

A Plea for the Poetic Metaphor

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What is the future of the poetic figures in a technological and scientific world where a more restricted view appears to be emerging as to what is adequate and relevant about metaphors? What part should the radical trope play in a script where the figures that are heralded are usually those that are perceived as having practical importance, i.e., those that fill in the gaps of existing knowledge? It will be the intent of this paper to show that the current preoccupation of much of philosophy and psychology with structural explanation and cognitive theory has certainly contributed to establishing a coordinated and unified theory of metaphors, but left unto itself such a concern is severely limited and does not adequately explain the full potential of metaphorical expressions.

At one time when one thought about metaphors one usually thought about those lyrical figures of poetry which quickened the heart and allowed humanity to get a feel for life. Such figures were not often examined in painstaking fashion but appreciated more for what they disclosed. Their value was determined not by whether they represented abstracted truth, but on whether they had "presented" some newly found and embodied meaning, i.e., whether the poetic figure helped us "see" things differently than before.

But apparently those were the days when humankind didn't murder to dissect; when every figure was what Ezra Pound longingly called "substantial manna." It would hardly be an overstatement to say that such fanciful figures appear to stand in far less favor today. Not only has the unlimited expression and self-interpretive nature of much of modern poetry cast some doubt upon whether the poetic metaphor can have much business with the deep psychic content that individuals share, but evidently impressive advancements in science, and in cognitive theory, have spawned a concern for the figurative that appears more epistemic than existential in tone (cf., MacCormac, 1985;

Ortony, 1979). The fact that intentional ascription in psychology has become more like a placeholder for things which are beyond personal awareness, e.g., computational routes and excitation patterns, perhaps presciently suggests that startling people into recognition or probing the world of inner feelings may have become of less interest than achieving some type of cognitive gain.

In one sense, the metaphor that leaves its poetic glamour behind to occupy a more problem solving role; the metaphor that loses its elasticity as it gains a public coinage, this is the kind of figure that many seem to find most rewarding (cf., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). For a metaphor to stay plurisignative today would be almost a dereliction of duty and a forfeit of purpose. It is only when metaphors communicate information to us or help us define and understand what we are dealing with that they appear to have done their job well.

What is the future of the poetic figure in a technological and scientific world where a more restricted view appears to be emerging as to what is adequate and relevant about metaphors? What part should the radical trope play in a script where the figures that are heralded are usually those that are perceived as having practical importance, i.e., those that fill in the gaps of existing knowledge (see Perkins, 1983)? It will be the intent of this paper to show that the current preoccupation of much of philosophy and psychology with structural explanation and cognitive theory has certainly contributed much to establishing a coordinated and unified theory of metaphors, but left unto itself such a concern is severely limited and does not adequately explain the full potential of metaphorical expressions. Less we underestimate the attraction of this new causal theory, it should be noted that even those heavily inclined to extol the virtues of metaphors have often become smitten by the prospect of explaining the mechanics involved and have unwittingly made "how" discourse—how metaphors emerge and how they are constrained—more important than the "why" element of human intention (e.g., Derrida, 1974).

As we intend to demonstrate, the poetic metaphor, or if you like the "diaphoric" metaphor (cf., Wheelwright, 1968), can continue to provide an indispensable service to humankind by enlarging the person's ability to grasp those unnamed and unknown things that are apparently beyond the sphere of more discursive rule-based language. Perhaps of even greater significance, such figures may ultimately serve as a desperately needed paean to the inherent worth of the individual particularly at a time when the received view of things seems more concerned with making the abstract interrelationship of elements the ruling reality.

It is worth mentioning, if only to ward off unfavorable comments, that there is no delusion in this effort about explaining once and for all what a "metaphor" is. The continuous nature of metaphors, plus their great diversity of style, makes any quest for descriptive precision here as wrongheaded as the

belief that brain hemispheres split nicely into two tidy sections. Neither the literal nor the metaphorical is an exclusive caste of meaning. As with the equatorial line on a world map, the distinction is there only to let us know where we are on the language grid and not to impede traffic across borders.

