously the subject of its states of consciousness provided that it is conscious in a certain particular way that shall be explained and that is not a substitute for tertiary consciousness.

The interpretation here discussed rests, instead, on the *secondary level* in regard to the relation between the individual and his or her stream of consciousness. What makes the individual consciously the subject of a state of consciousness is *how the individual is immediately aware of it*. In the following paragraph, Bieri (1982) expressed his view of how we are, uniformly, related to all the components of our stream of consciousness by means of direct (reflective) awareness:

We have not said everything about mental states when we say about them what can be said about physical states: unlike physical states, mental states are not just *there*. They are just *at hand*. They are not simply *presented* in front of us. Unlike physical events, changes of mental state do not just *happen*. In other words, mental states and events are not just simply *contained* in the world. We want to say that *more* is the case than this. For this “more” that is the case, we have the formulation: Mental states and events are something *for* somebody. They are *pour-soi*. . . . What is lacking in the case of physical states, can be called the *subjective character* of mental states. (pp. 79–80)

As indicated earlier in this article, one does not stand to any of the states of one’s body in the same conscious relation as one stands to (at least some of) the occurrences of components of one’s stream of consciousness. Of instances of both these categories of states, one does have an immediate kind of awareness, albeit of only a perceptual kind in the case of one’s bodily states. Whether or not this immediate awareness of bodily states or states of consciousness is, in turn, the intentional object of direct (reflective) consciousness, the individual is consciously the subject of components of his or her stream and not of states of his or her body. The latter is the case notwithstanding the fact that the individual has awareness of both kinds of state in a unique, privileged way, in a way in which no one else can have awareness except of his or her own states.

Clearly, the characteristic that Bieri attributed to *all* mental states, in the

above quoted paragraph, is the characteristic that Freud assigned to all *conscious* psychical processes and explicitly excluded for all *unconscious* psychical processes, whether or not the latter are nonconscious for psychodynamic reasons (see Natsoulas, 1984a, 1985b, in press). This characteristic is their possessing a subjective side: which Freud (1912/1958) explicated as the person's being aware of them and their being present to the person's consciousness.

Also, Bieri's emphasis on the proposition that mental states do not (as bodily states do) simply belong to somebody but are something *for* somebody recalls the first of James's (1890, Ch. 9) famous five listed properties of the components of the stream of consciousness. Evidently, this property most directly pertains to someone's being consciously the subject of his or her states of consciousness. In his list, James (1890) stated first, "Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness" (p. 225).

James's statement says *more* than simply that every thought is part of a stream of such occurrences that belongs to a person. What more? "The thoughts which psychology studies do continually tend to appear as parts of personal selves" (James, 1890, p. 227). This means, according to James's account of the formation of selves, that direct (reflective) awareness and an analogous kind of awareness of past components of the stream appropriates the components to a subjective unity with other members of the stream (see the concept of "conscious personality" in Natsoulas, 1984b, 1984c; also 1985-1986). And, in turn, this direct (reflective) awareness and corresponding "retrowareness" (Natsoulas, 1986c) also get thus included in an empirical self: that is, by becoming intentional objects of further instances of direct (reflective) consciousness.

However, such formation of selves is *not* what Bieri (1982) had in mind in referring to the subjective character of mental states, as in the above paragraph. He did not have in mind their direct (reflective) appropriation to a self, or anything else along those lines. Therefore, he stated, "Mental states are also something for beings that cannot ascribe these states to themselves" (p. 80). Appropriation of James's kind requires a propositional kind of awareness of states of consciousness. An appropriated occurrence of a state of consciousness is an occurrence that one takes as belonging to oneself. According to Bieri, beings incapable of this kind of awareness nevertheless have the indicated kind of unique access to their states of consciousness. Such beings are consciously the subject of their mental states simply because they have direct (reflective) awareness of those states that is such as Bieri described it (see next section).

Note also that appropriation is not unique to mental states. We appropriate to ourselves, on a firsthand basis, states of our body that we interoceptively perceive. From them and on the basis of other perceptions of our body, we constitute a bodily self. Appropriating them, we treat them all, normally, as states of one and the same body existing over time, and we subjectively

organize the states relative to each other and to their causes and effects.

However, no amount of this immediate awareness and subjective organization will make us consciously the subject of our bodily states, in the sense that we are such relative to our mental states. Thus, Bieri held the view that being consciously the subject is a more primitive phenomenon, which is literally intrinsic to all of our mental states, a matter of their very constitution.

Direct (Reflective) Awareness Considered as "Inner Experience"

By focusing next on the implicated view of direct (reflective) awareness, this section continues the present examination of being consciously the subject of states of consciousness according to Bieri's interpretation. The unique character of the individual's direct (reflective) awareness of these states is a crucial factor in the individual's being the subject of his or her states of consciousness. This awareness (which is Freud's attribute of intrinsic consciousness) is an intimate, necessary relation to the respective mental state: "There *are* mental states only if they are something for somebody. It is not the case of there being mental states and their being *in addition* for somebody. . . . At the moment when the pain is no longer something for me, it has ceased" (Bieri, 1982, p. 80).

It would be a mistake to infer from these statements that (a) the characteristic of mental states called "being *for* somebody" and (b) the characteristic of an individual called "having a mental state" are one and the same characteristic. Indeed, according to Bieri, if one has a mental state, then the mental state is something *for* one; however, for a mental state to be something for somebody is a specific epistemic phenomenon: that is, the fact of somebody's special inner awareness of it, which Bieri called having "inner experience" of it.

What is the character of this awareness that constitutes the individual's being consciously the subject of his or her mental state? Bieri's repeated reference to it as "experience" is suggestive. Would it help to revise and restrict the concept of experience so that the concept's primary application is only to the awareness that Bieri had in mind in this context, namely, the intrinsic inner awareness directed on mental states themselves (cf. Grossmann, 1983, pp. 19-20; see next section)? Accordingly, mental states could be called "experiences," as well, but in a clearly secondary sense: because they are the intentional objects of experience in the suggested primary sense. In Bieri's or Freud's view, when a state of consciousness occurs, it is necessarily "experienced" in this sense. Only components of the stream of consciousness can be experienced; only they are such as to include in their occurrence their owner's experiencing of them.

