

Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness

Uriah Kriegel

Brown University

Consciousness₄ is the property mental-occurrence instances have when the subject has immediate awareness of them. According to intrinsic theory, this immediate awareness is intrinsic to the conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance, whereas according to appendage theory, it forms a separate mental-occurrence instance. Assuming, rather than arguing for, the correctness of intrinsic theory, this paper investigates a number of theses about the specific intentional content of the immediate awareness built into conscious₄ mental-occurrence instances. These theses are mostly drawn from work conducted within the framework of appendage theory, especially by David Rosenthal. After transposing them into the conceptual framework of intrinsic theory, we discuss the merits of each of these theses.

Thomas Natsoulas has distinguished six senses of the word “consciousness.” The fourth sense is this:

I shall call the fourth kind of consciousness listed in the [*Oxford English Dictionary*] either “consciousness₄,” “inner awareness,” or “immediate awareness.” . . . All three terms have reference to a mental-occurrence instance’s being itself an “immediate” object of occurrent awareness. That is, all three terms have reference to someone’s being aware of a mental-occurrence instance in a way that is not mentally mediated by any other occurrent awareness. (1996a, p. 269)

A mental-occurrence instance (i.e., a specific dated mental event) is conscious₄ when, and only when, it is directly, immediately apprehended by the conscious subject. This sort of awareness is not, however, the introspective or reflective awareness in which the subject voluntarily focuses on her internal goings-on. *That* sort of awareness is mediated. The awareness in which we are interested here is of a phenomenologically “lighter” sort, an awareness which

is effortless and involuntary, and which is humming in the background of our mind throughout our waking life.

Consciousness₄ involves some sort of self-consciousness. When a mental-occurrence instance is conscious₄, the subject is not only undergoing the mental event in question, but is also aware of undergoing it. That is, the subject is *self-consciously* undergoing the mental-occurrence instance in question. Thus, if subject *x*'s hope that tomorrow will be sunny is conscious₄, *x* can be said to *self-consciously* hope that tomorrow will be sunny.

Natsoulas notes that there are two main theoretical approaches to *consciousness₄*. He calls the first *intrinsic theory* and the second *appendage theory*. According to intrinsic theory, when a mental-occurrence instance is conscious₄, the immediate awareness of it is part of the instance's very own existence. That is, a conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance is always partly self-representing, for it includes within it awareness of itself. When *x* self-consciously perceives a cube — that is, when her perception of the cube is conscious₄ — the intentional structure of her perceptual state can be represented as in Figure 1.¹




Figure 1: The intentional structure of consciousness₄ according to intrinsic theory.

By contrast, according to appendage theory, the immediate awareness is conferred on the conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance *from without* — from a numerically distinct mental-occurrence instance. On this view, whenever a subject has a conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance, she also has a *different* mental-occurrence instance which represents that conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance. On this view, the structure of a conscious₄ perception of a cube is better represented as in Figure 2.

¹In this figure and the ones following, the arrows represent intentional directedness and the thought bubbles represent a mental-occurrence instance.




Figure 2: The intentional structure of consciousness₄ according to appendage theory.

The difference here is not purely verbal: if we are realists about mental states, there is all the empirical difference in the world between a case in which the subject has *two* mental-occurrence instances and a case in which only one mental-occurrence instance is taking place. The difference bears importantly on the intentional structure of a conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance: whether it is always partly about itself, or always only about something other than itself.

This raises the question, Which of the two theories is more plausible? Natsoulas argues at length in favor of intrinsic theory (1989, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) and against appendage theory (1992, 1993). In this respect, Natsoulas follows a long line of philosophical psychologists. Intrinsic theory is particularly popular in the phenomenological tradition, where it was defended originally by Brentano (1874/1973), and later by Husserl (1928/1964), Sartre (1937, 1943), Gurwitsch (1985), Henrich (1966/1982), Frank (1995), Brough (1972), Sokolowski (1974), Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989), Wider (1997), Zahavi (1998, 1999), Thomasson (2000), and others. But its defense goes back farther in time, to such figures as Descartes (see Rodis-Lewis, 1950; Wider, 1997), Cudworth (see Thiel, 1991), Kant (see Sturma, 1995; Brook, 2001; Gennaro, 1996), Freud (see Natsoulas, 1984), and even Aristotle (see Caston, 2002). Elsewhere, we too have argued in favor of intrinsic theory (see Kriegel, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).

In the present paper, however, the strategic decision is taken to ignore the disagreement between intrinsic theory and appendage theory and focus rather on certain issues regarding the specifics of intrinsic theory. In particular, we will be concerned with the manner in which an intrinsic theorist should construe the precise intentional content of the immediate awareness built into conscious₄ mental-occurrence instances.

According to intrinsic theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious₄ when, and only when, it represents not only some external environmental stimulus, but also itself. Thus, a conscious₄ mental-occurrence instance

involves a twofold intentional content: it is intentionally directed partly outward and partly inward. In what follows, the outward-looking aspect of its intentionality will be referred to as *outer awareness* and the inward-looking aspect of its intentionality will be referred to as *inner awareness*. The question to be pursued is this: What is the exact content of inner awareness? When we have a conscious experience of, say, a yellow ball, the content of the experience's outer awareness is something like <yellow ball>, or <this is a yellow ball>. But what exactly is the content of the inner awareness?

