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A Rediscovery of Presence

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When we see Wilfrid Sellars's favorite object, an ice cube pink through and through, we see the very pinkness of it. Inner awareness of our visual experience finds the ice cube to be experientially present, not merely representationally present to our consciousness. Its pinkness and other properties are present not merely metaphorically, not merely in the sense that the experience represents or is an occurrent belief in the ice cube's being there before us. Despite his behavioristic inclinations, Sellars acknowledges experiential presence and gives an account of it in terms of a perceptual experience's having two intrinsic components, a sensation and a conceptual response to the sensation that ultimately refers to the sensation although it normally takes the sensation for the environmental item that produced it. Problems with Sellars's account include the inadequacy of the causal and referential relations postulated between the two components of a perceptual experience, and the experimentally demonstrated fact (Michotte, Thinès and Crabbé, 1964/1991) that, although sensations may be necessary for perceptual experience, experiential presence of a particular environmental property does not always require corresponding sensations. If someone with Sellars's extraordinary philosophical sophistication could not avoid rediscovering experiential presence, what chance do others have who travel the same theoretical path as he did.

> We not only see *that* the ice cube is pink, and see it *as* pink, we see *the very pinkness* of the object; also its very shape — though from a certain point of view. (Sellars, 1978, p. 177)

> *Something, somehow* a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely *believed in*. (Sellars, 1978, p. 178)

The above two statements are part of an attempt to say what in fact takes place experientially when someone is seeing a pink ice cube. According to their author, these statements are just about as far as sheer phenomenology

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can take us in the effort to describe the nature of the experience. Of course, psychologists want to understand more. Especially, psychologists of consciousness want to know how what one is perceptually aware of (i.e., the "object" of perceptual awareness) can be, as one of the statements says, "present in the perception." How does the object of perceptual awareness have presence to one's consciousness, in a different sense than its merely being represented, or believed in, to be there before one's eyes?

Many psychologists hold that internal representations exist, that these are more than instrumental postulations, and that they play an essential role in awareness, both inner awareness of one's mental-occurrence instances and outer awareness of the environment and one's body by means of the senses. But some psychologists refuse to reduce awareness to representation. And they would agree with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, when he wrote as follows regarding a certain "fundamental error."

> The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given "in person" in a manner peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a picture or sign is given. A picture-consciousness or a sign-consciousness must not be substituted for perception. (Husserl, 1913/1983, pp. 92–93)

Often, psychologists conceive of internal representations in analogy to ordinary representations such as pictures or words. However, although a picture or a word may be a representation of a thing or state of affairs, it can never be an awareness of this or of anything else. That is, there are essential disanalogies between representations and awarenesses, and psychologists would do well to keep these disanalogies in mind as they exercise the concept of an internal representation and try to develop their accounts of inner or outer awareness.

Moreover, when one is aware of a thing or a state of affairs, one need not be aware concomitantly of any representation of this object of awareness, whether the representation is external or internal to the mind. Even in nonimaginal thought, the object of one's conceptual or propositional awareness is the thing or state of affairs itself, and not something else that stands in its place. Ostensible exceptions that will come to mind are not really exceptions. For example, the merely apparent objects of delusional thought are not representations; they simply do not exist. To be aware of these objects as though they do exist, to apprehend their apparent reality character, is not to be aware of something else that does exist.

Convergences

The two sentences quoted at the head of the present article appear in the published version of a paper presented in 1975 as part of a symposium on

"Consciousness" under the auspices of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Bearing the title "Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness," the paper was delivered by Wilfrid Sellars to an audience that consisted largely of phenomenologists. In contrast, Sellars was one of the leading analytic philosophers of his day, specializing in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. As well as most of the audience, Sellars's fellow symposiasts, Jitendra N. Mohanty (1978), then of the University of Oklahoma, and Robert Sekule (1978), then of the University of Chicago, were also phenomenologists.

A phenomenologist is a species of philosopher who belongs to a school of thought that is identified for historical reasons as "European Continental" or simply as "Continental." This school of philosophical thought is commonly considered to be distinct from, and even opposed in its basic assumptions and methods to, the dominant Anglo–American school of analytic philosophy. Relations between the members of these two schools of thought have improved somewhat over the years, but for a long time their respective adherents had little if anything to say to each other.

Thus, in response to Sellars's presentation, his fellow symposiast Mohanty (1978) stated that he was "comforted" by the fact that, like himself, Sellars did not see "an unbridgeable gulf" between his own analytic philosophical approach and the phenomenological approach, which Mohanty and many members of the audience practiced. However, to this day, phenomenologists rarely receive appointments in American university departments of philosophy. Not unusually, the members of these departments tend to prefer colleagues who are intellectually more like themselves.

Near the beginning of his talk, Sellars (1978) acknowledged that he was addressing an audience that was unusual for him. Nevertheless, he stated, "I expect this audience to be more sympathetic to what I have to say than many of my colleagues would expect" (p. 170). Sellars so expected because, as he explained, for many years, he had "conceived of philosophical analysis (and synthesis)," which was the activity in which he had been so effectively engaged, "as akin to phenomenology." This affinity would be noticed by his audience as he spoke. However, his own philosophical colleagues, the many members of his own school, would take his presentation as a contribution to mainstream philosophy of mind.

His analytic colleagues, for the greatest part, would not spontaneously connect Sellars's account of perceptual consciousness to similar efforts by practitioners of the alternative philosophical approach. This is not to say, of course, that Sellars's colleagues would miss the fact that he was partly engaged in phenomenological description. For example, Hector-Neri Castañeda (1975) had already characterized Sellars's widely admired philosophical investigations as yielding, among other things, "beautiful phe-

nomenological analyses of the structures — both practical and theoretical — of human experience" (p. vii).

For the present occasion, in which I shall make central use of an aspect of Sellars's phenomenology, I should add that many of Sellars's (e.g., 1963, 1968, 1981a) contributions to the philosophy of mind turn out to be, upon careful study, highly pertinent to the psychology of consciousness as this field has lately been emerging (cf. Natsoulas, 1977, 1986).[1] And I believe that the same can rightly be said regarding Husserl's phenomenological psychology (e.g., 1913/1983; cf. Dreyfus, 1982; Natsoulas, 1994a). I have made use of the advanced thought of both Husserl and the prominent psychologist of perception James J. Gibson (e.g., 1967/1982, 1979/1986), for the purpose of addressing the problem of what the objects of perceptual consciousness are, or, in Gibson's terms, "what there is to be perceived" (Natsoulas, 1994b).

