"Triumph of the Will": Heidegger's Nazism as Spiritual Pathology

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Weber's sociology of inner-worldly mysticism, Almaas' recent synthesis of transpersonal and psychoanalytic object relations theory, and Jung's related metaphorical psychology of alchemy, are brought to bear on the development of Heidegger's evocations of the felt sense of Being between 1927 and 1946, understood as the noetic core of spirituality. In particular, Heidegger's assumption of the Nazi rectorship at Freiburg in 1933–34 is seen as a specifically spiritual crisis based on the "metapathological" grandiosity that can result from the miscarriage of self realization in inner-worldly mysticism. In Heidegger's case, as in much contemporary spirituality, this crisis was intensified by pre-existent narcissistic vulnerabilities of character. Heidegger's later writings are considered as expressions of a more genuine spiritual or essential realization, which, while invaluable as a conceptual framework for transpersonal psychology, nonetheless stops short of a balanced personal integration. This analysis constitutes a specific example of how the combination of transpersonal psychology and psychodynamics can be used to understand the emotional conflicts stirred up by transpersonal realization and the resultant potential for distortion in modern spiritual development, as presented by Hunt (1995b).

Three complementary frames of reference are needed to approach the issue of Martin Heidegger's Nazism in relation to his life and work, particularly in his active phase in 1933–34 as the first Nazi rector of a major German University. The first frame will seek to place Heidegger in the context of twentieth century approaches to mysticism. The second constitutes the socio-cultural analysis of religious and mystical movements by Max Weber.

The third will use more recent developments that synthesize transpersonal psychology and psychoanalysis in order to better understand the personal crises that can complicate what Max Weber termed the "inner-worldly" mysticisms of modernity. Later these perspectives will be extended to Carl Jung's own ambivalent attraction to National Socialism, the earlier example of Socrates, and general issues raised by the politicalization of spirituality.

Heidegger as Spiritual Thinker

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) can be considered as part of a twentieth century attempt to understand the experiential core of spirituality as an inherent, in some sense "natural," human capacity. It comes in several strands. Jung and contemporary transpersonal psychology consider the impact of numinous states on personal development. Others (Hunt, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1995a; Alexander et al., 1990; Gackenbach and Bosveld, 1989) have considered the abstract cognitive processes that would underlie such experiences. Max Weber's sociology of mystical experience will be considered in detail below. Heidegger himself can be said to have articulated a "noetics" of spirituality — what mysticism is about at its experiential source, beneath its metaphysical and theological conceptualizations.

For Heidegger the sense of the holy rests on our capacity for wonder and awe that anything is at all — the "sense" or "primordial experience" of Being. The early Heidegger crossed his initial studies in medieval Catholicism with the phenomenology of Husserl (Kisiel, 1993) to arrive at a structure of human existence or *Dasein* in which the openness of time ahead into the indefinite and unknown offers the "horizon" or potential for this sense of Being or isness, as such. The intrinsic anxiety or dread of our "being-towards-death" means that our openness to Being is occluded, a particular characteristic for Heidegger of the modern West. This is the burden of the *Daseinsanalysis* of *Being and Time* (1927). After 1935 Heidegger writes more evocatively and poetically to convey the experiential sense of Being as the hidden "disposition" (Heidegger, 1938a), or better "felt meaning," latent within the concepts of western metaphysics. His evocations of the abstract animism of the pre-Socratics show most clearly what has been termed the "mystical element" in Heidegger's philosophy (Caputo, 1986).

After 1950, Heidegger's writings become reminiscent of Meister Eckhart on the paradoxical nothingness of the Godhead and Buddhist views of the void compassionately welling forth all that is — as when he writes Being as B̶e̶i̶n̶g̶ to convey his sense of a source that gives forth specific beings while disappearing behind them as ostensibly nothing (Heidegger, 1956). Indeed, in *On Time and Being* (1962) Heidegger echoes Plotinus when he translates the German "es gibt" ("there is") in its etymological sense as "it gives" — so

that both Being and temporality are by implication "unconcealed" or "released" by an "it" whose only description can be a continuously renewed welling forth out of "mystery." For Heidegger our capacity for the sense of awe and the holy comes from the attunement to this potential openness within our ongoing experience, which he himself found so reminiscent of Eastern mysticism.

This consideration of Heidegger as a transpersonal thinker requires some examination of his enthusiastic assumption of the Nazi rectorship at University of Freiburg in 1933, ostensibly in order to extend the National Socialist revolution within the universities, along with his duplicitous and often vindictive behaviour while rector, until he abruptly resigned in 1934. Opinions range from the view that his National Socialism was a temporary aberration with no inherent relation to his philosophy (Dallmayr, Pöggeler, Young), to the conclusion that his entire work is thereby revealed as implicity Nazi or Fascist (Rockmore, Wolin, Lang). The present approach will eschew both these extremes. Rather, if Heidegger is a major focus of modern spiritual thought then the moral failing of his Nazism must be relevant, but as a specific crisis requiring an analylsis of both his spiritual and personal development.

This view fits well, with Jung (1953), Maslow (1971), Wilber (1984) and most recently A.H. Almaas (1988) on the concept of spiritual crisis or "metapathology." Almaas points out that the felt impact of spiritual realizations will put pressure on one's sense of self, stirring up feelings of deficiency and inadequacy that create a "higher" version of the narcissistic vulnerabilities of self esteem depicted by Kohut, Winnicott, and Fairbairn. This will be especially so when, as with Heidegger, there are pre-existing dilemmas in sense of self. Metapathologies can look psychotic or borderline, at least in their thematics and suffering, but they need not include actual clinical disability. Almaas identifies three features of these reactions: grandiosity — what Jung similarly termed "inflation," "negative merging," — a defensive symbiosis with destructive relationships and groups, and withdrawal or isolation. We will see how prominent the first two are in Heidegger during his rectorship. The third, a more schizoid isolation and sensed futility, appears immediately after 1934 but is especially marked in his post 1946 reaction to the de-Nazification hearings in which he was banned from teaching until 1950 and very nearly had his house and personal library confiscated.

The Rectorship

Our discussion of Heidegger's one year assumption of the rectorship remains on the level of an overview, bypassing many of the debates that have made the contemporary study of Heidegger so controversial. Heidegger was

drawn toward National Socialism by the same neo-romantic concern with roots and renewal that also briefly drew Jung. Despite more recent accusations, Heidegger's behavior was not merely opportunistic. He was not responsible for banning Husserl from the university library (Ott, 1993) and seems not to have been anti-Semitic in his personal dealings (Neske and Kettering, 1990; Young–Bruehl, 1982). He had already had a typical mentor–student falling out with Husserl from 1927 and actually tried to delay Ministry of Education anti-Semitic decrees, as well as various book burnings. Heidegger did, sadly, make anti-Semitic comments where he thought it would further his own goals. Even in his speeches praising Hitler's revolution, however, he avoided the crude racism and pseudo-biological doctrines that defined Nazi orthodoxy, and was sharply criticized for this by the Ministry of Education (Farias, 1989). Heidegger was especially drawn to the Röhm faction of the S.A. and its call for a second cultural revolution, to follow Hitler's political one, and which Heidegger thought he could lead within the universities. Specifically he sought the elimination of departmental divisions and acceptance of his own grounding of all disciplines in ancient Greek thought. He was fascinated with the nationalist and romantic ideology of the *Freikorp* veterans and the S.A.'s Black Forest youth camps, whose camp fires and workshops Heidegger attended enthusiastically. He actually thought the Nazis represented a rejection of technology, which by itself shows the danger of truly non political people getting caught up in mass movements. He had resigned before the 1934 assassination of Röhm, which he later said opened his eyes to the violence of the regime.

In 1934, Heidegger was quoted as saying that the rectorship was "the greatest stupidity of my life" (Petzet, 1993). After the war he made several private confessions of shame — for not attending the 1938 funeral of Husserl, the loss of his friendship with Karl Jaspers and the latter's Jewish wife, and his temporary estrangement from Hannah Arendt (his secret lover during the 1920s). It is important to note that, although he did not resign from the party, he began speaking out against the National Socialists from 1935 on, which seems relatively courageous for the timid and frightened person described by Arendt (Ettinger, 1995). Thus, in 1935 (*Introduction to Metaphysics*) he speaks scornfully of the "falsified spirit" that seeks "the regulation of a nation's vital resources and race," in 1938 ("Age of the World Picture") of the mistaken subjectivity of man that "fosters himself as a race . . . and . . . empowers himself as lord of the earth," and in 1941 (*Basic Concepts*) of "when world dominions are knowingly planned to last millennia."[1] He suffi-

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[1]Heidegger, M., *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 38, "Age of the world picture," p. 152; *Basic Concepts*, p. 14. Even the oft cited notoriety of the passage in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (p. 166), where Heidegger speaks of the "inner truth and greatness of this movement" of National

ciently annoyed the Ministry of Education that he was actually under surveil-
lance by the S.S. from 1936 and was briefly mobilized in 1944, at age 55, as
part of Germany's desperate final defense, when younger colleagues at
Freiburg were spared. None of this mattered in the de-Nazification hearings
of 1946, partly because of the prominence of his early support, partly because
of the self serving nature of his written "apology," and partly because
Heidegger's stridently Nazi and racist wife was so unpopular in Freiburg (Ott,
1993).

