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Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality. Jennifer Radden. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996, 311 pages, \$42.00 hardcover.

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Exactly when Philosophy of Psychiatry started as a subfield of Philosophy is hard to say. There are several different estimates of how old psychiatry itself is, from one hundred to three hundred years, and of course there has been discussion and treatment of mental illness for at least a couple of thousand years. A host of issues which could count as belonging to the field have been discussed just within the last hundred years. For instance, a large literature on the philosophy of psychoanalysis dates back to the beginning of the century, and in the last thirty years there has been discussion of amnesia and multiple personality in the philosophy of mind, bioethical debate about involuntary hospitalization and the ability of the mentally ill to give informed consent to drug trials, and recent continental philosophy has shown much interest in madness, civilization, capitalism and schizophrenia. However, I suggest that Philosophy of Psychiatry reached a sense of itself as a separate field only in the 1990s. In this time, it has gained its own association, journal, and a book series with a prestigious press. I refer to the American Association for Philosophy and Psychiatry, the associated journal, *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology*, and the MIT Press series, *Philosophical Psychopathology: Disorders of Mind*, edited by Owen Flanagan and George Graham. Jennifer Radden's *Divided Minds and Successive Selves* is the first book in that series.

Most of Radden's book is focused on issues having to do with dissociative identity disorder (DID), and so is applicable to only a very small proportion of cases within psychiatry. DID is one of the most conceptually interesting parts of abnormal psychology, but still, studying it would be a luxury if it did not have larger relevance. Fortunately, Radden's discussion also includes cases of mania, psychosis, and the cycling pattern of manic depression, and she draws some links between these cases and dissociative identity disorder. Understanding these illnesses is one of the central challenges for Philosophy of Psychiatry. Much of the present work in the field involves bringing approaches and ideas from previously disparate parts of philosophy and psychiatry, and melding them together. This can easily result in a patchwork rather than a seamless whole, but it also promises to deliver some extremely interesting philosophy. Radden's book is a worthy representative of this new field, both in the problems it faces and in its strengths.

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Radden was clearly aware of these problems in writing this book. In the very last paragraph of the book, she says that her enterprise has been analysis without much synthesis. The task of bringing so many ideas together is hard enough in itself that it would be asking too much to insist on more, yet the lack of an overall viewpoint makes the book somewhat frustrating. Works such as Radden's are a necessary step for the maturing of the field, and therefore are invaluable, yet we can still look forward to a time when more can be taken for granted and the central issues in the field are well defined.

It is not clear who Radden's audience is intended to be. The book will not greatly satisfy philosophers immersed in the details of metaphysical or moral debates, because of lack of detailed and sustained argument. But it also seems too technical for a more general audience. It strikes me that the ideal people to read this are philosophy students and those who want an introduction to some of the philosophical issues in psychiatry. The introduction, sixteen chapters, and conclusion fill out 290 pages, which gives an average of about 16 pages per chapter. Some are as short as 12 pages, and the print is not dense. Her writing style, not untypically of modern Anglo-American academic philosophy, is clunky and occasionally awkward. To give just one example that particularly struck me, on page 45 we find, "If, for example, importance attaches to Locke's recognition that the self is what he calls a forensic concept, with moral work to do, then admitting of difference senses of 'self' will require us to establish which is the morally significant one." The flow is not helped by the style of reference to other works, putting the authors and dates in parentheses at the end or even in the middle of the sentence, although this is an unfortunately common practice! Putting the footnotes at the end of the book does help the flow of the reading experience, but it also makes one less inclined to read them.

Metaphysics

The aim of the book is how to understand the divisions within a person and her life, and the implications of this for moral responsibility. The book is divided into four parts, the first being four chapters in which Radden does some of the groundwork for the metaphysical issues. Psychological dissociation is starting to become a familiar topic in philosophy. There have been several philosophical books and articles including discussions on multiple personality, such as those by Wilkes (1988), Humphrey and Dennett (1989), Braude (1991), Baillie (1993), and Hacking (1995). Radden covers much of the same ground as these writers, discussing Morton Prince's case of Sally Beauchamp, the personality change experienced by Phineas Gage, cases of commissurotomy, and the connection between these cases and everyday irrationality such as self-deception and weakness of will. The approach that Radden uses, though, is reminiscent of that of Kathleen Wilkes in her book *Real People*.