The idea of interanimating the psychological theses of Husserl and Gibson will strike some psychologists as farfetched. However, the relevant convergence of these two very different perception theorists is well indicated by the following, highly informed comment regarding one of them: "What is interesting about the Husserlian conception is its having put contact with the world at the very heart of the being of consciousness" (Levinas, 1930/1973, p. 43). Gibson (1979/1986) is well known to have conceived of perceiving as an animal's means of keeping in touch with its surrounding environment. By means of the activity of perceiving, the animal directly apprehends (i.e., has mentally unmediated perceptual awareness of) those parts of the world that give structure to the energies being registered by the animal's perceptual systems (e.g., its photically constituted field of view; cf. McDowell, 1994). The relevant convergence of these two thinkers is explained in greater detail elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1994b).

What Is Phenomenology?

As a psychologist of consciousness, I find the following definition of phenomenology gratifying for two reasons. (a) It emphasizes the stream of consciousness itself — rather than language, logic, or method — as that which phenomenologists are seeking to investigate and to describe. (b) And the

[1]Perhaps I should mention, for psychologists who may become interested in the Sellarsian conception, my encountering statements to the effect that philosophers find Sellars's work difficult. Nevertheless, since the midsixties, although a psychologist, I have been repeatedly rewarded by study of Sellars's articles, chapters, and lectures. However, I can understand the feeling that Sellars's writing arouses in Keith Lehrer (1981): "You learn as you go, and feel that if you can but understand, you will have the answer" (p. 5).

definition serves as a welcome reminder of the existence of another rigorous and highly active discipline concerned with the very explananda that occupy present-day psychologists of consciousness. Thus, we are not alone.[2]

> *Phenomenology* may be defined as the study of structures of consciousness or experience, including the "ways" things "appear" or are presented in consciousness ("phenomena," in one technical sense of the term). The study of intentional characters, or *contents*, of experiences is thus a part of phenomenology. Phenomenology is sometimes taken to be a movement, featuring the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau–Ponty, Sartre and others — an historical definition that allows for wide differences of theory and method within the movement. Or sometimes phenomenology is itself identified with a philosophic method, especially Husserl's method of epoché or Heidegger's hermeneutic method. However, I prefer to take phenomenology to be a field of study defined by its subject matter, which is human experience, or consciousness. The differences between, say, Husserl and Heidegger I see as deep differences about how even to refer to that subject matter. (Woodruff Smith, 1989, pp. 13–14)

I should also mention, of course, that, in recent years, practitioners of analytic philosophy have increasingly taken an interest in the problems of consciousness. This interest has reached a level where, it would seem, as many pages of the analytic philosophical literature are devoted to discussion of problems of consciousness as are devoted in the much larger psychological literature. I hesitate somewhat in giving the latter estimate, because no analytic philosophy journal deals exclusively with topics of consciousness. However, more analytic philosophers than psychologists have been publishing books lately on the topic of consciousness.

The above definition comes from a book of basic phenomenology that addresses three types of ostensibly direct cognitive relations falling under the heading of "acquaintance." They are (a) perceptual awareness of one's surrounding environment, (b) being empathically aware of other people, and (c) having inner (i.e., introspective) awareness of oneself and one's mental-occurrence instances. The author of this book and of the above definition, David Woodruff Smith, is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He is a well-known phenomenologist, and a coeditor (with Barry Smith of the State University of New York at Buffalo) of *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*. Also, Woodruff Smith has intellectual roots in the Anglo–American analytic tradition (see especially Woodruff Smith and MacIntyre [1982]). In a historical section that appears early in his book, Woodruff Smith (1989) gives equal space to the account of acquaintance

[2]Nor were we alone back then, when a psychology of consciousness was no more than a gleam in our eye. I remember as a graduate student standing in front of the many bound volumes of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* in the library stacks, and wondering why the psychology I was studying and getting ready to practice did not address, except rarely, the kind of problems with which the volumes before me were filled.

that was developed by Husserl (e.g., 1900/1980) and the one that Bertrand Russell (e.g., 1910–1911/1971) developed.[3]

There is another use of the word *phenomenology* that can be found in the psychological literature. A psychologist may express an intention to study, or may report having studied, a subject's phenomenology, meaning by the latter term the contents of the subject's stream of consciousness under particular, specified conditions. Thus, the word is used to refer either to a certain philosophical school, or to any study of the internal structure of an individual's stream of consciousness or experience, or to the object itself of such a study.

Two Statements

In his contribution to the phenomenologists' symposium on consciousness, Sellars (1978) admitted, in fact he stressed, that our mental-occurrence instances do not in all cases merely represent the thing or state of affairs of which they make us aware or of which they seem to make us aware.[4] For example, our perceptual awarenesses do more than merely to categorize, more than merely to mentally apprehend their objects under a heading as thoughts do.

And, in what amounts to the same respect, our hallucinatory awarenesses and our imaginal awarenesses, too, do more than to apprehend conceptually their (actual or unreal) objects. Sellars (1978) stated, "The *somehow*, other than as believed in, presence of a cube of pink ice facing one edgewise would be common to what can provisionally be called veridical and non-veridical ostensible seeings of a cube of pink ice" (p. 179). That is, a cube of pink ice need not actually lie within our field of view, nor need it even be a real thing, in order for there to be within our seeming awareness of a cube of pink ice the "somehow presence" to which Sellars was drawing special attention.

However, it is erroneous or misleading to express this part of Sellars's view as his cosymposiast Mohanty (1978) did: "But if my perception was in fact a hallucination, the perceived cube of pink ice did not exist out there and yet

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[3]I am not sure why Woodruff Smith failed to mention William James's distinction in *The Principles* (pp. 221–223) between "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge-about." He mentioned James (James's account of the emotions) briefly at only one point in his book. Regarding the influence of James on Husserl and phenomenology, see Edie (1987).

[4]The latter phrase is included in order to cover those cases in which the apparent object of awareness does not actually exist, has not existed, and will not exist, for example, a hallucinatory fire-breathing dragon. In such cases, I would say that we are not actually aware of anything, because the second term in the relation does not exist, has not existed, and will not exist. This is not to say, of course, that the respective awareness does not occur. In fact, it may be just as though we were aware of something; that is, we seem to ourselves to be so aware. Needless to add, from the first-person perspective, such merely seeming awareness can be just as vivid, affecting, and determinative as any awareness whose object is real. However, it would be too awkward to mention the qualification just added in the text every time it subsequently applies.

there was something standing before me, something that was being perceived as a cube of pink ice" (p. 192). This statement makes it seem as though Sellars was saying that hallucinating a pink ice cube is like, for example, perceptually taking a juniper bush at dusk and at a distance to be a man waving his arm. Sellars point was that a veridical perception and a hallucination of a pink ice cube share the same "somehow presence" of a cube of pink facing the person edgewise. His statement by no means implies that something else in the environment is misperceived when one hallucinates the presence of an ice cube there.