Evidence of metapathology or spiritual crisis in Heidegger's conduct is
striking. There are signs of inflation and narcissistic grandiosity. Jaspers con-
cluded at the time that Heidegger hoped to be "spiritual Führer" of Germany
— that he would somehow influence Hitler directly as a sort of Platonic
philosopher–king of culture and education (Oliver, 1994). This grandiosity is
also reflected in the bombastic rhetoric of his speeches and in the way he
shaved his moustache to look like Hitler's. Most shocking, however, is the
mendacity and cunning of his actions as rector. This is actually a complex
story. He was already under suspicion by the Nazis as an opportunist, soft on
race. There are Ministry documents criticizing him for close ties to Jewish
students, and for his "Talmudic" and "schizophrenic–degenerate" writing
style (Farias, 1989). It seems likely that *in part* some of his rather two-faced
behaviors are attempts to compensate for such accusations. So we find him
protecting favorite Jewish students as "Jews of worth" while writing letters to
the Ministry attacking others, usually non Jews who failed to support his
positions in totality, for their "Jewish connections" (Farias, 1989; Neske and
Kettering, 1990; Ott, 1993). Not surprisingly, he ends up distrusted by all
sides and resigns when he realizes that his reforms will be blocked at the
Ministry level. As Hans Gadamer (in Neske and Kettering, 1990), his early
student, states, if he were primarily an opportunist he would have been more
of a racist in 1934 and more of a democrat after 1946, but instead he was
politically naive and personally "deluded." In 1933 he was forty four years old
and at the height of his fame. We will see later how his spiritual crisis first
appeared in his writings when he was about forty, which Levinson (1978)
documents as the beginning of a several year period of vulnerability to mid
life dilemma.

Socialism, in its actual context is part of his critique of its more outwardly established ortho-
doxy. Some of the rhetoric around Heidegger's rectorship is unfortunate. The truth is gener-
ally bad enough, without the exaggeration to which many in our current "culture wars" are
prone (Ettinger, 1995; Farias, 1989; Wolin, 1990). The whole affair seems more personally
desperate and confused than the current hysteria over Heidegger in North America manages
to portray. The latter seems to have the covert agenda of simply making Heidegger, as an
implicit Nazi through and through, "unreadable" in our time (N. Hunt, 1994).

Max Weber on the "Broken" Quality of Inner-worldly Mysticism

A second frame of reference, coming from the sociology of religious experi-
ence of Max Weber (1915, 1922) and Ernst Troeltsch (1931), will also help
to link transpersonal experience in the twentieth century to the dilemmas in
sense of self of such interest to Kohut and object relations theory. It is that
linkage that will illuminate Heidegger's vulnerability to narcissistic grandios-
ity in the early 1930s.

Weber distinguished between two forms of radical salvation movement in
urban civilizations during times of the inevitable secularization of "charisma"
— his term for the outer, social face of Otto's (1923) "numinous" (the felt
core of religious experience). Prophetical or ascetic movements, such as early
Christianity and Islam and the Protestant Reformation, ordinarily have the
most direct political consequences. Their predominantly ethical teachings
depict utopian and fundamentalist solutions to widely felt social and class
tensions within society. Mystical movements, on the other hand, usually
emerging from the educated and artistic classes, seek a more private and aes-
thetic cultivation of the numinous. Weber further divides both movements
into "inner-worldly" and "other-worldly" forms, with Troeltsch predicting an
advent of inner-worldly mysticisms on the basis of an expanding, educated
middle class identified with traditional artistic/aristocratic values. Inner-
worldly mysticism cultivates an openness to transformations of consciousness
in the midst of everyday social involvement, in contrast to the monastic,
"other-worldly" tendencies, East and West, to withdraw from society and
seek dissolution into an impersonal, transcendent oneness. This-worldly mys-
ticisms seek an immediate sense of presence — I am-ness or being there — in
here and now situations. Just as for Weber (1905) capitalism could not
develop fully without the inner-worldly, prophetical "ethic of vocation" of
the Protestant reformation, we could say that our society of "separate indi-
viduals," pluralistic to the point of fragmentation and isolation, may not be
livable without access to an experiential sense of presence and felt reality.

Jung's concept of "individuation" is an example of such an inner-worldly
mysticism, with its emphasis on direct cultivation of an autonomous imagi-
nation understood as a psychological or this-worldly process. For Jung,
"active imagination" elicits archetypal dimensions of experience that "cir-
cumambulate" a central, unknowable Self — rather than a more impersonal
God. We can also include Jung's (1944) and Hillman's (1978, 1980) meta-
phorical interpretation of alchemy as depicting stages of individuation or
spiritual realization. The goal of alchemy was not the white light luminosities
of other-worldly mysticism but the this-worldly "red" (*rubedo*) of the philoso-
phers stone. Another example would be the Sufi "self remembering" tech-
niques, central to the "fourth way" teachings of Gurdjieff (1975) and

Ouspensky (1949) and cultivating a sensed personal presence in the midst of the various "doings" of everyday life.

The point, of course, is that we must also include in this tradition Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Here felt presence is an attunement to personal Being or the sense of "I am," which he terms "authenticity." Authenticity entails a resoluteness in the face of the anxiety or dread that comes first with the sensed openness of time ahead — as inherently a "being toward death." Heidegger's superordinate existential dimension here is "care," as our potential to sense our own being and a "solicitude" for the same potential in others that is reminiscent of "compassion" in Mahayana Buddhism. *Being and Time* can be considered as a secular mysticism of the "heart," both in its dimensions of existential autonomy/strength and of contact/solicitude. We will see below how close Heidegger's authenticity of personal Being is to Almaas on "personal essence."

Weber emphasizes what he calls the "broken" quality of inner-worldly mysticism. Its "be-here-now" attitude must also entail a heightened sensitivity to all the frustrations of ordinary living, as well as to modern narcissistic and schizoid dilemmas. Winnicott, so reminiscent of his contemporary Heidegger here, calls attention to the widespread sense in twentieth century society of not feeling fully real and alive, while Kohut calls attention to vulnerabilities in sense of self. Inner-worldly mysticism, direct or secularized, means an openness to the vulnerabilities basic to object relations psychoanalysis and Kohut's self psychology: "I am here now in this situation feeling . . . awful about myself, withdrawn, shame, rage, and/or desperate grandiosity." The difficulties of sustaining in-the-world meditation techniques that bring the person face to face with such pain will be considerable.

I have discussed elsewhere (Hunt, 1995a, 1995b) how experiences of consciousness as such, as in meditation, must exteriorize the inner-most structures of awareness, in particular the earlier internalization of the mirroring, containing relationship of mothering one and infant. Resultant "metapathologies," analogous on a higher developmental level to the traumas and deficits of object relations theory, will be exacerbated by actual failures at these earlier levels that are fundamental to sense of self and basic trust. Unless these widespread modern vulnerabilities can be dealt with, the various transpersonal approaches to self realization must eventually stir up more pain than the individual will be able to handle, even as a contemporary anomie intensifies a sensed lack of presence and aliveness in society generally. It is for this reason that contemporary transpersonal psychology (Almaas, 1988) has gradually concluded that "higher" self actualization can never be as independent of "lower" psychodynamics as Maslow (1971) believed. The current Heidegger controversy offers a unique opportunity to illustrate this more recent synthesis (Hunt, 1995b).

The Interface of Transpersonal Psychologies
and Contemporary Psychoanalysis

We see the interface of the transpersonal and psychodynamic, as our third frame of reference, in Jung's (1916) early distinction between "regressive" and "progressive" meanings, with the latter emerging from the full acceptance of childhood conflict through a spontaneous "transcendent function." It is similarly reflected in Michael Fordham's (1958, 1976) addition of Kleinian object relations as the dynamic face of Jung's autonomous archetypal imagination, and in James Hillman (1980, 1981, 1986) and Paul Kugler (1993) on the false and true forms of "alchemical" stages of self realization. Fordham's integration of spirituality and childhood dynamics has been further developed by Washburn (1994). Winnicott (1965) had earlier suggested that the lack of feeling real and alive in schizoid clients showed an early failure to support and mirror a dimension of Being whose full adult development could lead to mystical spirituality. Here we will concentrate principally on the related approach of Almaas (1986a, 1986b, 1988).

Almaas locates multiple aspects of true spirituality or "essence," false or defensive forms of these aspects, and specific felt deficits or "holes" of these same aspects. These emotionally painful deficits are based on the early dilemmas of object relations that must be fully felt and accepted for the transition to the sense of presence involved in each essential or archetypal aspect. These deficits are early emotional wounds that derailed the young child's potential for feeling present and fully alive, leaving instead Winnicott's "false self." Each essential aspect can be realized more on the side of a personal presence and I-am sense or in the more impersonal, and formless side of other-worldly mysticism — as in the Buddhist void, or the Being of the later Heidegger. Almaas, somewhat reminiscent here of Jung, sees several dangers in such development. First, there is the likelihood of a one-sidedness among the different essential aspects of strength, will, joy, love, compassion, power, and knowledge. Second, in the face of personal and social suffering, there is the tendency to seek the more transcendent, formless dimensions before the more personal presence aspect has been attained. As Almaas (1988, p. 15) says, "Transcending a situation is not necessarily the same as resolving it."

Like Jung, and Heidegger himself after 1935, Almaas distinguishes between "false" and "true" aspects of essence. Genuine spiritual realization, ineffable in ordinary language, is felt and can only be expressed as a "coincidence of opposites." As in Otto's classic phenomenology of the numinous, mystical experience must be conveyed by the use of contrary attributes that from an ordinary language standpoint are "paradoxical." Heidegger (1941) similarly speaks of Being as simultaneously empty and as surplus, the most common

and most unique, the most intelligible and most concealed, the most said and most silent, and the most constraining and yet liberating.

