

## The Case for Intrinsic Theory

### I. An Introduction

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This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness<sub>4</sub>." "Consciousness<sub>4</sub>" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances (the "conscious<sub>4</sub>" ones) wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account of consciousness<sub>4</sub> that properly comes under the heading of "intrinsic theory" is distinguished by the thesis that a mental-occurrence instance's being conscious<sub>4</sub> is an intrinsic property, rather than an external-relational property of that mental-occurrence instance. My hope for the present series of articles is that, by the end, the case for intrinsic theory will be so evidently strong, or at least so vivid, that all psychologists of consciousness will have to address intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness<sub>4</sub>. In this article, I set the stage by (a) rendering some of the relevant meanings explicit, (b) spelling out my purpose and approach to making the case for intrinsic theory, (c) providing some context for the discussions to follow, and (d) mentioning important objections to intrinsic theory that have been voiced in the literature.

In the case of an [experience] directed to something immanent, or briefly expressed, a *perception of something immanent* (so-called "internal" perception), [experience and experienced] form essentially an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio. Here the perceiving includes its Object in itself in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractively, only as an essentially non-selfsufficient moment, from its Object. (Husserl, 1913/1983, pp. 79-80; his later corrections)

Recently, *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* published an article of mine titled "Consciousness<sub>4</sub>: Varieties of Intrinsic Theory" (Natsoulas, 1993a). In that article, I briefly reviewed nine "intrinsic" accounts of the kind of con-

sciousness that I have been calling “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” since my essay “Consciousness” appeared in *The American Psychologist* (Natsoulas, 1978a; cf. Natsoulas, 1978b, 1983, 1986–1987, 1994c). Although the present article is a sequel to Natsoulas (1993a), it is also the first installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the “intrinsic” kind of explanatory account of “consciousness<sub>4</sub>.” Over the years, my understanding of “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” has become aligned with the “intrinsic” kind of account of “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” advocated or adopted by, among other theorists, William Hamilton, Franz Brentano, Sigmund Freud, and David Woodruff Smith (Natsoulas, 1993a, 1993b, 1994c).

It does not suffice for me simply to say that “intrinsic theory” (like the alternative “appendage theory” [Natsoulas, 1993d; Rosenthal, 1993]) is a kind of explanatory account that addresses how “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” occurs and that proposes “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” takes place “intrinsically” with respect to individual “mental-occurrence instances.” I realize that “intrinsic theory” will be an unfamiliar term to many readers, as will certain other terms I will be using in the present series of articles, including “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” itself. Therefore, I shall make a special effort throughout the series to render explicit my meanings and those of the other authors whose views and arguments will enter the discussion.

### Initial Explicatory Statements

Indeed, a large portion of the present, propaedeutic article is devoted to the task of making meanings explicit. The following set of initial explicatory statements will be helpful as a start and will convey meanings that are not, I trust, entirely unfamiliar to psychologists.

1. A mental-occurrence instance is a single, concrete pulse of mentality. In using the phrase “a mental-occurrence instance,” I shall be referring to a mental occurrence that has taken place, is just now taking place, or will take place at a particular point in time and in a particular human being or other animal. When I use that phrase on its own, I shall not have in mind a mental-occurrence type, a kind of mental occurrence, or a particular subcategory of mental-occurrence instances. My models for mental-occurrence instances are James’s (1890/1950) basic durational components of the stream of consciousness, that is, the stream’s minimal temporal sections that give veridical or nonveridical awareness of, or as though of, something, which can be anything perceivable, feelable, imaginable, thinkable, or internally apprehensible (cf. Natsoulas, 1994b). James is well-known for holding, analogously to Heraclitus, that no basic durational component of the stream of consciousness ever takes place more than once. It always has something different about it when it is said to occur a second time; thus, it is qualitatively, as well as numerically, a different mental-occurrence instance. However, I do not

hold, as James did, that all mental-occurrence instances are components of a stream of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1992–1993).

2. We may speak of a “conscious<sub>4</sub>” mental-occurrence instance. “Consciousness<sub>4</sub>” is a property of individual mental-occurrence instances, although we may also speak of someone’s being “conscious<sub>4</sub>” of a mental-occurrence instance or having “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” of one of his or her mental-occurrence instances. I gave consciousness<sub>4</sub> this name because it is the kind of consciousness that *The Oxford English Dictionary* identifies in its fourth subentry under the word “consciousness” (Natsoulas, 1978a, 1978b, 1983, 1986–1987, 1994c). I have been using numerical subscripts to distinguish the six kinds of consciousness that the dictionary identifies under that word. Recently, I completed a series of six articles each of which is devoted to a different one of the dictionary’s six meanings of “consciousness” (Natsoulas, 1991a, 1991b, 1992b, 1994c, 1994d, 1994e). The (“intrinsic”) kind of theory that I will be addressing in this series addresses directly the fourth of these six kinds of consciousness.