Chapter one catalogs the heterogeneities of a person in everyday life, which serves as the touchstone with which to compare more radical forms of disunity. No substantive philosophical claims are made here, or at least not explicitly. In chapter two, Radden investigates the way we talk about the changes in personality that people undergo. She points out that in the case of most non-human objects, there are both literal and figurative uses of the phrase "not the same X as before," and that such a distinction also applies to people, although there are times when the distinction becomes less clear. For example, suppose you clean your old brownish

carpet and it turns out to be a pleasant cream color. You might well say "it's not the same carpet as before," but this is a figurative use. If you had gone out and bought a new carpet, it would be literally not the same carpet as before. It seems that the distinction she is talking about here is that between quantitative and qualitative change. She clarifies her ideas by reference to the extensive literature on personal identity. She goes through ideas with a swiftness which leaves me wanting more detail. The ideas of Locke, James, Parfit, and others are surveyed in the space of a few pages. The basic issue, though, is whether our talk of successive selves is literal or figurative. Radden argues that "moral responses in part determine the plausibility of metaphysical theories" (p. 33), and the second part of the book will examine the moral implications of the different metaphysical views.

The third chapter is devoted to producing criteria of fragmentation and multiplicity. It is assumed for the most part that multiple personalities are real, although Radden does concede that there seems to be some cultural element to creation of the phenomenon (p. 54). She distinguishes four broadly agreeable loose criteria of multiple personality: each different self must be a separate agent; each must have a separate personality; each must have its own continuity; and one of the personalities must have a greater than normal disturbance in memory (p. 41). These are not intended to be necessary or sufficient, but only a guide with which to range different cases (p. 43). She suggests that we should not have to choose between whether a person is multiple or unitary, and advocates talking of "multiplicity within unity" (p. 45). Radden explains these criteria thoroughly by spelling out many possible relationships between different selves in a multiple, concerning action and consciousness.

Armed with these criteria, she moves on in the next chapter to examine other clinical phenomena, such as mood disorders and schizophrenia, in order to determine the extent to which they also exhibit multiplicity. She points out that these illnesses do not, as a rule, lead to profound personality changes. The personality change associated with mania can last for weeks or months, and while there is no significant loss of memory, there is memory distortion and selectivity (p. 64). But Radden's discussion of these cases is disappointingly short. Despite the fantastic array of real clinical phenomena, she gives just one case and draws conservative conclusions from it. I would have preferred a much fuller and exploratory approach to the metaphysical issues raised by bipolar mood disorder and schizophrenic episodes. Radden does make an interesting, all too brief, comparison with conversion experiences. [This area has also been briefly explored by Owen Flanagan (1994).] Then quickly she moves on to akrasia and disorders of impulse control, where she argues that these forms of irrationality do not count as examples of multiplicity in the full sense. This is not a surprising claim and, indeed, I don't know of any philosophers who would deny it. Even those who propose "homuncular" explanations of irrationality, dividing a person into sub-personal agents, do not claim that the "sub-persons" are persons or selves.

Personal Responsibility

Part II of the book, devoted to moral responsibility, is the longest of the four, taking over 100 pages and divided into six chapters. In the first of these chapters Radden says her method is to aim for reflective equilibrium. She thinks there must be interplay between theory and intuitions, using a circling and iterative process. Her proposal is a sound one, and serves her well. She agrees with many of the criti-

cisms of the method of philosophical discussion of personal identity made by Kathy Wilkes (1988), and adds a couple of her own. The main thrust of these criticisms is that the use of the ubiquitous fantastic thought experiments such as brain transplants or machines which perfectly duplicate people cannot tell us anything significant about our concepts as we use them in everyday life. So, in her project to understand the conceptual, metaphysical and moral issues that are her subject, she does not propose relying on our intuitions in bizarre but real cases from psychopathology.

Radden moves on, in chapter six, which is about multiple personality and responsibility for action, to the main point of this part, which is to investigate the responsibility of successive selves for the actions of the person they constitute. She is strongly sympathetic to Strawson's view that for a person to be responsible for an action *just is* society's tendency to have reactive attitudes toward the person concerning the action, such as resentment, gratitude and forgiveness. This enables her to investigate when a person should be held responsible by considering when we would tend to hold him responsible. Radden discusses and rejects what she calls "Locke's principle," which states that a person must remember performing an action in order to be accountable for it.