Along the same tract, what constitutes a poetic metaphor is hardly without any less obscurity. By poetic metaphors we have in mind those "oppositional" figures which help us resist confinement by driving us toward perceiving the discord in things so that a deeper form of explanation and reference can come to light. Such expressions are best associated with the field of poetry, but they are hardly limited to it. As many authors have recently noted (Hausman, 1989; Levin, 1988; Novitz, 1987), other mediums like art, music and dance may very well fulfill the function of a poetic metaphor (though I am inclined to believe that language provides a greater semantical reach and therefore a much greater extensional possibility).

The Poetic Metaphor

It would certainly be a valid arraignment of poetic metaphors that they sometimes shrug linguistic restraints and leave us without a logical clasp to hold things together (at least logic as conceived in a traditional binary sort of way). The romantic tendency of glorifying the autonomy of expression, of looking upon the radical juxtaposition of references as being the essence of creative thought, often seems to send the more aberrant figure on what Wittgenstein pejoratively called "a holiday that never ends." The impressions being conveyed are in many instances so refractory or dissonant that any hope of focusing on a theme can only be viewed as testing the limits of possibility and license. Often the expressions used are so privately conceived that one inevitably becomes sensitive to the difficulty of communicating outward, to the undermining of shared cultural codes, to the decline of logic within the public domain.

Anyone can conjure up a radical trope, but to present diverse particulars in a meaningful arrangement clearly requires some relation of rapport with standards and conventions. The lifeline of any metaphorical expression ultimately depends upon its proximity to shared meaning. If there is no cross-over between normal and special speech, then no comparison can be made, no meaning can be shared. Deviant expressions cannot deviate from nothing. There must be a fundamental understructure, a basis for all divergent activities; otherwise, "we have not a metaphor, but nonsense of a particular kind" (Beardsley, 1966, p. 143). Derrida's (1974) wry attempt to break down the myth of literal language by paradoxically calling it "metaphorical" really only confounds a difficult situation further by leaving us with no substantial basis for determining what is or is not semantically deviant.

Those who hold metaphors to be sufficient unto themselves, who look upon the primacy of the figure as the key to language, truth and knowledge, surely drink the brew before it ferments (cf., Hospers, 1985; Nietzsche, 1911). Such souls are so often impressed by the formative power of the human mind that they come to look upon the metaphorical in a Dionysian-like way, i.e., as kind of a spontaneous inner shaping which suddenly transforms a barren void into a rich new world. What they fail to see is that this form of expression is merely a component of a more comprehensive process. They may not be consummate solipsists, yet these theorists pay homage to a world of private feelings and internal meaning, fearful of submitting any presentational figure to the scrutiny and review of more determinate meaning.

In one sense of the term, these theorists may be called "naive" for they miss the fact that even though poetic metaphors are seemingly the most difficult to analyze and interpret, such figures are not a privileged awareness that is exempt from the prospects of further elaboration. Even if the metaphorical was temporally and logically prior to the literal, which in most cases it is not, it would be poor thinking to assume that what follows must therefore pale in significance. Is it not true that many concepts not present at the beginning of the creative act are often brought into existence by the application of more evaluative thought; that the nature of the inaugural figure may change considerably when one places it under more constrained conditions? Perhaps it is not terribly surprising that one of the hallmarks of the idiot savant is that his or her efforts, no matter how extraordinary, tend to become habitual and uninventive precisely because the interpretive act seems forever wanting (cf., Gilhooly, 1982).

By upholding a policy of splendid isolation, by making the genesis of meaning the thing in itself, these lovers of unlocked inhibitions and unfettered visions certainly do right by the present as a feature of metaphorical meaning, but they somehow miss in the process how human feelings and experiences are cumulated, fused and retained. I would think by now that there is an overwhelming mass of information around to strongly suggest that no figure is completely gratuitous in the sense of being devoid of representational content or totally unconnected to the contributions of past events. Without some form of linkage between temporal events, without some causal feedback from the world, the individual would be overwhelmed by the magnitude and diversity of what she or he experiences. Indeed, there would be no way newness could emerge since there would be little to displace; no way potential can be carried forth into actuality. One can seriously question whether a manner of explanation that finds the person indispensable, yet replaces the person with a phenomenological unit that has an integrity, pattern and order of its own, is really coherent enough to connect the moments in a single life so that the same activity could refer back to the same person.

Meaningful structures endure and change, but a metaphorical presentation without any ties to the past or integration with the future can only degenerate into chaos or a noncommunicable surd of instincts and passions.

