

An Examination of Four Objections to Self-Intimating States of Consciousness

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In a recent article, I raised the question whether any state of consciousness, or instance of a mental occurrence of which its possessor is directly (reflectively) aware, is self-intimating. A state of consciousness would be self-intimating if its possessor was directly (reflectively) aware of it due simply to its occurrence and without his or her having any awareness of it that is distinct from its occurrence. Critically examined in the present article are the following four objections to self-intimating conscious states. (a) David M. Rosenthal has objected that there is no good reason to uphold the idea that our direct (reflective) awareness of an occurrence of a mental state is a part of that occurrence, as opposed to being a higher-order thought about the occurrence that the occurrence immediately produces. (b) D.M. Armstrong has objected that a state of consciousness and direct (reflective) awareness of it are "distinct existences" on the grounds, in effect, that the functional roles of these two mental occurrences are mutually incompatible and cannot be performed by any one mental occurrence. (c) Wilfrid Sellars has in effect objected that the primary candidate for self-intimating states of consciousness, namely sensory states (or instances of sensory consciousness), are not even awarenesses let alone awarenesses of themselves. (d) Reinhardt Grossmann objected against Franz Brentano's self-intimational conception of direct (reflective) awareness that, if a conscious act of hearing actually had itself as its intentional object, the subject of the act of hearing would hear his or her act of hearing. Brentano himself had formulated a version of Grossmann's objection, to the effect that a self-intimating act of hearing a single sound would perforce include two auditory experiences of the sound. I present Brentano's own defense against this objection. In my view, the early and facile demise of self-intimating states of consciousness has been exaggerated.

In the present article, the words *state of consciousness* (or *conscious state*) shall make reference only to particular happenings of the following kind.

A state of consciousness is any one of those actual instances of a mental occurrence of which its possessor is aware directly: not by inferential means or by receiving further sensory input.

It is by definition, therefore, that a state of consciousness is a particular "conscious" mental occurrence and its possessor has "direct (reflective) awareness" of it. Direct (reflective) awareness of a state of consciousness occurs either right after the state of consciousness or in the instant of its occurrence.

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That is, it is a matter of controversy when, and also how, direct (reflective) awareness takes place. In a recent article, I posed the question whether *any* state of consciousness is “self-intimating” (Natsoulas, 1988b). That article amounted to an introduction of the following hypothesis.

Among all of the states of consciousness that people experience, there are some of which their possessor is directly (reflectively) aware due simply to their own occurrence and without their possessor's having any awareness of them that is distinct from their own occurrence.

Ryle (1949) characterized self-intimating mental occurrences as follows while arguing against their existence. “Their intimations of their occurrence are [purportedly] properties of their occurrences and so are not posterior to them” (p. 160).

Consider any present state of consciousness of your own and suppose that this state of consciousness is self-intimationally conscious. Your direct (reflective) awareness of this self-intimating instance of a mental occurrence is not *produced* by the instance nor does it somehow *result from* it. The very occurrence of your self-intimating state of consciousness is your direct (reflective) awareness of it.

As I stated there, my previous article on self-intimation could only scratch the surface of whether any states of consciousness are self-intimating. The present sequel resumes that discussion by examining several objections from the literature to there being any states of consciousness at all that possess the attribute of consciousness due to their own constitution and intrinsically. (Cf. Freud, 1895/1966, pp. 307–312, on the distinctive constitution of conscious psychical processes; Nagel, 1974; Natsoulas, 1984a.)

It may be useful to read the present article and its antecedent in the order of their published appearance. However, the two articles can also be read independently. To consider objections to the self-intimational hypothesis, as I do here, requires the inclusion of adequate introductory materials.

The first objection that I consider was formulated in the course of presenting an account of consciousness and direct (reflective) awareness alternative to the self-intimational kind. In this view, what makes a state of consciousness conscious is its *effect* of direct (reflective) awareness.

First Objection:
**“No Reason To Uphold Awareness of Conscious State
 Is Part of the State”**

“Just a Matter of Having a Certain Kind of Thought About It”

The theorist who expressed this first objection to self-intimating conscious states consistently used the words *mental state* in place of *mental occurrence*

to exercise the same concept (Rosenthal, 1986b). This section of the present article shall follow that practice.

Let me quickly describe David M. Rosenthal's own account of direct (reflective) awareness before I consider his objection to self-intimating conscious states. The following are two typical general statements of his view (Rosenthal, 1986b).

Conscious states are simply mental states we are conscious of being in. (p. 329)

In general, our being conscious of anything is just a matter of having a thought of some sort about it. (p. 335)

One needs to add a certain qualification, just as Rosenthal did.

Consider one of Sigmund Freud's mental states of the special kind that occurs in the part of the psychical apparatus outside the perception-consciousness system. (See Natsoulas, 1985, for a discussion of Freud's understanding of the relation to consciousness of nonconscious mental states, which is the category that includes both preconscious and unconscious mental states.) Any instance of such a mental state cannot be conscious even though the person has a thought about it when it occurs, that is, even if the person is conscious of being in that state when in fact he or she is in that state. Awareness of any mental state that occurs outside the perception-consciousness system is, according to Freud, perforce indirect. Awareness of the occurrence of a nonconscious mental state is always based on awareness of something else and inference that is based on the latter awareness.

Rosenthal (1986b) proposed that an instance of any mental state is conscious *only if this instance itself causes noninferentially and without producing sensory input a "roughly contemporaneous" thought about the particular instance.* To have such a "higher-order thought" is to be aware of the mental-state instance that directly caused the thought to occur. However, to be aware of something, anything at all, is not simply for the intentional object of awareness to cause, however directly, a thought or other mental state to occur in one. Rather, the thought or other mental state that is an awareness of anything must be *about* that something.

"A Thought That One Is Oneself in the Mental State"

Then how does Rosenthal's conscious-making higher-order thought find its "target" mental state of which it is the thought? To have a thought about, for example, visual awareness of a certain type is not necessarily to be aware of the particular instance of visual awareness that happens to have caused this thought to occur. How is it that a particular occurrence of a higher-order thought is about the particular mental state that produces it, rather than about *another* instance or *no particular* instance of the mental state?

Again, Rosenthal's account of how the possessor of a conscious state is directly (reflectively) aware of it considers a conscious state and one's consciousness of it as *totally distinct* mental states. This makes essential an adequate treatment of the problem of the particular aboutness of direct (reflective) awareness. (Cf. Natsoulas, 1984b, on the analogous problem of the reference that perceptual experiences make to something in particular.)

Suppose, instead, that a conscious state and its owner's direct (reflective) awareness of it are a single mental state. The intentional object of direct (reflective) awareness would then be included bodily in the direct (reflective) awareness of it and would not then have to be conceptually represented in order to be directly apprehended.

Rosenthal's distinct-awareness conception presumably holds that a state of consciousness and one's roughly contemporaneous consciousness of it are successive components of the person's stream of mental states. Needless to say, not all successive instances of different mental states stand in relation to each other as a conscious state and a higher-order thought about it do, even in those many cases when a mental state determines what its successor mental state will be.

It would seem that whatever property or properties of the higher-order thought give to this thought its particular cognitive content also determine thereby what the intentional object of the thought is. This is evident from Rosenthal's (1986b) following proposed solution to the problem of particular aboutness in the case of the conscious-making higher-order thought.

The only way for a thought to be about a particular mental state is for [the thought] to be about somebody's being in that state. . . . So, in the case at hand, the higher-order thought must be a thought that one is, oneself, in that mental state. (p. 344)

Rosenthal's implication would seem to be that direct (reflective) misidentification or nonidentification of *the subject* of one's mental-state instance means that one is not actually directly (reflectively) aware of the instance and that the mental-state instance is not a state of consciousness. The respective higher-order thought has missed its target and is either a thought without an intentional object or a thought whose intentional object is the whole class of mental states of the same type. The following statement also supports this understanding of Rosenthal's (1986b) position. "For a mental state to be conscious, the corresponding higher-order thought must be a thought about oneself, that is, a thought about the mental being that is in that conscious state" (p. 346).

A higher-order thought may be in error concerning certain properties of the corresponding conscious state and still the latter is a state of consciousness. However, the higher-order thought must meet a higher standard with regard to who it is who has the state of consciousness; otherwise, the mental-state

instance that causes the thought cannot be considered a part of one's stream of consciousness. Evidently, this is a price that Rosenthal's account must pay given his solution to the relevant problem of particular aboutness.

Reason To Uphold Some Self-Intimating Conscious States

There is evidence that we are not immune from error through misidentification of the subject of our states of consciousness, whether we are recollecting these or are now directly (reflectively) aware of them. Some of this evidence is cited in an article on the unity of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1979). And there is reason to believe that in some altered general states of mind the possessor of the mental-state instances that proceed therein can be directly (reflectively) aware of them without ascribing them to anyone. Surely, awareness of a seemingly impersonal or alien mental-state instance would not, as Rosenthal (1986b) proposed, "just be about that type of mental state" (p. 344) as opposed to being about the particular instance that directly caused the awareness.

Equally problematic is the idea that a higher-order thought finds its target by ascribing the mental-state instance to the person himself or herself. Many instances of the same mental state will occur to a person, sometimes in temporal proximity to each other. How does a higher-order thought succeed, as it does, in picking out the particular one of these instances that is the cause of the higher-order thought?

There is some indication that Rosenthal may not be averse to answering as follows. "The higher-order thought must be a thought about the mental-state instance *as cause of the thought* in order that the thought be a direct (reflective) awareness of the instance." Thus, the higher-order thought would, so to speak, successfully narrow down to a single one the alternative candidates for intentional object of the thought, since there is only one mental-state instance that is a cause of the particular instance of the higher-order thought.

The higher-order thought identifies the respective state of consciousness as being a cause of the higher-order thought. *But any mental state that is an awareness of something as a cause of the mental state would seem thereby and therein to be a self-intimating state of consciousness.* Such a mental state is self-referential or self-directed. The cognitive content of such a higher-order thought would be of the kind that, for example, the following sentence would express. "In this very thought I am aware due to its occurrence of visually experiencing a small, green, smooth-skinned frog" (cf. D.W. Smith, 1986, p. 152). Thus, a higher-order thought that was causally self-referential would be both an awareness of an instance of a lower-order mental state and an awareness of itself as caused by that instance. This higher-order thought would be about

itself and about the single state of consciousness on which it confers consciousness.

Interestingly, as will be seen shortly, Rosenthal (1986b) accepted the hypothesis of some self-intimating higher-order thoughts, but he did so for a reason different than to solve the problem of particular aboutness in conscious-making. However, these higher-order thoughts, though clearly self-directed on Rosenthal's view, need to be better integrated into his account and related to his main thesis of extrinsic direct (reflective) awareness, which he forcefully advanced.

Statement of First Objection to Self-Intimating Conscious States

Rosenthal (1986b) presented the following objection to the self-intimational hypothesis that is alternative to his general view that, always, direct (reflective) awareness of a first-order mental state is a matter of having a second-order thought about it.

But anything that would support the view that conscious mental states are conscious because they know, or are in part about, themselves would provide equally good evidence that consciousness is due to an accompanying higher-order thought. Moreover, we have no nonarbitrary way to tell when one mental state is a part of another. Accordingly, there is no reason to uphold this idea that our awareness of conscious states is a part of those states other than the desire to sustain the Cartesian contention that all mental states are conscious states. (p. 345)

Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the hypothesis of concern in the present article and its antecedent article is *none* of the following three hypotheses.

All mental-state instances are conscious (e.g., James, 1890; see Natsoulas, 1986-1987, pp. 305-306).

All mental-state instances are self-intimationally conscious (e.g., Brentano, 1911/1973, 1929/1981; Helminiak, 1984).

All conscious mental-state instances are self-intimationally conscious (e.g., S. Freud; see Natsoulas, 1984a, in press-a; D.W. Smith, 1986, 1988, forthcoming).

The question that I am considering is a far more restricted one than any of these hypotheses. My question is whether *some* mental-state instances are conscious on their own and without the involvement of anything like Rosenthal's higher-order thoughts.

Now I may have occasion, in a later article, to ask analogously whether any states of consciousness are conscious states due to their relation to a higher-order thought. D.W. Smith (1986) stated that it is hard to see how a non-conscious judgment about one's current experience or a nonconscious immediate recollection of it could make the experience conscious. And I have

stated (Natsoulas, 1985) that no amount of interaction among nonconscious psychical processes can cause one or more of them to become conscious psychical processes, according to the Freudian perspective.

But it is not my intention to advance here a general conception of states of consciousness such as the Freudian conception, which claims that all psychical processes that transpire in the perception-consciousness system are intrinsically conscious. All of Freud's states of consciousness are conscious states due to their individually possessing the tripartite attribute of intrinsic consciousness. One of the three components of this attribute is the person's direct (reflective) awareness of the respective state of consciousness (see Natsoulas, in press-a).

Be that as it may, Rosenthal's above objection to self-intimating states of consciousness can be construed as asking for any good reason at all to uphold that any state of consciousness includes awareness of itself, rather than uphold that its owner is extrinsically aware of it. While I have already given one such reason in the present article—Rosenthal's higher-order thoughts must be self-directed if they are to find their respective target mental-state instance that produces each of them—I believe that Rosenthal himself provided quite explicitly a second reason to uphold some self-intimation over uniformly extrinsic direct (reflective) awareness. And the extrinsically conscious states of consciousness would be equal in number or fewer than the intrinsically conscious states of consciousness, as will be seen.

“Strong Intuitive Sense of Somehow Reflexive Consciousness”

Rosenthal (1986b) brought up the existence of “a strong intuitive sense that the consciousness of mental states is somehow reflexive, or self-referential” (p. 345). Indeed, there does appear to be such an intuitive sense.

Consider the contrast between perceptual awareness of something in the environment and direct (reflective) awareness of a state of consciousness, the contrast between them in how they seem to us. Whereas we do not spontaneously take the book on the table to be a part of our visual experience of it, there seems to exist, aside from the book, only the state of consciousness (in this case the visual experience) of which we are directly (reflectively) aware. We seem to be aware of the state of consciousness through its own occurrence.

I must admit that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the perceptual experience from the segment of the environment of which one has perceptual awareness. It is as though the experience itself is transparent, or diaphanous (cf. Rosenthal, 1986b, p. 345). However, this difficulty recedes when the perceptual experience is allowed to vary while the perceived part of the environment remains unchanging.