3. A conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance is an object of direct apprehension (sometimes called “internal perception” [e.g., Brentano, 1911/1973, 1929/1981]). Direct apprehension of this exact kind was what Husserl (1913/1983, pp. 79–80) was discussing in the passage from which I quoted at the head of this article. In the present series of articles, I shall call the fourth kind of consciousness listed in the dictionary either “consciousness<sub>4</sub>,” “inner awareness,” or “immediate awareness.” I shall put these three terms to use interchangeably; for my present purposes, they are equivalent to each other in meaning. All three terms have reference to a mental-occurrence instance’s being itself an “immediate” object of occurrent awareness. That is, all three terms have reference to someone’s being aware of a mental-occurrence instance in a way that is not mentally mediated by any other occurrent awareness.

4. It is thus that a mental-occurrence instance is a conscious (better, a conscious<sub>4</sub>) mental-occurrence instance, rather than a nonconscious (better, a nonconscious<sub>4</sub>) mental-occurrence instance. Better to write of conscious<sub>4</sub> and nonconscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances because the subscript can serve as a reminder that the mental-occurrence instance referred to may or may not be conscious in some different sense of the word. A conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance necessarily differs from a nonconscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance with respect to being an object of immediate awareness. It would be self-contradictory to say that a nonconscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance was an object of immediate awareness, or that a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance was not such an object.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>My concept of consciousness<sub>4</sub> and Rosenthal’s (1993) concept of (mental-) state consciousness are much the same concept except that Rosenthal would include, as being state conscious, all mental-occurrence instances of which their owner has occurrent awareness by

5. More specifically, what makes a mental-occurrence instance conscious<sub>4</sub> is that it is the object of an occurrent awareness that does not require, in order for it to occur, the individual's having occurrent awareness of something else from which the presence of the mental-occurrence instance is inferred. This is what I meant above in saying that the requisite occurrent awareness is not mentally mediated. Therefore, I would not exclude, for example, the influence of adopting an introspective attitude, which has the effect of causing conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances to take place relatively more frequently.

6. Any account of consciousness<sub>4</sub> that properly comes under the heading of "intrinsic theory" is distinguished by its holding that a mental-occurrence instance's being conscious<sub>4</sub> is an intrinsic property, rather than an external-relational property, of that mental-occurrence instance. I shall soon return to the latter, main thesis of intrinsic theory; see "A Single Unmediated Unity" further on. For the moment, let me just append the following two points. (a) An intrinsic theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, by treating of consciousness<sub>4</sub> as an intrinsic property of mental-occurrence instances, does not necessarily imply that all mental-occurrence instances are conscious<sub>4</sub>. The intrinsicity of a property that belongs to mental-occurrence instances does not entail that instantiating such a property is essential to being a mental-occurrence instance. (b) Whether they are "intrinsic" or not, different accounts of consciousness<sub>4</sub> have the same property for their explanandum although they construe the property differently; what makes a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance conscious<sub>4</sub> varies in its theoretical interpretation.

### Purpose of Present Series

The purpose of the present series of articles is to review, to spell out, and to develop arguments in support of one or another intrinsic theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub>. I believe that a series is necessary, rather than a single article, because, in presenting the case for intrinsic theory, I want to be as comprehensive as possible. I want not to omit any argument that has been preferred, or any argument that I may develop in favor of intrinsic theory. Even those arguments for intrinsic theory that I would not myself put forth may contribute to convincing some readers regarding the validity of intrinsic theory.

My hope for the series is a rather ambitious one. I hope that, by the end of the series, the case for intrinsic theory will be so evidently strong or, at least,

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nonconscious inferential means. Clearly I would not include such cases as conscious<sub>4</sub>, even if I believed that there was such a thing as nonconscious<sub>4</sub> inference, that is, inference in which no immediate awareness occurs of any of the mental items involved except for the concluding thought.

so vivid that all psychologists of consciousness will be obliged to come to terms — in one way or another, except by trying to debunk the existence of consciousness<sub>4</sub> (e.g., Hebb, 1968, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980) — with intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness<sub>4</sub>. If I succeed in the present effort, the psychology of consciousness will have entered a new, more advanced phase of its development. This is not to diminish the fact that the psychology of consciousness has come a considerable distance already, since the decades that consciousness languished in “the oubliettes of behaviorism” (Mandler, 1975).

I believe that intrinsic theory is closer to the truth about consciousness<sub>4</sub> than its competitors are; and that it is time, in view of how often one or another of these competing theories is advocated, to attempt to marshal in one place all of the arguments in favor of intrinsic theory. Of course, not all such arguments will reveal themselves to be equally good or sound. However, those relevant arguments that do not receive a high rating for soundness may nevertheless be susceptible to improvement. Upon closer scrutiny, they may lead to the development of better arguments. Or they may inspire in certain readers, I should hope, still better arguments for intrinsic theory than the ones that I will have presented in this series.