As the inquiring mind forges new models to see how the world would be other than how it is, it rarely loses contact with the "games of the underground" (Koestler, 1964). There is always some sort of connection with a determinate base if only to translate the messages received, to economize on the range of possibilities, to focus on and retain one's experiences, or to judge and improve the quality of the work. We are certainly indebted to those cognitive theorists who remind us that interpretation is used throughout the metaphoric process and not just to cap off the final stages. A poetic metaphor may walk around with an immuned and unbridled mien, but it is far from being a privileged citizen.

Of course, to say this is not to encourage an overplay of the hand. Where some theorists go too far the other way is in their reluctance to recognise and admit that the establishment of the literal is in many cases dependent upon prior human participation—the faint fumes of fancy often being the catalytic point where the sowing of a semantical field commences. As the objectivity of science is not removed from the experiences of the human subject, so the relations and associations of our everyday world are often by-products of meaning procreated at a more primitive level of mentation. Although it is true that there is no way of knowing from the start what a concept will eventually end up referring to until it has been worked out by society itself, still it would appear that whatever is attained by the passage of collective thought certainly cannot be divorced from more private and pre-analytical meaning. The figures of conventionality may appear more selective because there is a general consensus as to what constitutes the particularity of things, but such exclusivity is hardly removed from the primal influences of their predecessors. There are synthesizing links and personal insights which inevitably seep into the language process. As what we remember is related to the nature of the initial event and to the character of the subject's original intention (cf., Mandler, 1980), so the repository of literal language, if not the domain of human understanding itself, is never really removed from those metaphorical sketches that indelibly imprint themselves on the fabric of future form.

It is only the more devout literalist who fails to appreciate that the established system is fed by the raw material of a more personal and emotionally charged meaning (Rosch's theory of prototypical natural categories and the substitution theory of metaphors comes immediately to mind). The belief that there is no such thing as metaphorical meaning (Davidson, 1978), that the metaphorical figure is simply a derivative byproduct of contextual thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), certainly deals with the social side of human expression, but it unfortunately neglects to take seriously how idio-

graphic factors work through time and between levels of organizations to effect the situation at hand. Such an end-state explanation is pre-eminently inclined to disdain the poetic metaphor by gazing upon it in a Piagetian sort of way; that is, as a kind of childish, first-draft step in a more linear and progressive development. The creative leaps of the artist, the spontaneous reorderings of Gestalt, even the distinctive nature of metaphor itself, all have little meaning in such an incremental setting, for any initial burst of insight will always be modified many times over before it reaches its final donouement.

It would surely be absurd to deny the tremendous contributions that structural accounts and mediational theories have made toward our understanding of human behavior (particularly in reference to our long range dispositions to act in a certain way and those constraints which influence our representation of the world). But to see the metaphor as an outgrowth of systematic thought (a point that strangely both Davidson and Derrida agree), or as simply a juxtaposition of normally associated referents (MacCormac, 1985), has the rather unsettling effect of surgically removing the person from the heart of the operation. Although there is not space enough to traverse all that is involved here, there is more than a rationalist tendency within current philosophical and psychological thought to look upon the behavior of the individual as dependent upon a preexisting system of categories and beliefs that is divorced from his or her intentions but which still irrevocably shapes the direction the consequences take. Whether it be encoded inscriptions inside the brain (Dennett, 1978), or inside society (Mischel, 1977), recent explanation seems to imply some variation on the theme of an epistemic subject, i.e., a subject's relation to other subjects in a symbolic field or knowledge structure which is common to all. What follows from this is the supposition that the individual is of lesser importance than the network of meaning at work; that a fortiori, the metaphorical act is simply a borrowed token of strongly underlying factors—a step by step modification of previously existing ideas.

I really have little quarrel with the supposition that structural factors are contributing causes to human conduct. The fact that a good deal of human motivation, references and values are the result of inescapable conceptual structures which the individual has little or no control over makes any Socratic or existential confidence in absolute freedom somewhat of a misplaced idealization. What I would take issue with, however, is whether this implies (1) that the self is nothing more than an enervated product of abstract formulas of transaction (and therefore on the sidelines of what is meant and what has meaning), and (2) that metaphors have very little influence over their cognitive structures and are in fact residual offshoots of such combinatorial thinking. My own thoughts are that though this species of

thinking has proven to be a very powerful technique for explaining the other-than-personal structures that mediate our behavior, it by and large does little justice to the flexibility and complexity of the human mind on at least two counts.