Thus, they are not just "lived through," as Freud's nonconscious psychical processes always are. Due to their intrinsic nature, states of consciousness, subjective states, or conscious psychical processes are experienced—which is

an intrinsic special form of awareness of them. At work in the following statement from Husserl (1913/1983) is the distinction between “living” a mental process and Bieri’s sense of experiencing it:

Each Ego is living its mental processes, and in the latter a great variety is included really – inherently and intently. It lives them: that is not to say that it has them and [has] its “eye on” what they include and is seizing upon them in the manner characteristic of an experiencing of something immanent or of any other intuiting and objectivating of something immanent. (p. 174)

That is, one may merely live a mental process without also having immanent experience of it (cf. Husserl, 1925/1977, p. 117). The latter possibility, which was countenanced by Husserl, Bieri ruled out from the start.

Continuing to apply Bieri’s interpretation and the restricted concept of experience (as only inner experience), we would say that visual perceptual awareness of an external object (e.g., the sun, a part of one’s body, another person) is experienced whereas the external object itself is not experienced: because the external object cannot be an intentional object of experience, although it can be the intentional object of perceptual awareness.

In a secondary, less strict sense, a visual perceptual awareness can be said to be an experience or “in experience” because of the special way in which its owner is directly (reflectively) aware of it (about which more follows in the next section). Analogously to an external object’s being *something perceived* (sometimes called a “percept,” and even a “perception”), the visual perceptual awareness of the external object is *something experienced* (sometimes called an “experiential state,” or even an “experience”; see above section on experiences).

And if we return to the notion of “givenness” or “subjective presence,” we can begin to understand the notion as referring to the owner’s experiencing components of the stream. As will be developed, to experience such a component involves the component itself in a relation to our awareness of it wherein the component is not merely apprehended and a cause of its being apprehended but, also, the component enters personally our awareness of it.

Also, mention may be included of another point that will be developed. Might Bieri and James have both been right in part? If one adopts James’s kind of account of direct (reflective) awareness with respect to some states of consciousness, one can develop Bieri’s view as follows though not with expectation of his agreement: whereas to experience a state of consciousness is to be directly (reflectively) aware of it, to be directly (reflectively) aware of it is not necessarily to experience it. Not to experience a state of consciousness is not equivalent to failing to have it; nor is it the same as not to be directly (reflectively) aware of it.

From Acts of Experiencing to Reflective States of Consciousness

What more specific kind of immediate awareness is the individual’s (inner) experiencing of a state of consciousness? As Freud did, Bieri (1982) explicitly

rejected the idea that the inner experience of a state of consciousness is an appendage to the state, which need not occur each time the state of consciousness occurs. For Bieri, as for Freud, though not for James, each momentary total component of the stream, that is, each occurrence of a state of consciousness, includes within it an experiencing of it which is the individual's immediate awareness of it.

This was also Grossmann's (1984) view: each component of the stream includes "the act of experiencing" that component. And this act of experiencing is an "undefinable mental act through which we are acquainted with the ingredients of our minds. By means of this act, one experiences whatever there is to one's mind at the moment" (Grossmann, 1984, p. 53; cf. 1983, p. 99).

This does not express Grossmann's view exactly (cf. Oaklander, 1986); more accurately, the act of experiencing (which is a part of every occurrence of any state of consciousness, of any momentary total component of the stream of consciousness) is directed on only the remainder of the state, *not upon itself as well* (cf. Husserl, 1913/1983, p. 174). Accordingly, in Grossmann's words, "the act of experiencing" is part of "the total mental state of the moment" but is not part of "the conscious state," meaning that it is not itself an intentional object of the act of experiencing that it is.

As James did, Grossmann located all mental occurrences, in effect, in the stream of consciousness; that is, in his view, there are no nonconscious psychical processes in Freud's sense. Moreover, as stated, all components of the stream include an act of experiencing. The latter is consistent with Freud and, at the same time, implies a difference in view. As explained earlier in this article, Freud's nonconscious psychical processes are not experiences, they are not experienced, and they are not components of the stream. The concept of a mental state does not include, for Freud, an act of experiencing as part of every mental state.

However, the main concern here is Grossmann's act of experiencing. Occurring simultaneously with a state of consciousness and being a literal part of this state, one's experiential awareness of the state differs from how one is directly (reflectively) aware of the state according to James. According to James, one is aware of it subsequently, and, perhaps, purely conceptually; that is, one is aware of it in a way that does not give one experience of the state.

Consistently with Grossmann's kind of view, Husserl (1913/1983) sought to express the character of our experiential awareness of our states of consciousness when he wrote, "To have something real given originally and . . . 'experience' of it in an intuiting simpliciter are one and the same. . . . We have originary experience . . . of our states of consciousness in so-called internal or self-perception" (p. 6). *Internal perception* was Husserl's term for the act of experiencing that Grossmann proposed.

Continuing the thread of Grossmann's proposal, we may say that when one experiences, for example, a visual perceptual awareness (as opposed to,

assuming it is possible, being noninferentially aware of it in a nonexperiential manner, by means of another kind of "act"), the visual perceptual awareness is, as Freud stated, present to our consciousness. The experiencing of a visual perceptual awareness makes it *personally* present to its owner, in contrast to its being present by virtue of some form of representation of it, wherein the corresponding representative ("in place of" the visual perceptual awareness) is personally present to his or her consciousness. An experienced visual perceptual awareness is itself present, when it is experienced, or "given originally" (Husserl, 1913/1983).