An explanation for our strong intuitive sense of the intrinsicity of con-

sciousness would be that this intuitive sense is veridical and due to the component of the intrinsic attribute that I have called "tertiary consciousness" (Natsoulas, 1989). The Freudian perspective and the perspective of Franz Brentano, for example, propose that each state of consciousness gives to its possessor not only immediate awareness of itself but an awareness that this is a conscious awareness.

However, this does not necessarily add up to three awarenesses. It might be supposed that a conscious awareness of, say, a visual experience involves a primary awareness of the object of the experience (e.g., a small, green, smooth-skinned frog), a secondary awareness of the occurrence of the experience itself, and a tertiary awareness of this secondary awareness. Thus, awareness of the experience would be a conscious awareness of it. Rather, according to a possible intrinsic view, a fully conscious visual experience (and all of them are) might be a single complex awareness whose cognitive content is expressible by such as the following sentence. "In this very experience I visually experience this small, green, smooth-skinned frog" (cf. D.W. Smith, 1986).

And the state of consciousness that has this cognitive content is a visual experience and not a higher-order thought. The very having of such an experience is awareness of the experience itself as giving awareness of a certain entity with certain properties in a certain qualitative way of which one is therein aware. The intrinsicality of consciousness is part of what one has awareness of in having a visual experience that is a state of consciousness.

However, acceptance of this understanding of "reflective visual experiences" does not commit one to the view either that all visual experiences are states of consciousness or that all states of consciousness are intrinsically conscious.

Further Reason To Uphold Some Self-Intimating Conscious States

Rosenthal (1986b) accepted the responsibility of the theorist of consciousness to explain the common strong impression of the intrinsicality of direct (reflective) awareness. Although he stated that there is no need to invoke the idea that states of consciousness include direct (reflective) awareness of themselves, he proposed that the cognitive content of a higher-order thought includes reference to the thought itself as well as to the state of consciousness that causes the thought and is its intentional object.

We can construe that thought [i.e., the higher-order thought that confers consciousness on a mental state] as being that whatever individual has this very thought is also in the specified mental state. The sense that something is reflexive about the consciousness of mental states is thus due not to the conscious state's being directed upon itself, as is often supposed. Rather, it is the higher-order thought that confers such consciousness that is actually self-directed. (Rosenthal, 1986b, p. 346)

One is directly (reflectively) aware of the conscious state as belonging to oneself to whom also belongs "this very thought" by which one is aware of the state of consciousness.

There is consistency here with what Rosenthal (1986b), in passing, made of *knowing what it is like* to be in a certain state of consciousness. This "whatlike knowing" is usually treated of by authors in terms of some kind of intimate or inner access to the particular state of consciousness. Whatlike knowing how it is to be in a certain kind of state of consciousness is often considered as deriving from an intrinsic direct (reflective) awareness of the relevant mental-state instances. Rosenthal claimed that such knowing takes place at the higher-order level; that is, it amounts to "knowing what it is like to be aware of being in that [first-order] state" (p. 341). This statement would seem to be consistent with the idea that the second-order thoughts are the mental states that include awareness of themselves.

However, the possible implication lingers that, according to Rosenthal, a third-order thought is involved. If so, then why does not the second-order thought inform us concerning what it is like *to be in* the first-order mental state, if it is a third-order thought that informs us concerning what it is like *to be aware of being in* the first-order mental state? In that case, what is the import of Rosenthal's (1986b) following statement?

Knowing what it is like to be in a state is knowing what it is like to be aware of being in that state. So, if the state in question is not a conscious mental state, there will be no such thing as what it is like to be in it, at least in the relevant sense of that idiom. (pp. 341-342)

I gather that there is *nothing* it is like to be in any first-order state because there being such is a matter of something that occurs only within individual states of the higher orders, namely, states that are self-directed.

It is tempting to conclude this subsection with the statement that all higher-order mental states, as Rosenthal defined them, are self-intimationally conscious mental states. And there must be at least as many self-intimationally conscious states of consciousness as there are extrinsically conscious states of consciousness, since every first-order state of consciousness is accompanied by a higher-order thought about it that is self-directed.

Are All Higher-Order Thoughts Self-Directed and Conscious?

There is reason to think that Rosenthal (1986b) would not agree with my just stated conclusion concerning his account of consciousness. Consider his following three statements, and my subsequent reactions to them in turn.

But higher-order thoughts are not automatically conscious, any more than other mental states are. They are conscious only when we have a yet higher-order thought that we have such a thought. (p. 337)

Typically mental states occur in our stream of consciousness without our also having any evident thought that we are in those states. (p. 336)

We can construe the second-order thoughts as each being a thought to the effect that whatever individual has this very thought is also in the target mental state. And, if a fair number of these thoughts are conscious thoughts, it is plausible to suppose. . . . (p. 344)

1. Are not all higher-order thoughts self-directed and “automatically” conscious? Does not a higher-order thought confer consciousness on itself by including reference to “this very thought?” Why is a “yet higher-order thought” needed to make a higher-order thought conscious?

2. The second quoted statement makes clear reference to first-order mental-state instances that are conscious. The statement explains why we seldom notice the second-order thoughts that confer consciousness on first-order mental-state instances. The reason is that second-order thoughts do not normally evoke the third-order thoughts that would make us conscious of the second-order thoughts. Perhaps there is another reason which Rosenthal omitted. Perhaps it is also not normally the case, in his view, that our second-order thoughts are self-directed. I realize that the latter statement contradicts the long quotation contained in the preceding subsection of the present article. Every higher-order thought that we are in a state of consciousness would be “evident” if all higher-order thoughts were self-directed.

3. The third above quotation from Rosenthal (1986b) may be suggesting either (a) that self-directed higher-order thoughts are not conscious unless they evoke yet higher-order thoughts about them or (b) that not all higher-order thoughts are self-directed. I believe the latter understanding of Rosenthal’s account produces the greatest degree of consistency, while leaving in place the idea that self-directed higher-order thoughts are therein self-intentionally conscious.

Deliberate Introspecting and Higher-Order Thoughts

Perhaps Rosenthal’s view is that higher-order thoughts only occur when the person is trying to attend to his or her states of consciousness. Note that self-directed second-order thoughts came up at only two points in Rosenthal’s (1986b) discussion. One point was with reference to the unity of consciousness; the other point was with reference to the strong intuitive sense of intrinsicality. Both of these contexts are higher-order; they have to do with how the person takes his or her mental life to be. The two contexts would seem to be ones in which the person tries to make sense of his or her stream of consciousness.

Rosenthal (1986b) called the mental activity of trying to attend to one’s states of consciousness “introspection.” He stated that this activity in which

the person deliberately engages produces conscious higher-order thoughts, that is, instances of such thoughts that are themselves states of consciousness. "Only when we are introspectively aware of a mental state are we also aware of our higher-order thoughts" (p. 337). Rosenthal emphasized the idea that it is when we are introspecting that our second-order thoughts produce third-order thoughts, which are about the respective second-order thought that produces each of them.

Indeed, one could hardly be considered as deliberately introspecting if one was merely aware of one's first-order mental states and not aware, as well, of being aware of them. Deliberate introspecting is an activity with a goal of becoming usefully informed concerning one's first-order mental states. Such a goal requires that one have conscious thoughts about one's states of consciousness. Only by apprehending one's awareness of various properties of the first-order states can one put the information required to deliberate use.

But third-order thoughts cannot be all that introspecting requires from Rosenthal's point of view. It seems reasonable to think that the deliberate mental activity of introspecting determines that the second-order thoughts being produced by first-order mental states will predominantly be self-directed thoughts. Self-directed second-order thoughts would seem just the kind of higher-order thought that makes successful introspecting possible.

The person who is introspecting is concerned with what it is like for him or for her to have the particular first-order states of consciousness that he or she is having. Recall that, in Rosenthal's account, awareness of the properties of the first-order mental states takes place in the form of their effects on the second-order thoughts. In a separate recent article, Rosenthal (1986a) reaffirmed his view as follows. "Although such consciousness is the result of intentionality, it is not a result of the intentionality of those [first-order] states that are conscious. Rather such consciousness is due to the intentionality of the second-order thoughts about such states" (p. 182). The level of the second-order thoughts is, therefore, the level at which should emerge the enhancement that deploying attention onto one's mental life should yield. The activity of introspecting poses the following kind of question. "What quality or property of my current mental state am I now aware of?" The needed information is provided by the higher-order thought whose cognitive content is expressible by such a sentence as "In this very experience, I am aware due to its occurrence of visually experiencing a small, green, smooth-skinned frog."

Still Further Reason to Uphold Some Self-Intimating Conscious States

A certain deliberate mental activity, introspecting, can increase the number of higher-order thoughts but also the frequency of the self-directed kind. Ed-

mund Husserl analogously described a stream of perceptual experience that becomes "reflectionally modified" for a duration of its course (see Natsoulas, 1988b, pp. 190–192). This modification of the perceptual experiential stream, producing what I have called "reflective experiences" (Natsoulas, in press-b), results from the perceiver's engaging in the deliberate mental activity of "natural reflection." Thus, there is a contrast with Rosenthal's account. The reflectionally modified mental states due to the activity of introspecting were held to be of the two higher orders. Third-order thoughts now occur. Probably more second-order thoughts are evoked by first-order mental states. And the proportion of self-directed second-order thoughts is increased substantially according to my interpretation.

I mention the parallel and contrast to Husserl in order to suggest still further reason for introducing self-intimational states of consciousness into Rosenthal's account. It would be very surprising if the effects of introspective attention were restricted to modifying only higher-order thoughts, among all the kinds of mental states (cf. Hill, 1988). The modification of second-order thoughts that makes them self-directed is a modification of intentional properties. A self-directed second-order thought has a different cognitive content than the corresponding second-order thought that is not self-directed. Both of these are about the mental state that causes them and the properties of this mental state. However, only the cognitive content of the self-directed thought makes reference to the thought itself. Why could not any first-order mental state with the same intentional properties as second-order thoughts possess also be reflectionally modified by introspective attention?

Rosenthal's account gives signs that self-directed mental states will enter the account by more than a single theoretical route if the account is developed further. Once some of the first-order states of consciousness are recognized as having partly self-directed cognitive content, it will be a small step to allowing for direct acquaintance with the qualities of experience—as opposed to apprehending these qualities from a distance, as though they belonged to the experience of the other cerebral hemisphere (Natsoulas, 1987, pp. 457–458).

**Second Objection:
"Conscious State and Awareness of It
Must Be 'Distinct Existences' "**

The Very Nature of Mental Occurrences

Another recent author (Armstrong, 1968, 1984a) has argued that, whatever an instance of a mental occurrence may be the awareness of, the intentional object of the particular instance must be, exclusively, other than the instance itself. What is the basis of Armstrong's objection to there being any self-intimating states of consciousness?

It seems that the very nature of mental occurrences requires awareness and its intentional object to be distinct in every particular instance of a mental occurrence that is an awareness and has an intentional object. More specifically, I believe that Armstrong's objection comes down to the following, as will be seen in this main section of the present article. No single mental occurrence can perform both its own causal role, which constitutes it as the mental occurrence that it is, and the causal role of the mental occurrence that is the individual's direct (reflective) awareness of the first mental occurrence. Evidently, their functions are intrinsically incompatible and must be divided between them as the functions are.

If true, then I would need to supplement my discussion of the concept of consciousness, (which embarked from the third definition of consciousness provided by the *Oxford English Dictionary*; Natsoulas, 1983b, 1986-1987). In this sense, Dewey (1906) stated,

"Conscious" means *aware*: "consciousness," the state of being aware. This is a wide, colorless use; there is no discrimination nor implication as to contents, as to what there is awareness of,—whether mental or physical, personal or impersonal, etc. (p. 40)

Yet, if Armstrong was correct, to know that someone is aware of an unspecified something at a particular moment is to know that the individual *is not* aware at that moment of the particular mental-occurrence instance that makes him or her so aware. The direct (reflective) awareness must be subsequent.

"Neither in Any Way Is the Other"

Long before Armstrong, James (1890) had more generally stated as follows the view that whatever we cognitively apprehend must be completely distinct from the act of apprehending it.

The psychologist's attitude toward cognition will be so important in the sequel that we must not leave it until it is made perfectly clear. *It is a thoroughgoing dualism.* It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither *makes* the other. They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart. This singular relation is not to be expressed in any lower terms, or translated into any more intelligible name. (p. 218)

In this statement, James was objecting to those epistemological positions which hold that knowledge is a matter of *acquisition*: that is, a matter of something that passes into the mind from outside the mind and becomes part of the mind. Nor does cognitive apprehension bring into being that which the knower thereby apprehends. Rather, there takes place in the mind "duplication" or a "new construction" of what exists independently of the mind's activity.

In the preceding chapter, James (1890) had expressed the same idea with reference to our knowing firsthand our own mental occurrences—notwithstanding the fact that direct (reflective) awareness all takes place inside the mind. Feeling angry and feeling tired were James's examples of mental occurrences that must be understood as totally distinct from any possible immediate awareness of them. Accordingly, the "immediate *feltness* of a feeling" should be distinguished carefully and consistently from "its perception by a subsequent reflective act." The first of these, in James's view, is simply to *have* the feeling and does not involve any awareness of the feeling unless an instance of the feeling is succeeded by direct (reflective) awareness of it.

James also claimed that it is a mere superficial introspective illusion that direct (reflective) awareness of an instance of feeling tired or feeling angry occurs "at a single stroke," that the direct (reflective) awareness is identical to the feeling, a unitary mental occurrence. One might think that having the feeling causes one to be directly (reflectively) aware of it as the feeling proceeds, so that feeling and awareness of it become indistinguishable, a single state of consciousness having both qualitative and conceptual content. Rather, in James's view, the feeling is transiently replaced in the stream of mental life by the direct (reflective) awareness, which is a distinct pulse of experience.

However, James recognized that, normally, the feeling does not end with awareness of it. One does not cease feeling tired or feeling angry upon becoming aware that one is. But he explained this as the return of the feeling right after direct (reflective) awareness of it; as also the feeling returns, usually, after any other instance of a mental occurrence that is not the feeling and is, therefore, a "distraction" from the feeling.