Firstly, though there are operations taking place outside our awareness which suggest that one could be quite wrong about the contents of one's own mind, there is not enough that can be culled from such a fact to warrant placing the human person in a passive role setting. One gets the idea with the current trend of explanation that human consciousness is nothing more than an accidental affair—a side effect of a particular kind of software package or the emerging product of a higher level of spreading activation (cf, Barrs, 1988). Not only does such explanation allow very little room for the reconstructive nature and generative capabilities of the person, but it appears to make any metaphorical act simply a short term event with no positive function other than providing the system with a self-preserving strategy for solving problems.

But it seems ridiculous to think that we as humans are totally annexed by representational systems; that we are simply reading the contents of a coded text. Individuals may not be in a privileged position when it comes to the question of whether their judgments are a reliable indicator of their beliefs, but they do appear to be in a position, since judgments come one at a time, to arrive at outcomes that are the objects of their decision or preference. Mediation theory may not need a ghost to make it go, but without a sharper distinction between the agent who engages the structure and the structure itself, such a perspective takes the symbolic factor too much to heart and offers us a causal explanation of behavior that makes the relation of element to element so important that the metaphorical can only be distinguished at the cost of triviality or misrepresentation. I take it as obvious that a representational system is a semantic matter and cannot initiate action; that human consciousness, in the form of an awareness that attends to the occurrence of mental happenings, is still the place where the person most appropriately draws things together to energize the system as a whole, i.e., the place where metaphors can help people come to terms with themselves.

Secondly, the fact that we cannot attend to all things consciously does not mean that the non-conscious part of the self is simply a storage place of what the mind has forgotten or blocked out. Cases of blindsight, subliminal perception and co-consciousness (Hilgard's hidden observer) may leave in doubt the unity of consciousness and the sanctity of existential reference, but the fact that consciousness is a matter of degree and not omnipresent in all mental events does not imply that all background is representational or that there is no subjective element that persistently prevails. The idea that there is nothing mystical to the processes underlying thinking certainly can be

applauded for its ambitious attempt to rid us of alchemic explanations, but it certainly doesn't warrant the extreme claims (1) that there is nothing happening during unconscious activity (Langley and Jones, 1988), or (2) that the metaphorical process is inevitably mechanical (Schank, 1988), if not just inevitable in its own right (Perkins, 1983). There is a rich play of unconscious self-organizing activity around (for example, the intentionality of dreams, cf., Globus, 1989) which rather strongly suggests that there are personal factors at work, even at the unconscious level, which may force any structural explanation to work within the scope of a more dynamic framework (cf., Johnson, 1987; Rychlak, 1977). It is well recognized that the seeds of creativity often begin to germinate during an incubation period where clarification, structuring, enlightenment and unconscious scanning all take place (Vaughn, 1979). This is certainly not to advocate a return to an unknown and unqualified substratum, but only to suggest that the structure of the unconscious is an active affair that takes note of life experiences and responds according to its own framework of interpretation.

What this means for a theory of metaphor is that it is extremely difficult to conceive of the metaphorical act in completely derivative terms. Belief producing processes no more explain metaphorical thought than rules of logic explain thinking. There are dynamic, spatial and historical factors at work—non-epistemic concerns which arrange objects and events in a personalized sort of way—which effect the overall structure and thus force any linear explanation to work within the scope of a less associative and more inclusive framework (cf., Rychlak, 1977). Studies on metaphorical language make it clear that literal analysis is not an obligatory stage for understanding metaphors and that the nature of metaphor often exceeds at times the standards and constraints of its own system (Gerrig, 1989).

To see an artwork as an imitation, as Plato did, is to admit that the artwork represents something external to it. To see metaphors solely in terms of associated and commonplace referents fares no better for it concentrates on just one function of thought—its capacity to uncover and discover antecedent similarity (cf., Ortony, 1979). That the metaphorical in science usually appears in such form is hardly surprising for similes and analogies in most cases seem to assimilate the new to the old and therefore prevent fresh relationships from being unduly unfamiliar. If blood vessels are to be the body's irrigational canals, then the use of canal to explain some sense of blood vessel must follow certain rules of correspondence and fit comfortably within the well formed formulae of a respected research tradition (cf., Hesse, 1966; Rothbart, 1984). Although it is highly questionable whether all similes and analogies are explicable in detail (consider Dylan Thomas' verse, "the windy blood slides like a sea"), there is little doubt that such comparative figures seem to supply a lend-lease of attributes which bring the form of the unknown entity closer to the structure

of the more established and anticipated subject. "Strongly, though with a progressive loss of virility as a figure of speech, a metaphor becomes not less but more like literal truth" (Goodman, 1968, p. 68).