In the two statements quoted at the head of the present article, Sellars expresses in two sorts of ways the more that perceptual awarenesses do than merely to apprehend their objects conceptually. First, Sellars makes his point in terms of something like James's (1890/1950) distinction between "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge-about." Then, on the next page, he states a closely related point in terms of a perceptual awareness's having something "present" within it, as opposed to the perceptual awareness's being merely an occurrent belief in its object. I comment on each of Sellars's two statements in turn.

1. Seeing the very pinkness. Of that of which we are perceptually aware, we are not simply aware of it *as* having one or another property. We are aware of the property *itself*. We are aware of *the very pinkness* of the pink ice cube in Sellars's example, rather than just *the fact that* it is pink.

What may usefully come to mind here is a familiar kind of contrast. In this case, it is the contrast between (a) a congenitally blind person's awareness of a certain ice cube's being pink, such awareness being perforce an awareness *in thought*, and not the kind of awareness that is characteristic of seeing or visually imagining the ice cube, and (b) a sighted person's having visual experience of the pinkness of the ice cube, among other properties of the ice cube.

The congenitally blind person can know *that* the ice cube is pink, if he or she is told that it is, or by means of certain unlikely photic measurements that the congenitally blind person could carry out with respect to the ice cube, if he or she were equipped with the proper instruments and knowledge, or by having himself or herself deliberately made the ice cube pink by having added a certain substance to the water to be frozen. But the congenitally blind person has not experienced and cannot experience hues and, so, he or she cannot be perceptually or in thought aware of, cannot have acquaintance with, the very pinkness of the ice cube. Such awareness involves more than representing the hue; there is a kind of encounter with pinkness "in person," that is, a nonconceptual apprehension of it firsthand.

2. Present in the perception. An awareness may have present in itself that of which it makes one aware; of this, according to Sellars (1978), the practice of phenomenology assures us in the case of seeing the very pinkness of a pink

ice cube. The first question that Sellars's second statement summons to mind is the following. Is the "somehow presence" of the awareness's object in the awareness itself meant by Sellars to be a literal presence — rather than a metaphorical presence: such as the awareness's being a thought about its object and thereby including its object within it although not actually?

One can, of course, be occurrently aware now of items and states of affairs that have long ago ceased to exist or have not yet come into existence (cf. Gibson [1979/1986] on "nonperceptual awareness"). There should be no doubt that such objects of awareness cannot themselves be literally present in an awareness that occurs at such a temporal distance from them. However, where the object of awareness is reflecting or radiating adequate light for vision to a perceiver's point of observation here and now, and the perceiver's visual system is intact and functioning normally, perhaps some good sense can be made of the idea that the environmental item or state of affairs is itself, not only present within the perceiver's field of view — that is, within the solid angle of light that can be registered now by the perceiver's ocular system (Gibson, 1978/1986) — but also "present" in the visual perceptual awarenesses themselves that the environmental item or state of affairs and the corresponding photic stimulation are helping to produce.

Instead, Sellars may mean that something bearing *a special resemblance* to that of which one is aware is sometimes literally present in the awareness. This is the more accurate construal of Sellars's position. Sellars's second statement (quoted at the head of this article) seems to imply that what is present in the awareness in such cases is not actually that of which one is aware in having this awareness. In his example, one is perceptually aware, presumably, of a pink ice cube. However, what is literally present in the perceptual awareness is not the pink ice cube itself.

Accordingly, introducing this example, Sellars (1978) states, "Consider for example, my favorite object, this pink ice cube. Its consisting of ice is largely a matter of its causal properties. It cools tea and is melted by fire" (p. 177). Insofar as that which is present in the perceptual awareness has causal properties, they are not the same causal properties as an ice cube instantiates. For example, among the pink ice cube's properties is its reflecting light into our eyes under certain conditions, thus causing visual perceptual awarenesses of the ice cube to take place. These perceptual awarenesses have, according to Sellars, something else present in them that Sellars needs to specify, something other than the pink ice cube that helps to bring them into existence. That something else cannot reflect light into anyone's eyes, nor can it melt or cool tea.

As will emerge, particularly in the main section titled "Sellars's Account," it is Sellars's view that what is "somehow present" in the perceptual experience when one sees, imagines, or hallucinates a pink ice cube and experiences or seems to experience its very pinkness is a sensation (or a sensing) of

a cube of pink. The perceptual experience will normally mis-take this sensation as a pink ice cube present in the physical space before one.

Experiential Presence

Sellars (1978) states that what is present in certain perceptual awarenesses is "something" that is "somehow" a cube of pink in physical space. Sellars goes on in his paper to explain that what is "present," in the sense that he means, is not actually a cube of pink in physical space. "Being 'somehow' a cube in physical space" is not equivalent to "being a cube in physical space" as we ordinarily mean the latter phrase to say. But then, what does Sellars mean by "present in the perception"? And what is it that is "present in the perception," given that it is not something actually in physical space?

If, in the ordinary sense of seeing, we see the pinkness, cubicity, and location of an ice cube relative to our own location, are these properties of the ice cube "present in the perception" of them? Is it such properties, which are taken perceptually to belong to the ice cube, that get literally into the perception, whereas the ice cube, being a physical object, perforce keeps its distance from any perceptual awareness of it?

What Experiential Presence Is Not

As already noted, the "experiential presence" of something, as I shall call what Sellars was talking about, is not a mere matter of having an occurrent belief in that something's being there or in its existence. In the case of hallucinating a fire-breathing dragon, one may actually disbelieve in the dragon's existence even while having vivid experiences that are seemingly of a dragon. For that matter, one may even disbelieve in the very thing or state of affairs of which one is at the moment having veridical perceptual experience. This disbelief in the object of awareness may be a dimension of the perceptual experience itself, not simply a judgment passed on the basis of the deliverances of experience, that is, a postperceptual judgment.