Almaas' (1986a, 1988) separate dimensions of spiritual experience offer a major differentiation of Otto's earlier phenomenology. Almaas describes a felt aspect of "essential strength," with its paradoxical sense of openness and its physiognomy of fiery redness; "essential will," with its paradoxical letting be and acceptance and its felt imagery of silvery whiteness; "essential power," with its sense of peaceful stillness and imagery of blackness; and "essential joy," with its acceptance of emotional suffering and its expansive physiognomy of glowing yellow. Almaas also includes analyses of essential compassion and love, which tellingly remain undeveloped in Heidegger's writings. Each essential aspect has its corresponding false or metapathological form. Thus, there is the self-righteous anger and narcissistic rage of false strength, the strident control of false will (so obvious in Nazi propaganda and public rallies), the hatred and domination of false power, and the manic enthusiasm of false joy. Finally, using psychoanalytic object relations theory, Almaas describes the specific childhood deficits ("holes") that can both block the experience of the numinous and be stirred up in its aftermath in the metapathological distortions of spirituality. Here he utilizes Kohut (1971, 1977) and Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975) on the fearfulness and lack of sense of self that must be fully accepted to re-appear as the strength aspect of the numinous, while Winnicott's (1965, 1971) portrayal of the early failure of holding and supportive mirroring becomes the deficit of essential will, and Fairbairn (1954) on the schizoid sense of futility and inner agitation is taken as the basis of a deficit of essential power. The deficit of essential joy rests on the loss of expansive spontaneity suffered in many childhoods.

The richness of Almaas' analysis, and its closeness to Hillman on the color imagery in alchemy as a metaphoric language of archetypal experience, will emerge in considering the vicissitudes of Heidegger's development from 1928 to 1946 and beyond, as reflected in his more explicitly evocative, experiential writings from this period. It will also allow us to trace the complication of this spiritual development by his narcissistic vulnerabilities of character — as manifested in particular in 1933–34 and in the impact of the de-Nazification hearings after 1946.

Heidegger's Spiritual Crisis and its Partial Resolution: 1928–1945

With *Being and Time* (1927) Heidegger had completed his analytic of *Dasein*, or human existence. It had begun in the early 1920s as a traditional theology of the "heart" from Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard, later reinscribed as the authentic care implicit in the openness of time. Heidegger's

"authenticity," based on resolve, presence, care, and contact, is close to Almaas on personal essence as a sense of autonomy, fullness, beingness, personalness, and contact — implying a goal akin to a this-worldly vitality. His discussion of "solicitude" bears comparison to Maslow on higher forms of love in self actualization, but it is not a theme to which Heidegger would return. *Being and Time* culminates in an intricate analysis of the way in which the ecstasis of temporality, the flowing into one of past, present, and future, allows *Dasein* — "cleared by light" — to break into a sensed spaciousness. This happens in the fullness of the "moment of vision," a concept he takes from Kierkegaard (*The Concept of Dread; Philosophical Fragments*), and from Augustine's *Confessions*. Augustine speaks of religious experience in a phrase itself reminiscent of Heidegger: ". . . with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at *that which is*" (in Happold, 1963, p. 200). Heidegger's stated task at the end of the uncompleted *Being and Time* is to move from the *analysis* of temporality as the horizon of Being to the felt sense of Being as such. He seeks to directly (poetically) "say" and evoke this spaciousness of the moment.[2]

While Heidegger had the sensitivity and openness to locate a personal core of presence/solicitude, he was apparently unable to integrate it into his own life. We will see that Heidegger's essays from 1928 through 1931 show him immersed in what Almaas would term the felt deficits of the lack of a sense of Being. He is in the painful throes of Winnicott's dilemma of being or feeling real. This period is abruptly replaced by the false, strident versions of the essential categories of will, power, and strength, as seen in Heidegger's speeches of 1933–34. If his Nazism is rightly to be taken as a spiritual crisis or metapathology then these speeches should differ as much from his 1928–1931 essays as from the more evocative imagery that appears after 1935 — which indeed do show more genuinely spiritual (and so paradoxical) phrasings.

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[2]For many scholars it is this shift that begins Heidegger II — the later Heidegger. Of course, Heidegger continued to offer careful analyses of classical metaphysical philosophers, but his most significant writings came to have a more experiential, explicitly metaphoric or poetic, and evocative quality. He is now explicitly trying to unconceal the "felt sense" of Being as the holy, lost within the categories of western metaphysics. In their recent analyses of Heidegger's lecture courses beginning in 1919, Kisiel (1993) and Van Buren (1994) have argued that there is really no "later" Heidegger, since by the late 1930s he had actually returned to those earlier lectures on mysticism. While this is true on a purely conceptual level, it is precisely the more experiential and metaphoric element that is lacking in what Kisiel (1992) himself terms these "very unpoetic" earlier conceptual analyses and which Heidegger himself saw as "scientific."

1928–31

For Jung, the first stage of personal transformation is the alchemical *nigredo* or blackening. This is the point where the *prima materia,* here Heidegger's analytic of *Dasein,* is to be melted down in a density of suffering and despair. By 1928 Heidegger was left with the fame and notoriety of *Being and Time,* the recent deaths of both his parents, and the winding down of his tortured affair with Hannah Arendt — who he later declared to be the "love of his life" (Ettinger, 1995). All this seems reflected in his preoccupation with the existential analysis of apathy and boredom in "What is Metaphysics" (1928) and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/30). He speaks of "this profound boredom drifting hither and thither in the abysses of existence like a mute fog," "a queer kind of indifference," "empty silence," the solitude of "abandoning" oneself to "emptiness," and a mood of profound indifference that is a *"being held in limbo* by time as it drags along and . . . *coming to be left empty* by things in general." It is interesting in this regard that Fairbairn locates futility as the fundamental emotion of the schizoid dilemma, with its outward coldness and inner hatred, and which Almaas presents as the sensed deficit of essential power. In the 1928 essay Heidegger writes of a "negation" pervaded by "nothingness," "the violence of loathing," "harshness," "mercilessness," and "bitterness."[3]

A deficit of strength/autonomy is also reflected in "What is Metaphysics" in references to the "clear night of dread's Nothingness" and to the way *Dasein* "quivers" with the "pulsation" of dread — a pulsation greatest in the "courageous," who "leap" and "let themselves go into Nothing."[4] Given that Almaas (1986a) sees the aspect of essential strength as the core of a vitality that most directly opens to the initial sense of spaciousness in spiritual experience, it is interesting that in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* in the throes of his period of evoking dread and futility, Heidegger explicitly rejects any connection between *Dasein* and aliveness or bodily vitality. This is a permanent step back from the obvious potential alliance with Bergson's vitalism and Whitehead's philosophy of organism (Hunt, 1995a; Krell, 1992). Consistent with the possibility that his work finally fails to develop this aspect of strength/vitality, it is interesting that later when his friend Medard Boss (1988) asked Heidegger why he ignored the phenomenology of the body, the latter responded, "Because this is the most difficult thing" (Craig, 1988).

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[3]Heidegger, M. "What is Metaphysics," pp. 334, 336; *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,* pp. 119, 106; "What is Metaphysics," p. 342.

[4]Heidegger, M. "What is Metaphysics," pp. 339, 349.

A false form of strength is also implied in the 1929/30 lectures where he speaks of truth having to be "torn" and "stolen" from concealment, in marked contrast to the metaphors of openness and unconcealment he had started to use in Being and Time and attesting to his own loss of openness in the late 1920s. More ominously we find him calling "for someone capable of instilling terror into Dasein again"[5] — a frighteningly concretized version of the more abstract relation between dread and time from Being and Time.

The deficit of essential will, for Almaas, based on the re-experience of early childhood anxieties of lack of support, appears in Heidegger's discussion of the "abyss" of nonsupport or groundlessness. In The Essence of Ground (1929) "freedom" is the experience of the "groundlessness of existence." This absence of any sense of containment is also seen in his 1931 Hegel lectures, where, since our essence is already "abandonment," no "leap" is necessary. Man cannot "leap away from himself in order to leave himself behind as finite" — as if that leap out of himself is just what Heidegger longed for, and then attempted in 1933. In this regard Heidegger, widely accused of ignoring being-with-others in Being and Time, ends his 1929 reflections on groundlessness with, "For only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self."[6] To paraphrase his famous 1966 interview (in Neske and Kettering, 1990), where an older and more despairing Heidegger said "Only a god can save us now," it is as if in 1929 he is saying "Only a group can save us now." His wife, an overly dominating influence as we will see, joined the National Socialist Party in 1929.

Heidegger's 1930 essay "On the Essence of Truth," with its preliminary discussions of letting be, truth as unconcealment, and openness to the mystery, is often seen as the beginning of the later Heidegger's reconstitution of Meister Eckhart's mysticism (Richardson, 1963). However, it seems more an eerie harbinger of his more immediate political future. Here it is not the later openness of Being-as-such that Heidegger discusses, but an openness to "error" as part of the structure of Dasein. The "letting be" on this level is our potential for a relative truth and falsity that blocks or conceals the totality of Being. The mystery is this "dissimulation" of Being. "The revelation of what-is-as-such is at the same time the concealment of what-is in totality." Our ". . . freedom itself springs from . . . the reign of mystery in error" — and Heidegger was about to make a big one.[7]

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[5]Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 172.

[6]Heidegger, M. The Essence of Ground, p. 129; Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 149; The Essence of Ground, p. 131.