In trying to make the case for intrinsic theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, I will inevitably be drawn into raising objections to alternative theories of the same phenomenon. The weaknesses of a competing theory, it is tempting to think, indicate strengths of the theory that one favors. However, as I recently stated, “To show a theory to be deficient does not improve, *ipso facto*, a competing theory’s adequacy to the phenomena” (Natsoulas, 1993d, p. 144). I shall try in the present series to give the greater emphasis and attention to arguments for intrinsic theory that are positively in its favor, rather than dwelling on arguments that may help to make a case for intrinsic theory by default, that is, by demonstrating that an alternative theory is lacking in something important.

### Three Preliminary Comments

Before I continue with my preliminary task of making “consciousness<sub>4</sub>” and “intrinsic theory” more explicit, let me briefly go back, by way of further introduction to this series of articles, to the precursor of the present series, which I mentioned at the start of this article (Natsoulas, 1993a). I wrote in the precursor as follows:

The problem of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, or of how conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances differ from the nonconscious<sub>4</sub> ones, will soon be high on the scientific agenda of the emerging psychology of consciousness. My purpose in the present article is to assist psychologists in their forthcoming search for an adequate explanation of [conscious-

ness<sub>4</sub>]. I present here a survey of a number of . . . "intrinsic" theories of [consciousness<sub>4</sub>]. I believe that the present article may help psychologists of consciousness to make some choices regarding which theories of consciousness<sub>4</sub> they want to develop . . .<sup>2</sup> But, it will be evident that a comprehensive analysis of intrinsic theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub> still awaits. (pp. 110-111)

That article's introductory section could serve, with minor alterations, as part of an introduction to the present series of articles as well. In addition, at least three comments on the above quoted passage are pertinent.

### *1. Neglect of Consciousness<sub>4</sub>*

Regarding first the passage's reference to the currently emerging psychology of consciousness, and the relevance of the present topic to this new sub-field of psychology, let me say the following.

Psychologists think of individual mental-occurrence instances as being either conscious<sub>4</sub> or nonconscious<sub>4</sub>. Although Searle (1989, 1990, 1992) has recently argued at length (as James [1890/1950] did) against the existence of mental-occurrence instances that are not actually or potentially conscious<sub>4</sub>, the time is long past when it was commonly believed that every mental-occurrence instance was actually conscious<sub>4</sub> or could have been conscious<sub>4</sub>.

Moreover, those many cognitive psychologists who have adopted an information-processing approach are, in general, more strongly drawn to psychological processes of which their subjects have no immediate awareness at all, that is, to psychological processes that they must posit entirely on explanatory grounds: in order to make sense of their subjects' behavior under the experimental conditions. No doubt, this preference is a consequence of the lengthy incarceration of consciousness in the oubliettes of behaviorism and the consequent predominantly behavioristic methodologies that cognitive psychologists put to use in their work. Also, the partiality of cognitive psychologists to explanations in terms of nonconscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances frees them from having to contest and to explain the often very different accounts that their subjects give, if asked, for the behaviors that they produce in cognitive experiments.

The subjects' stream of consciousness during an experiment can be ignored or downplayed as a causal factor no less so than in the heyday of behaviorism. I am reminded here of Hebb's (1972) lauding Sigmund Freud as a pioneer of objective method while, at the same time, informing the undergraduate readers of Hebb's introductory textbook that, however their relation to their mental life may seem to them, they are not in fact "conscious of their consciousness." Perhaps, getting this radical idea across to the students and

<sup>2</sup>I mentioned at this point several other publications which could be helpful (Natsoulas, 1992a, 1992b, 1993c, 1993d).

convincing them of its truth made the promulgation of psychological hypotheses much easier. Accepting Hebb's denial of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, the students would no longer consider themselves to be authorities regarding their own conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances and would be more docile.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to Hebb's insistence that inner awareness does not exist, Freud assigned to a separate perception-consciousness system a central role in psychological functioning. Those mental-occurrence instances that were part of the functioning of Freud's perception-consciousness system were held to be intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> in every case (Natsoulas, 1984).<sup>4</sup>

Not only cognitive psychologists, but psychologists in general seldom if ever address what it is that makes a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance conscious<sub>4</sub>, or how this puzzling condition comes about, which the dictionary describes, quoting William Hamilton, as "the recognition by the thinking subject of its own [mental] acts and affections." Surely, any psychologist who is scientifically intrigued by what James (1890/1950) called "the stream of consciousness" will want to know how it is that the basic durational components of that stream, unlike other mental-occurrence instances that may also be taking place in the same individual at the same time, are conscious<sub>4</sub> rather than nonconscious<sub>4</sub>.<sup>5</sup> For psychologists of consciousness simply to attribute the property of consciousness in this sense, without further inquiry about the property and how it is instantiated, would seem to be the sort of reaction that clinical psychologists would classify as a defensive maneuver.