Though such a view of metaphors places the figure in a public forum where it can vigorously display its strong phenomenal and predictive powers, it is also sadly true that such a monistic stand is extremely limiting in the sense that no relationship can be sustained which was not already learned or regarded as being well in place. Not unlike steady-state cosmology, or an imperishable pantheistic view, there is no world that can be created here for the world in one sense is ready-made which anybody under the right conditions can discover.

But does the fact that these more systematically developed metaphors are greatly disposed to discovering what is out there—i.e., of forcing the metaphor to work within a problem-solving methodology where outside standards and "associated commonplaces" predominate—necessarily imply that the more personalized or eccentric figure is inherently fatuous simply because no independent criteria are available to a solitary self to confirm these expressions? I would think that what a poetic metaphor means has little to do with how the unknown entity relates to the structure of the more established environment. Such figures are "looked at in their whatness with no concern for correspondence or lack of correspondence with the world" (Hester, 1967, p. 200). Indeed, it is exactly how things relate to the world as extant that is being challenged here.

The fact is that the value of the poetic figure is determined not by whether it is true or valid, but on whether it can provide a jolt of recognition or a more penetrating picture of what might be the case. If anything, the notion of truth is a distraction for it erroneously suggests that the function of metaphors is to reveal how things really are. If there is something like a poetic intent, it would certainly seem to revolve around alerting us to the pitfalls of an impersonal and invariant concept of reality along with the accompanying folly of a puffed-up pride in national thinking. When poetry is successful it decouples us from the world so that we can intentionally extend nature beyond itself (cf., Kittay, 1987). Such figures play around with multiple meaning so that those who listen to what is said, rather than those who read into it what they want (Davidson's limited view), may have a freer rein to suggest possible patterns within diverse events.

To assume that metaphors perform properly only when they end up as literal statements, or that the metaphorical supervenes upon the literal, is to fasten the figurative down to the interpretive priorities of everyday life. No doubt the ever increasing belief that human thinking is more practically than formally based has done much to egalitarianize mental activity by challenging the idea of metaphor as (1) a mysterious act accessible to only intellectual prodigies, and (2) a rare and exclusive process that is divorced from

the labors of everyday life (cf., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). But does the fact that all forms of thinking involve a successful adaptation to novel situations necessarily suggest that all forms of expression are equal or that all human adaptations speak to us in the same way? Evolution may deny human beings any special place in the total scheme of things, and admittedly some deviation from conventional standards does not always prove to be insightful, but I would think that when we are dealing with the poetic metaphor that the depth and extent of the product made might prove to be the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a higher cognitive act or a more profound expression.

Though it is true that no figure is immune from the possibility of further scrutiny, it is highly doubtful whether the anomaly of poetic expressions can be systematically unpacked to the point of rendering them literal or making them suitable to some type of denotative equivalent. All metaphors are paraphrasable to some degree, but that the more fanciful do so grudgingly, and with great difficulty of translation, is a factor that is not easily dismissed (cf., Arieti, 1976). There is a marginal quality which removes the more tensive metaphor from the magnetic pull of a public world and allows it to travel in different linguistic orbits. Some metaphors, like those of a similitic bent, gravitate closer to the surface than others, but the imagery and prototypicality of the poetic type i.e., the metaphor of imagination which goes beyond pre-existing similarity to reform our settled views, always seem to prevent its complete incursion into the world of ordinary meaning.

Conclusion

It has often been thought that in the evolution of thought there must be something like an inventive phase where ideas suddenly burst into our consciousness and generously provide us with new highways for our jumbled-up feelings. C.S. Lewis (1939) referred to this as the "spontaneous" stage, Polanyi (1966) saw it as the "heuristic function," and DeBono (1968) simply called it "lateral thinking." No matter what terminology is searchingly employed, to many this is the launching pad for human adventure; the period of acute human participation where the developing person alters encoding strategies and prototypical descriptions through newly formed mental models. Here the individual is in a mystic-like state where one means more than one can say, and where the person, feeling free from certain constraints, grapples with form in an attempt to place those bewildering and unfocused impressions into novel schemes of meaning.