[7]Heidegger, M. "On the Essence of Truth," p. 319.

1933-34

One danger of spiritual development for both Jung and Almaas is a prema-
ture or false development to escape suffering, rather than accepting it so as to
allow its transmutation. Thus, from the Jungian perspective we can speak of
a false red of vitality/strength coming too soon, or the more malevolent
fusion of false strength and power (the black) [Kugler, 1993]. Heidegger man-
ifests both of these in 1933-34, along with what Hillman (1986) terms the
"lunacies of white" — a narcissistic grandiosity that has about it the "snow-
blindness of purity." It is interesting that Jaspers later described Heidegger
entering National Socialism "like a dreaming child" (Ott, 1993).

We have already seen the personal grandiosity in Heidegger's behavior as
rector. It remains to trace the rhetoric of false will, power, and strength
through his speeches and articles at the time — so lacking in both the para-
doxicalities of spiritual language in his post 1935 writings and the felt defi-
ciencies of 1928 through 1931.

It begins with his infamous inaugural rector's address "The Self Assertion
of the German University" [1933], whose appeal to a re-grounding in classi-
cal thought yet earned the initial praise of Jaspers.[8] We hear that "German
destiny must now come to power in the will to essence" that is inseparable
from "the will to science." Prometheus — with his stolen powers of the gods
— is accordingly presented as the first philosopher! "The spiritual world of a
people" is "the power that most deeply preserves [their] earth- and blood-
bound strengths." Most astonishingly, given Almaas on essential will as actu-
ally a paradoxical allowing and effortlessness, we find: "This people . . . ready
for battle . . . wills to be a spiritual people." One wonders how such a thing
could be *willed* in the sense Heidegger apparently meant. He closes with
Plato's phrase, again intriguing in terms of the latter's near lethal role as
advisor to the tyrant of Syracuse: "All that is great stands in the storm." In
later addresses and articles from 1933-34 Heidegger speaks of the necessity of
the "new courage" of this "hard race" who must "remain tough." To an audi-
ence of students he says "Ideas shall no longer govern your existence" but,
instead the Führer and his "glorious will." They must have the "courage to

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[8]The only allusion to the endemic anti-Semitism of the times in Heidegger's 1933-34
speeches and articles comes with "We have completely broken with the idolization of a land-
less and powerless thinking" (in Runes, 1965, pp. 31–32). In context, this alludes to the
widespread *volkische* notion, interestingly enough shared by Theodore Herzl, the founder of
Zionism, that Europe's urbanized Jews lacked rootedness in a land of national origin. As
Lacoue–Labarthe (1990) points out, the ultimate *volkische* absurdity in the Heidegger of
1933–34 is the view that the human capacity for attunement to Being as such could be a pri-
marily national affair.

cut loose from what exists, and either to grow or break" in a new spirituality "motivated by the toughness and danger of human existence."[9]

All this comes from the man whose more candid photographs show the timid, vulnerable, shy person described by Hannah Arendt (Ettinger, 1995). Heidegger's prose is consistent with Almaas on metapathology as an inflation based on false forms of will, power, and strength and showing a defense against the true autonomy foreshadowed in *Being and Time* by means of his sudden "negative merging" with a mass movement. He has found in the Nazis a temporary support and a reflection of his own frustration and hatred. On this view, we would see these speeches as false attempts to fill the "holes" of the 1928–1931 essays. If so, then beginning with his return to original writing and lecturing in 1935, we might expect to find genuine or essential forms of will, strength, and power and the first appearance of other aspects previously blocked. That is precisely what occurs.

1935–1945

After his resignation from the rectorship, Heidegger re-entered a period of overt suffering, a new *nigredo*, this time with the quality of the alchemical massa confusa. In a later letter to Jaspers he describes himself after 1934 as in a state of *Ratlosigheit* — loosely translatable as "at sea," with connotations of perplexity, helplessness, and embarrassment. In Almaas' terms this is part of the sensed deficiency of essential will. His earlier grandiosity has been replaced by shame over his alienations from Jaspers, the Husserl family, and Hannah Arendt. He has had the strength to resign and even in the face of the Röhm assassination to begin to criticize mainstream National Socialism in his lectures. But he is isolated and alone, without ground or support. The spiritual significance of his temporary tie to Nazi orthodoxy seems attested in a 1936 letter to Jaspers where he refers to the failure of the rectorship and his earlier break with Catholicism as "the two thorns in my side" (Ott, 1993).

Beginning with his more evocative essays/lectures of 1935 and 1936, we find the first appearance of the paradoxical phraseology of essential will, power, and strength, now explicitly contrasted with their false forms by Heidegger himself. As we will see, the aspect of essential power, the genuine or true black of the alchemical "illuminated night," with its physiognomy of peace and stillness, gradually tames the deficient inner turbulence and helplessness of the earlier period. Also appearing is essential will (the alchemical *albedo* or whitening for Jung), but based now on a "letting be" — the earlier

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[9]In Neske, G. and Kettering, E., Eds. pp. 6, 9, 10–12, 13; in Runes, D., Ed., pp. 25–27, 28, 42, 32, 35.

abyss of "groundlessness" replaced by "serene dwelling." Yet there is also an impersonality in the imagery of Heidegger that we are about to consider. It increases as he moves toward his major preoccupation with *logos* or essential knowing in the 1940s and into the 1950s, a permanent move away from the more "personal" aspects of resolve and solicitude in *Being and Time*. Certain vulnerabilities of character to be discussed later seem to have predisposed Heidegger to what in Hillman's alchemical language is a "premature cooling" of the work, a "coldness of soul" in which the capacity for personal relatedness disappears — most strikingly after 1946.

Gone, in the 1935 lectures later published as *Introduction to Metaphysics*, is the nothingness, groundlessness, and futility of 1928–1931. Here the sense of Being is to be approached by amplifying the pre-Socratic *physis* ("nature"). *Physis* is a self opening, an inward jutting beyond itself, an emergence from the hidden into the clearing and lighting of space — the classical imagery of spiritual experience. The text is full of the imagery of light and fire as an illuminating or shining forth.[10] A sense of the essential strength of this opening into spaciousness is implied by the way it flares up and shows itself, in contrast to what Heidegger now terms the "false appearing" of fame and glory — which surely describes his assumption of the rectorship. There is still an imagery of strife and struggle, but it is now more internalized. Specifically it is now within *logos* or knowing itself as the attempt at "gathering" and "holding" the contending opposites of beings. The turbulence and strife of the hole of power are now located within "language," which is understood as a violent overpowering — in short, a false mastery.

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[10]In addition to the primary shift in Heidegger's post 1935 writings to a more evocative and paradoxical sense of Being, it is interesting to note some parallel conceptual shifts that explicitly distanced him from National Socialist ideology. First, there is the change from his neoromantic fascination with "origin" in terms of *Volk* (as at the end of *Being and Time*) to a sense of the roots of western thought in general in the pre-Socratics. Similarly, his preoccupation with "homeland" shifts from the sense of Germany as nation and people in 1933–34 to the land and terrain of the Black Forest mountains. Finally, the sense of Being comes to be most directly evoked by the abstract animism of the pre-Socratics and Holderlin's poetry of nature. In present terminology, Heidegger is calling attention to the necessity of physical metaphors for any encompassing reflection on human existence, much as Jung, at roughly the same time, was moving away from the neo-romanticism of a "racial" or "ancestral" unconscious, that also temporarily drew him close to Nazi ideology, to the notion of an archetypal imagination based on a "psychoid" unity of mind and matter. For Jung, too, psyche could only be adequately reflected by cross cultural metaphors abstracted from physical nature — best illustrated in his re-use of alchemy as a psychological language. For Heidegger the "welling forth," "shining," "radiance" or "opening" of Being should not be considered a mere anthropomorphism or animism, since that presupposes that we actually know what humanity is (Heidegger, 1936b). Rather, our being is concealed and mysterious, much as Jung sees alchemical imagination as a knowing the unknown (mind) by means of the unknown (matter-based metaphors). For the later Heidegger (1947c) our being is a "dwelling," not as an explicit, and so limited metaphor, but because Being actually does *shelter* and *hold* us. There are no other words to convey this sense of the Being that somehow "allows" and "lets" our existence.

Later in 1935 in "The Origin of the Work of Art" this inward strife of logos moves toward its own resolution. Now it is art — as the essence of thought — that gathers across the rift between *physis* and human world (*ethos*). The dark, cold material of the stone of the temple, overlooking the sea, stands in this rift and "draws up out of the rock the mystery of [its] spontaneous support." The lustre of the stone "first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. [Its] towering makes visible the invisible space of air." The temple's "steadfastness [and] . . . repose brings out the raging of the sea." There is still a "battle" but it is now between the concealment and unconcealment of truth in logos. Yet the "concentrated agitation" of this "primal conflict" is also a "repose."[11] Here an essential power emerges in Heidegger's imagery as both the dynamic radiance of the "illuminating" black and as its inner peace and stillness. We see increasingly the abstract physiognomies and metaphors that characterize traditional mystical spirituality.

The articulation of an essential will as a letting be and abiding comes to the fore in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (1936a). The poet is said to evoke the openness of a ground that shines. While a "weak vessel" cannot bear the separation and isolation involved — essential strength again — to "dwell poetically" is a gift of Being that Heidegger uses to characterize human existence as such.