## 2. *Attractions of Appendage Theory*

As psychologists increasingly turn their attention to the general topic of consciousness, they will soon be facing the problem of what it is that distinguishes conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances from mental-occurrence instances that are not conscious<sub>4</sub>. When they do, I expect that psychologists will find most appealing some kind of "appendage theory" of consciousness<sub>4</sub>.

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<sup>3</sup>A very useful research project would investigate the impact of psychologists' classroom experiences as teachers on their scientific theories and philosophies of science.

<sup>4</sup>In fairness to Hebb, I should mention that he would seem to have moderated his radical position at certain points by suggesting that the nature of that of which we are said to be immediately aware is a theoretical matter, rather than its being something known firsthand (e.g., Hebb, 1980, p. 28).

<sup>5</sup>However, James himself rejected the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences. All mental-occurrence instances were either actual objects of immediate awareness (i.e., conscious<sub>4</sub>) when they occurred; or they were potentially so — that is, they could have been conscious<sub>4</sub> but happened not to be. Actually, this is a charitable interpretation of James because there are places where he argues against the possibility that a particular mental-occurrence instance might not be an object of immediate awareness.

Again, partly responsible for this preference will be, I believe, the concerted effort that took place in psychology over many years to develop a psychology without consciousness. Appendage theory resembles behavioristic psychology. With some exceptions (e.g., James, 1890/1950; Rosenthal, 1993), appendage theorists tend to treat of our immediate awareness of a mental-occurrence instance as some sort of response to the latter in which the fact of its presence is apprehended.

This understanding reflects the general belief that we cannot come to know about anything unless we either respond to it or respond to something else that is related to it in a special way. Even if it is true that a mental-occurrence instance is, as many psychologists believe, identical to a happening in the brain, we cannot be immediately aware of that happening unless we respond to it. An enormous number of happenings take place in our brain of which we can know only inferentially because we cannot respond to them.

However, it follows from this kind of thinking that we are no more intimately acquainted with our own pain, for example, than we are acquainted with a piece of furniture that affects the stimulation at our receptors and to which we consequently respond. In both cases, a kind of representation of the object and its properties occurs, and this representation does exactly the same work in both cases. Anything known immediately about a mental-occurrence instance is known in the form of its being represented by the distinct mental-occurrence instance that is the immediate awareness of it.

Fundamentally, there is no difference between (a) Skinner's (1957, 1976, 1980) operant verbal responses ("tacts") that refer to and describe the "private event" that is their occasion (or discriminative stimulus) and (b) the proposed inner awarenesses of appendage theory. An exception to the latter statement obtains when an appendage theorist construes inner awareness as though it were like having perceptual experience of a mental-occurrence instance. See my characterization of "mental-eye theory" of consciousness<sub>4</sub> in "What Is Wrong with Appendage Theory" (Natsoulas, 1993d).

### 3. *Analysis of Intrinsic Theory*

In the passage that I quoted above from the precursor (Natsoulas, 1993a) to the present series of articles, I stated that, after my brief review of nine intrinsic theories, a thorough analysis of intrinsic theory still remains to be carried out. Attempting such an analysis, however, is problematic because there are a number of different intrinsic theories of consciousness<sub>4</sub> and a single analysis, an effort to spell out the crucial assumptions of intrinsic theory in general, would perforce include statements objectionable to some intrinsic theorists.

For example, I now wonder whether I was right to include Searle (1983, 1989, 1990) as an intrinsic theorist of consciousness<sub>4</sub> (Natsoulas, 1993a), in



view of (a) Searle's (1992) comment on David Woodruff Smith's intrinsic theory and (b) a personal communication that I received from Searle regarding what I had said in Natsoulas (1994a) about his conception of consciousness<sub>4</sub>? Let me just reproduce Searle's (1992) comment on Woodruff Smith (1986):

It is sometimes argued that every state of consciousness is also a state of self-consciousness; that it is a characteristic of conscious mental states that they are, so to speak, conscious of themselves. I am not quite sure what to make of this claim, but I suspect that if we examine it, we will find that it is either trivially true or simply false. (p. 142)

It would seem that either Searle is a reluctant intrinsic theorist, who must emphatically distinguish his own account of consciousness<sub>4</sub> from the accounts of other intrinsic theorists, or Searle is an appendage theorist who is finding an appendage account difficult to sustain. I have elsewhere commented on what Searle (1992) made of intrinsic consciousness<sub>4</sub> right after his above statement (Natsoulas, 1994a, pp. 235–236).

Given that intrinsic theory is not monolithic, the best that I can do in the present series of articles is to address, as they become relevant to making the case for intrinsic theory, different accounts that share what is the main thesis of all intrinsic theories of consciousness<sub>4</sub>.

### A Single Unmediated Unity

The quotation at the head of this series of articles is from the founder of phenomenology, and states the main thesis of intrinsic theory.<sup>6</sup> Edmund Husserl is saying, in effect, that any conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance is conscious<sub>4</sub> as part of its own occurrence, as part of its very own phenomenological structure.