It is hard to find a strong positive thesis that Radden wants to defend in this chapter, and the reason for this becomes clearer in the next, when she explains that before we can make any claims about moral responsibility and personal identity, we need to clearly delimit and separate the different contexts of discussion. So she sets out some of the relevant contexts. First is therapy, where the issue is mainly feelings of blame and anger toward others. She says that in therapy of multiple personalities, where the aim is to develop a unified personality, it is necessary to "acknowledge and feel wholeheartedly the appropriate attitudes toward others who have wronged one" (p. 114). It is essential for the therapist to acknowledge the separateness of different selves of the patient. But, once unification is achieved, there is also room for the agent to regret her past actions.

When dealing with a legal context, in the eighth chapter, Radden concludes that none of the proffered reasons for excusing a person for actions that one of her selves performed stands up to scrutiny, so it may be justifiable to punish a person with dissociative identity disorder for crimes that he or she has committed. In this discussion, Radden considers only retributivist approaches to punishment, which she says are the ones that undergird English common law and the North American legal system. While there is some truth to this claim, and it surely simplifies an already complex discussion, it is a sweeping generalization with many counterinstances. Some would claim that deterrence should have at least equal weight in our understanding of the law as it is. It would have been interesting for her to consider what punishments a consequentialist approach to punishment might favor. Be that as it may, she goes on to discuss four kinds of defense that might be used for people with DID. These are the insanity defense, the defense of unconsciousness, suspended personhood, and diminished capacity. Suffice to say, given the precedents of cases in the North American legal system, none of these defenses is viable. One of the basic points Radden makes is that there are pragmatic constraints on a legal system which make it unable to adapt itself to the subtleties we might allow ourselves in therapeutic or moral contexts.

The chapters on paternalistic overriding of a patient's wishes on the grounds of a previously written advance directive are maybe the most interesting and successful in the book. Radden considers and finds wanting various defenses of the use of

advance directives as applied to cases in psychiatry, where the issue is whether to treat a patient against his wishes at the time. What justification can be given for allowing his former wishes, expressed while fully competent, to override his current refusal of treatment, when he is thinking less rationally? The first problem is that it is hard to define and provide criteria for competence and incompetence, and yet we need to draw a sharp line between the two in order to make decisions about what to do. Radden makes the blanket statement, "Competence tests only admit of one judgment: competent or not" (p. 149). One subtlety that she does not take into account is that we can and should have different criteria of competence according to what decision has to be made. Trivial decisions require only the ability to express a preference, while major decisions probably require a much stricter definition. For her purposes this subtlety does not make much difference, since the various decisions about psychiatric treatment are all serious, especially in a context where the treatment would be provided against the patient's wishes. Her conclusion is that competence is such a contested concept that it cannot help us in deciding what to do in such cases.

Radden also criticizes the proposal of Ruth Macklin that forcing a patient to undergo treatment can be justified on the grounds that it makes the patient more autonomous, by returning the patient to her authentic self. Radden points out that Macklin's analysis requires that there be a close conceptual connection between autonomy and authenticity, but counters that in fact there does not seem to be any such link. Some people become self-identified with their chronic illness, and so treatment would not make the person more authentic. This would be especially true of forced treatment. As so often in the book, Radden's criticisms are interesting but she rapidly moves on to the next topic, and makes many of her claims with precious little justification. Autonomy is a concept that has received a large amount of philosophical analysis. The literature contains several theories of autonomy and maybe more than one concept of autonomy. The same goes for authenticity. It is hard to feel that Macklin's argument has been given a fair appraisal, and seems plausible to suppose that there is indeed a strong link between concepts of authenticity and autonomy, which might well vindicate Macklin.

Another criticism of Macklin made by Radden is rather odd. She argues that Macklin's approach strongly suggests an implicit assumption of successive selves, and that this is metaphysically dubious. It is unclear, she says, whether the notion of self in "authentic self" is merely figurative, and this lack of clarity is problematic enough so that the argument fails to justify forced treatment. The oddness of this criticism is twofold. First, Radden herself in this part of the book uses the language of "selves" without much clarification of her metaphysical assumptions, and also never commits herself to a position about whether a metaphysics of successive selves is appropriate in cases of manic depression and schizophrenia, which are the central ones at issue in much of the discussion. Of course, the second half of the book does spend much more time discussing metaphysics, so Radden can't be accused of totally shirking the task she criticizes others for not attempting. But it seems a weak criticism merely to just say that Macklin's approach is unclear. If Radden had shown that there are problems with Macklin's approach on both literal and figurative readings of her successive selves talk, then her criticism would be substantive.