That something more balanced and integrated has begun to unfold is also implied by the appearance of the new aspect of what Almaas terms essential joy in "Remembrance of the Poet" (1943a). In Hillman's use of alchemy as metaphor, the yellow is the expansiveness and enlivening of the white as part of its transition toward the vitality (redness) of the philosopher's stone (Hillman, 1989) — the this-worldly presence of self actualization. A "coincidence of opposites," a key to the phenomenology of the numinous, appears as Heidegger writes: "the Most Joyous . . . declares itself to me now, in this grief" — both in the sadness of "homecoming" and in "waiting" in the "proximity" of God's absence. In accepting this sadness the poet arrives at "the Serene," which "allots each thing . . . [its] place of existence." This is the "space [to be] at home . . . . The earth serenifies 'the house.'" "The Serene . . . holds everything in tranquility and wholeness. The Serene is fundamentally healing." "Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the source," which is an inherent "mystery" and "the holy."[12] Here for the first and last time in Heidegger we see a sense of basic trust implicit in the relaxation and

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[11]Heidegger, M. "The Origin of the Work of Art," pp. 42, 42, 57–58.

[12]Heidegger, M. "Remembrance of the Poet," pp. 262, 247, 248, 251, 258.

playful lightness of joy. Its disappearance is not surprising given Heidegger's bitterness, isolation, and depression after 1946.

Heidegger viewed art and poetry as the essence of thinking when it is attuned to Being. So it is not possible to separate the preceding discussion from Heidegger's writings from 1937 through 1945 on thinking as an essential opening to Being in its own right, beginning in the still untranslated *Beitrage* and later in his treatment of the Greek *logos* and *aletheia* (truth) as unconcealment. There is a distinct and more impersonal quality in these writings that fits well with Almaas (1988) on "essential intelligence," with its imagery of the color blue, as an inherent aspect of spirituality. Essential intelligence, reflected for instance in the "mysticism of knowledge" in Eckhart or Plotinus, offers its own access to all other aspects of essence — strength, will, joy, compassion, etc. After all, Heidegger is above all a thinker, and it is at this point he comes to see that thought (what he will later [1959] term "presentational thinking") *is* Being. For Hillman (1993), also, the alchemical blue is its own "vertical" dimension appearing at the point where the alchemical white first shines out of the black. It is associated with the "wisdom of Sophia" and the "impersonal depths of sky and sea." As with Almaas on essential intelligence and its potential for the intuitive synthesis of the multiple aspects of essence, the metaphoric blue of alchemy has its own access to the full spectrum of alchemical colors. Again we find Hillman's metaphoric psychology and Almaas' more direct phenomenology in remarkable agreement.

In his lectures on Parmenides (1942/3) and Heraclitus (1943b, 1944) essential or spiritual intelligence emerges as a paradoxical acceptance of "mystery" and openness to "not knowing" — as the unconcealing of the concealment of Being. The "lighting of Being," as the unconcealment of truth (Heidegger, 1943b), opens an "expanse in the brightness" which can no longer be "grasped" or "stolen." In the Parmenides lectures (1942/3) this is an openness to the mystery that shelters or saves the gift of Being itself. *Logos* (Heidegger, 1944) is a "gathering" that is no longer a strife but lets things "lie together" as they come to "shine" as presence. This "letting" of thought reflects a "highest willing" in "Conversation on a Country Path," published in 1959, but based on conversations that Heidegger said took place in 1944–45. Here thought looks into the "openness as such" of the horizon — of the blue sky — which is "an enchanted region where everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests." "Steadfastness" in "waiting" for the opening is not an ordinary "willing" but an "indwelling" and "abiding" which is also a "noble mindedness" — a generosity of attitude and a "thanking" that begins to imply something of the compassion in Mahayana Buddhism.[13]

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[13]Heidegger, M. "Conversation on a Country Path," pp. 64–65, 81–85.

Heidegger's writings between 1935 and 1945 represent the furthest Heidegger was to go in bringing together the dimensions of essential power, strength, joy, compassion, and especially will in their more impersonal aspect. This period shows a triumph of essential will as a "letting be" and "opening" that offers an appropriate counterpoint to the triumph of false will at the public spectacles of the Nuremberg rallies. It was perhaps the shame, rage, and further withdrawal consequent on the events of 1946 that prevented Heidegger from integrating this work with the more personal sense of Being in *Being and Time,* and pushed him defensively and prematurely toward the more impersonal formless dimensions of his later writings.

Heidegger's Vulnerabilities of Character in the Light of Object Relations Theory and Self Psychology

Transpersonal realization, with its sensitization of consciousness, may create a vulnerability to metapathologies resembling narcissistic and schizoid conditions, certainly true for Heidegger as we have seen. These dilemmas follow from the basis of our self referential consciousness on the early internalization of the "mirroring" relation between infant and mothering one (Hunt, 1995a, 1995b). It is the occurrence of trauma and/or deficit in that early relating that is postulated in object relations psychoanalysis and Kohut's self psychology as the source of narcissistic and schizoid problems. It follows that spiritual or metapathology consequent upon essential realization will be especially exacerbated where earlier development has left a narcissistic vulnerability, also true for Heidegger. For the object relations theorists this implies possible developmental difficulties in the first few years of life and especially in the relationship with the mother. It is widely acknowledged, however, that the psychobiography of the famous — and especially with someone as secretive as Heidegger — often miscarries in speculative attempts to reconstruct early childhood etiologies for adult problems (Runyon, 1982). Accordingly, the majority of the discussion to follow will concentrate on establishing the presence and depth of narcissistic and schizoid *themes* in Heidegger's life, and will minimize what must remain speculation about his childhood. Yet it is also important to note that several philosophers sympathetic to him have suggested that the clues to Heidegger's conduct in the 1930s and after the war rest with the psychology of his character, and have called for just such an investigation as presented here (Neske and Kettering, 1990).

Certainly Heidegger's adult life manifests the thematics of Winnicott on the split between an inner, hidden "true self" and an outer, falsely accommodating self, Kohut on the vulnerability to shame in narcissism, and Fairbairn on the schizoid dilemma of futility, emptiness, and loneliness. It seems fitting

that Winnicott (1971), almost exactly Heidegger's contemporary, sees early deficits in sense of support and mirroring as associated with the inability to feel real and alive — the same failure of sense of Being wherein Heidegger locates the dis-ease of this century. Many accounts of Heidegger emphasize his own timidity, shyness, and childlike vulnerability — reflected in his inability to meet the gaze of others and a watchful distrust that under pressure appeared as a more active manipulativeness and cunning (Ettinger, 1995; Ott, 1993; Petzet, 1993). We learn with surprise that when directly contradicted on points of philosophy, Heidegger retreated into inaccessible silence (see Picht, in Neske and Kettering, 1990). Yet many also emphasize the sense of charismatic excitement and mystery he could evoke in the classroom, heightened or not by his idiosyncratic version of rural "Black Forest" clothing. Something of a self confession may be present in this passage in *Being and Time:* "When . . . one's knowing-oneself gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others or even to 'see through them.'"[14]

There is a strong sense of aloneness and solitude in Heidegger, also reflected in his months of long isolation in his mountain cabin while he wrote. In the older Heidegger this aloneness became a painful loneliness, which he shares with the older Jung (1961). In a late interview (in Neske and Kettering, 1990) he states "Yes, . . . I am lonely, how lonely you don't know." It is interesting that after his brief psychiatric breakdown in 1946, he said of von Gebsattel, his "existential" therapist, that all he did was to take him on hikes in the nearby forest snow. "That was all. But he showed me human warmth and friendship. I came back a healthy man again."[15] In short he was recognized not as a great (or evil) philosopher but in his *personal* being.

There may be a related contrast between his post war depressions, which sound more like crises of futility and inability to work and from which Hannah Arendt's visits could rescue him, and a more quiet kind of sadness from which his creativity emerged. On visits his friend Medard Boss was struck by the way Heidegger would fall into an aloof depression during their morning walks — "as if wounded in some undiscoverable way" (Boss, 1988). In explanation Heidegger said that this was the time when he became spontaneously immersed in thought. "Always at this time of day 'the thinking' comes over me. Then, if I don't want to do myself painful violence, I have to

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[14]Heidegger, M. *Being and Time*, p. 161

[15]In Neske, G. and Kettering, E., Eds., p. 106; in Ott, H., p. 319.

surrender myself to it." This had replaced what Heidegger termed an earlier "constant pressure to think" and after his breakthrough in the late 1930s became a "more serene and composed" attitude. Herein we may see the reparative sadness that Winnicott (1965) makes central to the capacity to be alone and which Balint (1968) sees as a mourning for and acceptance of a sense of "basic fault" in one's life. In contrast to his later periods of futile despair, we can see here, in Almaas' terms, an essential and, so vulnerable and sad, quality of strength available to Heidegger as part of his development of "essential intelligence" in the later 1930s and early 1940s, and partially transmuting an earlier frustration. Thus we find Heidegger in 1947 in "The Thinker as Poet" linking his thought of Being with the spontaneous lifting of an implied mourning. "When . . . a ray of the sun suddenly glides over the gloom of the meadows: We never come to thoughts. They come to us."[16] Many who met the older Heidegger outside his periods of withdrawal sensed this quality of quiet sadness (Neske and Kettering, 1990).