A present-day phenomenologist has dramatized the latter point as follows:

Suppose at one moment I have the experience of smelling a jasmine blossom and in the next instant I am totally obliterated. Then at one moment I am having a conscious experience of perception and the next moment I do not exist and so am prevented from any recollection of the perception. Still, the perception was conscious. So the inner awareness that constitutes consciousness cannot consist in an immediate recollection of the experience. (Woodruff Smith, 1989, p. 85).

Woodruff Smith is using the words "conscious" and "consciousness" to refer to the property of consciousness<sub>4</sub> or, equivalently, to the occurrence of inner

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<sup>6</sup>Schuhmann and Smith (1985) would comment on the "founding" of phenomenology along the following lines: "Although we have no hesitation in calling [Johannes Daubert], and not Husserl, the true architect of the phenomenological movement, it nonetheless is true that [Daubert] 'never published a line' " (p. 763).

awareness, in which a mental-occurrence instance (e.g., a perceptual experience) is the immediate object.

An intrinsic theorist would say the same, as above, against consciousness<sub>4</sub>'s being any other kind of distinct apprehension of the perceptual experience. For a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance to be conscious<sub>4</sub>, there is no need for any further mental-occurrence instance to accompany it or to have it as an object. Consciousness<sub>4</sub> is not, as it were, a dual-state phenomenon, a matter of the simultaneous or successive existence of two mental occurrences. Adding further mental-occurrence instances, whatever their content and reference may be, cannot transform those mental-occurrence instances to which other mental-occurrence instances are added into conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances.

Suppose that you have a thought, say, regarding the weather, and then a second thought that is about your having the first thought or the fact of the first thought's occurrence. We should realize that, from the perspective of intrinsic theory, both of your thoughts may be nonconscious<sub>4</sub>. The latter statement would be contradicted, of course, by any intrinsic theorist who held that all mental-occurrence instances are conscious<sub>4</sub> (e.g., Brentano, 1911/1973). Therefore, the kind of intrinsic theory that I am discussing is the kind that attributes to the human mind nonconscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances as well as conscious<sub>4</sub> ones (e.g., Woodruff Smith, 1989).

Given this understanding, the point that I am making is as follows: the fact that you have some sort of awareness of a certain mental-occurrence instance does not make this mental occurrence instance conscious<sub>4</sub>. Agreement with the intrinsic-theoretical position on this point may be improved if I mention three kinds of cases.

1. Suppose you remember having had a certain experience, for example, your experience of awe or wonder which took place on the first occasion when you witnessed the occurrence of a certain natural phenomenon. Your now remembering that experience is itself a mental-occurrence instance (i.e., one or more of them) that occurs consciously<sub>4</sub> (cf. Tulving, 1985). Also, this instance of remembering perforce involves your having awareness now ("retrowareness": Natsoulas [1986]) of that early emotional experience. However, that the experience of awe or wonder was conscious<sub>4</sub> does not depend on your (or anyone's) remembering it, although it is conceivably the case that your remembering it now depends on your having been conscious<sub>4</sub> of it when it occurred (cf. Armstrong, 1979; Shevrin, 1991). Forgetting an experience cannot make the experience, retroactively, less conscious<sub>4</sub> than it was when it occurred.

2. Another kind of awareness that one can have of a mental-occurrence instance, whether another person's or one's own, is the result of inferential processes. One might observe a piece of behavior or an involuntary bodily reac-

tion that is evidently affected by something within a person's field of view, and correctly explain that response or reaction in terms of a certain visual experience or judgment. This postulated experience or judgment need not have been a conscious<sub>4</sub> one in order for one's inference about it to go through.

3. Consider the occurrent instances of one of Freud's unconscious wishes. The fact that Freud often had thoughts about this unconscious wish did not make the particular instances of the wish's occurrence any less nonconscious<sub>4</sub>. Thoughts about his unconscious wish usually occurred while Freud was working on his theory of the unconscious. Sometimes, a thought about his unconscious wish came to Freud while he was musing on a particular one of his actions, that is, when he was trying to explain his action in terms of psychoanalytic theory. At still other times, Freud thought of his unconscious wish seemingly out of the blue; it suddenly occurred to him that he was now undergoing an instance of that wish. And sometimes, if not always, his presentiment to the latter effect was valid. However, in none of these cases were Freud's instances of his unconscious wish conscious<sub>4</sub>. Compare Freud's unconscious wish with one of his conscious<sub>4</sub> wishes. In the case of the occurrent instances of his conscious<sub>4</sub> wish, Freud had immediate awareness of wishing for something. Freud's immediate awareness apprehended the wish's occurrence from the inside, rather than in the same sort of way that Freud apprehended other people's instances of wishing. As being highly relevant to an account of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, I return in a future article of this series to the difference between how we are aware of our own conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances and how we are aware of other people's mental-occurrence instances.