Two Leading Questions Toward Self-Intimation

As can be seen from the following statement, James (1890) held that the extrinsic relation between a mental occurrence and its owner's immediate apprehension of it characterizes every instance of direct (reflective) awareness. "No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else" (p. 190). Rather than try to reconstruct James's case in support of the latter proposition, let me turn to a contemporary theorist whose own account of direct (reflective) awareness this proposition represents as well. Before I do so, however, I want to raise two questions that further discussion of James's position will need to address. Admittedly, both are leading questions toward self-intimation.

1. It seems that, in James's account of direct (reflective) awareness, whenever an instance of feeling brings into existence or is succeeded by an instance of another mental occurrence, the feeling is caused to terminate or to be interrupted. Why must a feeling stop when an instance of another mental oc-

currence appears in the stream? A plausible answer would be that the feeling must change; it cannot be the same feeling if a new mental occurrence replaces it. According to James, each successive pulse of mental life is a unitary experience; therefore, the continuation of a feeling could not proceed alongside the mental occurrence that succeeded it. However, this leaves open the possibility that the feeling, though transformed, goes on right through direct (reflective) awareness. It is one thing for a feeling to stop and start, another for it to change, though not to a different feeling, and then change back.

2. If an instance of feeling need not terminate when it produces or is followed by an instance of a different mental occurrence (cf. James, 1890, p. 242), then why cannot this instance of feeling as it proceeds and changes, though not essentially, become its own direct (reflective) awareness? Before the change, the feeling was nonreflective; then it became reflective. Although the feeling existed before it became transiently reflective, the feeling is self-intimating since its reflective form is a present, not retrospective, apprehension of itself.

"An Absolute Distinction Between the Eater and the Eaten"

Of course, the statement from James (1890, p. 190) quoted in the preceding subsection is not yet an objection to self-intimation. It is a statement of an alternative conception of what makes a mental occurrence conscious. The following passage amounts to the case that Armstrong (1968) made against the self-intimational alternative to his uniformly extrinsic view of direct (reflective) awareness.

Let us consider the mechanical analogue of awareness of our own mental states: the scanning by a mechanism of its own internal states. It is clear here that the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must be "distinct existences." A machine can scan itself only in the same sense that a man can eat himself. ["A mental state cannot be aware of itself, any more than a man can eat himself up": p. 324.] There must remain an absolute distinction between the eater and the eaten: mouth and hand, say. Equally, there must be an absolute distinction between the scanner and the scanned. Consider an eye (taken solely as a mechanism) scanning itself by means of a mirror. Certain features of the eye, such as its colour and shape, will register on the eye. But the registering will have to be something logically distinct from the features that are registered. . . . It seems clear that the natural view to take is that pain and awareness of pain are "distinct existences." If so, a false awareness of pain is at least a logical possibility. (Armstrong, 1968, pp. 106-107)

This objection to all self-intimating states of consciousness does attempt to express in what James called "lower terms" the relation between awareness and the intentional object of awareness. That is, Armstrong was here relying, to make his case, on the possible physiological mechanism of direct (reflective) awareness as he conceived of the latter (cf. Armstrong, 1984b, p. 24). Armstrong held that the operations of this mechanism are analogous to the operations of an inner eye.

An eye cannot register its own properties except for those of them that can determine the pattern of light energies reflected from the surface of the eye. The visual registering of properties that belong to the environment or to the perceiver is not itself among the properties of the eye that determine the pattern of light energies. The eye cannot register its own registering of properties. Or, the registering of this registering must be accomplished by other means than the original registering. Analogously, an awareness on its own cannot give awareness of itself; awareness of awareness requires a distinct awareness.

Armstrong referred to the distinction between awareness and its intentional object as "absolute" and "logical." However, this absolute distinction is a matter of fact, if it is a fact, rather than of logic. According to Armstrong, the inner scanning mechanism is so much like an eye that it cannot register its own registering of instances of mental occurrences. However, one can conceive of an eye that could register its registering of features of eye, perceiver, and environment. The registering would itself involve a surface of the eye that was unoccluded from the light; that is, the registering would take place at this surface.

In any case, as Sanford (1984) stated,

If we extend the visual word "scan" to cover [a] non-visual situation, such as introspection, . . . we should be cautious about taking truths about visual scanning to hold of any kind of scanning. Armstrong's [1968] claim that a situation scanned must be distinct from its scanning should be tested against other sorts of examples. (p. 76)

Be that as it may, Armstrong (1984a) also asserted that the brain includes no inner sense organ that could be used, as a scanner is used to scan, to gain direct (reflective) awareness of some of the mental occurrences that take place in the brain and are brain processes. Moreover, Armstrong recognized, the brain may well contain no sense receptors that could receive stimulation produced in them by mental occurrences in the brain. In place of his earlier idea of the neurophysiological mechanism of direct (reflective) awareness, Armstrong (1984a) stated, "There are mechanisms, of a more or less complex sort and involving a variety of causal links, by means of which the mind becomes aware of some of its own current states and processes" (p. 112).

What Argument Supports a "Variety of Causal Links" in All Cases?

To the latter understanding of the mechanism of direct (reflective) awareness, Armstrong did not attach an argument in support of the requirement of a "variety of causal links," without which any instance of a mental occurrence cannot give to its possessor direct apprehension of the instance. (Cf. Rosenberg, 1986, pp. 34-35, on Immanuel Kant's insistence that the mind

must be *affected* by its own thoughts in order to be directly, reflectively aware of them. Whereas Hill, 1988, suggested that it is "intuitively correct" to say that the phenomenal qualities of sensations *cause* awareness of them, Rosenthal, 1986b, joined the many supporters of Moore's, 1922, p. 25, well-known observation that introspective efforts to distinguish a sensation from awareness of it do not easily succeed. Our direct, reflective awareness only picks out the particular sensory state, not also a distinct awareness of it; cf. Armstrong, 1984c, pp. 22-23.)

Given that states of consciousness do not need to be perceived by means of scanning mechanism or inner sense organ in order for the person to immediately apprehend them, what will Armstrong's argument be in support of the need for a "variety of causal links" in order to have, in any instance, direct (reflective) awareness of a mental occurrence? Armstrong will need to supplement his ideas about the physiological mechanism of direct (reflective) awareness with answers to the following questions.

1. How is it that an awareness is about whatever it is about? How does awareness have the intentional object that it has? (I should add, "In those cases in which an awareness has an intentional object." In a recent article, Natsoulas, 1988c, I distinguished between two properties that an instance of a mental occurrence may possess. The instance may have "intentionality" without also having "aboutness," or it may have both or, perhaps, neither. That is, an instance of a mental occurrence may be merely as though it is about something; its seeming intentional object may not exist. In that case, it would have intentionality and not have aboutness.)

2. What is it about all instances of awareness that prevents every last one of them from being its own intentional object, though nothing prevents some of these instances from having other mental occurrences as their intentional object? Evidently, according to Armstrong (1968, 1984a), the relation of some instances of awareness to their respective intentional object is such that when their intentional object is an instance of a mental occurrence, awareness of the instance confers consciousness on the instance, albeit a certain kind of ("introspective") consciousness since the instance may already be a consciousness of something (Armstrong, 1979, 1981). Why, then, cannot an instance of a mental occurrence that is an awareness confer the same kind of consciousness on this very instance?

If Armstrong is correct, there must be something about *those specific properties of an awareness which make the awareness be about that which it is about* that limits the possibilities of what can be the intentional object of an awareness in such a way that excludes the awareness itself as intentional object.

Armstrong's account of the mental must include an answer to the second question that goes beyond the analogies of a person's being incapable of eating himself or herself up and a scanner that cannot relevantly scan itself. The

answer must go beyond, as well, the bare statement that "awareness of something logically cannot also be an awareness of that awareness" (Armstrong, 1968, p. 324).

An Unexplained Incompatibility of Causal Roles

Armstrong (1984a) addressed the problem of the aboutness of a mental occurrence in the following terms, and he expressed the view that an explanation of aboutness, of how a mental occurrence is about that which it is about, must be given *in causal terms* if it is to be consistent with Armstrong's general causal account of the mental (cf. Armstrong, 1984b, pp. 235–236).

[Aboutness] is a rather mysterious phenomenon. Consider Wittgenstein's [1953] question "What makes my image of him into an image of HIM" [p. 177]. How does the image point to the particular person rather than any other person? (It might be a very vague and schematic image.) What relations must obtain between the imagery and the person imaged? And could these relations be purely physical relations? (Armstrong, 1984a, p. 149)

Immediately, Armstrong acknowledged a deeper problem than working out the relation between an awareness and that which the awareness is about. This deeper problem is what the properties of mental-occurrence instances are that make them be as though they are awarenesses of something. (Cf. Føllesdal, 1974, pp. 377–378: "The general theme of Husserl's phenomenology is intentionality, the peculiarity of consciousness to be directed, to be as if it is consciousness of something.") Mental-occurrence instances may possess the property of intentionality without their being about anything, since that which would be their intentional object happens not to exist (cf. Natsoulas, 1988c).

However, I do not need to enter here into Armstrong's (1968, 1984a) treatment of the intentionality of mental-occurrence instances except to mention one general point about this treatment. Which awareness a certain mental occurrence is, according to Armstrong, is a matter of its *causal role*, or how the mental occurrence fits into the network of causes and effects in which it is the cause of some elements and the effect of some elements of the network. Accordingly, Armstrong (1984a) argued that the brain process that is his intention to paint the bathroom could be a different intention (e.g., an intention to write a poem) if the brain process was causally connected in a different complex way than it is.

The reason that such a transformation is difficult to contemplate, Armstrong explained, is that the replacement in causal role of one brain process by another brain process would involve many changed causal interconnections. The intrinsic nature of the intention to paint the bathroom is not the problem in conceiving of the transformation. The problem is the multitude

of causal connections to other mental occurrences and to behavior that would have to be exchanged between the present intention to paint the bathroom and the present intention to write a poem, in order for the two brain processes to exchange roles and therefore identities, that is, in order for each brain process to become the intention that the other brain process now is.

Armstrong's causal-role conception of which mental occurrence a brain process is applies, of course, to the brain processes that are direct (reflective) awarenesses. Therefore, with reference to the main issue of the present article (i.e., whether any states of consciousness are self-intimating), Armstrong must argue that two things cannot be combined: (a) the causal role that constitutes a certain brain process as being a certain direct (reflective) awareness and (b) the causal role that constitutes a certain brain process as being a certain mental occurrence other than a direct (reflective) awareness. Armstrong's accounts of direct (reflective) awareness and intentionality of mental-occurrence instances require the conclusion that these two causal roles do not mix; no mental occurrence can perform both of them. A single mental occurrence cannot play both the causal role of, for example, visually experiencing a small, green, smooth-skinned frog and the causal role of direct (reflective) awareness of this visual experience. These are not only different causal roles in Armstrong's view; they are incompatible roles, given that an instance of awareness cannot be awareness of itself.

This incompatibility is what Armstrong needs to argue if he wants to object to self-intimating states of consciousness. He must make this case if he wants to continue to maintain, for example, that pain and awareness of pain are, in every case of pain, "distinct existences." Armstrong's (1984a) recent essay contains a section entitled "Against Self-Intimation." In this section Armstrong argued, *inter alia*, that pain and awareness of pain cannot be identical to each other.

A Self-Intimational Hypothesis with Reference to Cases of Pain

In the course of this discussion of pain and awareness of pain, Armstrong (1984a) did not address the alternative view that pain and awareness of pain are identical to each other *in some cases*. (Armstrong, 1984b, p. 232, did address the alternative speculative possibility mentioned by Sanford, 1984, that, say, pain and the awareness of pain might be sometimes partially identical, allowing the pain to exist alone at times and to be a proper part of the respective awareness of pain at other times. With regard to his original argument in favor of distinct existences, Armstrong, 1984b, stated that it was incomplete. That is, he had not given an argument that successfully ruled out Sanford's possibility and did not have one now. To this, he added, "It seems to be a very strange notion that a certain state of affairs, or part of it, should

be an essential part of the apprehension of this state of affairs. Essential in the sense that without it the apprehension would not be the apprehension.”)

Rather, Armstrong (1984a) was concerned with whether pain and awareness of pain can occur independently of each other. By focusing on this question, Armstrong suggested that independent occurrence means distinct existence—which would indeed follow on the assumption that whatever is shown about some cases of pain applies to all of them. Armstrong (1984a) stated, “It ought to be possible for any current mental phenomenon to be overlooked, including pain” (p. 133). Accordingly, not only do pain and awareness of pain occur independently, but also there is no self-intimating pain.

A particular kind of self-intimational hypothesis, with reference to the case of pain, is relevant to the present article. I shall illustrate by means of “Hypothesis SI,” which is spelled out in the following ten enumerated points. I formulate Hypothesis SI before proceeding with a consideration of Armstrong’s (1984a) discussion of pain and awareness of pain because what Armstrong has argued does not count against the kind of self-intimational hypothesis that Hypothesis SI illustrates. This is the main point of the remainder of the second main section of the present article.

1. In agreement with Armstrong, *cases of pain do occur independently of direct (reflective) awareness of these cases*. Let us call these cases of pain “cases of pain_{nr},” since they are not conscious, not objects of direct (reflective) awareness, not reflective cases of pain.

2. Let us call the remaining cases of pain “cases of pain_r,” since these cases are conscious, are objects of direct (reflective) awareness, are *reflective cases of pain*.

3. Hypothesis SI does not consider a case of pain to be a case of pain_r if it merely produces a thought to the effect that I, the one who has this thought, am also at the moment in pain (cf. Rosenthal, 1986b). From the perspective of Hypothesis SI, *a case of pain_{nr} no matter how quickly thought about is not a case of pain_r*.

A recent self-intimational theorist of consciousness, D.W. Smith (1986), offered the following argument against a mere thought about a mental-occurrence instance making that instance conscious.

Suppose the inner awareness that makes [the experience] conscious is a concurrent judgment. . . . If this judgment is unconscious, it is difficult to see how it could make the . . . experience conscious. But if it is conscious, then it would be rendered so by a further judgment. . . . And an infinite regress would ensue. . . . But suppose inner awareness is an immediate recollection of the experience. . . . Then [the instance] would be followed immediately (in the “next” moment) by a recollection. . . . Now, it is hard to see how a subsequent retention could make my current experience conscious. Moreover, if that retention is unconscious, it is implausible that it could render my experience conscious. And if the retention is conscious, then it would be made so by a subsequent retention of it. . . . Whence an indefinite regress ensues. (p. 150)

Recently explaining the Freudian perspective on consciousness (Natsoulas, 1988a), I pointed out that (a) no amount of however sophisticated thought accompanying a nonconscious psychical process would confer Freud's basic consciousness on the process, and (b) a conscious psychical process does not receive its consciousness from thoughts that tag behind it or simultaneously share the stream of consciousness with it as distinct existences. In contrast, Malcolm (1984, p. 15) seemed to equate his noticing that the aching of his legs had ceased with his having the thought that the aching has stopped (see also Rosenthal, 1986b).