If an act of experiencing and a visual perceptual awareness are as Grossmann suggested, parts of a single state of consciousness, it will prove useful to think of these two ingredients of the state as interacting (cf. Husserl's, 1913/1983, p. 80, reference to "interpenetration") and thereby constituting a single joint psychical process, which would be an instance of Freud's conscious psychical process. By so thinking, additional sense may be given to a process having a subjective side, and to a state of consciousness being personally apprehended.

Husserl (1913/1983), too, suggested that the experiencing of a state of consciousness and the experienced state of consciousness constitute a single process. In the following sentences, he began to say something, as well, about this process as a unified process, not merely about its ingredients, but also about the process that is so constituted:

In the case of [an experience] directed to something immanent [i.e., immanent to the stream of consciousness], or briefly expressed, *a perception of something immanent* (so-called "internal" perception), [experience and experienced] form *essentially an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio*. Here the perceiving includes its [intentional] Object in itself in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractively, only as an *essentially non-self-sufficient* moment, from its [intentional] Object. (pp. 79-80)

Thus, we have not merely a state of consciousness and an act of experiencing it, but a unity that is, shall we say, a "reflective state of consciousness." This state is neither the act of experiencing nor that which is thereby experienced; it is both experienced and experiencing.

Commenting on the above from Husserl, McKenna (1982) stated that the intentional object of immanent experience does not only exist now and is lived but also "it is actually itself there" in the immanent experience, which he also expressed as its "being present to" the experiencer. In inner perception, as opposed to outer perception, the intentional object is itself given, rather than given by mediation of appearances, as in outer perception. McKenna (1982) concluded as follows:

Lacking an appearance-content which is distinct from the object which appears, such [an internal] perceiving is a transparent attentive consciousness which can be intentional, i.e., of a certain object, only by virtue of the actual presence of that object to it. It would be countersensical to say, then, that there was a perceptual experience of a certain object, but the object was not itself actually present to the perceiver in the perception. (p. 95)

Of course, perception means here, consistently, immanent experience, and its object is the reflective state of consciousness of which this internal perception is itself a part.

Possible Composite View Acknowledged as Regards Self-Intimation

The question often has arisen, in the literature, as to whether states of consciousness are self-intimating. And readers have had to choose between self-intimating states of consciousness and these states being directly (reflectively) conscious due to the occurrence of an "appendage" to them. The question has also arisen whether in any instance at all of their occurrence, states of consciousness are directly (reflectively) conscious. Some authors have argued that no mental state is ever the intentional object of direct (reflective) awareness.

See James (1890, pp. 304-305) for a clear statement of an inferential hypothesis concerning how one is aware, when one is, of any instance of one's own mental states or processes. Although this position tempted him, James did not adopt it, and continued to assume "a direct awareness of the process of our thinking as such, simply insisting on the fact that it is an even more inward and subtle phenomenon than most of us suppose" (p. 305). Hebb (e.g., 1954, 1960, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982) championed an inferential view in a long series of publications. For argument against Hebb's extended effort to debunk all direct (reflective) awareness, see Natsoulas (1977a, 1978, 1983a, 1983b, 1985d; cf. Bruner, 1982). Recently, the radical behaviorist Rachlin (1985) adopted a position with some affinity to Hebb's: "I believe you can know yourself by focusing outward—by taking an observer's attitude toward the interaction of your whole body with the environment. . . . It is not ridiculous to look in the mirror to discover your mental state" (p. 80). Criticism of Rachlin's view by psychologists and philosophers accompanies its publication. (See also Dunlap, 1912, pp. 410-411: "I am never aware of an awareness. . . . How do I know that there is awareness? By being aware of something." Contrast Swinburne, 1985, p. 158.)

Frequently in psychology, two competing theories will both be correct, though they are not as general in their application as each theorist believes his or her theory to be. That is, competing theories succeed in capturing a different part of the truth concerning the phenomena in common that they seek to explain. Therefore, in the present context, a possible composite view of the relevant phenomena deserves acknowledgment at the least. If sufficiently specific, the suggestion that all the views discussed in the present article are partially correct constitutes an alternative view that deserves recognition: if only because all the parts of the composite view have received eloquent support from often important theorists.

The composite view on direct (reflective) awareness and self-intimation

would propose, so to speak, "all of the above," that is, the existence of all the kinds of mental states that the theorists who are mentioned in the present article have advocated. For present purposes, these mental states fall into three mutually exclusive categories:

1. As Freud proposed, there are *nonconscious psychological processes*. Relevant to this proposal are Hebb's (e.g., 1980) arguments to the effect that only inferentially may their owner know the fact of the occurrence of any of these processes. Indeed, there is no way, no kind of training or directing of attention, by means of which the possessor of a nonconscious psychological process can have direct (reflective) awareness of it. Nonconscious psychological processes are neither present to our consciousness nor do they produce "presentiments" (Natsoulas, 1983a, pp. 429-431) of their occurrences. They do not include as part of their occurrence an act of experience (Grossmann, 1983, 1984) nor do they cause to occur a separate immediate awareness of them of the kind that James (1890) proposed (cf. Aune, 1963a, 1963b, 1966, 1967, Clark, 1982; Rosenthal, 1986; Sellars, 1963, 1968, 1975, 1980, 1981a, 1981b). As Freud argued again and again (e.g., 1905/1960), one's nonconscious psychological processes are no less psychological for one's not having direct (reflective) consciousness of their occurrence.

Consistently with Freud, Smith (1986) stated,

Indeed, an unconscious mental state has no phenomenal quality: there is no such thing as its subjective or phenomenal character, what it is like to experience it, for the subject has no inner awareness of it as it transpires. . . . The [conscious] mental state has a specific phenomenal character, which consists in its structure "appearing" phenomenally in consciousness. (p. 152)

In contrast, Wollheim (1984) attributed subjectivity to unconscious mental states on the grounds that their causal efficacy depends on it, in the way that their conscious counterparts have their specific effects due to their own phenomenology. Therefore, the sense in which unconscious mental states are not conscious must be found in "something experiential, or in the way in which the subjectivity of the mental state is registered" (p. 48). Perhaps Wollheim had in mind a mental state of a kind that would be characterized as follows: (a) has qualitative content, is a qualitative mental state; (b) is nonreflective, does not include in itself direct (reflective) awareness of itself; (c) does not have a proper "conscious representative" (Natsoulas, 1985b) when it occurs, does not "become-conscious" when it occurs; (d) may be known about but not known by acquaintance (James, 1890, p. 221). In the present article, following Freud, nonconscious psychological processes that are qualitative are not countenanced, although nonqualitative components of the stream of consciousness, contrary to Freud, are not ruled out.