As Husserl stated the main thesis of intrinsic theory, a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence and the apprehension of it that qualifies the mental-occurrence instance as conscious<sub>4</sub> constitute together *a single unmediated unity*. Neither of them has any existence apart from the other. However, if someone suggests in response that a mental occurrence may take place either consciously<sub>4</sub> or nonconsciously<sub>4</sub>, the point can be accepted by an intrinsic theorist without weakening his or her thesis of the unity of any conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance with the apprehension of it that is essential to its being conscious<sub>4</sub>. Therefore, the thesis of the intrinsicity of consciousness<sub>4</sub> does not require that every mental-occurrence instance constitutes a unity with an apprehension of it, only that every conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance does so.

For example, the thought that it rains a lot in London may occur consciously<sub>4</sub> or nonconsciously<sub>4</sub>. Whenever it occurs consciously<sub>4</sub>, immediate awareness of it is included in the thought's own phenomenological structure. Whenever this thought occurs nonconsciously<sub>4</sub>, it is actually not the same thought: it has a different phenomenological structure; it is entirely about rainy London.

*A Recent Intrinsic Account*

Sounding much like an intrinsic theorist, John McDowell very recently stated the following in the published version of his John Locke Lectures at Oxford University: "The objects of 'inner sense' are internal accusatives to the awareness that 'inner experiences' constitute; they have no existence independently" (McDowell, 1994, p. 21). By "inner experiences," McDowell had in mind experiences that are "mere sensations." For example, "seeing red" due to a blow on the head is an experience of red that is not an awareness of the redness of something in the environment. When we "see red" in the above sense, we have awareness, instead, of a "red" sensation, which is, according to McDowell, intrinsic to our very awareness of it.

However, it is useful for the present purpose to interpret McDowell's statements more broadly: as though he intended them to describe how all conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances are conscious<sub>4</sub>. There is a hint in his book that McDowell would himself generalize his point, at least to how we are conscious<sub>4</sub> of perceptual experiences. Thus, McDowell mentioned the subjective likeness between inner experiences of "seeing red" and those outer experiences that are involved in actually seeing something red in the environment. Presumably, we know of this likeness firsthand by having intrinsic immediate awareness of outer experiences as well as of inner experiences.

An intrinsic theorist could say "indeed" to McDowell's above quoted statement about inner experiences, whether these are understood broadly or narrowly. Agreement would not have to imply mental-occurrence instances only exist when they are objects of inner sense (i.e., inner awareness). The object of an instance of inner awareness has no existence independently of that inner awareness because they constitute together a single mental-occurrence instance; the inner awareness and its object are one unmediated unity. Thus, the reason for agreeing with McDowell's statement (as broadly interpreted) is not the proposition that there do not exist, for example, perceptual experiences or thoughts that do not involve intrinsically any immediate awareness of them. In fact, according to some intrinsic theorists, while one is gazing at an environmental item, one's visual experience of it will likely fluctuate between conscious<sub>4</sub> visual experiences of it and nonconscious<sub>4</sub> visual experiences of it.<sup>7</sup>

The context of McDowell's above statement is his arguing that inner sense (as well as outer sense) must be conceived of as occurring passively yet as

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<sup>7</sup>I have argued elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1992d, 1993c) that a subject could not report on what he or she visually experienced in an experiment unless the subject had immediate awareness of his or her visual experiences. Visual experiences strictly directed on the experimenter's display (i.e., nonconscious<sub>4</sub> visual experiences) cannot provide a basis for perceptual reports, because the subject has no awareness of them.

possessing conceptual content. That is, according to my generalization of McDowell's view, (a) one is perforce aware of a conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance simply in having it, simply by its occurrence, however actively or passively the mental-occurrence instance itself might come about. Immediate awareness of a mental-occurrence instance is not something that one does with respect to the mental-occurrence instance, such as engaging in thought about it. Yet (b) one's immediate awareness of a mental-occurrence instance is partially a conceptual apprehension of it. A conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instance is a mental-occurrence instance that involves conceptual content that has reference to that instance. Thus, that inner awareness involves conceptual capacities is not a thesis that can only be held by an appendage theorist or by a mental-eye theorist (i.e., a theorist who models inner awareness on perceptual experience). It is from something very much like an intrinsic-theoretical perspective that McDowell (1994) asserts the following about inner sense, contrary to accounts that interpret inner awareness as distinct and perceptionlike: "We cannot suppose that these operations of conceptual capacities constitute awareness of circumstances that obtain in any case, and that impress themselves on a subject as they do because of some suitable relation to her sensibility" (p. 22).