4. According to Hypothesis SI, *cases of pain_r are intrinsically different cases of pain than are cases of pain_{nr}*. At the least, cases of pain_r and direct (reflective) awareness of them are a single mental occurrence.

5. Among other things, this means that *a case of pain_r does not cause direct (reflective) awareness of it to occur*. The direct (reflective) awareness of a case of pain_r and that case of pain_r do not occur successively in whole or part. They do not overlap each other but are one with each other.

6. Normally, the condition of a part of the body outside the nervous system causes cases of pain_r to occur, as it causes cases of pain_{nr}. That is, the self-intimating mental occurrence that is *a case of pain_r is brought into existence in the same general way as a case of pain_{nr}*. The same condition of the same part of the body responsible for cases of pain_r may produce, depending on the frame of mind (see below), cases of pain_{nr} exclusively.

7. In some frames of mind, no doubt, both kinds of cases of pain occur in some sort of pattern.

8. When one is engaged deliberately in the activity of introspecting (Rosenthal, 1984b), perhaps only cases of pain_r are produced by the particular part of the body responsible.

9. Being self-intimating, *cases of pain_r perform a different causal role than do cases of pain_{nr}*.

With this statement, however, I do not mean to imply that Hypothesis SI includes Armstrong's thesis concerning what it is that makes a brain process the particular mental occurrence that it is. If a kind of brain process that is a kind of case of pain_{nr} and a kind of brain process that is a kind of case of pain_r exchanged their complete causal roles, then the first brain process would not give to its possessor direct (reflective) awareness of it and the second would not lose its ability to do so (cf. Hoy, 1985, p. 363).

10. *Every case of pain_r includes as an intrinsic characteristic of it direct (reflective) awareness of it*.

A complete change of causal role would leave a self-intimating mental occurrence in the same status with respect to being an object of direct (reflective) awareness. Thus, contrary to Armstrong's (1968) statement that "being in a mental state entails nothing about awareness of that state" (p. 115),

Hypothesis SI holds that it depends on *which* category of mental state one is referring to. One cannot be in *certain* mental states without having direct (reflective) awareness of them.

"The Aching of Malcolm's Legs Ceased During the Conversation"

In his subsection "Against Self-Intimation," Armstrong (1984a) made use of the following kind of case of pain in his reasoning about direct (reflective) awareness as extrinsic to the instance of a mental occurrence of which it makes its owner aware.

We just want cases where something mental is, as it were, in one's introspective field of view, but no introspective attention is given to it. I think that Malcolm [1984] provides such a case. He considers at some length a case where his attention is distracted from pain. His legs begin to ache during a long walk, but as a result of a lively conversation he ceases to be aware of the aching, only to become conscious of it again when the conversation stops. It seems to me that this is the sort of case required. The natural thing to say about this case is that the aching continued throughout the conversation, but that during that time Malcolm was unaware of the pain. (p. 125)

Indeed, what should we say about this case? From the "natural perspective," is it correct to say that *the aching continued* throughout this conversation? Is it less "natural" to say that Malcolm *ceased to be aware of his legs* during this very lively conversation?

"We can only be aware of so much at a time," someone may understandably say, "and we can, when our attention is taken up by something absorbing, cease to be aware of all other things." Perhaps Malcolm's lively conversation was in this regard like an absorbing story that, as we read it, succeeds in shutting out the real world, as we say. Perhaps Malcolm found, as we also say, many other things of which to be aware in place of his legs and the effects upon them of the long walk he had just completed.

When speaking about the case in this way, I do not mean to suggest that the aching of the legs is part of the physical condition of the legs themselves, that is, independent of Malcolm's awareness of them. Rather, my own view is like Armstrong's in this regard when he stated,

I think that pain is proprioceptive perception (but one which characteristically causes a drive) and that one may or may not introspect that perception. If you are aware of it, you are conscious of it; if you don't introspect it, which happens in some odd cases, you have unconscious pain. (Armstrong et al., 1979, p. 330)

Hypothesis SI would not agree with the implication that it is the same case of pain that may or may not be introspected. But the idea that *all cases of pain, whether of pain_r or of pain_{nr}, are awarenesses of a part of the body* is highly compatible with Hypothesis SI. To say that the aching of the legs ceased during

the conversation is to say that Malcolm did not have pain-qualitative awareness of his legs during the conversation.

"The Aching of Malcolm's Legs Continued Throughout the Conversation"

Malcolm (1984) did not want to say that the aching of his legs ceased during his lively conversation, though he was not aware of the aching during that time; during that time, he was neither aware of his legs nor was he aware that the aching had stopped. About this case of pain, Armstrong (1984a) wanted to say that the aching continued throughout the conversation.

Siding a little with Armstrong, I would say that Malcolm was not consciously aware of his aching legs. That is, there may well be behavioral reason to hold, despite Malcolm's not being in a position to so report, that during the entire time of the conversation Malcolm was painfully aware of his legs (cf. Rosenberg, 1986, on "pure positional awareness"). There is also our general knowledge of what some walks do to legs, and how legs hurt continuously for a time after such a walk is taken.

Malcolm's painful awareness of his legs would consist of proprioceptive awareness that his legs are aching or would consist merely of his being aware of his legs painfully. That is, the nonconscious pain-qualitative awareness of his legs might be predicative or merely "prepredicative (attributive)" (Hannay, 1988, pp. 415-418; Gibson, 1979, p. 260; Miller, 1984, pp. 46-48). In the latter case, Malcolm would be pain-qualitatively aware of *his legs with some of their properties* but not aware *that* the legs have these properties. Although there is awareness of some of the properties of the legs in being aware of the legs, the properties are not therein predicated of the legs (or of anything else). An observer could infer that Malcolm was having at least this kind of non-conscious awareness of his legs during the conversation, on the basis of observing how Malcolm was standing and moving and certain past information about him or people in general.

If Malcolm's legs ached throughout the conversation, the reason he gave for answering negatively to the following question is not a correct reason. "Could I report that the aching *continued* throughout the conversation? No: for I was not aware of any aching during that time" (p. 15). Although Malcolm's legs were aching throughout the conversation (i.e., Malcolm had pain-qualitative awareness of the legs of some kind, be it only the prepredicative, attributive kind), Malcolm's awareness of his legs was not conscious awareness. This is why he wrote that he was not aware of his aching legs during the conversation. Although he was so aware, he had no awareness of being so aware (nor was he aware of not being so aware).

Ex hypothesi, he was pain-qualitatively aware of his legs throughout the conversation, yet he was not in a position to report that the aching continued

throughout the conversation. This is because only conscious awareness can be reported. Although Malcolm was pain-qualitatively aware of his legs, his awareness was not conscious. Therefore, he had no idea that the aching continued throughout the conversation. (For he also had no "presentiments" that his legs were aching. Better, he had either no such presentiments or no conscious ones. By a presentiment to this effect, I mean such a thought as pops into one's mind without any awareness of how it is produced; cf. Natsoulas, 1983a, p. 427.)

Attending to One's Aching Legs Anew

The mental occurrence that is Malcolm's pain-qualitative awareness of his legs and of which Malcolm has no direct (reflective) awareness is "a case of pain_{nr}." The latter is the name I assigned to all cases of pain of which their owner has no direct (reflective) awareness. (As I have already indicated, according to Hypothesis SI, a case of pain_{nr} may produce a thought that one's legs are aching yet this would not make this case of pain_{nr} a case of pain_r, since this thought, though occurring together with the case of pain_{nr}, would not be a direct, reflective awareness, *a noticing of the aching of the legs*. According to Hypothesis SI, the thought would be as much a thought out of the blue as certain presentiments. Such thoughts, of course, may change one's frame of mind so that one now begins to have cases of pain_r in place of pain_{nr}.)

As I have identified them, the cases of pain_{nr} are not instances of proprioceptive awareness that take place inside what Armstrong (1984a, p. 125) called "an introspective field of view." There is no introspective field of view, analogous to the field of view of seeing (Gibson, 1979). The person who is now undergoing cases of pain_{nr} cannot turn his attention to them and become directly (reflectively) aware of them. The mental life flows on and is determined by the new frame of mind (e.g., the deliberate effort to become aware of what goes on there). Malcolm (1984) made an excellent point when he said that it is a mistake to "assimilate the phenomenon of one's attention being distracted from the aching to the phenomenon of one's attention being distracted from a flashing light" (p. 15). Whereas the flashing light continues as it was before one's attention was distracted from it, prior to becoming distracted from his aching legs, Malcolm was not simply undergoing cases of pain_{nr} of which he was directly (reflectively) aware. With distraction, cases of pain_{nr} come into existence or become more or less the exclusive cases of pain that are now taking place.

Let us assume that no substantial change occurred in the condition of Malcolm's legs by the time that the lively conversation ended. His legs were still aching, which means that they were still producing instances of pain-

qualitative awareness of the legs. Once the conversation ended, the condition of his legs was still such as again to attract his attention absent strong distraction. What did Malcolm's attending anew to his aching legs involve?

Attending anew to his aching legs *did not* mean (a) a shift from not having to having pain-qualitative awareness of his legs. With Armstrong, I have assumed that Malcolm continued to have such awareness throughout the conversation. And, surely, the shift of Malcolm's attention to his legs *was not* (b) a shift to attending to his "introspective field." Malcolm began again to attend to a part of his "bodily field," which is part of his "perceptual field."

Attending to his legs anew means that Malcolm became differently aware of them than he was during the conversation. In place of all or some of the cases of pain_{nr} that occurred during the conversation, there now occurred cases of pain_r. Malcolm was now consciously aware pain-qualitatively that his legs were aching. After the conversation, Malcolm entered a new frame of mind, or resumed an earlier one, though this was improbably an introspective frame of mind.

Concerned about his physical condition, did he instruct himself, as it were, to actively introspect the feeling that his legs were producing in him? Or was he concerned "to obtain a detailed and trustworthy representation of an extramental entity" (Hill, 1988, p. 23), namely the condition of his legs? I should think it was the second of these. After the conversation, Malcolm's interest in his legs resumed, and with this interest different ways again emerged of being aware of the legs, different from those present during the conversation. Among these different ways were those that allow their possessor to *report* about how his or her legs feel. Armstrong (1984a) himself put this point as follows. "If at any time [Malcolm] had stopped to consider the matter, he would have been aware that his legs were aching" (pp. 125-126). That is, had Malcolm stopped to consider the matter, he would have had during the conversation what he had after it, namely, *conscious* pain-qualitative awarenesses to the effect that his legs were aching.

Such awarenesses do not require active introspection, or the deliberate attempt to turn one's attention to one's mental occurrences. Deliberate increased attention to one's body or environment should also increase the frequency of self-intimating mental occurrences, because when self-intimating mental occurrences occur we can know what we are aware of here and now. Such mental occurrences are an adaptationally valuable part of how our minds function. Those instances of awareness of which we do not have direct (reflective) awareness are not useful to our desire to know. Though they make us veridically aware of features of the world and of our body, those mental occurrences of which we do not have direct (reflective) awareness occur and have their effects on us without our knowledge of them and, therefore, without our knowledge of that about which they make us unconsciously aware.

Conclusion

Armstrong (1984a) claimed that when Malcolm's conversation ended, the pain Malcolm was feeling throughout evoked again distinct direct (reflective) awareness of it. Of course, Armstrong would reject the idea that stimulation from Malcolm's legs began again to produce self-intimating feelings, whereas the same stimulation produced feelings of a different kind during the conversation. My main point is not that Armstrong is wrong, although I believe that he is. My main point is that the case that Armstrong wanted and found in Malcolm's aching legs is not a case "against self-intimation" in the form of Hypothesis SI.

In this connection, consider finally this one of Armstrong's (1968) statements on the topic of direct (reflective) awareness.

Suppose that we decide that pains, sense-impressions, images, etc., logically must be apprehended, the logical possibility must still be admitted of inner happenings which resemble these mental states in *all* respects except that of being objects of introspective awareness. For if introspective awareness and its objects are "distinct existences," as we have argued, then it must be possible for the objects to exist when the awareness does not exist. And once we concede this, we have every reason to call such states pains, sense-impressions, etc. (p. 114)

Suppose we decide, instead, that there are cases of pain that must be apprehended since they are self-intimating mental occurrences. These are the cases of pain_r according to Hypothesis SI. It can also be consistently admitted that there are other cases of pain that are not self-intimating. These are the cases of pain_{nr} according to Hypothesis SI. The cases of pain_{nr} resemble the cases of pain_r, perhaps not in *all* respects but certainly in many respects with the prominent exception of the property of self-intimation. Since cases of pain_r and cases of pain_{nr} are "distinct existences," even when both occur due to a particular bodily injury, it is possible for cases of pain_{nr} to occur independently of cases of pain_r. Thus, it is possible for people to have feelings of pain without being directly (reflectively) aware of any. However, there are some cases of pain that cannot occur without the person's direct (reflective) awareness of them, because in their case pain and awareness of it are not "distinct existences."

Third Objection: "Sensory States Are Not Awareness of Anything"

Thoughts as Direct (Reflective) Awareness of Sensory States

Those occurrences in the brain which are called "sensory states" (or cases of "sensory consciousness," or "acts of sensing," or "sense impressions") often

are considered to be the primary candidates for self-intimating states of consciousness. As has been seen in the first main section of the present article, Rosenthal (1986b), in contrast, opposed a self-intimational account of being directly (reflectively) aware of first-order mental states, including all sensory states. (Not all theorists interpret sensory states as mental states. The latter term is sometimes restricted to only those brain occurrences that possess intentionality, while sensory states may be held not to possess this property. See Sellars, 1981a, and below.)