The objects of perceptual experience may not seem real, either individually or as part of a larger unreal whole. In a useful compendium of "anomalies of experience," Graham Reed (1988) has described as quoted below the phenomenon of "derealization," following the reports of individuals who have experienced it. For a time, these people's surrounding environment lost its reality for them as they were visually perceiving it.

> The things around [them] seem to be flat and lacking in significance. One young woman described the experience as follows: "Everything seemed muzzy, as though it wasn't really there. I couldn't understand it — it was like walking through a dream. Everything was ordinary, but nothing was real any longer . . . ." It should be noticed

> that the experience does not imply any failure in perception. It is not a question of input lacking intensity, vividness or discriminability, and judgment is not impaired. What the individual is noticing is that the *quality* of perception is different. He no longer feels convinced of the *reality* of what he is perceiving. (p. 129)

This point requires comment emphasizing the perceptual character of the belief or disbelief involved in perceptual experience. That is, it does not merely amount to passing judgment on whether or not things are as one's perceptual experience represents them to be. In derealization, for example, one's perceptual experiences themselves have changed. They now present what they present without its normally perceived character of reality. The objects of perceptual experience seem to be unreal. People who report derealized perceptual experiences consider them strange in that, whereas what the experiences present does not seem otherwise unusual, it seems unreal, or lacking in the kind of concreteness that it is normally perceived to possess. However, for seeming to lack the reality character, the objects of perceptual experience are no less experientially present. It is not as though something else appears to have come between perceptual experience and its objects in the environment. It is not as though something else is perceived in their place.

Therefore, Sellars's point should be revised by leaving aside the matter of believing in what one is perceiving. It would probably be better to say that the experiential presence of something is not a mere matter of the respective experience's representing it. This is what Sellars (1978) meant when he stated, "In traditional terminology, the *somehow* presence of a cube of pink does not consist in its intentional in-existence as the content of a conceptual act" (p. 178).

Better still to say, perceptual awarenesses, imaginal awarenesses, and hallucinatory awarenesses are not merely conceptual mental acts: they always involve the "somehow presence" of something, which is more than conceiving of it or having a thought about it. Perhaps these kinds of awareness are always representations of something, either of something actual or of something unreal, but they are always more than that, which the phrase "the somehow presence of . . ." seeks to capture.

Woodruff Smith (1989) would wisely call perceptual awarenesses "presentations" rather than "representations," in order to avoid the suggestion that such awarenesses involve something that functions as a sign of that of which they make us aware (cf. Husserl, 1913/1983, as quoted in the second paragraph of the present article).

Another reason for calling perceptual awarenesses a kind of presentation is that they do involve experiential presence. They do involve that somehow presence which Sellars underlined and which is more than the metaphorical presence of the objects of awareness that is instantiated in representing or thinking them. It might be useful to restrict technical use of the problematic term *repre-*

sentation to designating those awarenesses of something in which that something and anything else as well are not experientially present in the awareness.

Is Amodal Perception a Counterexample?

Seeing and experiential presence. As I have, in different words, Sellars (1978) stated, "Seeing *of* the cube its very pinkness and its cubicity (from a point of view) would be analyzed in terms of this *somehow, other than merely believed in* presence of a cube of pink in physical space facing one edgewise in the visual experience" (p. 178). This statement would rule out the possibility of the mentioned properties' being seen in the absence of their being "somehow present" (in Sellars's sense) in a visual experience. Indeed, according to what we normally mean by *seeing*, if one has awareness of something and it is not "somehow present" in one's visual experience, one would not be seeing it. That is, if those properties of the ice cube were only conceptually present, present only as believed in, or merely in the mode of their being represented, it would not be a case of one's literally seeing them.

In such a case, one would not see, for example, the very pinkness of a pink ice cube. Suppose, for example, that the light were so dim that the pinkness was not experientially present, one might still see the pink ice cube as a pink ice cube without seeing the very pinkness of the ice cube, just as one might see the ice cube as cold without having, at the time, in the visual experience that is an essential part of seeing the ice cube, any experience of the coldness itself of the ice cube.

Next, I consider some psychological research that may be interpreted, incorrectly I believe, as providing counterexamples to the thesis that to see something itself (e.g., the very pinkness) requires that the something be "somehow present" in the visual experience that is an essential component of that instance of seeing. As will be spelled out, the appropriateness of such an interpretation of the phenomena to be considered in this section depends on what that "somehow presence," which I am calling experiential presence, amounts to according to Sellars.

Also, the connection will be made to Sellars's theoretical introduction of visual sensations for the purpose of explaining the fact that, for example, "something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space" is experientially present when we see or seem to see a pink ice cube. It will be suggested that, whereas sensations are probably necessary for experiential presence, corresponding sensations are not always necessary in order for a particular property of the object of awareness to be experientially present. The experiential presence of something, such as a cube of pink in physical space, cannot be reduced to the respective perceptual experience's inclusion of the corresponding sensation.

The tunnel effect. Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé's (1964/1991) relevant article is titled "Amodal Perception of Perceptual Structures." The idea of the article is that there are two basic ways in which environmental items can be visually perceptually experienced, the modal and the amodal. Among other phenomena, the authors consider the laboratory phenomenon called "the tunnel effect." They consider the tunnel effect to be a case of having amodal visual perceptual experience of an entity, property, or event. That is to say, from Sellars's perspective, the tunnel effect is a case of having perceptual experience of something although it is not present in the experience in the same way as the pinkness itself is present in the visual perception when we see, of a pink ice cube, its very pinkness.

In their research on the tunnel effect, the experimenters often had an object move across a display in a straight horizontal line. The middle part of the object's trajectory, however, took place behind an opaque screen; this was the time spent by the moving object in the so-called tunnel. While the screen occluded the object, the object did not project (i.e., did not directly radiate or reflect) any light to the experimental subjects' point of observation.

Consequently, it may be suggested, during the middle phase of the object's travels across the display, the subjects did not have any visual perceptual experience in which the object was somehow present other than as believed in or as represented. Thus, according to one interpretation, which is not the experimenters' own, (a) the object was first seen, and (b) then it was no longer seen but merely conceived or thought of as moving, and (c) then it was seen again, when it emerged from behind the screen.[5]

Although they did not mean to do so, Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991) will seem to have been contributing to the latter kind of interpretation when they described the object of the perceiver's experience, while the object travelled through the tunnel, as having "only a purely formal character. It is deprived of every sensory quality in the strict sense, such as luminance or color and is thus an amodal completion" (p. 163).[6]

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[5]A related matter of greater potential controversy than the interpretation of the phenomena addressed in the text is Gibson's (1979/1986) proposal that one's continuing awareness of one's interlocutor as one looks at and away again and again from him or her is a continuous visual perceptual awareness of the person, rather than consisting of alternating perceptual and nonperceptual phases, as though one were alternately seeing and not seeing but only thinking about the person. The stimulus information that was picked up while the other person was projecting light into one's eyes continues to determine one's visual perceptual awareness in the interval that one is looking away from him or her. In the language of the present article, the other person continues to be experientially present in one's visual perceptual experience when he or she goes out of sight as one turns one's head. There is, according to Gibson, a persisting perception of the other person's persistence in the environment.