2. Also, there are *conscious psychological processes* of the kind that Freud proposed, as many others have, including Bieri (1982), Grossmann (1983, 1984), Husserl (1913/1983, 1925/1977, 1929/1977) and Smith (1986). Whereas Freud

would agree with Rosenthal (1986) that "consciousness is not essential to mental states," Freud would not agree that consciousness is "an extrinsic characteristic of whatever mental states have it" (p. 343). Conscious psychical processes are "reflective states of consciousness" because each and every instance of their occurrence, under whatever conditions, includes an inner experience of the occurrence, or an act of experience that is directed on the occurrence itself. (While the latter statement is true, it can still be misleading relative to Husserl's view, since reflective states of consciousness transpire, for him, under particular conditions.) Thus, there are, as well, nonreflective states of consciousness that transpire under different conditions than do reflective states of consciousness. As there are not for Bieri and Grossmann, who held that all states of consciousness are reflective in the sense explained. In the case of these authors, therefore, there is no risk that the latter statement will be misleading. (Smith's [1986] view appears to be similar to Husserl's; see a subsequent section.) These components of the stream of consciousness are "reflective" because their possessor's direct (reflective) awareness of them is intrinsic to each of them, and is part of their very constitution as the particular state of consciousness that each of them is. Each of the occurrences of a reflective state of consciousness is itself reflective. It is not the case that they are as they are because another, "reflective" act is directed on them from outside them.

Or from inside them according to Smith (1986): "Inner awareness does not consist of a second presentation, a presentation of the experience itself, accompanying or following the primary presentation in the experience (here the presentation of 'this frog')" (p. 150). That is, reflective states of consciousness do not possess dual contents, as would be true if each such state consisted of two mental states.

What has been stated here concerning reflective states of consciousness in no way denies that adoption of a reflective or "introspective attitude" (Gibson, 1963, 1966, 1971, 1979; Natsoulas, 1985a) will cause a stream of reflective states of consciousness to occur. As Husserl (1925/1977) stated for the perceptual case:

If we perform a reflection upon the modes of givenness of the [perceived] object, upon the streaming subjective appearances [of the objective] and then even upon the actively participating, perceiving I, as it directs its attending and explicating acts toward the appearing object, etc.—all that yields reflective perceptions [i.e., reflective states of consciousness of the perceptual type] which direct themselves to the components of the given external perceptions, but go beyond them by the continual positing of the transcendent object. (p. 144)

A qualitative state of consciousness of the reflective type includes, at the same time, awareness of its components and awareness of the external object that appears through them. To perform a reflection, in Husserl's meaning, is to engage in a mental activity that produces a stream of consciousness that consists largely of reflective states of consciousness.

3. However, contrary to the position of many authors who propose the existence of reflective states of consciousness, not all states of consciousness (durational segments of the stream) are reflective (cf. Addis's, 1983, p. 566, reference to a certain blunder). There are also *nonreflective states of consciousness*. In contrast to the previous category of mental states, the members of this category, in an instance of their occurrence, may either be or not be directly (reflectively) conscious. Whereas its possessor is necessarily directly (reflectively) aware of a reflective state of consciousness, the possessor of a nonreflective state of consciousness may or may not be so aware of it (cf. Swinburne's, 1985, distinction between "mental states" and "conscious episodes"). He or she becomes directly (reflectively) aware of such a state only if the state affects the immediately subsequent member of the stream in such a way that the latter member has the component immediately prior to it as its intentional object.³ Nonreflective states of consciousness are conditionally conscious states of consciousness, and they have the same properties regardless of whether their owner has direct (reflective) awareness of them. The latter statement does not include, of course, their causal properties; the effects of such states will depend on whether their owner has direct (reflective) awareness of them in the particular instance of their occurrence.

Nonreflective states of consciousness, which belong to the stream and therefore possess the potential for being conscious, should not be confused with nonconscious psychological processes in Freud's sense. Nonconscious psychological processes cannot be intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness no matter what else happens. In contrast, nonreflective states of consciousness may qualify as conscious mental states, provided that one does not require that, to do so, they must be something *for* somebody (Bieri, 1982) or present to somebody's consciousness (Freud, 1912/1958; Smith, 1986).

Reflectionally Modified and Reflectionally Unmodified Mental Processes

One would confuse reflective and nonreflective states of consciousness if one implied that the same states of consciousness can be reflective or nonreflective on different occasions of their occurrence, as though it was their context or accompaniments that determined which category of state they belonged to. Among the main points of the previous section were the following ones, which are relevant here: (a) Reflective states of consciousness are directly (reflectively) conscious in every instance of the occurrence of any one of them.

³However, according to Sellars (e.g., 1975; for objections, see Addis, 1983, p. 567), the ability to have direct (reflective) awareness of components of the stream is learned by first acquiring overt verbal behaviors in response to such components (cf. Skinner, e.g., 1957). Consequently, a direct spontaneous overt utterance that is caused by a component of the stream and that states the component's occurrence would be a direct (reflective) awareness of the component (cf. Natsoulas, 1986c).

(b) Any nonreflective state of consciousness may occur sometimes as a directly (reflectively) conscious state and sometimes without its being directly (reflectively) conscious. (c) When an occurrence of a nonreflective state of consciousness happens to be directly (reflectively) conscious, the state is not and does not thereby become a reflective state of consciousness. The indicated possibility of a confusion of states leads quite naturally into a brief discussion of a part of Husserl's conception of reflective and nonreflective states of consciousness, because his way of expressing the view may produce that confusion.