Winnicott (1971) and Kohut (1971, 1977) cite the deep need for recognition and mirroring in those with a fragile sense of self, as also illustrated in the centrality of exclusive "muse" relationships in the highly creative (Khan, 1974). We can see several times over in Heidegger's life the importance of total support from those around him. Indeed, the people he could be said to have betrayed or abandoned most seriously during and immediately after the rectorship were former students who had deviated in some way: his early student Lowith whose work began incorporating Marxism, Baumgarten sliding toward Max Weber's social democratic circle, and Mueller, remaining a Catholic thinker in the face of Heidegger's strident repudiation of his own earlier Catholicism. Hannah Arendt's importance to Heidegger during their affair in the 1920s very much included her role as privileged confidant and witness to his work. Even after the renewal of their friendship in 1950, which played a key role in alleviating his depressions, he later ignored her for almost two years after she had sent him some of her own widely known writings. Arendt saw this as testimony to his need for her to play the exclusive role of muse (Ettinger, 1995). It may not be coincidental that Heidegger's final letters to her, in their last years, became genuinely personal and empathic only after her husband had died (Ettinger, 1995) — which may have allowed Heidegger's feelings to return to the fantasy of total mirroring of many years before.

Kohut (1977) and the Jungian analyst Jacoby (1994) both stress the narcissistic vulnerability to shame, rather than guilt, as the basic response to the felt inadequacy in sense of self. Almaas (1988) understands shame as part of

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[16]In Boss, M., p. 8; Heidegger, M. "The Thinker as Poet," p. 6.

the incapacity to be oneself authentically — which will be intensified by the felt sense of non support and non value. In contrast to the guilt that seeks to assuage itself by making amends and confession, shame is silent and seeks to hide. This is perhaps the best explanation for Heidegger's supposedly notorious "silence" on the holocaust and rectorship in his post war writings. Privately he told several, including Jaspers, of his "shame," but he visibly froze and withdrew at any suggestion of a public statement (Neske and Kettering, 1990). Jaspers, who had written an influential essay on German guilt, finally broke with Heidegger in the late 1940s over Heidegger's failure to admit his "guilt," despite the latter's statements of deep shame in several letters (Ott, 1993). Jaspers missed what for Kohut would be the gulf between the psychologies of guilt and shame. From Heidegger's point of view, whatever he had *done* — which, after all, *included* resigning, criticizing the regime, and helping several Jewish students — would have paled beside what he had *shown* — his inner grandiosity and his capacity for cunning.

In their letters Jaspers and Arendt agreed that Heidegger had "no character," and she repeatedly refers to him therein as "the fox" in the years before their rapprochement in 1950 (Kohler and Saner, 1992). Such ascriptions fit well with Winnicott (1965) on the opportunism and secrecy of the false self dilemma, and it is interesting to note that Jung (1961) was puzzled that so many people found him similarly "cunning." The list of those in Heidegger's life who came to see an expediency thinly covering his own agenda is long. It includes the de-Nazification committee, the National Socialists themselves, Husserl and his circle, and his Ph.D. supervisor, Heinrich Finke, who withdrew all support from Heidegger in 1916 when he realized that Heidegger's commitment to "Catholic philosophy" was, by that point, only because the funds allowing his studies came from the church.

The origins of these ultimately false attempts at outward accommodation are instructive. Heidegger's parents were rural, very religious, and comparatively poor. Heidegger's early intellectual precocity came to the attention and sponsorship of the parish priest. The only path forward under such circumstances was a church sponsored boarding school in the city of Constance, with the aim of training for the priesthood — specifically for the Jesuits given his intellectual brilliance. Until his early twenties this seems to have been Heidegger's own aspiration as well. The only financial resources for such an education, also so significant for his family, were local scholarships through the Church. With constant re-applications and uncertainty, these supported Heidegger's studies from boarding school, his abortive seminary training, and finally through graduate studies in Catholic philosophy. By the time Heidegger was seventeen, however, his teachers were already commenting that his theological studies were suffering from his passion for German literature. Five years later, in the midst of university training, he had

hoped to study with Husserl but money problems kept him where he was. There was even a period of economic crisis around this time when the man destined to be one of the major philosophers of the century seriously contemplated becoming a high school mathematics teacher — so as to be finished with his studies and finally self supporting (Ott, 1993). By the time of National Socialism and its take-over of the universities, Heidegger had been well schooled in the necessary opportunism of the impoverished student with a true gift. He had learned how to "pass" while hiding his deeper intentions. It was naive for him to think he could do the same with Hitler, and it was probably inevitable he would continue the attempt with his self serving apology in the de-Nazification hearings.

The depth of the conflict between an unsupported, unrecognized true self and an outward false self in Heidegger's life is attested by his periodic "psychosomatic" crises, starting during the first weeks of his Jesuit training. His sudden heart palpitations and difficulties in breathing, then termed a "nervous heart disorder," made him unsuitable for the rigours of the Jesuits. The same symptoms ended his next attempt at seminary training in 1911, again within a few weeks. A similar "heart disease" and "neurasthenia" after his dissertation, and which he attributed to exhaustion and lack of adequate food, kept him in the university and out of the war until 1918 (Ott, 1993). It is not known if this pattern reoccurred in 1928 when he was described as "in crisis" (Farias, 1989) or in 1934, but it seems likely to have been part of his 1946 hospitalization, which was described as a "withdrawal" and "psychosomatic" (Ott, 1993). These episodes would seem to be "panic attacks," the bases of which appear to have been unconscious for Heidegger. They can also be seen as a series of Socratic "no's" from a latent inner strength that protected his sense of mission from the pressures that would threaten it.

We can only speculate on the familial origins of Heidegger's vulnerabilities in sense of self, and especially so since his only published reminiscences are so sketchy and idealized. In "The Pathway" (1947b) his father — church sexton and local cooper — is described as "laboring thoughtfully" in his workshop, while his mother "watched over everything" and sent him off "well provided with words of warning."[17] His student Max Mueller (in Neske and Kettering, 1990) later described Heidegger's mother as "too pious" and suggested that Heidegger never managed a separation and independence from her, as illustrated perhaps by her photograph on his desk as the only decoration in his spartan study. We can speculate that Heidegger's early and lifelong recourse to the surrounding mountain forests would constitute an alternative maternal mirroring environment, as it clearly did for Thoreau

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[17]Heidegger, M., "The Pathway," pp. 69, 70.

(Lebeaux, 1977) and Nietzsche (Jaspers, 1965). It may be that his mother's strong ambition for him to become a priest would contribute to a sense of not being valued in his own right, which Fairbairn (1954) sees as part of the schizoid dilemma. Certainly, the impact of his leaving home for boarding school must have been considerable, since Boss (1988) reports that the only dream Heidegger could recall was a repeating anxiety dream — only ceasing in the late 1930s — of his matriculation exam at Constance, with his teachers grilling him mercilessly.

The "inherited social awkwardness" that Arendt reports Heidegger attributing to himself (Ettinger, 1995) probably alludes to his taciturn father, who like Heidegger had married "up" in socio-economic terms. It is interesting to note that Heidegger's younger brother, Fritz, is described as conveying a "deep seated sadness" and suffering pain over "a small speech impediment" (Petzet, 1993). It seems also relevant that Heidegger's father had suffered the death of his own mother at age four — which might be expected to be part of the dimension of depression in both brothers.

The closest, at present, that we can approach Heidegger's early relations with his mother is by inference from his relationships with his wife, Elfride, and Hannah Arendt. Here we do find reflections of the coldness and dilemmas over closeness that Winnicott (1971) and Fairbairn (1954) see as etiological for schizoid vulnerability. Were the mother to resemble Elfride she would indeed have been dominating and cold, and this on multiple accounts (Ettinger, 1995; Ott, 1993). Elfride was widely resented in Freiburg for her behavior while in charge of civilian mobilization for defense in 1944, during which she insisted on including new mothers and patients in hospital, and she is also well remembered for her direct and personal anti-Semitism (Neske and Kettering, 1990). In 1945 she haughtily refused assistance from visiting French officers, also philosophers in peacetime, in locating the Heideggers' sons, presumed captured on the Eastern front. Heidegger gratefully provided the needed information to the officers in private as they departed (Ott, 1993). Arendt saw Elfride as the disaster of Heidegger's adult life (Ettinger, 1995).

Heidegger's behavior with Arendt during their affair well illustrates the dilemma between need for closeness and fear of engulfment. Heidegger insisted on a complete physical and emotional passivity from Arendt, with her forbidden even to write unless summoned. Early on he insisted she transfer universities to create more distance between them. She describes her painful experience of "waiting" through all this, while at the same time aware of his childlike vulnerability and his deep need of her (Ettinger, 1995). The extremity of Heidegger's need for control, extending well beyond the secrecy actually required, evokes Fairbairn on the dilemma of regulating distance and closeness — an intimacy desperately needed at one moment sud-

denly turning into a threatened engulfment that must be escaped. Arguably we may find in this tortured affair — they were the mutually declared loves of each others lives — the echo of a "waiting" endured by a much younger Heidegger.

Heidegger emerged from childhood with a deep fearfulness and shyness, a lack of felt support, and a degree of cunning to get it, none of which he ever lost. "I'm always so frightened," the elderly Heidegger says to Arendt before a lecture (Ettinger, 1995). Always for him there is the personal issue of how to be and feel real and alive, with the thematic of his life work as the crisis of Being. We see Heidegger caught between the deficits of essential strength (as autonomy) and the inability to trust any supporting mergence. There is his vulnerability to fear and the periodic crises of physical weakness and "neuras-thenic" exhaustion. The themes of "separation" and "homecoming" run all through his writings. He speaks of the source always ahead of us, of home-coming as "the arrival of a distant origin" ("The Pathway," 1947b). He suffers over the physical aloneness and isolation he needs in order to write. Almaas (1988) states that the ultimate barrier to spiritual enlightenment is the inability to separate from one's mother, and the mother image within. For Almaas it is only a full acceptance of the suffering of early deficits in sense of self that allows a transmutation into the essential qualities lost. Unfor-tunately, in his bitterness, confusion, and loneliness after 1946, Heidegger had rejected any such personal vulnerability.