[6]Rightly, Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé did not say that the respective perceptual experience was itself deprived of every sensory quality. The visual perceptual experience of the moving

The important relevant fact is that, nevertheless, the subjects continue to have, throughout the object's movement across the display, a visual perceptual experience of the object's movement. This amodal-completion phenomenon depends on such objective factors as the speed of the object's movement, the duration of the occluded phase, and the width of the screen. Under the effective stimulational conditions, the subjects spontaneously report that they have visual perceptual awareness of the occluded phase of the object's movement as being continuous with, and uniform in speed with, the two unoccluded phases, which take place right before and after the object's movement behind the screen. From the perspective of the subjects' awareness of the moving object, "it seems that there is no difference between a movement of this kind and a movement exposed throughout" (Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé, p. 152). A visiting psychologist who was shown the display from the subjects' usual point of observation stated, "I should never have believed that there could be phenomena in the perceptual domain so divorced from the stimulus conditions" (p. 154). The psychologist meant that an absence of stimulation from the moving object during the occluded phase did not eliminate, as he had expected, his visual perceptual experience of movement. Subjects are startled because they do not believe they should be seeing an object move behind a screen while they cannot see anything else of it.

Notwithstanding the perceived continuity of the movement from nonoccluded to occluded to nonoccluded phase, and the absence of any inner awareness to the effect that the movement itself is differently apprehended in the different phases, there does occur a difference between the occluded phase and the nonoccluded phases with respect to Sellars's what-is-somehow-present-in-the-perception-other-than-as-believed-in-or-conceived-of. That is, the other properties of the object are not experientially present during the occluded phase of the object's movement — although the subjects continue to conceive of the object as remaining unchanged in all its other properties (except location) during the hidden phase of the movement. The movement would seem to be experientially present throughout, whereas the size and shape and color of the object are not experientially present during the movement's middle phase.

The temptation is to say, instead, that none of the objects' properties is experientially present in the visual perceptual awareness that takes place

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object during its occluded phase was just as "modal" as during the movement's unoccluded phases. The subjects were visually aware of the hidden movement as proceeding behind a screen of which they were modally aware, along with other parts of the display. Contrary to Oldfield (1963, p. ix), there are no "'gaps or holes' in the modal sensory pattern" in the case of the tunnel effect and other amodal phenomena. In all such cases, the subject has visual-modal perceptual awareness of something else at the location in his or her field of view where the subject perceptually takes the amodally perceived object or part of an object to be. That is, there is modal perception of the occluding surface or object.

while the object is behind the screen. This temptation arises because the object is not affecting the photic stimulation at the subjects' point of observation during the object's passage behind the screen. In view of that, why should one of the object's properties be experientially present in the perceptual awareness while its other properties are not so present?

I shall not attempt to answer the latter question here. Elsewhere, I have raised the same question as a criticism of Gibson's (1979/1986) hypothesis that the tunnel effect is simply a case of persistence perception, that is, perception of the continuing existence of an object or property of an object. I asked, "Does the perception of the object's going out of sight [i.e., passing behind the occluding screen] in some way turn off persisting perception of its other properties" (Natsoulas, 1992, p. 170)? Here, I shall only emphasize that indeed there is this difference, in persistence perception, among the moving object's properties. During the occluded phase, the subjects' awareness of that property is different from the subjects' nonperceptual awareness of the other properties of the object during that phase.[7] With reference to that property, the subjects insist that they have visual perceptual experience of the object, that the moving object is present to their visual perceptual consciousness during the occluded phase no less so than it is present during the nonoccluded phases of the movement.

The simple static screen effect. I shall consider only one further effect showing amodal perception, that is, one further effect that shows the inadequacy of understanding experiential presence in terms of sensations or the like. About this other effect, Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991) state, "The essential feature of the [static] screen effect is that one object covers another without appearing to alter the integrity of the latter" (p. 143). For example, these experimenters placed two long paper rectangles of different hues one over the other so that they formed a cross together. The experimenters describe the stimulational result of this arrangement as containing a gap in the light reflected from the partially covered rectangle. This gap is analogous to the gap in the stimulation projected to the subject's point of observation by the moving object in the tunnel effect.

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[7]In order to proceed without complicating the discussion in the text, let me quote a paragraph from an article in which I discuss the tunnel effect and related matters in greater detail:

> Gibson [1979/1986] identified the tunnel effect as "the perception of a moving object during the interval between going into a tunnel and coming out of it" (p. 191). Of course, not all the properties of any object are ever perceived; "perception of a moving object" does not mean the moving object is perceived in all its aspects or dimensions. It is always appropriate to ask about P's [a perceiver's] perceiving any object: What does P perceive *of* the object? If we ask *what of* the moving object in these experiments is perceived while it is in the tunnel, the answer seems to be that, aside from the relational property of the object's being occluded by the screen, the subjects perceive only the object's location and properties of the object's movement (speed, direction, shape of trajectory) and, under certain experimental conditions, the object's stopping and starting again to move behind the screen (Burke, 1952/1962). (Natsoulas, 1992, p. 166)

Nevertheless, a rectangular whole, complete and unbroken, is experienced in the case of the partially occluded rectangle, as in the case of the rectangle that is covering it. The two unoccluded parts of the under rectangle and its occluded part form a single unit with respect to the experiential presence that the rectangle has for someone looking at the display. Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991) call this unified experience of the partially covered rectangle a case of amodal completion. The partially covered rectangle's perceived continuity behind the middle part of the covering rectangle is a case of amodal completion. As with respect to the occluded phase in the tunnel effect, the experimenters use the latter term to refer to the absence of sensory qualities in the perceptual experience of the rectangle's middle part, that is, the absence of sensory qualities produced by the rectangle's hidden part.