What is partly at issue here is the extent to which ethics and social policy need to delve into metaphysical issues. I myself have argued that they do (Perring, 1997), and so I am sympathetic to many of Radden's criticisms. My reservation about her

approach is that she needs to do more to show the need for metaphysical analysis. The complaint that, without it, claims about real or authentic selves are vague is not likely to cut much ice with ethicists and policy makers, who have been living and dealing with the problem of lack of metaphysical clarity for quite some time. Furthermore, there are an increasing number of minimalists who argue that ethics can proceed without metaphysics, or indeed, that ethics can dictate metaphysics [for example, Korsgaard (1987) and Johnston (1992)]. But Radden never addresses these issues. Given the growing debate about the relevance of philosophy and philosophers to biomedical ethics, and the centrality of the issue to the legitimacy of her project, (indeed, the subtitle to a late draft of the book was "An Essay in Metaphysics of Psychopathology"), this is a pity.

Radden does a good job in setting out the difficulties of justifying forced treatment as being in the patient's best interests, what the patient would have wanted, or whether the patient would be grateful after the treatment. She assumes throughout her discussion, implicitly, that the best default position is that people should be free of interference. The default should only be trumped when we have clear justification. Some might question this placing of the burden of proof, especially considering the problems that a person with severe mental illnesses can cause for herself and others if she goes untreated. In a culture such as that of the United States, where individual autonomy is put at a premium, it may seem the most reasonable approach, but one doesn't have to go far to find cultures which are more willing to sacrifice individual freedom for the good of the community, and they might take a different default position. This is a possibility that Radden never raises.

In chapter ten, Radden turns to Ulysses contracts. Can and should we honor advance directives written by psychiatric patients while healthy? In these directives, the patients instruct that in the event that they become severely ill again, physicians should force treatment on them. Radden argues against this use of force too, and challenges the moral authority of these directives, except in the case when there is a danger that the person will harm herself. Radden says that the personality change undergone when a person becomes disturbed is so radical that "it naturally invites a language of successive selves" (p. 164). [Note that she backs away from saying that we should take this language literally.] Given that there are different selves at different times, she says that the advance directive allows the earlier self to unfairly oppress the later one. Against Joel Feinberg's point that we have the central moral capacity to bind ourselves in advance in entering into contracts, Radden counters that we have a central moral ability to change our minds in the light of new evidence, changed values, and an altered situation. This, she supposes, is enough to block Feinberg's criticism of the successive-self analysis.

Radden's apparent defense of the successive-selves analysis here is rather implausible. It is true that there are dramatic shifts in personality that occur in schizophrenia and mood disorders, but ordinary practice is still to refer to the person as the same person. While friends might say that "she was not the same person while in the grip of mania," for instance, there is no indication that this is anything more than metaphorical or figurative use. They still tend to feel sympathy or annoyance with that person, their friend, rather than to conceive of the situation as a different person having come into existence. A spouse still regards the patient as his spouse, and family still regard the patient as the same family member. If the patient's responsibility to honor commitments into which she previously entered is questioned, it is not because of the change in personality per se, but rather because the reduction of her rationality and competency. The only kind of disorder which does

seriously invite a different person analysis is dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality) and these cases are comparatively rare. And even there, there is doubt. The very phrase "dissociative identity," used in DSM-IV (as opposed to the "multiple personality" used in DSM-III-R), shies away from attributing selfhood to the different dissociative states of a person.

Radden, however, does not rely exclusively on the successive-self analysis. She also argues against Ulysses contracts even supposing that there is just one self involved. She distinguishes between promises to others and resolves to oneself, and argues that they have different moral structures. While breaking promises is normally wrong, breaking a resolve is not wrong in the same way. We are permitted to change our minds, and even to be weak. It may be a failing, but it is not a breach of responsibility. Furthermore, she likens the changes in desire that she is concerned with to changes in mind rather than weakness of will. They are wholehearted refusals of treatment. While others may see the refusal as a weakness, the patient at the time sees her refusal in much more positive light. Radden strangely claims, with no real argument, that there is no way to decide whose perspective is right in such a situation (p. 171). Her conclusion is that we do not have the moral authority to override the patient's refusal, at least when the patient is not being self-destructive.

It is a standard liberal view that we can override a person's wishes just when those wishes are likely to harm another. In a person with recurrent major mental illness, understood on a successive-self analysis, when the ill-self threatens suicide, this also threatens the healthy-self, who would re-emerge if the illness was treated. It is already agreed that we can interfere with suicidal wishes when a person is mentally incompetent, but incompetence is difficult to establish even in the suicidal. In Radden's view, however, we don't need to resort to declaring the ill-self incompetent, since self-destruction can be prevented on other grounds, i.e., the protection of the healthy-self. Radden is explicit that this argument relies on the literally interpreted successive-selves analysis, and does not work with an identity-conserving metaphysics.