### Do Intrinsically Conscious<sub>4</sub> Mental-Occurrence Instances Exist?

In an article that has just appeared, Nelkin (1994a, p. 341) is somewhat distracted by my advocacy of intrinsic theory. He interprets me as "now" (i.e., Natsoulas, 1989, 1990) proposing that consciousness is "really" (his emphasis) a certain kind of "reflexive" mental state, whereas, Nelkin explains, I had earlier allowed for different "forms" of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1983). In order to make this erroneous statement, Nelkin had to forget that my (favorable) comments on intrinsic theory have always been with reference to consciousness<sub>4</sub>. Indeed, I do hold that an intrinsic account of consciousness<sub>4</sub> is most likely the best account of that phenomenon. However, I have repeatedly acknowledged that there are different kinds of consciousness. This can be seen (a) by consulting the entry for the word "consciousness" in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, which I have often used in introducing my articles, or (b) by consulting, among my other articles mentioned here, my critical article on appendage theory (Natsoulas, 1993d) that appeared in the same journal as Nelkin (1994a). Although there has been no major relevant change in my published views on consciousness<sub>4</sub> since Natsoulas (1990), had Nelkin consulted my more recent articles, he might have avoided the error mentioned above. More importantly, he could have found reason to reconsider his evident commitment to an appendage theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub> (Nelkin, 1994a).

Nevertheless, Nelkin's (1994a) concerns regarding my adoption of intrinsic theory are very relevant to the present article and series. A better understanding of his concerns can be grasped from two other recent efforts of his in which he also commented on my advocacy of intrinsicity for consciousness<sub>4</sub>. In the first of these efforts, Nelkin (1993) argues that an intrinsic account of consciousness<sub>4</sub> is unparsimonious. An intrinsic account postulates the existence of, among other mental-occurrence instances, mental-occurrence instances that include within their own individual structures awareness each one of them of itself. Nelkin proposes that all the relevant facts can be explained at least equally well by assuming, instead, that consciousness<sub>4</sub> occurs by means of an occurrent awareness that is distinct from the mental-occurrence instance that it renders conscious<sub>4</sub>. Thus, Nelkin would seem to be an appendage theorist of consciousness<sub>4</sub> (Natsoulas, 1993d; Rosenthal, 1993). Criticisms of appendage theory have been proffered in the literature (e.g., Woodruff Smith, 1989; Natsoulas, 1992a, 1993b, 1993d).

*Two Proposed Reasons Against the Positing of Intrinsically Conscious<sub>4</sub> Mental-Occurrence Instances*

In his other piece, Nelkin (1994b) gives two reasons for not positing any "self-reflective states" at all, that is, for not positing any mental-occurrence instances that are intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub>.

1. There is no direct way of knowing that such self-reflective states exist. One's consciousness<sub>4</sub>, which is the having of immediate awareness of one's mental-occurrence instances, cannot distinguish whether one or more of them has taken place. Nelkin (1994b) puts the latter point in this way:

That is, if self-reflective states exist, we have direct apprehension of them — by the definition of self-reflective states — but *that* apprehension cannot itself discern that they are self-reflective states rather than complexes of separate and dissociable states. (p. 13)

Therefore, a theorist must posit self-reflective states for other, explanatory reasons. Again, Nelkin claims that he can explain the relevant facts without positing such states. But he has not done so; Nelkin has not assembled a compendium of all the facts that theorists, by positing intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances, have sought to explain over the years, and he has not shown that his account is capable of explaining those facts.

2. The second problem Nelkin (1994b) raises amounts to his refusal to grant that a single mental-occurrence instance could give awareness both of something else and of itself. (Another appendage theorist has granted the existence of such mental-occurrence instances [Rosenthal, 1993].) Nelkin

simply asks, in disbelief, how this could be; it seems to him quite a "mysterious" kind of mental-occurrence instance that could perform both these functions.<sup>8</sup> Nelkin is evidently not cognizant of Woodruff Smith's (1986, 1988, 1989) phenomenological analysis of intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances (discussed in Natsoulas [1991–1992a, 1991–1992b, 1993a]).

The present series of articles can serve as an answer to the first of Nelkin's above two objections. The remaining articles in this series will consist largely of arguments in favor of the intrinsic kind of account of consciousness<sub>4</sub>. I believe that these arguments will provide sufficient reason for theoretically introducing intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances. Also, an appendage theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub> cannot be sustained unless it is modified to include some intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances (cf. Natsoulas, 1992a, 1993d).

Some of the arguments for intrinsic theory are phenomenological ones, in the sense that they depend on how having consciousness<sub>4</sub>, or immediate awareness of one's mental-occurrence instances, seems firsthand. Therefore, there will be occasion for me to return to the above indented quotation from Nelkin (1994b), which is based on phenomenological evidence. Elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1992a), I have already begun to address the question of whether the phenomenological evidence conforms more closely to the expectations of intrinsic theory or to those of appendage theory. I have argued that, when we try to introspect, we do not become aware of two distinct mental-occurrence instances, say a certain perceptual experience and a distinct inner awareness of it. Contrary to Nelkin, I believe this is what an appendage theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub> would expect (Natsoulas, 1992a).