The experimenters report that only occasionally did their subjects have visual imagery of the hidden part of the rectangle. Very largely, the experience of the under rectangle was not an experience of it of the kind that one has when one is asked to imagine a colored rectangle. Rather, the subjects' perceptual experience of the under rectangle is of the over rectangle's hiding its middle part. The experiential presence of the middle part, notwithstanding its experienced continuity with the two unhidden parts, did not itself involve the kind of literal content of perceptual experience (i.e., sensations) in terms of which Sellars wished to explain experiential presence. I shall return to the relevance of amodal completion to Sellars's account in the final subsection of the next main section.

Sellars's Account

To explain experiential presence, including the fact that such presence also occurs when we merely ostensibly see something, Sellars (1978) makes what he calls the "obvious" move; he theoretically introduces sensations as states of the perceiver. To treat theoretically of his example, Sellars introduces visual sensations of a cube of pink facing one edgewise. He does not say that we have visual sensations of cubes of ice, however, for we cannot see an ice cube's being made of ice, as we do its very pinkness or its very cubicity. Involved in the cube's being made of ice are certain causal properties. When we see an ice cube, its causal properties may be objects of awareness but only conceptually or propositionally. They cannot be objects of awareness in the way that the pinkness and cubicity of the ice cube can: that is, "modally," as Michotte would say. One cannot see, as it were, the very iceness of an ice cube.

What more can be said about Sellars's sensations? How do they perform their proposed function of giving visual experiential presence to environmental items, as well as to some things that are not actually there? Aside from their normally being brought about by the physical presence to the

visual sense of, for example, a pink and cubical object, one thing that Sellars (1978) says about sensations (or sensings) is that they are analogous to certain corresponding environmental properties of which we are perceptually aware:

> Thus, the color manners of sensing are to be understood in terms of the incompatibilities involved in the family of ordinary physical color attributes. And, correspondingly, the shape manners of sensings would exhibit, as do physical shapes, the abstract structure of a pure geometrical system. (p. 180)

It would seem that our visual perceptual experience of the very pinkness of an ice cube bodily includes a sensing that is related to other sensings analogously to how the pink color of the ice cube is related to the other colors of the objects that we perceive.

But how does a likeness, however detailed and concrete it may be, between our perceptual experiences and the environmental properties of which those experiences make us aware result in the experiential presence of those properties? How does a certain sensing, one normally brought about by something in the environment that is a certain shade of pink, work to give experience of that shade of pink in the environment? Is not this kind of reference to a sensing simply a restatement of the original problem?

Is Sellars's reference not merely another way to say that the perceptual experience is so constituted that we have experience of the ice cube's very pinkness? In fact, even if a property of which we are perceptually aware were literally itself a property of the perceptual experience by which we are aware of it, the following question would still demand an answer. How does the property's bodily inclusion in the experience give us awareness not simply of the property as represented, as brought under a certain heading, but of the property itself, for example, the very pinkness of a pink ice cube that we are seeing?

Sellars does take his account one step further, to the role played by a sensing within the perceptual experience of which it is a constituent. He proposes that, although they are both parts of one experience, there is a causal relation between the sensing component and another component of the experience that Sellars (1978) describes as "the taking or believing *in*, construed on the model of the complex demonstrative phrase This cube of pink ice" (p. 182). Given a certain perceptual set, a sensing will immediately cause a certain perceptual taking to occur. Sellars states that this causal relation is clearly part of the relation between sensings and takings within individual perceptual experiences, as well as within certain other kinds of experience, such as the hallucinatory ones. Evidently, Sellars supposes that the causal relation between a sensing as cause and a perceptual taking as effect is so clearly the case that he does not need to consider it further on the present occasion.

As will be seen in the next subsection, I believe the purported causal relation between the sensing component and the conceptual component of a perceptual experience to be a weak link in Sellars's account of experiential presence. The theoretically required relation must involve something more intimate than a causal relation. Although Sellars would seem to acknowledge the latter point, he does not come up with anything more than the following inadequate idea about the relation between the sensing and taking components.

According to Sellars, the conceptual (or taking) component of a perceptual experience really refers to, has as its ultimate referent, the sensing component or one or more features of the latter. Thus, Sellars proposes as well that the relation between the two parts of a perceptual experience involves more than mere causation between them. The actual referent of a perceptual taking is always a sensing, the particular sensing that brought that taking about. For example, a perceptual taking construed on the model of the demonstrative phrase "This cube of pink ice facing me edgewise" would be about a sensation of a cube of pink facing one edgewise. The perceptual taking would be "ultimately" about the sensation although the taking may well take the sensation to be a cube of pink ice in the environment. This would be an example of a kind of systematic adaptive error; there will very often be an ice cube there where an ice cube is taken to be, notwithstanding that, according to Sellars, what one actually has perceptual experience of is the sensation that the ice cube produces.

Problems with the Account

1. Causal distance. The phenomenology of seeing a pink ice cube raises for psychologists and philosophers of consciousness the problem of how a perceptual experience can be an awareness of the very pinkness of the pink ice cube, especially if the perceptual experience is conceived of as a conceptual response to the pink ice cube that merely represents the ice cube and its properties. Sellars proposes that the awareness involved in this perceptual experience is a conceptual response to a sensation of a cube of pink. Sellars's proposal leads us right back to the same kind of problem, still unsolved. Now we need to know how a perceptual taking, which is supposed to be the conceptual component of a perceptual experience, can give us awareness of the very pinkness of a cube of pink, an awareness we know firsthand that we have.

That Sellars's account returns us to the same problem may not be grasped at once as he presents his account. His theoretical inclusion of a sensation as one of the two components of a perceptual experience may lead a reader to think of Sellars's perceptual experiences as being, psychologically, something more than merely a kind of conceptual response. Indeed, sensations are

themselves often conceived of as a kind of experience (e.g., James, 1890/1950). Thus, Sellars might be understood to hold that a perceptual experience consists of both a conceptual response and a more basic kind of experience, which varies analogously with variations in the perceived properties of its environmental causes.

However, for Sellars, sensations are not themselves experiences. On their own, assuming that they can occur without bringing about a perceptual or nonperceptual taking, sensations cannot make us aware of anything. Moreover, they cannot add flavor or color or quality to our perceptual experiences. Their sole function is causal, to bring about a corresponding perceptual taking, which itself contains no sensations, being a purely conceptual mental occurrence. Even our inner awareness of our sensations is no more than a conceptual response to them. According to Sellars's theory, although perhaps not according to his phenomenology, we have a no more intimate access to anything at all than in the form of either a perceptual taking or a taking that is nonperceptually caused (e.g., a taking brought about by the occurrence of a thought).

