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The Journal of Mind and Behavior
Summer 1999, Volume 20, Number 3
Pages 351–356
ISSN 0271–0137

In Defense of Human Consciousness. Joseph F. Rychlak. Washington, D.C.: American Psychologocal Association, 1997, 351 pages, $29.95 hardcover.

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In Defense of Human Consciousness, by Joe Rychlak, is an attempt to apply a teleological theory of mind to the multifaceted phenomena of "consciousness." As with Rychlak's other writings (e.g., 1981, 1988, 1994), this volume is intellectually thorough, challenging, and well worth the time and effort needed to grasp its points. Rychlak begins by lamenting the ways that traditional approaches to psychology have eliminated any sophisticated discussion of consciousness and free will. His solution is a philosophically rigorous "enlightened return to the terminology that was jettisoned in science 300 years ago for a good reason but is now under continued repression for a bad reason (i.e., to defend the Newtonian status quo)" [p. xiv].

Chapter 1 lays out the philosophical underpinnings of the approach Rychlak will take throughout the volume. Rychlak first distinguishes between logos (the realm of meaning making and intentionality), bios (the realm of the biological substrate), and physikos (the realm of the physical substrate) approaches to psychology. He alerts the reader to his belief that formal and final causes, located in the logos realm, provide a scientific understanding of events as valid as the material and efficient causes associated with the bios and physikos realms. He also discusses the uses of reflexivity within different philosophical traditions. Finally, he argues persuasively that mixing logos and bios terminology results in the former being twisted and deformed into the latter's theoretical system. In this regard, he is arguing in a manner consistent with Kelly's (1955/1991a, 1955/1991b) constructive alternativism. Kelly's position holds that the universe is open to innumerable possible constructions and, since the universe owes its allegiance to no particular understanding of it, scholars should be free to pursue their approach within whatever theoretical position seems most productive. In other words, one can be free to explore logos understandings of phenomena without having to prove that bios understandings are incorrect or limited. Such a position frees humanistic and dynamically oriented scholars from having to argue with their reductionistic colleagues about which approach is "right." All too often, this principle is ignored in the intellectual imperialism of mainstream psychology (Bohart, O'Hara, and Leitner, 1998).

I would like to thank April Faidley and Adelbert Jenkins for their comments about this book and this review. Requests for reprints should be sent to L. M. Leitner, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056.

Rychlak introduces the reader to Logical Learning Theory (LLT) in Chapter 2. Even if one has read his more lengthy presentation of LLT (Rychlak, 1994), this chapter is dense and filled with highly technical terminology. If you have little familiarity with LLT, I would advise a very slow and careful reading and re-reading. Without having a solid grasp of LLT principles, the remainder of the volume will be of limited usefulness. However, if you take the time to comprehend this chapter, you will be rewarded many times over throughout the volume when Rychlak applies LLT principles to various aspects of human consciousness.

Chapters 3–5 provide a fascinating overview of the historical approaches to understanding consciousness. These chapters are made particularly interesting by Rychlak's conceptualization of the evolution of ideas about consciousness from within an LLT perspective. He postulates that each major development in human self-consciousness and agency can be explained in terms of emerging self predications. Initially, when self predications were/are first developing, the self is pictured as weak and falling short of the demands placed upon it (Rychlak uses the Biblical creation myth to illustrate this point). Rychlak sketches the development of self predications (and consciousness) as human history develops, relating the measurement of time, the invention of the printing press, and the dawn of Newtonian physics to humanity's growing sense of self. In this historical analysis, his intellectual similarity to Kellian (1955/1991a, 1955/1991b) thought provides an optimistic and empowering view of human evolution. For example, he states that "Nature seems to have provided us with a logical process in which we can either limit our interests to hone in on a narrow range of meaning and grasp it intensely, or back off to widen our expanse by leaping across formerly limiting boundaries" (p. 85). This statement is virtually identical to Kelly's Choice Corollary (see Landfield and Leitner, 1980). Rychlak concludes Chapter 3 with speculation about the implications of post-Newtonian physics (with its greater emphasis on formal cause reasoning) for psychology. Although a more detailed analysis of these implications is not relevant to the thrust of the book, I wish they had been developed further. Psychology sorely needs to reconsider whether it wishes to continue emulating Newtonian physics or enter into more modern scientific understandings.

Chapter 4 emphasizes the contributions of psychoanalytic psychology to the meaning of consciousness. After detailing some of Freud's intellectual roots, Rychlak's description of Freudian and Jungian psychology suggests the theorists were more teleological than they are given credit for in mainstream texts. While I agree with his conception of Freudian and Jungian psychology, the real heart of the chapter for me was his application of LLT principles to certain psychodynamic "truths." For example, he explains the "wisdom" of the unconscious by pointing out that absolute truth is always unipredicational (no awareness of possible dialectical alternatives or meanings beyond the literal). Without the ability to explore alternative formulations, to wonder about contrasting possibilities, such "truth" is, by definition, unconscious. Further, such a unipredicated meaning cannot come from a position of doubt and comes across to us as infallibly true. It is easy to see how clients and therapists alike would conclude that these unconscious assertions are "wiser" than what is going on at a more conscious level, where the very nature of predication leads to oppositionality, what ifs, and doubts.