Adopting a certain mental attitude, or engaging in a certain mental activity called "reflection," the owner of the stream of consciousness causes to occur thereby and therein a certain modification of the states of consciousness that ensue (cf. Swinburne, 1985, pp. 157-158). As a result of "performing a reflection," the person's stream of consciousness becomes constituted of "reflectionally modified" mental processes. To keep matters simple, let us assume that immediately prior to adoption of a reflective attitude, the mental processes or states of consciousness that were constituting the same stream were "reflectionally unmodified." This assumption renders the following statement a correct expression of Husserl's (1929/1977) view: "Natural reflection alters the previously naive subjective process quite essentially; this process loses its original mode, 'straightforward,' by the very fact that reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process but not objective" (p. 34). The reflectionally modified process is itself an intentional object (objective).

Now, in this statement and repeatedly, Husserl (1913/1983) described the change that is produced by reflection as one in which "an already given mental process or really immanent Datum thereof (one not modified reflectionally) undergoes a certain transmutation precisely into the mode of consciousness (or object of consciousness) reflectionally modified" (p. 178). This sounds as though nonreflective states of consciousness are individually converted into reflective states of consciousness, which is not possible. We should think of the modification that Husserl had in mind as a modification of the stream of consciousness, and this consists in a transition from one kind of state to another. Thus, if one is engaged already in, for example, straightforwardly seeing something in the environment, the activity of reflection normally works to replace the nonreflective states of which the stream consisted prior to reflection with reflective states of consciousness that also constitute a kind of seeing of the same thing in the environment (cf. last clause in Husserl quote of previous section).

Performing a reflection modifies a "consciousness" that is already in progress without being an intentional object of direct (reflective) awareness. When this "consciousness" is modified, the transformed "consciousness" not only is such an object but also it is modified intrinsically. Therefore, it is a "reflec-

tionally modified" process in two senses.

As such, how does it differ from a reflectionally unmodified mental process, as existed before adoption of a reflectional attitude? What more can be said than that one includes and the other does not include direct (reflective) awareness of it? Suppose, for example, that both kinds of process happen to be very similar instances of perceptual awareness. In both cases, there is awareness of a certain particular part or aspect of the external environment. The following can be said only of the reflectionally modified process: "Here are two actualities related to each other for the one reflecting, and both given in the unity of one acceptance: the objective, worldly actuality and the actuality of the experiencing as 'having or acquiring that which is objective in its subjective field' " (Husserl, 1925/1977, p. 96). Do not construe this as saying that reflective states of consciousness differ from nonreflective states of consciousness in the number of awarenesses that each state involves. Both kinds of state are equally unified; they differ, rather, in the content of awareness. In the one category of states, none of the members makes reference to itself, while in the other category all the members do (cf. Smith, 1986, on the content of conscious mental states; see a subsequent section).

Appendage Theorist of Direct (Reflective) Awareness Critiques Self-Intimation

In the following sentences, Rosenthal (1986) expressed an important and by this point familiar view of direct (reflective) awareness, a view that was, however, contrary to his own largely appendage theory: "Conscious mental states are conscious, on this [Cartesian] account because they are about themselves. And this self-reference is intrinsic; it does not result from some connection those states have with other mental states" (p. 345). To this view, Rosenthal objected as follows: (a) any proffered grounds for holding that direct (reflective) awareness is intrinsic to a state of consciousness would not support this hypothesis as against Rosenthal's own appendage view: which contends that direct (reflective) awareness of a state is, with an important exception (see below), a distinct state of consciousness, distinct from the state of consciousness of which it makes the person aware. (b) We have no nonarbitrary way to tell whether a directly (reflectively) conscious component of the stream includes awareness of itself as opposed to having such awareness as an accompaniment.⁴

⁴Consider the following reply to Rosenthal: A pain-qualitative awareness often produces a desire that it end; thus, its owner is aware of it, as it were, "from the outside," that is, by means of a state of consciousness (the desire) distinct from its intentional object. This desire need not be evoked, although it usually is, and the desire's occurrence will depend on, among other things, whether the owner has awareness (of the noxious state) in which the state is felt. However, a separate thought to the effect that the state is occurring will not suffice; awareness "from the inside" would seem to be required to evoke the desire that the state end.

Also, Rosenthal argued that the self-intimational kind of position that he opposed would do best if it did not make the included "act of experiencing" (Grossmann, 1984) itself necessarily an intentional object of direct (reflective) awareness. Such an assumption would result in an infinite regress of direct (reflective) awarenesses, each one making the prior one conscious. However, this good advice (which is consistent, for example, with Grossmann's self-intimational position) results, according to Rosenthal, in further reinforcement of his own conclusion that there is no nonarbitrary way to distinguish the correctness of the self-intimational view from the correctness of the appendage view.

However, simultaneously with this critique of self-intimational views of direct (reflective) awareness, Rosenthal acknowledged "a strong intuitive sense" that direct (reflective) awareness is "somehow reflexive, or self-referential." Presumably, this intuitive sense is due to what Rosenthal (1986) called "introspective awareness of a particular mental state." Introspective awareness is "having a thought that one is in that mental state, and also a thought that one has that thought" (p. 337; cf. tertiary consciousness earlier in this article). And, presumably, what he meant by the particular intuitive sense of direct (reflective) awareness that we have was that tertiary consciousness does not reveal to us mere (secondary) thoughts about the (primary) components of our stream of consciousness.