As for Nelkin's second objection, for now, let me merely mention that, in one of my articles that Nelkin cited, I have already addressed at some length an objection, which Armstrong (1968, 1984) put forward, that is very much like Nelkin's second objection. Armstrong's objection was one of four important objections to intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances that I sought to answer in that long article (Natsoulas, 1989). The other three objections had been put forward, respectively, by David M. Rosenthal, Wilfrid Sellars, and Reinhardt Grossmann. I shall not try to summarize my

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<sup>8</sup>Cf. Ryle (1949), who critically discussed intrinsic ("self-intimational") theory partially as follows:

Nor . . . is it supposed that my act of wondering and its self-intimation to me are two distinct acts or processes indissolubly welded together. Rather, to relapse perforce into simile, it is supposed that mental processes are phosphorescent, like tropical sea-water, which makes itself visible by the light which it itself emits. (pp. 158–159)

Also, Dulany (1991, p. 105): "Rather than seeing awareness as mysteriously 'self-intimating,' as Brentano did, we should, I think, regard reflected awareness [i.e., consciousness<sub>4</sub>] as a product of remembering and inferring a just prior or still earlier intentional state or mental episode" (p. 105).

answer to Armstrong now. For my immediate, preparatory purpose, I need only quote my earlier paraphrase of Armstrong's main point and refer the reader to my discussion of his less than cogently argued thesis: "No single mental occurrence can perform both its own causal role, which constitutes it as the mental occurrence that it is, and the causal role of the mental occurrence that is the individual's [immediate awareness] of the first mental occurrence" (Natsoulas, 1989, p. 75).

### *Further Objections to Intrinsic Theory*

In order further to set the stage for the present series of articles, let me give some idea of the other three objections to intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances that I discussed at length in Natsoulas (1989).

1. Similarly to Nelkin, Rosenthal (1986) had argued as follows:

But anything that would support the view that [conscious<sub>4</sub>] mental states are [conscious<sub>4</sub>] because they know, or are in part about, themselves would provide equally good evidence that [consciousness<sub>4</sub>] is due to an accompanying higher-order thought. Moreover, we have no nonarbitrary way to tell when one mental state is part of another. Accordingly, there is no reason to uphold this idea that our [immediate] awareness of [conscious<sub>4</sub>] states is a part of those states other than the desire to sustain the Cartesian contention that all mental states are [conscious<sub>4</sub>]. (p. 345)

In my article, I responded to Rosenthal by giving reasons to uphold the existence of intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances. And in a separate article (Natsoulas, 1992a), I discussed Rosenthal's own theory, giving reasons pro and con his version of the appendage kind of theory of consciousness<sub>4</sub>.

2. Also, I argued against Sellars's (1981) objection to the effect that the primary candidates for intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances, namely sensations, are not even awarenesses, let alone being, as some intrinsic theorists would hold, immediate awarenesses, each sensation of itself.<sup>9</sup> My response to Sellars amounted to suggesting an alternative, improved Sellarsian perspective that would not encounter certain difficulties that his own perspective encounters. My proffered revision included the positing of intrinsically conscious<sub>4</sub> mental-occurrence instances that are each partially constituted of Sellars's sensations. A perceptual experience, for example, would be both an immediate awareness of sensational features of itself and an indirect awareness of an environmental item. This single awareness of both would be the outcome of a Sellarsian process that works, systematically and

<sup>9</sup>Pursuing Sellarsian issues, McDowell (1994) at one point describes the alternative assumption of considering sensations not to be a matter of awareness at all as "look[ing] like the embarrassing philosophical strategy of 'feigning anesthesia' [Ayer, 1964, p. 101]" (p. 36; cf. Natsoulas, 1989, p. 100).



constantly, to mis-take features of sensations for environmental items (Natsoulas, 1989, pp. 101–103). Clark (1982) has usefully discussed the indirectness of Sellars's conception of perception. Also useful is comparing Sellars on perception with Gibson's (1966, 1979/1986; Reed and Jones, 1982) direct perception theory, particularly the two theorists' very different treatments of sensations.

3. Against Brentano's (1911/1973) intrinsic account of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, Grossmann (1984) objected that, if a conscious<sub>4</sub> act of hearing gave immediate awareness of itself simply by its occurrence, we would hear the same sound twice every time we consciously<sub>4</sub> heard a sound. Interestingly, Brentano believed that such experiential doubling is an implication of appendage accounts of consciousness<sub>4</sub>, but not of his own kind of conception. Grossmann argued, in effect, that the distinct awareness (as appendage theory assumes) of a conscious<sub>4</sub> act of hearing would not be an instance of hearing anything, since that kind of inner awareness is not itself an act of hearing, whereas an inner awareness of an act of hearing that was intrinsic to the act of hearing would constitute a second hearing of the sound. In Natsoulas (1989), I discussed in some detail Brentano's (1911/1973) own defense against this kind of objection, which Grossmann (1984) raised against Brentano many years later. See especially my article's final subsection: "How Did Brentano Avoid Double Experiences?" (Natsoulas, 1989, pp. 113–114).

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