At the same time, Rosenthal (1986b) acknowledged that, when it comes to sensory states, his understanding of our immediate access to our mental states is most likely to be considered mistaken. Thus, in the context of developing and defending an account of direct (reflective) awareness in terms of higher-order thoughts about mental states that cause those thoughts, Rosenthal (1986b) stated,

Whatever one holds about intentional states, it may seem altogether unacceptable to try to explain the consciousness of sensory states by way of higher-order thoughts. Consciousness seems virtually inseparable from sensory qualities, in a way that does not seem so for intentional properties. Indeed, as noted . . . , it may seem almost contradictory to speak of sensory states' lacking consciousness. This intimate tie between sensory quality and consciousness seems to hold for all sensory states, but appears strongest with somatic sensations, such as pain. (p. 347)

Rosenthal distinguished sensory mental states from intentional mental states. Although both kinds of states are mental occurrences and can be the intentional objects of direct (reflective) awareness, only intentional mental states have the property of intentionality and can be about something (including themselves, it will be recalled, in the case of higher-order thoughts).

However, sensory states do possess qualities (as do some intentional mental states); Rosenthal did not deny qualities, though he insisted that the direct (reflective) awareness of sensory states and their qualities is just a matter of having thoughts about them. Thus, simply to think about the qualities of sense, such as the qualities of pain, is to be directly (reflectively) aware of them. To have thoughts about them is to mentally apprehend qualities in the only way, evidently, that we can apprehend them.

To be completely fair to Rosenthal's position, I must add what seems to me to be a minor qualification. The direct (reflective) awareness of any particular instance of a sensory state (and any mental state) consists exclusively of having one or more thoughts about that instance that the instance produces in a noninferential manner and not by means of the senses (i.e., not by making observations). While this direct-causal qualification is essential to Rosenthal's account of a person's being directly (reflectively) aware of his or her sensory states, I do not consider it a major dimension of his account because it does not add anything intrinsically to the higher-order thought

that is the direct (reflective) awareness. To have thoughts about qualities of sense when the thoughts are not produced here and now by the respective sensory states is no less to be aware of the qualities of sense, in Rosenthal's view.

Of course, when someone lives through a case of pain, he or she may have many more, and more various, thoughts about the case of pain, but otherwise there is nothing intrinsically different about the thoughts when they are not produced directly by the respective sensory state. This is not to say that a sensory state will not produce other mental states than simply thoughts about it. The point is restricted to the character of the thoughts that are, according to Rosenthal, the direct (reflective) awarenesses. While thoughts will differ in their cognitive content depending on whether the case of pain is now taking place, they will not differ otherwise; direct (reflective) awarenesses are mere thoughts, not basically different from later thoughts about the particular mental state. This was Rosenthal's view.

Primary Candidates for Self-Intimating Conscious States

One can understand, therefore, why some readers would tend to consider Rosenthal's account of direct (reflective) awareness as mistaken in its treatment of what is involved in those instances of a sensory state that are states of consciousness. According to Rosenthal's counterintuitive view, a conscious instance of a sensory state is one that *causes* its owner to be aware of it "from the outside." Sensory states do not, by their occurrence, *make* their owner aware of them "from the inside."

We must keep in mind that Rosenthal's higher-order thought (which is the direct, reflective awareness) does not combine with the sensory state of which it is the awareness. The higher-order thought is an accompaniment and not part of the sensory state. Whether or not the instance of a sensory state and one's awareness of it overlap in time, their owner is the subject of two partially simultaneous or successive mental occurrences. For example, in being aware of one's current pain, one feels the pain and, separately, has a higher-order thought about the feeling (in the conscious cases).

There are many cases in which the instances of a sensory state are extremely brief (e.g., a brief twinge of pain). Of these, Rosenthal would likely hold that we do not have awareness of them at the time of their occurrence, because they are gone before their effects, including direct (reflective) awareness of them, come into existence.

As I am using the terms, if mental occurrence A "makes" its owner aware of something, as opposed to "causing" its owner to be so aware, mental occurrence A itself (rather than another mental occurrence caused by mental occurrence A) is the owner's awareness of the something. According to Rosen-

that's conception of direct (reflective) awareness, an accompanying thought makes its owner aware of the instance of a sensory state that produces the thought.

In Rosenthal's view, sensory states are among the causes of those mental occurrences that are actual or seeming awarenesses or apprehensions of something. The relation of the possessor to his or her sensory state is in this sense external, if we identify the possessor closely with his or her awarenesses and not with their causes that are not awarenesses.

Certain mental occurrences in the brain are probably affected by the chemical solution in which the respective "cell assemblies" (Hebb, 1949, 1968, 1980) are bathed. Changes in the composition of this solution will cause some mental occurrences to be evoked spontaneously. According to Rosenthal's perspective, nothing more than such a causal relation as between the change in the chemical solution and the respective mental occurrence exists between conscious sensory states and the direct (reflective) awarenesses of them that they produce. (Cf. Sellars's, 1980, pp. 13-17, characterization of the causal relation between an immediate awareness and its intentional object. The immediate awareness is a response to its intentional object in the same sense as an iron filing responds to a magnet sufficiently near it.)

However, the empirical evidence, as it were, would seem to run counter to this externalistic conception of direct (reflective) awareness of sensory states. Our direct (reflective) awareness of our sensory states does not seem anything like mere thoughts about the occurrence of sensory states and their qualities. Rather, the qualities (or qualitative gestalts) of which we are directly (reflectively) aware seem to have "presence" to us. Therefore, other theorists have proposed that sensory states are "present to consciousness," meaning that the very occurrence of any instance of a sensory state is their possessor's qualitative apprehension of it—as distinct from a merely cognitive apprehension of it "from the outside."

In such alternative views, the qualities of sense amount to qualitative apprehension of the sensory states to which they belong (cf. "self-presenting" states, below). Thus, we have a more intimate contact with our sensory states than we do with the mere objects of thought. Whereas, the mere object of a thought is represented by the thought, the instance of a sensory state makes its owner aware directly of the state in the form of its own qualitative presence. This accords with the empirical fact that the apprehension of sensory states seems to be identical to experiencing them. For example, to feel a pain is, all by itself, to be aware of the feeling.

Quality as Essential Dimension of All Conscious States

Whether a conscious first-order mental state possesses qualities or not, the mental state is conscious in the same way, according to Rosenthal (1986b),

that is, by producing a higher-order thought about it. Thus, direct (reflective) awareness does not depend for its occurrence on the possession of qualities by its intentional object, although the direct (reflective) awareness may be an awareness of qualities. As will be seen, the requirement of qualities for direct (reflective) awareness belongs to a different account.

Rosenthal's (1986b) following statement does not contradict my claim about his account.

An account in terms of higher-order thoughts actually helps explain the phenomenological appearances. If a sensory state's being conscious is its being accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought, that thought will be about the very quality we are conscious of. It will be a thought that one is in a state that has that quality. So indeed it will be impossible to describe that consciousness without mentioning the quality. (pp. 349-350)

Actually, the accompanying suitable higher-order thought may or may not be an awareness of qualities. If the concept of a certain quality has not been acquired then the person will not be aware of the quality though the quality is present in the sensory state of which the person is directly (reflectively) aware. In this sense, new concepts "actually cause sensory qualities to arise" (Rosenthal, 1986b, p. 350).

One might be aware of a sensory state, therefore, not in terms of its qualities. It all depends on the available concepts. And, of course, one has direct (reflective) awareness of mental states that lack all qualities, according to Rosenthal.

An account has also been advanced recently that is competitive with Rosenthal's extrinsic kind of account of all direct (reflective) awareness. According to this account, all states of consciousness are, in effect, sensory states. They are all qualitative states and stand in contrast in this regard to unconditionally nonconscious mental states, which are all nonqualitative. Freud (see Natsoulas, 1984a) and, recently, D.W. Smith (1986) are among those who have adopted a qualitative conception of what it is about a mental occurrence that makes its possessor directly (reflectively) aware of it.

D.W. Smith (1986) expressed his view of the qualitative dimension of all conscious mental states in the following words.

Part of what makes an experience conscious—what brings it to life—is its "phenomenal" quality, or "qualia". . . . Not only sensations, but all conscious mental states have qualia. The *phenomenal* character, or *qualia*, of an experience is the subjective character of the experience, how it "appears" in consciousness: as we say, what it "feels" like, or simply what it is "like," to have that type of experience. . . . *Every* conscious mental state has a certain phenomenal quality, a quality distinctive of that type of experience. To have such a quality is part of what makes an experience conscious. Indeed, an unconscious mental state has no phenomenal quality: there is no such thing as its subjective or phenomenal character, what it is like to experience it, for the subject has no inner awareness of it as it transpires. (p. 152)

In the latter part of this statement, D.W. Smith seems to say that a lack

of qualities is due to the absence of direct (reflective) awareness. It has also been held (see next subsection) that direct (reflective) awareness is possible only because mental occurrences have qualities. Otherwise, in the absence of the qualitative dimension from a mental occurrence, the instance could not be taken notice of. In some views, this is why there are unconditionally nonconscious mental occurrences. There is no way in which such mental occurrences can acquire qualities and thereby become intentional objects of direct (reflective) consciousness.

Since such mental occurrences lack all qualities, there is no way by which their possessor can become conscious of them. Which is not to say, of course, that one cannot have thoughts about one's unconditionally nonconscious mental occurrences even as they occur. But to think about something is not the equivalent of being directly (reflectively) aware of it, however "directly" one may think about it.

According to the qualitative conception of direct (reflective) awareness, Rosenthal's self-directed higher-order thoughts (see first main section of present article) could not have the self-referential cognitive contents that Rosenthal ascribed to these thoughts absent their possession of qualities. For it is their possession of qualities that makes thoughts or any other mental state "present to consciousness," so that they can be cognitively apprehended.

Freud's Unexceptionally Qualitative Conscious Psychological Processes

I should mention explicitly that D.W. Smith (1986) did not proceed to the latter contention. He did not consider it inconsistent with his conception of direct (reflective) awareness that mental states lacking all quality could be self-intimationally conscious. Self-intimation was a matter of the "structure" of the mental state, and the phenomenal quality of the mental state is a distinct "aspect" of the mental state.

D.W. Smith left the possibility open that mental states can have either of these two aspects of consciousness without also having the other aspect. He stated that any human state of consciousness had to have both aspects.

Freud, too, held that all conscious psychological processes are constituted of sensations or qualities (see Natsoulas, 1984a; e.g., Freud, 1895/1966, pp. 307-312). All conscious psychological processes are qualitative experiential gestalts. Even conscious thoughts fit this description by consisting of auditory speech-imagery or other kinds of sensory imagery. (D.W. Smith, 1986, p. 152, was not as explicit about the source of the qualities belonging to conscious thoughts. He wrote,

Even pure thoughts have qualia, so long as they are conscious thinkings: compare what it is like to think, consciously, that President Reagan is obsessed with Nicaragua, to think that Fidel Castro is obsessed with Angola, or to think that the Dodgers are baseball's best.)

Freud (1912/1958) defined a conscious psychical process as a psychical process that is "present to consciousness and of which we are aware" (p. 260). Accordingly, conscious psychical processes have qualities, presence thereby, and we are aware of them. Therefore, I shall speak of all conscious psychical processes as possessing "qualitative presence" in every instance of their occurrence. I generalize to all instances because, in Freud's view, qualities are intrinsic to each occurrence of any conscious psychical process. Since conscious psychical processes have qualitative presence, they are not simply mental occurrences of which their possessor has nonobservational and noninferential awareness.

Freud's conscious psychical processes are as Hoy (1985, pp. 355-356) characterized self-presenting states, namely "reflexively self-presenting." Hoy conceived of self-presenting states as reflexive in the sense of presenting themselves to themselves. And he distinguished the reflexivity of a self-presenting state from a mental occurrence's "presenting itself" so that it may be represented by a further psychical process.

I would modify these statements slightly. The self-presenting of a conscious psychical process is its being present to its owner absent any response to it. Freud's conscious psychical processes always qualitatively present themselves to their owner and not simply by causing him or her to respond to them however perspicaciously.

That is, their qualitative presence is not the cortical equivalent of a perceptual object's stimulatory presence at the sense receptors. (For Freud, conscious psychical processes occur in the cerebral cortex.) Nor is qualitative presence a matter of the owner of a conscious psychical process being affected by the process in such a way as to give him or her a distinct cognitive apprehension of it and its qualities.

The Other-Than-Thought-About Presence of a Cube of Pink

To explain further what qualitative presence is, it is useful briefly to review some of Sellars's interpretation of a person's having something present to him or her in cases of perceptual consciousness. As will be seen later in this main section, Sellars's position on self-intimating states of consciousness was negative. To wit, the primary candidates for self-intimating conscious states, namely sensory states, are not awarenesses of anything, let alone each state of itself. (Yet sensory states are responsible for the environment's perceptual presence to us, and perceptual consciousness is fundamentally direct, reflective awareness of our own sensory states! See Clark's, 1982, p. 358, statement of Sellars's view: "Perception of external things, properly understood, is indirect. It is channeled through occurrences and conceptualizations of sense impressions. Sense impressions are acts of sensing [or sensory states] of which we are in perception somehow directly aware.")

However, Sellars expressed in a suggestive way something very much like the notion of “presence to consciousness” when he discussed the ingredients of perceptual consciousness. Sellars’s following two statements from different publications concern what I would call the *derived* qualitative presence (actual or seeming) of an environmental perceptual object. (Read the latter “object” to include events, processes, states of affairs, and so on, therefore not only literal objects.) I call the qualitative presence of an environmental perceptual object *derived* because its presence to consciousness depends on the object’s producing a mental occurrence in the perceiver that has underived or *intrinsic* qualitative presence.

For, phenomenologically speaking, the descriptive core consists in the fact that *something* in *some way* red and triangular is in *some way* present to the perceiver *other than as thought of*. . . . When I see or ostensibly see something to be a pink ice cube, a pink cube has not only being for thought but also being for sense. The *somehow* presence of the pink cube could then be referred to as its being sensed. (Sellars, 1975, p. 310)

We not only see *that* the ice cube is pink, and see it *as* pink, we see *the very pinkness* of the object; also its very shape—though from a certain point of view. . . . *Something, somehow* a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely *believed in*. (Sellars, 1978a, pp. 177–178)

According to Sellars, all of our perceptual consciousness is a systematic though adaptationally extremely useful illusion in which our sensory states are taken by us as environmental perceptual objects. Note that, in this way, perceptual consciousness has sensory consciousness as one of its ingredients (though this needs further comment), and that sensory consciousness would seem to be responsible, by virtue of how it is taken, for the fact that the world seems to appear to us, though actually it is cases of sensory consciousness themselves that have whatever qualitative presence to consciousness is involved in perceptual consciousness.