There are at least three serious problems with this view, which I will briefly list. First, as previously noted, it seems implausible that, even with a recurrent major mental illness such as schizophrenia or a mood disorder, the different person-stages are sufficiently different as time goes by to be literally described as distinct selves. Second, it is not at all clear that a harm principle extends so easily to successive selves, since selves are not the same thing as persons. Third, it is not clear that the harm principle extends to future or potential selves, rather than actual selves. For instance, many in the abortion debate deny that the future or potential person that the fetus would become has a right to life or a right not to be harmed.

The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the responsibility of one self to care for another, when they both occupy the same body. This is not just altruism, since the interests of the two selves are so closely intertwined. But does one self have a *duty* to care for another of the same body? Radden suggests that it does, because their relationship is so intimate. This raises a weird possibility that she does not entertain. Radden is concerned with the responsibility of the ill-self to the healthy self. But it will work the other way round too. It would seem that one self should not suppress the existence of other selves of the same body. This would mean that a healthy-self should give her ill-self (once it has been "born") some time to exist. This will strike most people as an absurd consequence, and throws strong doubt on Radden's suggestion that selves do have a general responsibility to care for each other.

Identity Over Time

The third part of the book is devoted to metaphysical theories of the self and the continuity of a person over time. This makes it especially technical. Radden declares herself sympathetic to empiricist approaches to the self which avoid transcendental claims, such as those of Hume, James, Grice and Parfit. But she does consider important the recent objections to Parfit's theory that it does not do justice to the essential role of the concept of a unified self in our moral thinking and practical reasoning [such as set out in Korsgaard (1987)]. To this idea of the unified self, Radden gives the already overused title "individualism." In chapter twelve Radden considers why different philosophers find this idea useful. Some say that the unitary self is presupposed by many of our emotional attitudes which involve self-assessment and self-knowledge (p. 196). One can only reject the unitary self if one is also ready to reject self-knowledge and much of our traditional moral language, it is thought, and indeed, such wholesale rejection is embraced by some post-modernists. Our notion of agency seems to require that we suppose that the same agent exists over a period of time, in order to use categories such as rights, obligations, and accountability (p. 199). This kind of identity does not admit of degrees or vagueness. Radden thinks that some of these claims are overstated. For instance, she has argued that shame and blame are compatible with there being more than one self to a body. But she does agree that the reactive attitudes of remorse and contrition do indeed presuppose individualism, and she catalogs other instances of this. She finishes this chapter by noting that while we might be able to reject our old moral language and practices of praise, blame, and responsibility, we would find it harder to do away with agency altogether, and it would be too high a price to pay to do away with our concepts of purposive action and judiciously conferred trust (p. 206).

The next chapter is devoted to showing how the belief in individualism is embodied in the goals of psychotherapeutic practice. The aims of therapy, as Radden sees it, are self-unity, self-knowledge, and self-determination. We value one self in psychotherapy. Other cultures embrace different ideals. Different kinds of therapy in our society put different emphases on the three goals. Radden's claim here seems unexceptionable for most kinds of psychotherapy, but it comes under its most severe test with dissociative disorders. She points out that most therapies of multiple personalities try to unify the alter personalities into one personality, and relegates the exceptions to this to a footnote (p. 212). Her main argument for encouraging the development of individualism as a psychological state is that unity, self-knowledge, and autonomy promote functionality. Since what we mean by functionality includes coherence of goals and self-determination, this is not a difficult argument to make, and she explicitly backs away from a deeper investigation of the worth of those aims. Radden mentions many views concerning the nature of self-knowledge and autonomy, without coming down decisively on any side of the debates. She does end by endorsing "relational individualism," which is to say, the view that the self is socially embedded, and links this with the object-relations theory in psychoanalysis and Gilligan's work on moral maturity.