After the de-Nazification hearings and his hospitalization Heidegger felt shamed and dishonored. He complained of being "solitary and alone," "a comic figure to the world" and his despair and depressions often slowed his work (Petzet, 1993). His humor became bitter and caustic (Petzet, 1993). The shift in his writings is abrupt. There is a marked contrast to the develop-ing balance of essential aspects from the 1930s and 1940s and the tentative advent of joy and serenity. In "What are Poets For" (1946) he writes that our era is "defined by the god's failure to arrive . . . . Divine radiance has become extinguished in the world's history." In the "Letter on Humanism" (1947c), "The unique disgrace" of this age is that the dimension of grace has been closed, while in "The Thinker as Poet," "We are too late for the gods and too early for Being."[18] This failure of Being to turn its face toward us reflects Heidegger's own growing withdrawal and isolation.

Using Underhill's (1955) stages of mystical development, if we locate Heidegger's period of "purgation" in the years 1928–1931, "false illumination" in 1933–34, and "true illumination" from 1935 to 1945, then the years after

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[18]Heidegger, M., "The Pathway," p. 71; "What are Poets For," p. 91; "Letter on Humanism," p. 294; "The Thinker as Poet," p. 4.

1946 constitute the penultimate "dark night of the soul" in which Heidegger seems to have remained. Like the medieval mystic Suso, whose "dark night" included false charges of fathering a baby and then plotting its murder, Heidegger had been publicly shamed. Unlike Suso, however, who offered to adopt the child, Heidegger's vulnerabilities in sense of self prevented him from the acceptance of suffering that would be necessary for the development of essential strength and compassion. His bitterness and defensiveness instead helped to push his writings toward a still more impersonal level, and his later work articulated selected formless or transcendent dimensions of Being — in particular the sense of an emptiness "welling forth" (Heidegger, 1962) like the Buddhist void, and a logos, or essential intelligence, attuned, as "thanking" (Heidegger, 1954) to the ineffable source beneath time and Being.

Conceptually, the totality of Heidegger's work constitutes a complete noetics of the sense of Being, or presence–openness, as the experiential core of spirituality, with personal, impersonal, and formless aspects. However, it is a framework that Heidegger does not himself realize or personally integrate. The intellectual triumph of Heidegger's noetics of the transpersonal conceals a more personal tragedy. The aging Heidegger develops the more formless aspects of essential power, will, and intelligence — the alchemical black, white, and blue — but with an aridness and without the personal strength of red, the green of compassion, or the gold of dissolving mergence. The earlier essential joy and serenity ends as a "false yellow" (Hillman, 1989) of desiccation, jaundice, and bitterness. There is no integration with the "personal being" of *Being and Time*. What is missing is the "heart" basic to inner-worldly mysticism (see also Caputo, 1994). Despite the intellectual power and beauty of his later evocations of the formlessness of Being as such, and the significant parallels with Eastern meditative traditions, there is here no inner strength of this-worldly presence, and no inner beloved.

Dilemmas of Inner-worldly Mysticism: Some Comparisons

Jung

The similarities between Heidegger and Jung, contemporaries who pursued "naturalistic" versions of inner-worldly mysticism in this secular century, are striking. Both exemplify in their own lives Winnicott's split between true and false self, with a concomitant painful loneliness, especially in old age, and indications that they were exposed to a relatively cold mothering (Hunt, 1992; Winnicott, 1964). Both came from relatively poor, rural, and deeply religious backgrounds — Jung's father being a Protestant pastor. Both rejected these religious upbringings for their own explicitly post-Nietzschean

articulation of a more mystical and "natural" spirituality. Both apprenticed themselves to Jewish mentors, unusual for that time and place, and turned the secular systems of Freud and Husserl into versions of an inner-worldly mysticism, understood phenomenologically rather than supernaturally, but nonetheless to the horror of their teachers. The inevitable break from their mentors was followed by accusations of anti-semitism, which seems unlikely, as such, given the continued association of both Heidegger and Jung with Jewish pupils. Both engaged in passionate liaisons with much younger Jewish muse figures, Jung with Sabrina Spielrein (Kerr, 1993) and Heidegger with Arendt. These constituted crucial mirroring relationships during their years of creative breakthrough.

With respect to the background of their brief involvements with National Socialism, both Heidegger and Jung were already drawn to a neo-romantic revival of mythological and metaphoric modes of thought, which they saw not as "primitive" but as a needed return to origins. They were initially drawn by the National Socialist rhetoric of radical cultural renewal. Both justified their enthusiasms of the early 1930s in ways that later seemed opportunistic and self serving — Heidegger, of course, by insisting he was merely trying to save the independence of the universities. Jung argued that his assumption of the presidency of the German Medical Society for Psychotherapy and editorship of its journal, the whole in fact controlled by the Nazi ideologue Matthias Goering, cousin of Hermann, was only intended to preserve all forms of psychotherapy in Germany by giving disenfranchised German Jewish therapists the opportunity of belonging to its international branch (Jung, 1964). While there was a partial truth in both explanations, each also ignored the more grandiose and self serving aspects of their behavior — with Jung later stating in private "I slipped up" (Jaffe, 1989; Maidenbaum and Martin, 1991).

Jung's formulations during these years of a "racial" or "ancestral" level of his collective unconscious, and his continuing to write about differences among the "Aryan," "Jewish," and "Chinese" unconscious in Goering's journal, actually place him closer to the pseudo-biological racism of Nazi ortho-doxy, while Heidegger remained pointedly aloof from such doctrines. It is notable that by the late 1930s both Heidegger and Jung had switched from formulations extolling *volkische* roots to a more general concept of a rooted-ness in the abstract animism of the pre-Socratics and the "psychoid" (metaphoric) basis of alchemy, respectively. Heidegger and Jung, befitting the narcissistic dilemmas that would also draw them toward inner-worldly mystical solutions, experienced more shame than guilt over their affiliations after the war. Both avoided public apologies and neither discussed the holo-caust or its implications at any length, while both continued to offer more world-historical analyses of modernity and its alienations.

Why in retrospect has Jung fared so much better than Heidegger in the eyes of history, considering also the intense post-war criticism from psychoanalysis (Glover, 1956) and the more recent sober reassessments by Jungians (Maidenbaum and Martin, 1991)? In part, it is due to character and personal development. Jung's theoretical work was inseparable from his personal realization, and inseparable from specific techniques of active imagination to aid the process. Jung went further in healing his own true–false self division and had the more fully integrated life (Jung, 1961). While Jung made his own national radio addresses when visiting in Germany, he was more able to see the Faustian element in his fascination — witness his vomiting after meeting with Goebbels at the latter's request (Maidenbaum and Martin, 1991). Looking at Heidegger from the standard Jungian perspective on individuation of the Self, it seems clear enough from our above discussion that Heidegger was not able to see through the persona, or false outer self. His difficult relationship with Arendt and failure to include anything of the body and sexuality in his *Dasein-analysis* of authenticity indicate little assimilation of the anima, and Heidegger would have explicitly rejected any view that his version of National Socialism had to do with his own shadow side. He once indicated petulantly in a conversation that he would apologize publicly only after Hitler came back and apologized to him (Ott, 1993).

In part, however, the differing public fates of Heidegger and Jung are due to luck. Jung lived outside Germany and so could not assume a formal role of the sort available to Heidegger. Also Jung was well past the mid life crisis he suffered in the years after he split from Freud (Jung, 1961), whereas this period of Heidegger's life was timed precisely to his rectorship. By the 1930s, whatever Jung's fascination with the mythology of National Socialism, it was peripheral to the already integrated fundamentals of Jung's own spiritual development. One might expect, however, that were Jung as prominent in North American academic circles as Heidegger has become in recent years, then the "politically correct" culture wars now current against all that is perceived as "elitist" and "non rational" would have no difficulty including Jung within what is after all a very traditional condemnation of the only avenue of spiritual renewal that Troeltsch, and Durkheim (1912), saw as open to modern culture.

Socrates

An instructive, if discouraging, series of parallels can also be drawn between Heidegger and Socrates — whose "openness to mystery" and "not knowing" makes him a prototype for Weber's inner-worldly mysticism. In these comparisons Heidegger often emerges as a sort of carnival fun-house reflection of Socrates, attesting perhaps to the vulnerabilities in sense of self in the modern west and their disturbing impact on essential realization.

First, both Heidegger and Socrates experienced an internal daemonic "No" that guided their lives, although for Heidegger it took the form of a psychosomatic collapse that sustained the direction of his actual inner genius. Both had infamously, if anecdotally, cold and dominating wives. Elfride, with her more virulent version of National Socialism, appears here as the contemporary reflection of Xantippe, wrathfully pursuing Socrates through the market place. Heidegger very much needed some of the cheerful "Much good may it do her" spirit of Socrates in response to such incidents (Epictetus). Sadly, it seems entirely possible that it was Elfride's discovery of Heidegger's affair with Arendt that played a role in her swift allegiance to the Nazi's in 1929.