The preceding paragraph began with Sellars’s position and then moved away from it. The next paragraph continues that movement away.

It would seem, contrary to Sellars (see later), that Sellars’s *somehow-presence-of-a-cube-of-pink-other-than-as-thought-about* is the qualitative presence to consciousness of a certain sensory state. Without this qualitative presence, there could be no mis-taking the state, as Sellars held, for an environmental perceptual object. A sensory state cannot be taken unless it is given. And it is given qualitatively; or has qualitative presence; or makes its owner, by its occurrence, qualitatively apprehend it.

The Locus of Qualities of Sense

Some theorists hold that more than just instances of sensory consciousness are self-presenting in the sense that I have indicated. Sensory states are not the only mental occurrences whose contribution to the functioning of the

mental apparatus depends on their possession of this property. Moreover, sensory states and all other self-presenting states may be states of a distinct system within the brain.

Certainly from the Freudian perspective, it is true that all psychical processes of which we have direct (reflective) awareness and which thereby provide a basis for our chosen actions are self-presenting. (As already mentioned, D.W. Smith, 1986, p. 153, seems willing to countenance "self-monitoring unconscious mental states." Though these are self-intimating, they are not self-presenting since they are nonqualitative. Consequently, D.W. Smith did not promote them from their status as nonconscious mental states. However, it is not clear what their lack of "phenomenality" or "phenomenal appearance of mental structure" implies with respect to their function in the mental apparatus. By not presenting anything to consciousness, can these purely qualitative self-directed thoughts serve as a basis for chosen actions?)

According to the Freudian perspective, all conscious psychical processes are self-presenting because, like all sensory states, which they include, all conscious psychical processes have a qualitative constitution. If sensory states are, as Sellars (1981a) proposed, states of a particular part of the brain (cf. Sellars, 1971, pp. 401-402), namely the "sensorium," and if sensory states are self-presenting because they are states of the sensorium (rather than being states of the "mind," which for Sellars is perhaps another part of the brain), then all of Freud's conscious psychical processes, not only sensory states, must be states of the person's sensorium. Indeed, see Freud's omega system, dual perception and consciousness systems, and unified perception-consciousness system (Natsoulas, 1984a, 1989, and below).

As I have just indicated, Sellars (1981a) distinguished between the mind and the sensorium. Immediately relevant examples of occurrences that belong to these two systems are, for the mind, the perceiver's *taking* a certain sensory state *to be* something in physical space before his or her eyes (e.g., a pink ice cube), and, for the sensorium, the perceiver's *sensing* a cube of pink, or the perceiver's sensory state that the perceiver takes to be something in physical space.

The latter occurrences, of which this particular sensory state is an example, are "physical, not only in the weak sense of not being mental (i.e., conceptual), for they lack intentionality, but in the richer sense of playing a genuine causal role in the behavior of sentient organisms" (Sellars, 1981a, p. 87). Mental occurrences are no less physical in this causal sense than the sensory states are.

The Ultimate Nature of Qualities of Sense

But the relevant states of the sensorium (which other theorists characterize as self-presenting) are not mental occurrences, in Sellars's treatment of them;

they are not part of what he means when speaking of the mind. The states or occurrences that are mental are all some kind of actual or seeming apprehension or awareness of something, whereas sensory states do not, on their own, make their possessor aware of anything.

Among the apprehensions or awarenesses are perceptual takings, as I have already mentioned. (Therefore, both the sensorium and mind participate in any case of perceptual consciousness.) Sellars (1981a) characterized takings in the following way.

A taking reveals its distinctive character . . . by always being a taking there to be something, a taking something to be somehow, and hence to involve propositional form. The taking experienced by "this cube of ice" takes something to be a cube of ice. The sensing which accompanies this taking may be of *a cube of pink*, but it is not an awareness of something as a cube of pink. (p. 33)

All cases of sensory consciousness contrast with all cases of perceptual consciousness in not even being cases of *seeming* awareness of anything. The sensory state of seeing a cube of pink is, rather, "the very 'mode of being' of sensed cube of pink" (Sellars, 1981a, p. 89).

In trying to express the ultimate nature of sensory consciousness, as he saw it, or the ultimate nature of the qualities of sense, Sellars (1981a) quoted from an early statement of his in which he discussed the "non-particulate foundation" of the scientific image of the world that we have to this point developed.

In this non-particulate image the qualities of sense are a dimension of natural process which occurs only in connection with those complex physical processes which, when "cut up" into particles in terms of those features which are the least common denominators of physical process—present in inorganic as well as organic processes alike—become the complex system of particles which, in the current scientific image, is the central nervous system. (Sellars, 1963, p. 37)

But not all parts of the nervous system consist of those complex physical processes ("absolute processes") that possess the qualities of sense. Only the sensorium so consists; the mind does not. (Cf. Freud's, 1895/1966, view that only the omega system of neurones of the psychical apparatus possesses the necessary constituents whereby psychical processes occur that are qualitative; cf. Natsoulas, 1984a, and the quotation from Freud just below. Lycan, 1987, pp. 103–106, raised what he called the "shyness" problem, why the qualities of sense do not characterize anything else besides processes of the brain. In Sellars's view, there is a larger shyness problem, since qualities of sense characterize only certain processes of the brain, not the mental occurrences as distinct from sensory states.)

The Extraordinary Status of Sensory Consciousness

Note that the current scientific picture of the world, which conceives of the world as a complex system of particles, is a picture that is fundamentally *of absolute physical process*, rather than *of physical objects*. That is, according to Sellars (1981a), the world that actually exists and that science does what it can to describe is, in fundamental ways, not as science describes it. Physical process constitutes the actual world, and the qualities of sense are actual dimensions of certain physical processes, a certain part of the total process that is the actual world.

McGilvray (1983) suggested, with reference to Sellars's (1981a) conception of man in the world, that sensory consciousness is, in that case, "not so extraordinary" and there is "no need any longer to give sensory consciousness extraordinary status" (p. 248). McGilvray drew his conclusion from how Sellars had located sensory consciousness in the fundamental world of physical process.

Yet, sensory consciousness, though it is no more or less a matter of process than is everything else that exists, does have a special place in this picture of the non-particulate reality beyond perception and current science. That this is correct about Sellars's conception can be seen from two considerations.

1. Not all complex physical processes of which the world consists have the qualities of sense. Perhaps no others do than those physical processes that comprise the sensoria of human and other animals. This would mean that only states of the sensorium would have *presence to consciousness* in the sense that I have explained. Sellars's conception of direct (reflective) awareness (which includes only a conceptual response) does not allow him to draw the latter conclusion, but I draw it from my own perspective. (Cf. Freud, 1895/1966, pp. 308-309:

Consciousness gives us [only] what are called *qualities*—sensations which are *different* in a great multiplicity of ways and whose *difference* is distinguished according to its relations with the external world. Within this difference there are series, similarities, and so on. . . . Where do qualities originate? Not in the external world. For, out there, according to the view of our natural science, to which psychology too must be subjected here [in the *Project*], there are only masses in motion and nothing else. . . . We summon up courage to assume that there is a third system of neurones— ω perhaps [we might call it]—which is excited along with perception, but not along with reproduction, and whose states of excitation give rise to the various qualities—are, that is to say, *conscious sensations*.)

2. Only those processes with qualities of sense and presence to consciousness provide us with a "window" on the non-particulate foundation of the universe. What Sellars (1963, 1981a) could tell from his perceptual takings (which have as their ultimate intentional objects sensory states) caused him to propose

that the current scientific image of the world fails to comprehend the world in terms of its ultimate nature as absolute process.

The Role of Sensory States in Perceptual Consciousness

In Sellars's view, sensory states cannot be their own intentional objects. Nor do they make their owner aware of anything else, such as the part of the environment that reliably causes a particular sensory state to be produced. Sensory states are not mental states; that is, they lack intentionality, and so cannot make their owner aware of anything. Therefore, the job of cognitive grasping must be performed by some sort of actual taking, and not by those processes of the brain that possess qualities of sense.

That I have not exaggerated Sellars's construal of sensory states as non-cognitive can be seen from the following typical statement. "As I have used the term, to sense blue is no more to be aware of something *as* blue (roughly: that something is blue) than to breathe sneeze-ily is to be aware of something *as* a sneeze" (Sellars, 1981a, pp. 31-32).

The role of sensory states would be restricted, it seems, strictly to participating in a causal network, that is, being affected by environment, body, behavior, and perhaps factors internal to the brain itself and, in turn, having effects on the brain, including the mind, on the body, and on behavior. However, the causal cannot be all that there is to the role of sensory states. Although Sellars will not grant that such states are self-intimating, since they are not awarenesses, the question looms large. How do we know the properties of sensory consciousness on a firsthand basis? How can we be aware of them in such a revelatory manner that what direct (reflective) awareness tells us about them takes precedence over the current particulate scientific image? We saw that taking, as Sellars conceived it, is a purely conceptual matter from a distance; that is, there is nothing privileged about it that necessarily gets one to the heart of matter. But Sellars seemed to give perceptual taking greater power to "see" than having thoughts about things would seem to provide.

Perhaps this has to do with the fact that a, say, visual perceptual experience of a volume of white "involves the *actual* rather than merely *believed in* existence of a volume of white" (Sellars, 1978b, p. 244). Sensory consciousness may have another possible role, other than making its owner aware of something, which it does not according to Sellars, or being part of the relevant perceptual causal network in which the owner becomes aware of something. We have already seen that in Sellars's conception, it is sensory states, rather than environmental things that are "somehow" present to us not as thought of or believed in. And also, Sellars (1978a) stated that the relation between his two ingredients of perceptual consciousness (i.e., sensing or sensory state

and taking or cognitive apprehension) is more "intimate" than simply that "the former (given a perceptual set) . . . [is] the immediate cause of the latter" (p. 182). Though it does not seem so to the perceiver, the perceptual taking has as its actual intentional object the sensory state that immediately causes the taking. The sensory state is "that in the experience which is *somehow* a cube of pink over there facing one edgewise" (p. 184).

Is Direct Apprehension More "Intimate" than Conceptual Response?

What is the nature of the "intimacy" that makes the relation between sensory state and perceptual taking more than merely causal? How does being the intentional object of a perceptual taking make sensory state and perceptual taking more "close?" After all, would not the intentional relation between them be no more intimate than that between an intentional mental state and what it is about, for example, the relation between a first-order thought and Rosenthal's immediate higher-order thought about the first-order thought?

According to Rosenthal (1986b), the higher-order thought has the first-order thought as its intentional object and is caused noninferentially and nonobservationally by the first-order thought. Similarly, Sellars (1968) stated, "The apperception of a representing always involves a conceptual act which, however intimately related to the apperceived representing, is numerically distinct from the latter" (p. 11)

Perhaps the "intimacy" between two nonqualitative thoughts cannot be as great as when one of the two occurrences in the relation of direct apprehension is qualitative. Does the qualitiveness of the sensory state that is an ingredient of a case of perceptual consciousness make a difference, *somehow* allowing the sensing and the taking to "meld" as two distinct thoughts cannot?

Evidently, something different is going on than simply that a certain propositional thought is being evoked by visual stimulation through the causal mediation of a sensory state (and a certain perceptual set). Thus, Sellars (1978a) wrote, "We not only see *that* the ice cube is pink, and see it *as* pink, we see the *very pinkness* of the object; also its very shape—though from a certain point of view" (p. 177). Since, in fact, it is a sensory state that we have awareness of in this case as in others, the qualities of sense (e.g., the very pinkness) belong to the sensory state rather than to the environmental perceptual object. Therefore, Sellars's statement might be taken to say that this instance of perceptual consciousness makes its possessor aware not only conceptually or propositionally (i.e., by an act of taking) but also *qualitatively*. What else could Sellars mean by his emphasis on the pinkness?

At one point, while critically discussing a view competitive with his own, Sellars (1981a) mentioned the notion of an awareness's "existential confrontation" with its intentional object. In apprehending a cube of pink percep-

tually, one therein confronts the actual cube itself with its actual pinkness and actual shape. Is this not more than occurrently “believing in” something pink and cubical?

That Sellars would agree on the *qualitative* presence of the cube of pink, a presence distinct from its being thought about, is supported by (a) his frequently used phrase “present other than as thought of.” Also, (b) he stated that an “actual quantity of red” is a constituent of a visual experience of a red apple (Sellars, 1978b). Qualitative presence would also seem to be supported by (c) Lycan’s (1987) report on Sellars’s comments at a conference in May 1979:

Sellars insisted . . . that the pinkness and the cubicity of his pink ice cube are “given,” and that we are “directly aware of” [sensory states] (we must be, or we could not respond conceptually to them). What is not given, contrary to the phenomenalist tradition that Sellars has been concerned to oppose, is only the categorial status or “guise” of the pinkness and cubicity. (p. 145)

However, relative to this same context and generally, Sellars’s (1981a) explicit understanding of “direct apprehension” was of a conceptual, propositional response to a sensory state.

A Revised Sellarsian Perspective

Commenting on Sellars (1981a), Fogelin (1981) stated, “The confrontation involved in direct apprehension has to be of the right kind—there must be some internal relationship between what is confronted and what is believed” (p. 120). The following is my attempt to adumbrate this inner relationship.

Suppose that, somehow, the direct apprehending of a sensory state manages to pick out the particular instance of a sensory state that caused the direct apprehending qua conceptual response to occur. Therefore, the particular instance of direct apprehending has as its intentional object (what it is about) the particular instance of a sensory state. Let us suppose that this successful aboutness is unproblematic for Sellars’s current account of direct (reflective) awareness, although Clark (1982, p. 363) argued there is great uncertainty concerning how such aboutness might be accomplished, and suggested that Sellars and everyone else have no answer to this question. I make the assumption of no problem in order to emphasize that it is for another reason that a revised Sellarsian perspective is needed.

Also, suppose that, as Sellars held very consistently, the direct apprehension mis-takes the instance of a sensory state for the environmental perceptual object that reliably produces the state in the perceiver’s sensorium. Thus, my revision does not change the mis-taking that Sellars postulated. However, the mis-taking is accomplished by a unified conscious psychical process, rather

than by a direct apprehension "acting on" a sensory state (cf. Sellars's, 1981a, pp. 76-77, diagrams).