This can be seen by means of a contrast with the analogous case of having a certain particular thought about the sun and being directly (reflectively) aware of this thought. A thought about the sun does not seem to include the sun; one does not have an introspective sense of the sun as being part of one's thought about it. In contrast, a direct (reflective) awareness will often seem to include its intentional object (i.e., a primary component of the stream). In this way, our intuitive sense of direct (reflective) awareness contradicts Rosenthal's (1986) proposal that "to introspect a mental state is to have a conscious thought about the state" (p. 338). We seem to find something more integrated than merely a distinct thought about the state. Our tertiary consciousness is such that we find it difficult to believe that, in the case of many of the (primary) components of the stream, we could be mistaken about their occurrence. It does not seem to us that our direct (reflective) awareness of many of the components of the stream is distinct from the respective component itself. We find it difficult to agree (a) that "knowing what it is like to be in a state is knowing what it is like to be aware of being in that state" (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 341), especially where the latter awareness is held to be a mere thought about the state and the state is qualitative (e.g., a pain-qualitative awareness of a hurt foot; see Smith's qualia in next section), and (b) that having direct (reflective) awareness of a particular qualitative mental state is a mere "thought that one is in a state that has that quality" (p. 349).

Anyone who holds an appendage theory of direct (reflective) awareness

must explain the above "intuitive sense" that tertiary consciousness provides us (cf. Brewer, 1986; Brewer and Pani, 1983, on subjects' reports on personal memory). Rosenthal proposed to explain it by reference to a fact about direct (reflective) awareness, a fact about the thought itself that is the distinct awareness of a component of the stream. Rosenthal (1986) stated the following, thereby surprisingly introducing into his account the intrinsic property of self-intimation:

We do not need to invoke the idea that conscious states are conscious of themselves to explain this intuition. For a mental state to be conscious, the corresponding higher-order thought [i.e., the corresponding direct, reflective awareness] must be a thought about oneself, that is, a thought about the mental being that is in that conscious state. . . . We can construe that [direct, reflective awareness] as being, in part, about itself. For it is reasonable to regard the content of the [direct, reflective awareness] as being that whatever individual has this very thought is also in the specified mental state. (p. 346)

Rosenthal's account of direct (reflective) awareness is not throughout, therefore, an appendage account. Some components of the stream of consciousness include awareness each of itself, even as they are awarenesses primarily of something else, namely, another component of the stream.

The content of (veridical) direct (reflective) awareness has reference to two actualities as related to each other: (a) the actuality of *the other component* (of which the person has awareness) and (b) the actuality of the person's having *this very awareness* of that component. And so, Rosenthal's partial appendage theory causes one to wonder concerning why it is that, for example, a visual perceptual awareness of something in the environment cannot be such in some cases that it would make reference to both (in relation to each other) *the external intentional object* and *the herein visual appearing* of that intentional object. In a recent article, Smith (1986) has argued for a conception of direct (reflective) awareness very much along these lines, as will be seen next.

A Self-Referential Content Proposal for Reflective States of Consciousness

Interestingly, Smith (1986) insisted that a distinct direct (reflective) awareness, such as the kind that Rosenthal envisaged, cannot render conscious, for example, one's visual perceptual awareness of a frog. In order for the latter state of consciousness to be conscious (a) the state must be present to consciousness in the way that its qualia make possible (cf. Freud as discussed in Natsoulas, 1984a) and (b) the state must have the following kind of propositional content: "Phenomenally in this very experience I see the small, green, smooth-skinned frog" (p. 152). As described by Smith, this visual perceptual awareness clearly qualifies as a reflective state of consciousness in the sense of the present article. Moreover, just as all of Freud's conscious psychical processes are and all of Smith's conscious mental states are, this visual percep-

tual awareness is a qualitative reflective state of consciousness, since it meets both of the above requirements.

Note *how* Smith included inner awareness in the conscious mental state. He did not do so by combining, in effect, a nonreflective state of consciousness with an act of experiencing it (e.g., Grossmann, 1984). The very content of the reflective state of consciousness differs from the corresponding nonreflective state. Among these differences is the conceptual reference of a reflective state of consciousness to itself ("this very experience"), which corresponds to what some of Rosenthal's thoughts do ("this very thought").

Smith would consider Rosenthal's self-directed thoughts as "unconscious self-monitoring states," for the reason that these thoughts do not incorporate any "phenomenality." That is, Rosenthal's reflective states of consciousness are not present to consciousness, despite their possessor's direct (reflective) awareness of them by virtue simply of their occurrence. Smith's conscious mental states are each both qualitative and reflective (i.e., self-directed or self-monitoring) and their individual self-awareness is such that each state "appears" to its owner. This latter is how, according to this conception, qualia are involved in direct (reflective) awareness. A mental state that is not qualitative and, therefore, does not "appear" to its owner is not a conscious mental state, whether or not its owner has direct (reflective) awareness of it.

Smith (1986) countenanced nonqualitative reflective states of consciousness—Rosenthal's self-directed thoughts would be some—and even the possibility that all mental states are reflective. Even Freud's unconscious psychical processes would include awareness of themselves though not of the qualitative, self-presenting kind: "It is even possible that our own brains work in this way, so that every human mental state includes a self-monitoring structure" (p. 153).

In that case, the possessor of Freud's unconscious psychical processes would be directly (reflectively) aware of them each time that they occurred, since they could not be self-monitoring without making their possessor aware of them. Smith's analysis implies that the disturbing, distressing, even shattering thing that has to be avoided is not direct (reflective) awareness of the unconscious psychical process but the occurrence of the latter's conscious representative. This may be compared with the Freudian view that repressive defense prevents occurrence of an unconscious psychical process's proper conscious representative (see Natsoulas, 1985b). Gleitman (1985) may have been expressing the same or a similar idea when he wrote, "What Freud called unconsciousness might be most usefully reinterpreted as a form of meta-noncognition, in which the patient ends up *not* knowing that he knows" (p. 434). That is, direct (reflective) awareness of a repressed, abhorrent wish would occur, but this direct (reflective) awareness would not be, in turn, an intentional object of tertiary consciousness. Being an intentional object of tertiary consciousness can only occur in the case of wishes (and other psychical pro-

cesses) that transpire in the perception-consciousness system (cf. Natsoulas, in press). This whole idea deserves further consideration in another place, where it could be compared with Swinburne's (1985, p. 159) proposal of a "sub-conscious" thought as one whose owner (a) believes he or she has it but (b) will not let a thought to the latter effect occur (cf. Fingarette, 1969). For the concept of a nonconscious psychical process's "conscious representative," see Natsoulas, 1985b.