Rychlak's discussion of the implications of some of the evolutionary brain research for a predicational model of consciousness (Chapter 5) was, I felt, the weakest section of the volume. Interestingly, my reaction illustrates a point Rychlak had made much earlier in the work. In this chapter, he is reviewing scholars who

approach phenomena from the bios and physikos realms. It is hard to have such a dialogue without logos concepts being twisted to fit the bios based theories. On the other hand, he makes a strong point when he discusses the number of brain scholars who have attempted to develop more formal cause explanations of the brain because of their increased awareness that "brain" does not equal "mind." After reviewing these scholars, Rychlak summarizes the point nicely: "We need the brain to think like we need legs to run or dance. But brain action per se cannot direct what we will think about anymore than our legs can determine where we will run or the tune to which we will dance" (p. 144). Rychlak is agreeing with the eminent brain researcher Wilder Penfield (1975) on the independence of mind action from brain action.

The thrust of the volume turns in Chapters 6–9 as Rychlak takes up specific theoretical issues associated with human consciousness. Chapter 6 compares LLT and William James on the concepts of consciousness, self, and free will (referred to by Rychlak as the "telic triune"). Rychlak explores how, due to James's decision to place psychology in the bios frame of reference, James was forced to conclude that "the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds" (James, 1890/1952, p. 822). In contrast, from a teleological perspective, Rychlak argues that a person's freedom is in the very process of meaning making. "Free will . . . has to do with the psychological capacity to set freely the grounds — in this case, the aims — for the sake of which one is subsequently limited in behavior (i.e., determined)" [p. 161]. In other words, theories that emphasize formal and final causes are much more likely to emphasize free will. In contrast, theories devoted to material and efficient causation are likely to see the person as a passive responder, not an active meaning-creator.

Rychlak next discusses computers, predication, and consciousness. This chapter basically is an elaboration and re-statement of his volume on computers and LLT, *Artificial Intelligence and Human Reasoning* (Rychlak, 1991). After summarizing the works of several computer scientists who seem to suggest that computers are, or will soon become, conscious, thinking, machines, Rychlak explains why, from an LLT perspective, computers are not conscious. At the conclusion of the chapter, most readers will agree with Rychlak that the "reasoning" executed by computers, at least as currently developed, is demonstrative and unconscious in nature. I was once again reminded that, since computer scientists work within a physikos framework, concepts like "intelligence" and "consciousness" are distorted in order to fit coherently into their theoretical system.

Rychlak provides an LLT account of hypnosis, false memories, multiple personalities, channeling, lucid dreaming, and meditation in Chapter 8. He views hypnosis as inviting the person to enter into the world of unipredicational, demonstrative reasoning. In so doing, the person ceases to engage in active, teleological, oppositional, formal and final cause reasoning. Rychlak uses this approach to conceptualize and explain many hypnotic phenomena (e.g., hidden observer and trance logic). He continually finds creative ways of applying logos-based principles to concepts that have typically been explained in more bios-like terms. The theoretical material in this chapter raises provocative clinical questions. For example, how can LLT's understanding of lucid dreaming be used by a creative therapist? In what ways would meditation be helpful or harmful if the therapist was attempting to help the client transpredicate (become aware that the meanings that frame the particular construction can be transcended)? Since the focus of the volume is a theoretical and philosophical application of LLT to human consciousness, Rychlak, unfortu-

nately, does not devote much attention to these clinical implications. He does briefly mention ways that clinicians may be co-creating multiple personalities through frequent affirmations of the construct of several independent personalities living within one psyche.

Issues of sociality and social constructionism are explored in Chapter 9. Rychlak is quite critical of the ways that social constructionism, broadly construed, leads to the disempowerment of human beings (e.g., loss of human agency, extraspective formulations leading to the loss of personal responsibility, etc.). In his defense of "individual" constructivism against the social constructionist critique, Rychlak may actually be adopting certain framing assumptions that are unnecessary. Specifically, social constructionists (e.g., Gergen, 1991) tend to distinguish between these approaches to understanding meaning making as emphasizing the "individual" (disconnected, non-relational) versus the "social" (interconnected). While Rychlak offers a solid defense of the proactive individual in this chapter, it can be argued that the entire social constructionist way of framing the debate is misleading. Kelly (1955/1991a, 1955/1991b), whom Rychlak cites quite positively, for example, has elaborated a theory in which the person is simultaneously connected to and separate from others. Personal construct psychology, then, is something more than either "individual construct psychology" or "social construct psychology" (Epting, Pritchard, Leitner, and Dunnett, 1996).

Despite this, Rychlak clearly illustrates the hidden ways that the theoretical logic of social constructionism leads to a place where the active, agentic self is denied. In so doing, the chapter provides a welcome counter-weight to the increasing assaults on the active meaning making process that truly defines the person. To the extent that we continue to create images of humans that deny creativity, courage, choice, freedom, and responsibility, we either become less relevant as a discipline or we further impoverish the very nature of what we propose to study. In this regard, Rychlak's defense of human consciousness is an extremely important work. It shows that humanistic ideals can be incorporated into a theory that is rigorous and open to empirical test. Study this volume carefully; it is well worth the time and effort you will spend on it. It can be a beacon that illuminates the growing edge of psychology into the future.

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