Though many theorists today would oppose such conceptual leaps epistemologically on the grounds that to accept such a notion might entail a commitment to either some form of self-evident givenness or a coarse-grained

variety of ordering, it would certainly be taking the epistemic turn far too wide to conclude that there are no acts of immediacy or that these vaults of imagination are simply consignable to juvenile or unrefined eruptions. As biologists talk about evolution while recognizing disruptive leaps, so the continuity of cognitive processes does not deny in any way the possibility of periodic jumps. It is probably more correct to say that what these leaps of inventive thought are inclined to be are architectonics of composition, or "plots" to Ricoeur (1975), which hold together the thematic aspect of a constantly altering thought process—an efficient way of covering more ground swiftly and cursorily. To call these image-schemes "metaphors" might be somewhat presumptuous for these formations are really only potential vehicles of expression. Metaphors, on the other hand, are more inclined to be within the confines of a certain genre; which is to say, that an expressive medium would seem to be in order if these private image-formations are ever to achieve any sort of external realization.

It is during this struggle to unravel these vernal schemes that the individual turns toward the metaphorical for help: domain-specific expressions which take on, because of the highly fluid and personalized nature of new form, a very poetic appearance. During the inventive phase, when newly etched contours come into being, we are all somewhat poets; for no matter what discipline or genre, all efforts issue from the same generative light. Whereas art arises from the tacit acceptance of those primigenial ideas, so does the more acclaimed premises of science. In our seminal moments, we all attempt to express ourselves in ways that are generally figurative: graphic figures which are not meant to be examined in painstaking fashion, but appreciated more for what they anticipate or disclose.

Although poetic metaphors might seem less interpretable than the well-trodden literal figure, the insights that they offer are often more challenging and far-reaching. Metaphors at this level of activity often allow us to visualize what was once imperceptible and perceive what was previously obscure. They pry us loose from checked beliefs and deeply rooted assumptions so that alternative schema can be productively entertained. Indeed, this is where the human subject may be said to reverse natural entropy by constantly striving to impose new order on an ever changing world.

The established system may be the qualifier and interpreter of meaning, but poetic metaphors are often the designer of such conceptual furniture. Of course, the poetic propensity of the fresh metaphor needs the regularity and rigor of more evaluative procedures to tighten things up so that we can examine more completely what we come to find. But the logical bent of the more context-sensitive literal expression often requires the energy and scope of the poetic figure to create uncertainty within a static order, to shift unbending consciousness, and to fire and forge new alternatives to a some-

times drab and tired world. Whereas the lovers of unlocked inhibition and unfettered vision grasp the "non-thingness" character of metaphors, they miss the fact that new schemes are created by utilizing older ones and that inference, constraint and interpretation are never really removed from the nature of immediate expression. On the other hand, whereas causal accounts understand the role that underlying processes play in the genesis of metaphors, they really have little to say about how such processes are interrupted, how meaning is intimately embodied, or how people have managed from time immemorial to go beyond codification and rules to constantly legislate newer worlds (especially those directed toward non-existing objects and events).

In a world that would demystify our everyday interpretation of human behavior by making us either surface manifestations of underlying structures or simply another entity to be engineered, it might do well to remember that it may not be in our power to alter certain natural or environmental constraints that are forced upon us, but it would certainly seem to be in our power to unmask these unavowed forces, to scan our activity, to challenge what exists, and to bestow life upon those unprecedented forms which do not. It seems clear that in many ways the emergence of the poetic metaphor defies causal explanation and formula-driven methods by having no sufficient condition prior to the agent him/herself and no constancy of activity that is the same from person to person, if not from act to act. As we attempt to figure out the kind of thing humankind is in an objective way, we should not be blind to the complexity of the phenomenon or to the point that in some sense the person is a totality of dispositions and historical elements that is without category and without peer. There is not something in us causing something else in us, but something that we ourselves are doing with ourselves. If we are to understand human endeavor, we must continually realize that any attempt to explain it is greatly limited by the unique nature and essential solitude of its specific creator. Is there really any better form of expression for singing a song to this than the poetic metaphor?

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