However, Smith (1986) denied that human beings have qualitative nonreflective states of consciousness. These would be qualitative states that lack all awareness of themselves (cf. Rosenthal, 1986, p. 342). They would not each include

a reflexive apperception of its own phenomenally appearing structure. Perhaps some lower animals have such mental states: sensations or perceptions perhaps, with phenomenal qualities, that include no inner awareness of their own structure. (Would phenomenality alone then be a lower form of "consciousness," where a mental state is "appearing" but its subject is not aware of its appearing? Is that coherent?) (p. 153)

To propose that the streams of consciousness of both humans and animals include qualitative nonreflective states of consciousness would seem to be eminently coherent. This comes home immediately when reading Husserl's characterizations of the straightforward seeing in which all sighted human beings engage. On the topic, Husserl (1925/1977) wrote, for example, as follows:

If we are experiencing in a straightforwardly noticing manner and are looking purely at what is and is such and such in space, everything which comes to be laid hold of in this manner offers itself just as pertaining to spatial things, the shape as shape of the thing, a quality pertaining to it in movement and rest, in change and permanence likewise also, color as spreading over the spatial figure and thereby over the thing itself, qualifying what is objective in space. Nothing at all subjective falls within our mental sphere of vision. (p. 116)

Nevertheless, the external environment is appearing to the perceiver in a multiplicity of ways during any bout of straightforward seeing, though the perceiver is aware only of the part of the environment that is thereby, through those appearings, appearing to him or to her.

To Be Considered: Important Questions Relevant to Main Issues

The present article has merely scratched the surface of the problem of direct (reflective) awareness and whether any states of consciousness are self-intimating. By way of a conclusion that is also an anticipation of necessary further work, this final section shall consist of a list of highly relevant questions that require consideration or more full consideration than was possible here. Their order of listing corresponds to the structure of the article, and, in order to limit their number, only one basic question appears corresponding to each of the above fifteen sections.

1. When we speak of a component of the stream of consciousness as self-intimating, what minimal degree or minimal kind of inner awareness of this component do we or should we mean? Is an occurrence of a state of consciousness self-intimating if its possessor is aware of only its occurrence, while all else about it is completely obscure to him or to her (cf. Luborsky, 1967, on "momentary forgetting")? What, in this regard, do the various self-intimational conceptions of direct (reflective) consciousness propose? To illustrate: the present article has treated Grossmann's (1984) view as self-intimational, because Grossmann inserted, in every one of the succession of mental states that constitute a mind, an act of experiencing the rest of the state. However, the acts of experiencing, which make one "acquainted with" the rest of the state to which each of them belongs, would seem to be awarenesses of an uncertain character. Thus, Grossman (1984) stated, "To experience any kind of mental act . . . is precisely not to know that one has it" (p. 225). Knowledge in this context requires "introspection," which involves a further act of experience directed on the act by which the mental act is experienced. We need to know, from Grossmann, not simply what the intentional object is of an act of experiencing but also what the act's content is. That is, if acts of experience make their possessor acquainted with their intentional objects, what kind of awareness of the latter does this imply?

2. How is direct (reflective) awareness like and unlike perceptual awareness of, for example, bodily states (cf. Armstrong, 1968)? Since both make their owner immediately (noninferentially) aware of something, must not the two kinds of awareness have intrinsic properties in common with each other (cf. Natsoulas, 1981, section on awareness)? Does direct (reflective) awareness that is intrinsic to its intentional object (e.g., Brentano, 1911/1973) possess properties in common with modes of awareness that have intentional objects entirely distinct from their own occurrence (e.g., Gibson, 1979, p. 239)?

3. Is the concept coherent of an experience whose possessor does not have any direct (reflective) awareness of it (e.g., Kneale, 1949-1950, p. 5)? Is the concept coherent of an experience of which its possessor cannot have any direct (reflective) awareness except one that is a "distinct existence," which the experience may or may not evoke (e.g., Miller, 1973, p. 49)? Assuming that all experiences are qualitative states of consciousness (see Natsoulas, 1984a, pp. 203-207), which is what makes them experiences as opposed to a different kind of mental state, might experiences occur to somebody without therein "appearing" to him or to her (Smith, 1986, p. 153)?

4. When two temporally adjacent components of a stream of consciousness stand to each other in the relation of intentional object and direct (reflective) awareness (James, 1890, p. 214), how does the latter component manage to refer to the previous component rather than to something else (see Føllesdal, 1974, on content determining object)? If "the only way for a thought to be about a particular mental state is for it to be about somebody's being in that

state . . . [such as] a thought that one is, oneself, in that mental state" (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 344), does successful reference depend on the direct (reflective) awareness's occurring simultaneously with its intentional object (Hoy, 1985)? When one has direct (reflective) awareness of an immediately preceding qualitative component of the stream, as James (1890) proposed, may that component receive qualitative representation within the component of the stream that is its direct (reflective) awareness (cf. James, 1890, p. 190)?

5. Can direct (reflective) awareness that is a distinct existence from its intentional object somehow bestow upon the latter a subjectivity that interoceptive perceptual awareness does not bestow on states of the body (Bieri, 1982)? Although there is a "feltness" to the feelings that constitute the stream of awareness, how is this feltness different from the stimulation of the nervous system produced by, for example, the state of one's stomach (cf. Natsoulas, 1986b, pp. 100-104)? Is the owner of the feelings somehow the subject of their feltness in a way that he or she is not the subject of bodily stimulation (cf. Nagel, 1974/1979)?