The first step in revision must be, in my view, to *conflate* the sensory state and the corresponding taking. They must be fused into a single mental occurrence, which has both intentionality and qualities of sense. Sellars's two states of the perceiver must be brought together in order to explain the fact that the sensory state is, as I shall say, "noticed," rather than merely thought about. From this revised Sellarsian perspective, perceptual consciousness is, as before, a kind of direct (reflective) awareness, but it now consists of a single brain occurrence in place of the two that Sellars postulated (i.e., sensory state and direct apprehension of it). Let us call the single occurrence "inner sensory perception," since the occurrence makes its owner aware of itself, a certain sensory state, and therein seemingly, yet often veridically, aware of a part of the world outside of the brain.

From Sellars's current perspective, (a) the intentional properties of a mental occurrence pertain to a mental occurrence's functional role (e.g., Sellars, 1981b; see Natsoulas, 1977, pp. 83-87) and (b) the qualities of sense are certain dimensions of the processes that constitute a part of the brain. From the revised Sellarsian perspective, a mental occurrence that plays a certain functional role, which makes of it cognitively the mental occurrence that it is, may also possess qualities of sense. This assumption would seem entirely compatible with Sellars's current general account since qualities of sense belong to unspecified processes of the brain (see earlier). Why could not these processes have the "structure" (D.W. Smith, 1986) and role of a mental occurrence and also the qualities of sense that belong to a sensory state? All instances of inner sensory perception, as I have defined them, fit this description.

James's (1890) psychologist's fallacy must be avoided. What the psychologist may know about how an instance of a mental occurrence is caused is not also known by the mental occurrence, or simply by having the mental occurrence. The idea that a purely conceptual perceptual taking picks out a cause of it as its intentional object must, after all, be abandoned. Sensory states that do not themselves include a taking cannot be taken or mis-taken. For a sensory state to be given and taken is not to any extent a matter of its serving as cause. An internal relationship cannot be reduced to an external relationship. I do not imply, of course, that an inner sensory perception cannot mis-take itself for one of its causes in the environment, body, or nervous system.

The ability of direct apprehension to take a sensory state in some way would be explained using both the cognitive character and the presence to consciousness (or qualitateness) of inner sensory perception. The latter is *a noticing of*, for example, the occurrent presence of a cubical volume of pink, rather than just a conceptual response to or thought about the latter. Inner sensory

perception is a self-noticing since to speak of the occurrent presence of a cubical volume of pink is to speak of the qualitative dimension of the inner sensory perception itself. As Sellars (1981a) stated about a certain sensory state, a certain inner sensory perception is itself “the very ‘mode of being’ of sensed cube of pink” (p. 89). Reflexive or intrinsic noticing, as occurs in inner sensory perception, is our only possible form of experiential confrontation. No mental occurrence at a causal distance of whatever positive length from its intentional object is a true case of noticing that object. Absent the inclusion of “sensing cube-of-pinkly” (Sellars, 1981a) from all instances of inner sensory perception, no pink ice cube in the environment could be derivatively noticed, which is the only way it could be noticed. This is a sketch of the revised Sellarsian perspective that I recommend.

Fourth Objection: “One Cannot Hear One’s Acts of Hearing”

Statement of Fourth Objection to Self-Intimating Conscious States

Earlier, I stated that all cases of pain are pain-qualitative awarenesses of a part of the body. It would be more natural to speak of cases of pain in terms of how a part of the body feels. Perhaps one could say that to feel pain is to feel a painful part of the body.

In either case, what do these modes of expression imply for reflective cases of pain? That is, what do they imply with regard to those cases of pain in which, *ex hypothesi*, the mental occurrence that is the feeling of pain is, at the same time, an awareness of this feeling?

Does the hypothesis of self-intimation have the unwanted implication that people actually experience *two simultaneous feelings* of pain each time that it seems to them they have one? Does a self-intimational conception of direct (reflective) awareness amount to holding that, when we consciously undergo a case of pain, we not only feel a part of the body but also we *feel a feeling*? And would this mean that, in reflective cases of pain, one is pain-qualitatively aware of one’s pain-qualitative awareness of one’s body?

Interestingly, Brentano (1911/1973), whose own conception of direct (reflective) awareness was classically self-intimational, believed that the implication of doubled feelings, hearings, and so on, is an implication of conceptions of direct (reflective) awareness alternative to his own, namely of those conceptions that require *a distinct awareness* to make a case of pain, hearing, and so on, conscious (cf. Grossmann, 1965, pp. 17–18). As will be seen in this fourth main section of the present article, Brentano argued that his own account of what makes a mental occurrence conscious is free of this difficulty.

Nevertheless, Grossmann (1984) recently used what amounts to the implaus-

ible doubling of all reflective experience as a reason to reject Brentano's self-intimational conception of direct (reflective) awareness. However, Grossmann (1984) did not explicitly examine Brentano's relevant arguments. (He did so, somewhat, in an earlier work: Grossmann, 1965, pp. 17–18.) The following is how Grossmann (1984) stated his objection to the self-intimational aspect of Brentano's account of the mental.

Brentano's [1911/1973] view seems to me to be quite obviously mistaken. Consider once again the act of hearing [which I am calling] A_1 . There is an awareness of A_1 . But in what does this awareness consist? Not, we are told, in another act of awareness. No, it is A_1 which intends A_1 . But this means, if I understand it at all, that there is a *hearing* of a *hearing*! It seems quite evident to me that one cannot hear one's acts of hearing. What do they sound like? What pitches do they have? But if one cannot hear one's act of hearing, then it cannot be the case that an act of hearing can be its own (secondary) object. (p. 52)

Grossmann went on to say that this argument against self-intimation applies, with one exception, to all conscious states, not only to acts of perceiving. The conscious states that escape Grossmann's objection are the "acts of awareness" themselves. By an act of awareness, Grossmann had in mind the same category of mental occurrences as Rosenthal's (1986b) higher-order thoughts.

It will be recalled that higher-order thoughts are each about a respective first-order mental state, and are the distinct direct (reflective) awareness of the latter. Although an act of hearing could not be its own intentional object, according to Rosenthal, a higher-order thought could be self-directed. Rosenthal made use of self-directed higher-order thoughts in trying to explain certain phenomenological facts. In his view (cf. Hoy, 1985, D.W. Smith, 1986), a thought could be about itself *by representing itself* ("this very thought").

About self-intimational consciousness in the case of these higher-order thoughts, or acts of awareness, Grossmann (1984) stated, "This time, however, I have no decisive objection. It just seems to me that no mental act is ever its own object, not even an act of awareness" (p. 53). Grossmann believed that his objection to self-intimating conscious states other than acts of awareness was decisive.

Brentano's Concept of a Presentation

As mentioned, Brentano (1911/1973) had already considered a version of Grossmann's objection to Brentano's self-intimational account. Brentano argued that, contrary to this objection, his conception of direct (reflective) awareness *does not* force two distinct "presentations" into a state of consciousness, for example, both a presentation of a color and a presentation of that presentation.

In the course of setting forth his own conception of consciousness, D.W. Smith (1986) agreed with Brentano's counterargument (to be presented). D.W. Smith stated that direct (reflective) awareness is "an integral part of the experience itself, a modifying feature of the primary presentation (wherein 'I see a frog'), and not somehow an additional form of presentation—again as Brentano prescribed" (p. 151; cf. Brentano's, 1911/1973, p. 277, mention of the "determinate compounding" of the primary and secondary objects of a state of consciousness).

Although Brentano did not hold exactly as D.W. Smith did, Brentano insisted that a presentation of a color could be its own intentional object without thereby presenting the color to the mind more than once. If D.W. Smith and I are correct about Brentano's analysis, then Grossmann should not have interpreted Brentano as implicitly requiring dual presentations in the case of a conscious act of hearing.

Before I proceed to discuss Grossmann's objection to self-intimation, and Brentano's defense against this objection, I need to try to make clear a concept that is central to Brentano's general account of the mental. I am referring to Brentano's concept of a *presentation* (*Vorstellung*). (Strictly speaking, according to Brentano, there are no presentations and other mental acts. There are only individuals *who present something to themselves*, judge something, take pleasure in something, know something, and so on; see B. Smith, 1987.)

Sense perception and imagination are means by which we "acquire" presentations, which are the kind of mental act whereby something is presented to the mind. Whatever is presented, therefore, does not present itself, since it is presented by means of a mental act of presentation. For example, as B. Smith (1988) stated, "We would normally say that it is the colour or sound that presents itself to us, whereas, on the technical usage here adopted [by Brentano], it is the perceiver who presents the colour and sound to himself" (p. xxiv). Thus, a color or a sound is *a distinct existence* from a presentation of it, and might conceivably *exist without being presented* by the perceiver to himself or herself.

A sound or a color is a "physical phenomenon," whereas the presentation of it is a "mental phenomenon." The physical phenomena are sensible phenomena, which can be sensed by means of certain mental phenomena. The latter are presentations and not to be confused with the sensible phenomena themselves, such as color and sound, which they make "present to consciousness." (I used the latter phrase earlier in the present article to refer to the qualitative dimension of a mental occurrence. Mental occurrences are present to consciousness, I suggested, by virtue of possessing their qualitative dimension. This was according to the Freudian perspective, which was no doubt influenced by Brentano's thought; see McGrath, 1986. The possession of a qualitative dimension makes conscious psychical processes appear to us,

present to our consciousness, and we are thereby aware of them. However, notice the difference from Brentano, for whom sensible qualities were *the intentional objects* of presentations and were carefully distinguished from the presentations themselves.

It will be seen in the present main section that presentations themselves and other mental acts, as well as physical phenomena such as colors and sounds, are presented to the mind. However, it was not entirely clear, and became untrue in Brentano's later position, that all mental acts must be sensory or imaginal in order to appear to us.)

Brentano conceived of presentations under the general category of *thoughts*, and as presenting sensible phenomena. The kind of mental act that a presentation is involves both something's being presented and also the individual's *apprehending* that which is presented. The appearing of anything in consciousness is equivalent to Brentano's (1911/1973) concept of its being presented by an act of presentation (see p. 81; cf. Obstfeld, 1983, p. 275). Whenever an individual presents anything to himself or herself by means of a mental act of presentation, something is therein "presented and apprehended." (Cf. "given and taken" with "presented and apprehended." I used the former phrase, in the preceding main section, to argue that a conscious sensory state must be identical with the owner's direct, reflective awareness of it because the sensory state is present to consciousness and not simply responded to conceptually. I am now drawing attention to a parallel; I am not suggesting that the preceding sentence in this parenthetical entry corresponds to Brentano's position. Brentano's colors and sounds and other physical phenomena, which get presented, *are not* sensory states; rather, it is *presentations* of physical phenomena that are sensory states.)

Mental acts of presentation are fundamental in the sense that all other mental acts depend on them in order to be directed, in order to have an intentional object. Brentano (1911/1973) stated, "Nothing can be [for example] judged, desired, hoped, or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing" (p. 80).

However, presentation of "that thing" need not be the presence to consciousness of that very thing. Rather, it is sensible phenomena (qualities) that literally appear to us when we have a presentation of something that we judge, desire, hope, or fear, for example. In a detailed exposition of Brentano's *Deskriptive Psychologie* (1890-1891/1982), Mulligan and B. Smith (1985) described presentations with reference to their intentional objects as follows.

Brentano makes a further claim about the nature of the (primary) objects that ultimate, basic or fundamental as opposed to superposed acts must have. These objects must, he claims, be sensible phenomena. Acts of the given kind must "contain as their primary relation a presentation of a sensible concrete content" [Brentano, 1890-1891/1982, p. 85]. (pp. 633-634; cf. Kraus, 1924/1973, p. 396; McCalister, 1974, p. 334)

Brentano (1929/1981) himself wrote that “every external intuition contains spatial elements with concrete qualitative determinations” (p. 46). The familiar objects of external perception that we take to exist around us are constructions based on the primary objects of our presentations. These objects are sensible phenomena.

At least one major qualification must be attached to the preceding paragraph. The intentional objects of presentations and other mental acts, all of which are based on presentations, include mental phenomena (acts) as well as physical (sensible) phenomena. Whenever we have a presentation of something, it is not only sensible phenomena that appear to the mind. Also presented thereby is the particular presentation (mental act) itself. All mental acts, according to Brentano, are themselves presented and apprehended whenever they occur. (There are no nonconscious mental occurrences in Brentano’s view. Brentano, 1911/1973, argued at length against their existence. However, that thesis is not relevant to the present article. I consider Brentano’s self-intimational account of consciousness as applying to states of consciousness, without being concerned with whether his account applies to all mental occurrences.)

To be accurate concerning Brentano’s eventual position, I would have to add a further qualification, pertaining to whether sensible qualities are required for all thought (see footnote 92 by O. Kraus in Brentano, 1929/1981, p. 126). One can have something before the mind, one can present something to oneself, *either intuitively or conceptually*, either by means of sensible concrete content or by means of the exercise of concepts.

Brentano (1911/1973) compared how one is conscious of something in having a presentation of it from how one is conscious of something in the occurrence of a mental judgment about it. Although a presentation is a cognitive occurrence (as well as one in which qualities of sense are presented or a mental act is presented), Brentano did not conceive of a presentation as being a *predicative* mental act. (Contrast Grossmann, 1965, p. 111, on presentations:

We hold that all acts are *propositional*. The content of every mental act, in our view, is expressed by a whole sentence rather than a single word. This disagreement . . . rests on ontological considerations. So-called presentations, we argued in the last chapter, acquaint us neither with bare particulars nor with unexemplified universals. Instead, they present us with states of affairs; that is, with such facts as that a certain particular exemplifies a certain universal.)

For Brentano, a presentation does not consist of a referring component and a characterizing component in mutual conjunction.

However, in this regard, presentations do not differ from all judgments. For example, Brentano considered a “perception” (including both the inner and the external variety, i.e., both direct, reflective awareness and environmental perceptual awareness) to be a judgment, but argued that percep-

tions do not predicate characteristics of their intentional objects. Perceptions are the kind of judgment that simply *affirms* its intentional object.

A presentation, on its own, also makes its owner aware of something but only in a way that is expressible using a word or name, as opposed to a sentence (Brentano, 1911/1973, p. 228). Thus, the nature of the apprehensions that presentations are would seem to be of the sort that we encountered earlier in the present article, and identified as “prepredicative (attributive)” (e.g., see Hannay, 1988). This was made evident when Brentano (1911/1973), in a separate, late essay, used the words “a warm red pleasant-sounding thing” to express an “attributive” synthetic unity of presentations.