Both Heidegger and Socrates were publicly lampooned and ridiculed — Socrates in Aristophanes' "The Clouds" and Heidegger for his essay "What is a Thing?" Both lived in tenuously democratic countries taken over by fascist movements. At first both were overtly cooperative with these seizures of power, but later withdrawing when asked to participate in ways that went beyond their own beliefs and standards. Of course, it was Socrates who abruptly declined to participate in the arrest of fellow citizens ordered by the Tyrants, some of whom were his former students. Heidegger equivocated and manipulated for a year before he resigned. Both then quietly but distinctly criticized their respective tyrannical regimes, at some ostensible risk, but were more or less ignored.

The usual comparison made is between Plato's near fatal tutelage of the Tyrant of Syracuse and Heidegger's fantasy of being spiritual Führer, with one of Heidegger's colleagues actually saying "Back from Syracuse, Herr Heidegger?," on first seeing him after his resignation (Ott, 1993). Nonetheless, it was both Socrates and Heidegger who were put on trial after the return of their democracies, both under suspicion, if we follow I.F. Stone (1988) on Socrates, for cooperating with the very tyrants they had repudiated. Both are then accused of "corrupting the youth" of their respective nations with the intent of banning them from teaching. Indeed, it was Jaspers who so wrote to the de-Nazification hearings (Ott, 1993). Heidegger's trial has been the more prolonged, with various critics still in search of family and university documents. However, neither figure ever endorsed democratic values or apologized for their involvements, each insisting that political values were not relevant to their more spiritual–philosophical concerns — Heidegger coming to this conclusion in the 1966 *Der Spiegel* interview and considerably later in life than did Socrates. Both defended themselves against their accusers with "Apologies" of sorts. Here the contrast is perhaps the greatest, between Socrates' stoic repudiation and gentle taunting and Heidegger's temporizing and incompleteness. Yet it is fascinating, in passing, that I.F. Stone's attempt to make the Athenian position against Socrates more plausible and sympathetic uses arguments about the "elitist"

and "anti-democratic" nature of spiritual thought *identical* to the recent crit-
ics of Heidegger (Farias, 1989; Rockmore, 1992; Wolin, 1990). And just as
both Socrates and Heidegger had so little understanding of the value and
promise of democracy, it is equally clear that Stone, and Heidegger's political
critics, can find no value in an inner-worldly spirituality.

Finally, and with more irony, both Heidegger and Socrates were known for
their military retreats. Socrates, of course, was widely respected, at least
among his students and followers, for his slow deliberate march to the rear on
the order to retreat, while the rest of the Athenian soldiers fled in panic.
Heidegger, more infamous and sad here, is now known both for his agitated
bicycling back and forth between Freiburg and his home town Messkirscht as
the allied army approached in 1945, and for his frantic protests to the then
rector of Freiburg University before being marched out of town with the
Volkssturm for what they were told was a "defense to the last man." While his
confused bicycle trips also involved the attempt to save his manuscripts, and
his deliberate selection for the *Volkssturm* was somewhat in the nature of a
retribution by the Nazi regime, there is, nonetheless, a very modern pain,
groundlessness, and vulnerability in Heidegger and his fragile sense of self
entirely alien to Socrates. There is a lack in Heidegger of just the essential
autonomy, strength, and will of Socrates, which Heidegger could formulate as
personal being but did not realize in his own life.

Conclusions

1. Heidegger, a political conservative, made the same mistake as his recent
liberal critics. It is the same mistake that Jung also made during the 1930s.
They all think that spiritual philosophy (or psychology) held concrete, clear
implications for politics (N. Hunt, 1994).

It is a pity that Heidegger did not pay more attention to Eduard Spranger,
whose work he apparently admired (Kisiel, 1993), or for that matter to Max
Weber, whom he despised. Both put forward a view of the human mind as a
collection of distinct "forms of life" or "spheres of life," each resting on sym-
bolic forms whose full development involves very different processes, sensi-
tivities, and values. For Spranger (1928) those forms comprised the
theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious. Howard
Gardner (1983) has revived a related version of this pluralistic approach to
mind in positing multiple and only potentially interacting "frames" of intelli-
gence: linguistic, musical, logical–mathematical, bodily–kinesthetic, inter-
personal, and the intra-personal — wherein he locates spirituality.

Weber (1918a, 1918b) saw a major contrast between the spiritual and
political spheres of life, and the confusion between the two as dangerous.
Weber contrasts religion and its ethic of "ultimate ends" with politics in

modern societies as based on the relative ethics of competition, compromise, and responsibility for consequences.

> He who seeks the salvation of the soul . . . should not seek it along the avenue of politics . . . . Everything that is striven for through political action . . . following an ethics of responsibility endangers the "salvation of the soul." If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because responsibility for *consequences* is lacking . . . . (Weber, 1918a, p. 126)

Put otherwise, it would be a disaster for a master wood-carver, whose entire way of life is based on a master–apprentice structure, to apply that ethic to the governing of a state should such a person be so elected. Yet it is a similar mistake to conclude that the cultural tradition of fine wood carving is "fascistic" or "anti-democratic," in the actual political context of these terms. Heidegger made the *former* mistake, and risked the discrediting of his philosophical work thereby. But it is his critics who now make the *latter* mistake. So also did the Athenian democracy with the "elitist" Socrates.

A spiritual and mystical philosophy such as Heidegger's cannot be "fascistic" because it is not political, no matter who fails to understand the point, from whatever political position they may hold (N. Hunt, 1994). The recent attempt by the Jungian Andrew Samuels (1993) to argue for a transpersonal re-sacralizing of politics re-commits Heidegger's error, but from the political left. As James (1902) originally pointed out, mystical or transpersonal experiences are necessarily pre-emptory and "final" for the individual or group that undergoes them. This is a different sphere of life, with its heirarchic scheme of development, than the politics of competition and balance in a complex society.

2. Spirituality may have various effects, for good or ill, in leading people toward or away from political involvement. Other-worldly mysticisms, with what Weber terms their "world-rejecting" values, historically led practioners away from social commitment. It was an essential part of Weber's thesis on the relation between charisma and rationalization/secularization in the history of world civilizations that prophetical movements tend to have politically revolutionary consequences for their societies. This follows from their concentration on everyday ethics and socially utopian ideals. "Inner-worldly" mysticisms, seeking the sense of presence so wanting in contemporary life, could lead some practitioners toward more private, apolitical preoccupations and others toward a more grounded capacity to "do" — with resulting involvements in this-worldly political action. For Weber it is not so much being led toward or away from politics per se that is the "category mistake" but the cross application of particular spiritual realizations and specific political ideologies.

Given that Heidegger's and Jung's neo-romanticism led each to their brief enthrallments with Hitler's promise of a revival of the ancient culture of Aryan peoples, we might ask whether the contemporary tendency to inner-worldly mysticisms of presence, if applied politically, must be inherently conservative. While it has been demonstrated that the pull of National Socialism also included tendencies in German culture that were opposed to such neo-romanticism (Sluga, 1993), it is also true that the renewal of lost *volkische* roots was a key part of Nazi ideology. The mystique of a "people" which drew Heidegger and Jung clearly did have deeply conservative and potentially racist implications when applied to politics.

So it is of interest that the current version of a romantic mysticism of lost roots, the widespread interest in native shamanism (Furst, 1972, Walsh, 1990), if taken politically, seems to have implications that are more liberal and egalitarian. In the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s it seemed plausible to many to understand revivals of "archaic" *volkische* religiosity in specifically nationalistic terms, even extending to romantic fantasies about the "racially pure" Cro-Magnons who occupied the same areas as their enthralled, would-be descendants (Noll, 1994). In the contemporary fascination with shamanic "vision trance" and ritual use of hallucinogens and dream (Bourguignon, 1973), on the other hand, we find some very cosmopolitan people who are searching for a revivication of traditions that originate within entirely different social and historical peoples. The lack of any direct linkage with the shamanism of the Americas and Siberia in its current North American practitioners blocks the sort of "right wing" social mysticism that seemed logically inevitable in Europe. Instead, contemporary neo-shamanism is loosely associated with a more liberal or radical environmentalism and multi-culturalism.

Weber's caution on confusing spiritual realizations with specific political ideology seems well supported in this demonstration of the "political" relativity of romantic versions of inner-worldly mysticism. Wilhelm Reich (1976), provides a further demonstration, in the Europe of the 1930s, of how a post-Nietzschean system of presence-vitality could lead to, and be confused with, radical Marxism. The danger in all of the above is not political action per se, but the inflation of its necessary relativities with the felt "absolute" of spiritual realization.

3. Heidegger and Weber represent complementary views within a twentieth century inquiry into the nature of human spirituality that also includes James, Jung, the transpersonal psychologies of meditative states, along with Almaas' recent synthesis of spiritual realization and object relations psychoanalysis. Heidegger offers a phenomenological noetics of spirituality, based on a "this-worldly" sense of presence–openness as an inherent human attunement to Being as such. Although both Heidegger and Weber were deeply

preoccupied with what they saw as the historically unique development of spirituality within the western tradition, it is Weber who best illuminates the socio-cultural variations of charisma in complex historical societies. In particular, Weber shows how the inner-worldly mystical orientations, which Troeltsch and Durkheim foresaw for the modern west, will have a necessarily "broken" quality, since they cultivate a vulnerability and openness to experience as such in the midst of complex social constraints that will not be supportive of such sensitivities. This "broken" quality is, indeed, well illustrated in the metapathology of Heidegger's rectorship and in the "dark night" of his post war struggle.

Heidegger's noetics of Being provides the fullest conceptual context for the "human sciences" of the transpersonal, developed in this century by Weber, Jung, and Almaas. They in turn make far more sense of Heidegger's own spiritual path, personal suffering, and metapathology than he could for himself.

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