Sellars's sensations are not integrated with the component of perceptual experience that they bring about. Similarly to environmental causes, these sensations are supposed to act on the experience to which each belongs from outside the experience. Sensations for Sellars are components of experiences that themselves function within experiences strictly causally, to elicit the second component of the experience, which is the perceptual taking. That is all that they do. Therefore, one remains puzzled: How can sensations so conceived be used to explain the experiential presence of the very pinkness of a pink ice cube?

Compare: Does a pink ice cube's bringing about a visual experience of itself explain our seeing the very pinkness of the ice cube? Sellars, and many other thinkers, would say that this causal relation cannot provide the needed explanation, because the ice cube is at a causal distance from the experience of it, whereas, phenomenologically, the pinkness itself is present in the perceptual experience and not merely as represented or as conceived of therein. It is the special phenomenological presence of the pinkness that requires explanation.

The same as for the ice cube as cause would apply to the sensations Sellars postulates. They, too, are external to the perceptual takings that they respectively bring about. Even if the pinkness itself was best conceived scientifically not as a property of the ice cube, but as a property of the kind of visual sensation that pink ice cubes bring about, even then it would not be at all clear how a state possessing that property, by causing a perceptual taking that refers to that property, would explain the experiential presence of that property. Recall that a perceptual taking is merely a conceptual response to the corresponding sensation and does not itself do anything more than to represent the sensation or its features in a way analogous to how language repre-

sents them. Recall also that, according to Sellars and rightly so, the pinkness is present in the perception not merely as believed in or as represented.

2. *Reference.* Sellars's further notion — that the perceptual taking makes ultimate reference to the sensation, rather than to the environmental item that brings the sensation about — does not help to save his account.

The very pinkness itself that we evidently see of the pink ice cube is, according to Sellars, actually a feature of the sensation produced in us by the pink ice cube. And we do not literally see this feature or any feature of a sensation, as we are commonly said to see the pink ice cube. Rather, we have a kind of inner awareness of the pinkness, cubicity, and the like. This inner awareness occurs by means of the ordinary functioning of the visual system itself. It does not involve a separate introspective system. Nor, for that matter, does this inner awareness occur by means of anything more than what Sellars has qualified as part of the perceptual experience itself. Perceptual takings themselves are our immediate awarenesses of our sensations. In fact, that is what all perceptual experience amounts to, according to Sellars. Whenever we perceive anything, we are perceptually taking properties of our sensations in some way. Usually, our perceptual takings erroneously take these properties to belong to something in the environment, something beyond the sensations themselves. As Romane Clark (1982) expressed Sellars's view: "Perception of external things, properly understood, is indirect. It is channeled through occurrences and conceptualizations of sense impressions [i.e., sensations]. Sense impressions are acts of sensing of which in perception we are somehow directly aware" (p. 94).

However, a conceptual response to something to which this response also refers, assuming that such reference is nonproblematic, does not give us the kind of awareness that we have of the very pinkness of a pink ice cube. As Sellars (1975) himself had stated shortly before the phenomenologists' symposium on consciousness in which he participated: "When I see or ostensibly see something to be a pink ice cube, a pink cube has not only being for thought but also being for sense" (p. 310). A pure (nonimaginal) thought about something does not give us awareness of properties of its object or of itself in anything like the special way in which we have awareness of the very pinkness of a pink ice cube that we see.

3. *Amodal completion.* The perceptual phenomenon that Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991) addressed under the heading of amodal completion suggests that visual perceptual experience of certain features of environmental items can take place under certain conditions without those features evoking corresponding sensations. This does not mean that sensations are unnecessary for perceptual experience of those features, and does not contradict Sellars's understanding of perception in that respect. The amodal completions are understood by Michotte and his colleagues as, so to speak,

completions of modal experiences. From Sellars's perspective, the sensations that these experiences involve do not possess some of the features that the corresponding perceptual takings ascribe to parts of the environment.

I believe Sellars would say that those nonsensational features are present in the visual perceptual experience merely as believed in, merely as represented conceptually therein. They are not present in the perception as the pinkness of a pink ice cube is when we see it. There is, therefore, a further problem with Sellars's account of experiential presence. Phenomenologically, from the first-person perspective of the subjects participating in the studies of Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé, the amodally perceived features were remarkably like the modally perceived features with respect to their experiential presence.

Thus, not only was the movement of the object behind the screen perceived as occurring behind the screen, but also the movement was itself experienced. Some subjects described themselves as having a surprising experience of the movement though they did not continue to see, in the same sense, any of the other properties of the object. Also, not only was the middle part of the under rectangle perceived as hidden by the over rectangle, but also there occurred a unitary experience of an unbroken under rectangle. Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991) state, "This amodal completion is so intimately integrated with the covered parts of the object that the overall shape appears as an entirely continuous whole" (pp. 163–164). Its appearing as such is more than perceptually taking it to be a whole rectangle, for one sees the very rectangular shape itself. The latter perception takes place notwithstanding the fact that a large part of the total shape is hidden.

What the amodal completion phenomena suggest is that experiential presence is not a matter of perceptually taking sensations in some way. In the preceding subsection, I suggested as much — on the grounds that a conceptual response that is evoked by something to which the conceptual response refers cannot give the kind of intimate awareness that is essentially instantiated in seeing the very pinkness of a pink ice cube. Here, I am suggesting that a mere conceptual response to a sensation also cannot explain our ability to perceive, under certain conditions, certain environmental features that are not evoking corresponding sensations. For to perceive these features is not merely to represent them, but for the features to be present in one's experience of them, as the pinkness of a pink ice cube may be, but also as something hidden may be — and often is:

> It is astonishing how rare it is to find examples of objects where the side facing the observer is completely uncovered. Nearly all of them have parts hidden by other objects (screens), and despite this the shapes we see are neither interrupted nor breached. Indeed it is clear that the world as it appears to us is not made up of fragments of objects but of things with a complete shape presented to us in this way despite the partial and temporary concealment that happens to them. This is to a great

> extent due to the formation of amodal completions, which are thus seen to be an essential factor in the phenomenal permanence of things and consequently also in the adequate adaptation of the behavior of humans and animals to the environment in which they live. (Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé, 1964/1991, p. 165)

Concluding Comments

At another conference — this one a "miniconference" that was held in 1979 at Ohio State University by Sellars's analytic colleagues for the specific purpose of examining his theory of perception — Sellars is reported to have argued that we have a preconceptual kind of access to our sensations (Lycan, 1987). Thus, we have a more intimate kind of awareness of our sensations, or of certain features of them, than an awareness that would consist solely of conceptual responses to them. Moreover, Sellars is reported to have stated that a conceptual response to a sensation (i.e., a perceptual taking) depends upon having "direct awareness" of the sensation. Let me reproduce the description of this part of Sellars's comments.