Brentano's Own Version of the Fourth Objection

According to Brentano's (1911/1973) own version of Grossmann's objection to self-intimating states of consciousness, a conscious act of hearing must include *two presentations* of the sound heard. The possessor of a conscious act of hearing has, of the act, direct (reflective) awareness that is not distinct from the act. As do all mental acts that are not presentations, the direct (reflective) awareness must be based on a presentation of its intentional object (i.e., the act of hearing). Therefore, the act of hearing must include two presentations, a presentation of the sound and also a presentation of the act of hearing. The presentation of the act of hearing must include a presentation of the sound, since the latter presentation is essential to the act of hearing. This is the grounds on which the objection proposes that, in Brentano's theory, two presentations of a sound are included in a conscious act of hearing.

In the next subsection, I shall consider Brentano's defense against this objection that he himself formulated and which, in the present subsection, I lay out in somewhat greater detail than he did. Of course, in defending his account of self-intimational states of consciousness, Brentano did not accept all the steps in the critical argument.

A conscious act of hearing is at the same time (a) an act of hearing a particular sound and (b) an act of direct (reflective) awareness of this act of hearing. That is, at the same time, a conscious act of hearing is both an act of external perception and an act of inner perception.

In the following statement, Brentano (1911/1973) may have put the latter point a little less strongly but he was stating no less than what I just have.

We can say that the sound is the *primary object* of the *act* of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the *secondary object*. Temporally they both occur, at the same time, but in the nature of the case, the sound is prior. A presentation of the sound without a presentation of the act of hearing would not be inconceivable, at least *a priori*, but a presentation of the act of hearing without a presentation of the sound would be an obvious contradiction. The act of hearing appears to be directed toward sound in the

most proper sense of the term, and because of this it seems to apprehend itself incidentally and as something additional. (p. 128)

The primary object of an instance of an act of hearing is an instance of a certain sound, and the secondary object of this particular instance of an act of hearing is the latter instance itself.

The following inference is part of the argument against Brentano's self-intimational view. "Since there are two distinct intentional objects for every conscious act of hearing, there must be included a presentation of each intentional object in each act of hearing." Do the two intentional objects in this case require distinct presentations as well?

Brentano (1911/1973) seemed to suggest that two presentations are required when he discussed whether the "intensity" of a presentation is equal to the "intensity" of the presentation of that presentation. He argued that their "intensities" are equal, and left the impression that the presentations are distinct from each other (pp. 120-121).

As I mentioned in the preceding subsection, mental acts of either inner perception (i.e., direct, reflective awareness) or external perception (i.e., environmental perceptual awareness) must be founded on a presentation of the intentional object of each mental act. All mental acts, according to Brentano, are either themselves presentations or based on presentations. Presentations make it possible for other mental acts to, as it were, find their target. Thus, Brentano (1911/1973) stated,

We speak of a presentation whenever something appears to us. When we see something, a color is presented; when we hear something, a sound; when we imagine something, a fantasy image. In view of the generality with which we use this term it can be said that it is impossible for conscious activity to refer in any way to something which is not presented. When I hear and understand a word that names something, I have a presentation of what that word designates; and generally speaking the purpose of such words is to evoke presentations. (p. 198)

Since there must occur both a presentation of the sound and a presentation of the act of hearing the sound, the particular sound heard must be heard twice, once for each presentation. Indeed, this would follow if a conscious act of hearing involved a dual presentation of a sound. The sound would be experienced twice, that is, presented twice, apprehended twice, and affirmed two times.

Seeking an escape for Brentano from this consequence, one might ask *whether the presentation of the sound could not suffice* for both external perception and direct (reflective) awareness. Could not this "primary" presentation provide the intentional object of both judgments? Is a second presentation necessary, that is, a presentation of the act of hearing the sound? (I am reminded at this point of Dunlap's, 1912, pp. 410-411, following statement and

how inadequate it seems: "I am never aware of an awareness. . . . How do I know that there is awareness? By being aware of something.")

But could there not occur a *judgment* that affirms the act of hearing yet based on *only* the presentation of the sound? No. Brentano would hold that only the sound could be affirmed in such a case. There would be nothing in consciousness besides the sound to be affirmed. Although the unrepresented act of hearing would have occurred, it would be as though it had not occurred. An unrepresented act of hearing could conceivably have effects but none of these effects could be mental acts that referred to the act itself of hearing.

Consider the analogous case in which a sound occurred and the perceiver failed to have a presentation of it. How could one have a perception of the sound in the absence of its affecting the mind and being experienced? If, somehow, a perceptual judgment about the sound were to occur spontaneously, not based on a presentation, it would be like a telepathic thought without any particular referent.

So, too, how could one have an inner perception of an act of hearing if this act of hearing, consisting only of an experience of the sound, was not itself presented to the mind though it occurred there. Such a case would resemble the case of Freud's nonconscious psychical processes, each of which has its respective intentional object, yet no nonconscious psychical process presents itself to the mind. Consequently, there does not occur inner perception of a nonconscious psychical process. No immediate judgment is possible of which the nonconscious psychical process is the intentional object, since such a judgement could not find its target in the absence of a presentation of this psychical process.

Brentano (1911/1973, p. 278) acknowledged that we can think about a mental phenomenon in its absence. But in this case, too, in order to have thoughts about it, there must occur a presentation of it (Brentano, 1929/1981, p. 12). It would not suffice, in order to have thoughts about a mental phenomenon, merely to have further mental phenomena that have as their intentional object the same primary intentional object as the first mental phenomenon. For example, to think some more (with visual imagery) about its raining in London right now is not to have direct (reflective) awareness of the first visual imaginal awareness that one had in this bout of thinking.

In sum, the necessary "datum" of consciousness would be missing (cf. Brentano, 1911/1973, p. 77); in the absence of a presentation of a particular mental phenomenon, the respective inner perception could not have its intentional object. Brentano (1911/1973) was quite explicit and specific about this point when he stated, "It is obvious that in mental reference [of a mental activity to itself], the mode of presentation is never absent, for it is the prerequisite of the others" (p. 276).

Again seeking an escape for Brentano from the consequence of a twice-presented sound in any conscious act of hearing, it might be noticed that an act of hearing does not include within it the sound heard. According to Brentano, the act of hearing includes only the *presentation* of the sound. Therefore, it might be suggested that, analogously, the act of inner perception (i.e., direct, reflective awareness) does not include within it the act of hearing the sound, only the *presentation* of this act of hearing. Thus, the relevant question becomes whether the presentation of the act of hearing a sound includes a presentation of the sound heard. Grossmann (1965) answered this question in the negative:

It is not at all apparent that the awareness of the perceptual act must also be an awareness of the object X. . . . The object of any act is in fact no part of the act. The relation which obtains between an act and its object is not that of a whole to one of its parts. Nor is the object in any other sense immanent in the act. (pp. 17-18)

However, in the present instance, the question pertains to a presentation of X, and a presentation of this presentation. Whereas X is not a part of the perceptual mental act, a presentation of X is part of a perceptual act that has X as its intentional object. For example, a presentation of a sound is part of an act of hearing that sound. Is also a presentation of X part of a presentation of a presentation of X? What does the latter, "secondary" presentation include? Certainly, it presents the act of hearing, in our example, but does it also present the presentation of the sound that is a part of the act of hearing?

From Brentano's perspective, the answer must be in the positive, because an act of hearing is fundamentally a presentation of a sound. An act of hearing is not separable from the respective presentation of a sound, cannot occur without the latter. Therefore, the presentation of an act of hearing is a presentation of not only the perceptual judgment involved in hearing but also a presentation of the presentation of the sound. There occurs in inner perception not only a judgment concerning a presentation of a sound, as Grossmann would have it, but also a presentation of this latter presentation.

In reaching his negative conclusion as regards whether a presentation of a presentation includes a presentation of the object of the latter presentation, Grossmann (1965) understood inner perception (i.e., direct, reflective awareness) simply as a form of judgment, or he understood presentations as no different in the relevant respect than judgments. Accordingly, a judgment about a presentation of X is not a judgment about X (though it may lead to one).

According to Brentano (1911/1973, p. 134), in contrast, a presentation of a presentation of a color presents to the mind both the latter presentation and the color. Any presentation of a presentation presents to the mind *all of what the latter presentation presents* plus the latter presentation itself (and the former presentation).

What is there about the nature of presentations that results in Brentano's conclusion? In presenting a presentation to the mind, a presentation is not a mere act of awareness (Grossmann, 1984) or higher-order thought (Rosenthal, 1986a). (As we have seen, the latter mental acts are founded on presentations, according to Brentano.) This "secondary" presentation is, no less than the purported "primary" presentation, *a sensory activity*.

Thus, Brentano (1929/1981) wrote of "the sensory act of presenting, in so far as it relates to something mental" (p. 59). He meant that a sensory activity presents something mental when a presentation presents the presentation of, for example, a sound.

This same idea was expressed when Brentano (1929/1981) distinguished "mental and non-mental sensory objects." The latter are the physical (sensible) phenomena, whereas mental sensory objects are the mental acts of presenting non-mental sensory objects. Here, Brentano (1929/1981) wrote,

After the discussion of non-mental sensory objects we must now discuss sensory objects, in so far as *they are mental*. The variety is much greater here than among non-mental sensory objects. This is because every difference in the non-mental area corresponds to a difference in the mental area (if colour differs from sound, then seeing differs from hearing); and there are other differences as well. (p. 57)

Brentano went on to mention, shortly after, his view that "a body appears to be at rest if we sensorily perceive that we sense it, in a continuity of temporal modes, at one and the same location" (p. 58). Again, it is a sensory activity by which we are aware of sensing the body.

But then, as a sensory activity, a presentation of a presentation must be presenting, among other things, certain qualities of sense. Or else, how could it be a sensory activity? The only qualities of sense involved in a case of hearing are those that are the intentional object of the "primary" presentation. (See next subsection for additional relevant comment.)

If color or sound is presented in both the "primary" and the "secondary" presentations, it must be experienced twice. In fact, Brentano (1911/1973, p. 127) agreed that if two presentations are involved in a conscious act of hearing or seeing, then the sound or color must be presented twice. And this would mean that we would hear any sound twice, see any color twice, if we heard, saw, it consciously. In contrast, a judgment and a presentation both having the identical intentional object would not mean two experiences unless the judgment was based on a different presentation.

On the assumption of two presentations of a sound, we may conjecture about the character of the two auditory experiences. (a) The, so to speak, lower-level experience would be merely a presentation of the sound. Perhaps we might speak of this as a case of hearing_{nr}. (Cf. my discussion of two kinds of pain in an earlier main section.) (b) If only the "secondary" presentation

occurred, assuming that it could occur on its own, we would have a case of hearing, and there could be no objection about hearing the sound twice.

However, the occurrence of both presentations implies the occurrence of two acts of hearing, or two auditory experiences of the particular sound. And Grossmann (1984) would do well to ask, as he did, whether Brentano's account does not imply that we hear our own hearing.

How Did Brentano Avoid Double Experiences?

The answer to the title of this subsection was already implied in the quotation from D.W. Smith (1986, p. 51) which appeared near the beginning of the above subsection on Brentano's concept of a presentation. To wit, a conscious hearing of a sound has two intentional objects but does not consist of two presentations. Anything like proposing two presentations would amount to a distinct-awareness conception of direct (reflective) awareness. (Cf. Grossmann's, 1965, 1984, own account of direct, reflective awareness, according to which a "mental state" includes two main ingredients, an act of experiencing, or awareness, and a "conscious state" on which this distinct act is directed, though both are part of the one "mental state," which comprises "all there is to the mind" at the moment.)

Brentano (1911/1973) had the following to say about the interpretation of a conscious act of hearing as involving two presentations (including a statement of his own unitary view).

It is only by considering [a single mental phenomenon] in its relation to different [intentional] objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon [i.e., the sound] and the other a mental phenomenon [i.e., the act of hearing the sound], that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as its content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. (p. 127)

There is, Brentano stated, a single mental phenomenon, not two (as in Grossmann's view, for example), when we are directly (reflectively) aware of a mental phenomena (e.g., an act of hearing). This reflective mental phenomenon has two intentional objects. In the example, the two intentional objects are a sound and an act of hearing the sound. This act is the reflective mental phenomenon itself.

A conceptual division on this basis into two presentations would be due to the assumption that each intentional object (namely the sound and the act of hearing the sound) must be presented by means of a distinct presentation. In fact, according to Brentano, a single presentation presents both the sound and the presentation itself which presents the sound. In this one presentation, we apprehend the presentation presenting itself and the sound.

Direct (reflective) awareness of an act of hearing is "a consciousness not so much of [a presentation of a sound] as of a whole mental act in which the sound is presented, and in which the consciousness itself exists concomitantly" (Brentano, 1911/1973, p. 129). This statement amounts to Brentano's definition of the kind of mental occurrence that I would call a "reflective case of hearing" and D.W. Smith (1986) called "a conscious auditory experience." Brentano was saying that an instance of the (reflective) mental act of hearing a certain sound (a) is a consciousness of the mental act that is the consciousness and (b) is distinguished from other consciousnesses of the same kind by the fact that it is presenting a certain sound to the mind.

We can also say the following from Brentano's perspective. A conscious act of hearing is a consciousness not so much of a sound as of a whole mental act in which the sound is presented, and in which the consciousness of the mental act exists concomitantly. Recalling that, for Brentano, all acts of hearing are conscious (i.e., are objects of inner perception), I take him to be claiming that *there are no primary presentations of sound or color*, in the sense of mental phenomena in which only physical phenomena are presented.

For our purposes, Brentano could have claimed only that those acts of hearing (or seeing) that are conscious do not involve any distinct primary presentations of sound (color). They are cases of reflective hearing (seeing). When reflective cases of hearing occur, one hears the same sound (a physical phenomenon that is not a part of any mental phenomenon) in a different manner. One hears the sound as the intentional object of this act of hearing it (which is *not* to misconstrue the sound as internal to the act of hearing it).

Since direct (reflective) awareness of an act of hearing is basically a matter of an individual's presenting to himself or herself this very activity of presenting in which not only a sound is presented but also the presenting of the sound, it would seem that the conscious act of hearing, despite this complexity, remains a sensory activity as opposed to a conceptual one. After all, it is a single activity by which both sensible qualities and the sensing of them are presented to the mind somehow not as thought about.

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