6. If the being conscious of a conscious psychical process consists (as Freud, 1912/1958, proposed) of (a) the process's being "present" to its owner's consciousness and (b) its owner's having direct (reflective) awareness of it, how are these two dimensions of being conscious (passive sense) unified? Since it does not seem to be part of Freud's conception that a psychical process might possess only one of these two dimensions of consciousness (contrast Smith, 1986, p. 153), does it follow that a psychical process's being present to its possessor's consciousness is the way in which the possessor is aware of it? What is the relation between being present to consciousness and possessing qualities, as all conscious psychical processes were postulated to do (see Natsoulas, 1984a)?

7. Can a mental state that itself is not self-intimating make another mental state conscious simply by being a direct (reflective) awareness of the latter (Natsoulas, 1985b; Smith, 1986, p. 150)? Must there not occur something more than this in order to distinguish, with respect to subjectivity, a conscious mental state from a perceived external object (Husserl, 1913/1983, pp. 78-80)? Would it be reasonable to propose that *whatever* one has immediate awareness of (i.e., awareness unmediated by any other awareness) qualifies as something conscious (passive sense)?

8. To the answer for the latter question, does it make any difference whether one has tertiary consciousness (Natsoulas, in press), which is to have direct (reflective) awareness of being directly (reflectively) aware of a mental state (to be compared with direct, reflective awareness of being perceptually aware of an external object)? Since tertiary consciousness allows one to take action with reference to a mental state (see Natsoulas, 1985a, pp. 336-337), by making one aware of being aware of it (compare the case of perceiving an external object), should tertiary consciousness be considered as the owner's tak-

ing special possession of the state, subjectively making it his or her own (cf. Armstrong, 1968, p. 164)? But how can tertiary consciousness account for a conscious psychical process's being present to consciousness, unless tertiary consciousness's intentional object, which is a direct (reflective) awareness of the process, succeeds in "transmitting" the qualitative dimension of the conscious psychical process to the tertiary level?

9. Can a mental state be something for a creature that cannot ascribe the state to itself (Sellars, 1980)? Is such a creature directly (reflectively) aware of its mental states, as it is perceptually aware of parts of its body though it does not ascribe the latter parts to itself because it lacks the conceptual resources? Is a direct (reflective) awareness unable, as it were, to hit its target, as Rosenthal (1986, p. 344) suggested, unless the direct (reflective) awareness assigns its target to somebody ("otherwise, the thought would just be about that type of mental state and not about the particular token of it")?

10. In the case of pain-qualitative awareness of, say, a hurt foot, can we distinguish two separate actualities: this component of the stream and direct (reflective) awareness of this component, such that the first may occur in the absence of the second (cf. Churchland, 1984; James, 1890; Rosenthal, 1986; Sellars, 1980)? Are there two phenomena, one of having pain and the other of experiencing it, the latter in the sense of having it consciously? Or, is one's inner experience of it, as Bieri (1982) held, an essential part of having pain?

11. Do reflective states of consciousness contain an act of experiencing, as Grossmann (1984) proposed? Or is there a better way to construe such states, without distinguishing within them two parts that typically will have two distinct contents and intentional objects? Is the intentional object of an act of experiencing not different from the intentional object of the remainder of the state of consciousness of which the act of experiencing is a part (Grossmann, 1984, on the desire versus the experience of the desire)?

12. Do further categories of mental states need to be added to the three main categories distinguished in the present article: nonconscious psychical processes, reflective states of consciousness, and nonreflective states of consciousness? While it is true that multiple useful distinctions will come to mind within these three categories, are there mental states that are not included in any of the three categories? If so, how are they to be characterized relative to direct (reflective) awareness?

13. From before to immediately upon "performing a reflection" (Husserl, 1913/1983), how will the stream of consciousness be compared with itself? How does the stream differ as regards successive contents at the transitional points between reflecting and not reflecting? Can the streaming of the stream, the continuity of one component with the next component somehow justify the idea of a transmutation of the stream due to performing a reflection?

14. Is there, indeed, no way to tell whether an appendage theory is correct as opposed to a self-intimational theory of direct (reflective) awareness (Rosen-

thal, 1986)? In explaining our "inner experience," do the two kinds of theory, or the best example of each, do equally well? Is it true that no appendage theory can explain our direct (reflective) awareness of qualitative states of consciousness: that is, explain the fact that their possessor is aware of their qualitative dimension in a way that is not simply a matter of "conceptual response" (Sellars, 1981b) to the state of consciousness? When we are visually perceiving a pink ice cube, how do we know, as we do know, that "something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely *believed in*" (Sellars, 1978, p. 178)? About discussions like that of Rosenthal (1986), Hoy (1985) stated,

What is missing in these discussions is recognition of the possibility that there is a non-causal aspect of the exemplification of a property (in the sensuous case, its feel as opposed to what it brings about) and the idea that this aspect could be a self-presenting part of occurrent experience. (p. 358)

15. As between reflective and nonreflective states of consciousness, which are the more common? In the adult human being under everyday conditions, which of these two categories of states makes up the greater portion of his or her stream? Does not the temptation to answer, "The reflective kind," diminish upon recognition of *qualitative nonreflective states of consciousness that are straightforward awarenesses of something beyond the stream of consciousness*? Does not the temptation to answer, "The nonreflective kind," diminish upon recognition of the fact that *action with respect to the environment depends on our being directly (reflectively) aware that we are having the particular perceptual awareness of it that we are having*? Suppose that we had perceptual awareness of something in the environment but did not have direct (reflective) consciousness of this awareness: Would it not be for us as though we were not having such perceptual awareness? And would we act? Can we remember events from the day before of which we were aware but our awareness of them was not directly (reflectively) conscious? Neisser (1986) stated, "One proposition is certain: I will not remember anything tomorrow that I did not detect today" (p. 74). But straightforward perceiving is detection: Can it suffice for remembering? Compare Armstrong's (1979, pp. 240-241) suggestion that "event-memory" requires "introspective consciousness," and Freud's (1895/1964, pp. 366-379) discussion of "real memory" of thought-processes as dependent on the latter producing "indications of quality," which they do if they transpire in the perception-consciousness system (and are, therefore, intentional objects of direct, reflective awareness).

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