> Sellars insisted . . . that the pinkness and the cubicity of his pink ice cube are "given," and that we are "directly aware of" sensa [i.e., sensations] (we must be, or we could not respond conceptually to them). What is not given, contrary to the phenomenalist tradition that Sellars has been concerned to oppose, is only the categorial status or "guise" of the pinkness and cubicity; we must philosophize at length in order to determine whether they are properties of physical objects, adverbial modes of sensing, adjectival properties of pure processes, or whatever. (Lycan, 1987, p. 145)[8]

It seems correct to read this as saying (surprisingly so, as an expression of Sellars's view) that "direct awareness" is not itself a conceptual response but a more intimate kind of access to that of which one therein has awareness. Perhaps the "direct awareness" that Sellars mentioned is what makes it possible for us to see what Sellars himself described as the very pinkness or cubicity itself, rather than merely judging about it or taking it to be instantiated. Perceptual takings, being conceptual responses to sensations, cannot, as it were, get us that close to our sensations. However, this understanding of

[8]An interesting parallel: at about the same time, the prominent neuropsychologist Donald O. Hebb (1980) was moving from a denial that we are ever noninferentially aware of our own mental-occurrence instances to the view that we do have direct awareness of them but not of their nature. To know anything concerning what our mental-occurrence instances really are we must engage, as the psychologist does, in theoretical inference. Thus, the individual can veridically report about his or her experiences on a firsthand basis but has no special authority with regard to how his or her stream of consciousness should be scientifically construed. Moreover, both Sellars and Hebb consistently held that the individual's phenomenology, in the sense of his or her experiential contents, requires explanation. Skepticism could not be used to eliminate them as a potential subject matter for psychological or philosophical theory.

experiential presence would be divergent from Sellars's (e.g., 1968, 1980) published view according to which any "direct awareness" that we may have is merely a conceptual response to, a representation of, that of which it makes us aware.

Nevertheless, I find Sellars's discussions of these matters clarifying and enlightening. Also, I am fascinated because his account of perceptual consciousness constitutes a rediscovery, on the part of a very advanced, behavioristically inclined theorist (see, e.g., Sellars, 1980), of nothing less than presence to consciousness. Perhaps, with his comments at the miniconference, Sellars was moving closer still to a complete acknowledgement of literal presence to consciousness, closer still to a full realization that experiential presence cannot be reduced to the purely conceptual. Now if Sellars, given his extraordinary philosophical sophistication, could find no way to avoid experiential presence, what chance have others who may be travelling the same path as he was. Are they too not destined eventually to arrive at the same rediscovery?

Notwithstanding Sellars's conception of awareness as being purely representational, he acknowledged the existence of the somehow presence in perceptual and similar experience of such features as the pinkness and cubicity of what seems to be an ice cube. And he made an effort to explain this experiential presence by means of the limited resources at his disposal given his larger theoretical commitments (e.g., sensations, and a response that refers to its cause). Admirably, Sellars resisted any temptation that he may have felt to debunk the idea of presence to consciousness, as though experiential awareness were merely an illusion, or as though it amounted to something else (analogous to speech) of which Sellars had a better understanding. Sellars did not propose that experiential presence consists of someone's having thoughts or making judgments to the effect that something is experientially present to him or her.

And Sellars did not propose that, for example, visual experiential presence is simply finding oneself with a strong inclination to say that something is physically present in one's field of view. That is, he did not take, as one might expect, the usual behavioristic exits from the problem. Sellars surely knew that a theorist can, in the present intellectual environment, free himself or herself of the obligation to give an account of an unwelcome piece of phenomenological evidence by claiming that this "evidence" is no more than a proposition that the subject takes to be true. That is, it is true from the subject's perspective, but it is illusory from the superior, objective perspective of the theorist. The burden of argument can then be shifted to those theorists who are in agreement with the subject whose grounds are treated with skepticism.

Recall B.F. Skinner's repeated efforts to explain how mentalistic pieces of speech are acquired, and to lay out the environmental and internal occasions for their common use (cf. Sellars [1963] on "The Myth of Jones"). At the same time, Skinner was attempting to reduce to stimuli or responses, and sometimes to both stimuli and responses, all those mental-occurrence instances whose existence he could not deny with impunity. See Natsoulas (1986, 1988) for further discussion and relevant references to and quotations from Skinner's works.[9]

In contrast, Sellars (1975) frankly admitted that his account of perceptual consciousness "leaves almost untouched the intimate relation which exists between these two aspects of visual perception [i.e., sensings and perceptual takings]" (p. 313). There was much work yet to be done in order to be able to formulate an adequate account of experiential presence. Simply enriching the conceptual resources that we attribute to the subject (Sellars, 1981b) will not do the job.

And not only did experiential presence require further work of a nonbehavioristic kind. Sellars (1981a), the scientific realist who held that science is the measure of what really exists, was nevertheless willing, starting from his visual perceptual consciousness of the same pink ice cube, to reject the basic assumptions of physical science regarding the ultimate constituents of nature. Sellars proposed that the world in fact consists of a structure of pure processes — processes that are not based on objects, on particles or things — because physical science, with its particulate metaphysics, seemed to Sellars to have no place for ultimately homogeneous and continuous cubes of pink. He knew that such cubes exist not scientifically, not by theoretical inference, but on a firsthand basis. He knew from his perceptual experience itself, from having inner awareness of how he experienced an ice cube that was pink through and through. Experiential presence reveals facts regarding what there really is; it gives us a window on ultimate reality. This further aspect of Sellars's theory requires separate, detailed consideration.

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[9] Elsewhere, I have given Skinner credit for not taking the line that consciousness is scientifically indescribable or does not exist. He purported to tell us what consciousness really is. However, what else could it be, given Skinner's radical behaviorism, than a kind of responding? A kind of stimulation was the only other possibility. Indeed, pain was for Skinner, most of the time, a form of aversive stimulation. But our firsthand consciousness of the pain, even our immediate awareness of its aversiveness, of its very painfulness itself, was merely a conceptual response to the stimulation, acquired by operant conditioning from the verbal community. According to Skinner's incredible view, we have a no more intimate access to our pains than that.

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