In the last chapter of the third part of the book, Radden takes a stronger stand. She argues that we can make sense of attributions of responsibility even if we adopt a metaphysics of successive selves in describing some cases of personal change. That is to say, to put it in almost unavoidably paradoxical terms, a person can change into a numerically different person and still be praised or blamed for the actions of

her past self. She argues against the opposing views that we can only apply the concepts of agency, morality, and self-knowledge to individuals who remain strictly self-identical over a whole life time. Her main opponents are Alisdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. Her point is that even if it is true that continuity of psychological characteristics is required for the application of these categories, this continuity does not need to be such as to guarantee strict numerical identity of the person over a whole human lifetime. She concedes that in cases of extreme flux and discontinuity, as found in dissociative disorder, the concepts in question are hardly applicable. But she thinks that in more moderate cases, it is at least possible to apply the concepts to some degree, even if not completely. We find no problem in saying a person was trustworthy for some period of her life, but not during another period. Radden also points out that one can have integrity through dramatic changes in oneself, if there is a continuity of self-monitoring. Indeed, this is what often goes on in therapy. It is hard to imagine that MacIntyre or Taylor would want to deny the coherence of these instances of continuity, and Radden does not have a strong argument that their philosophical views commit them to denying it.

Unity of Mind

In the fourth and final part of the book, Radden turns to the ways that minds can be divided at one time. She starts off considering whether there can be more than one center of awareness within a body at one instant. Much of the supposed behavioral evidence for this phenomenon is not conclusive, both in people with dissociative disorder and in hypnotic states, and in people who have had commissurotomies. It is possible to explain these phenomena without recourse to divided consciousness. She also examines thought insertion, depersonalization, derealization, possession states, and out-of-body experience as other possible sources of evidence for divided consciousness. They are cases of division, but they do not imply that there are two separate independent centers of awareness. Rather, they are a duality of experience happening to one center of consciousness. That is why it is possible to describe them from a first-person perspective. Minds in these states are more divided than normal minds functioning in the usual way, but even subjective reports of these states provide at best mixed evidence for a separation of consciousness, argues Radden.

The concluding chapter aims to shed light on the philosophical issues raised in the previous one, by examining the nature of owning and disowning thoughts and experiences. Radden describes the view that a person owns all the mental states that occur in her consciousness, and cannot own the states of another person. [Unfortunately, she does not consider in any detail the opposing view, which has been recently argued for by Andrew Brennan (1989/90).] Her aim is merely to set out this theory and consider how well it deals with difficult cases. Her conclusion is that it can cope with all examples. It implies that disowned mental states are not really ones that are not owned by the subject, but rather, are ones that simply feel strange, "as if" they did not belong to the experiencer. Even telepathic experiences, supposing that they really happen, would not provide a case of one person having another person's thoughts, because they can be described as one person simply having her own thoughts which are qualitatively identical with those of the other person. The two thoughts are not numerically identical. Ownership may be determined by empirical facts about our connections with our bodies versus our connections with other bodies. However, Radden is more sympathetic with the view that

the facts about ownership are fundamentally grammatical, and so, in a sense, conventional. This is compatible with there being good reasons for drawing the boundaries of the self as we do. For instance, evolutionary theory may eventually be able to explain why it is beneficial to draw the boundaries as we do. Disowned experience does not suggest that the boundary between self and nonself is hazy, because in these experiences, the boundary is sharp. There is no breakdown of the capacity of self-attribution of experience here. (There may be different forms of psychopathology which do exemplify a breakdown of this capacity.) In order to account satisfactorily for disowned experience, Radden sympathetically reports the view of Graham and Stephens that self-ascription is analyzable into two components, which are ownership and agency. Normally these go together, but one can own an experience even if one is not the cause of it (Graham and Stephens, 1994).

Conclusion

The blurbs on the book jacket from leaders in the field of Philosophy of Psychiatry rightly praise Radden for her ability to synthesize descriptive psychopathology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Indeed, they should have added the personal identity to the list of categories of philosophy that inform the book. One of the great successes of the book is to show, by exemplar rather than by explicit argument, that metaphysical and conceptual issues are firmly enmeshed in ethical and social questions concerning mental illness. This should greatly enrich the literature in biomedical ethics.

But as I said at the beginning of this review, the swiftness with which Radden deals with most topics results from having so much material to cram into a medium length book. It might be that she intends to keep her more scholarly discussion of issues to academic journals. However, I hope that she considers the possibility of writing a second, greatly expanded edition of this book. If she doubled its length, she would be able to deal with many issues in a much more satisfactory fashion. The publisher might be less enthusiastic about trying to sell a large scholarly book devoted to a little-studied subject, but my hope for Radden's book goes with a hope for the field of Philosophy of Psychiatry, that in a decade there will be enough people working in the field to make such a book economically viable.

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