Before starting, let us introduce a pair of terminological shorthands. First, let us speak of consciousness rather than of conscious₄. Consciousness₄ is the only sense of consciousness that will concern us in this paper, so whenever the term "consciousness" will be used, it should be understood to refer specifically to conscious₄. Second, instead of the phrase "mental-occurrence instance," let us use the shorter and simpler "mental state," even though the former is in many respects more apt than the latter (as it avoids several misguided notions about the nature of mental life). The latter will be used simply for the sake of convenience, and the reader is invited to substitute "mental-occurrence instance" for any occurrence in the text of the phrase "mental state." So instead of "conscious₄ mental-occurrence instances," let us henceforth use "conscious mental states."

Inner Awareness: Content or Attitude?

Before embarking on the question of the specific content of inner awareness, it must be demonstrated that inner awareness is indeed an aspect of mental states' content, rather than of some other component. This is rejected, for instance, by Woodruff Smith (1986; see also Woodruff Smith, 1989, ch. 2). Woodruff Smith certainly adheres to intrinsic theory:

A mental state is *conscious* if and only if it includes a certain awareness of itself, that is, in having the experience, the subject is aware of having it. (1986, pp. 149–150)

And further along:

That inner awareness, I should like to propose, lies (to begin with) in a certain *reflexive* character in experience. That character is ascribed in the following phenomenological description, for the case of seeing a frog:

In this very experience I see this frog.

Thus, the reflexive structure "in this very experience" qualifies the presentational structure "I see this frog": indeed, the former would seem already implicit in the latter. (1986, p. 150)

But Woodruff Smith's account has an untraditional twist: the inner awareness of conscious mental states (what Woodruff Smith calls their *reflexive*

character) is not an aspect of the *intentional content* of the state, but rather an aspect of the *psychological attitude* or *mode* it involves toward this content. Woodruff Smith puts it in different terms, terms borrowed from the phenomenological tradition.² Following Meinong, Twardowski, and Husserl, he calls the psychological attitude “*modality of presentation*” and the intentional content “*mode of presentation*.” But he explicitly says (1986, p. 150, fn 7) that these terms are interchangeable with Searle’s (1983, ch. 1) “*psychological mode*” and “*intentional content*.” Let us use Searle’s terminology, as it is in wider usage.

In the first part of this section, the distinction between mode/attitude and content, and correspondingly, between the two emerging views of inner awareness, will be explained. In the second part, Woodruff Smith’s three arguments in favor of his thesis will be discussed and several counter-arguments will be offered.

Two Views of Inner Awareness

The following statement reports a particular mental state, namely Jones’s hope that tomorrow will be sunny:

- (1) Jones hopes that tomorrow will be sunny.

There are three kinds of variation on (1) one can introduce. These are captured in the following three statements (the change is indicated by italics):

- (2) *Brown* hopes that tomorrow will be sunny.
 (3) Jones hopes that *tomorrow will be rainy*.
 (4) Jones *believes* that tomorrow will be sunny.

Each of the variations emphasizes a different component of the state of affairs reported in (1). Report (2) introduces variation in the psychological *subject*: whereas (1) states that it is *Jones* who hopes tomorrow will be sunny, (2) states that it is *Brown* who hopes this. Report (3) introduces a variation in *intentional content*: whereas (1) states that what Jones hopes is that tomorrow will be sunny, (3) states that what Jones hopes is that tomorrow will be rainy. Hoping that tomorrow will be rainy is different from hoping that tomorrow will be sunny — and the difference is in what is being hoped, that is, in the content of the mental state. Report (4) introduces a variation in psychological *attitude* or *mode*: whereas (1) states that the attitude Jones takes toward

²This is untraditional, at least in the sense that Brentano (1874/1973) and Sartre (1943) clearly took a different line. Let us note, though, that Husserl (1928/1964) may have held a view somewhat akin to Woodruff Smith’s. At least this is how Zahavi (1998) seems to interpret him.

the possibility that tomorrow will be sunny is that of *hope*, (4) states that the attitude she takes toward this possibility is that of *belief*. The difference between believing and hoping something is a difference in psychological attitude.

According to Woodruff Smith, then, the characteristic inner awareness built into conscious states is an aspect of the attitude of these states, not their content. Thus, consider the mental state reported in the following statement:

- (5) Jones self-consciously hopes that tomorrow will be sunny.

Here Jones's hope exhibits the inner awareness in which we are interested. According to the tradition, Jones's mental state should be understood to involve (i) an attitude of *hope* toward the possibility that tomorrow will be sunny and (ii) an attitude of *awareness* toward itself. But according to Woodruff Smith, it should be understood to involve an attitude of *self-conscious hope* toward the possibility that tomorrow will be sunny and no attitude toward itself.

Is there any real difference here? Are content and attitude psychologically real aspects of mental states, or is the distinction between them a mere interpretative tool? In all likelihood, there is a psychologically real difference here. Consider the following two statements:

- (6) Jones desires to eat an ice cream.
 (7) Jones believes that eating an ice cream is desirable.

There appears to be an important difference between actually desiring to eat an ice cream and merely believing that eating an ice cream is desirable. Perhaps Jones recognizes that eating ice cream would please her quite a bit right now, but just cannot bring herself to jump off the sofa and actually get some. That is, when someone believes something to be desirable, there is still an extra mental step they have to take in order to actually desire it. This view — that (6) and (7) do not report the same mental state — is not beyond dispute (see Lewis, 1988), but arguing against it would be an uphill endeavor. In what follows, we proceed on the assumption that the difference between attitude and content is psychologically real.

If so, the question presents itself whether the inner awareness involved in conscious states is part of their content or part of their attitude. Contrary to tradition, Woodruff Smith argues it is part of the attitude:

The reflexive character is thus part of the *modality* [i.e., attitude], and not of the mode [content], of presentation in the experience. In the modal structure "in this very experience," the experience is not, strictly speaking, presented; indeed, the experience itself is not in any way presented in the experience — what is presented is "this frog . . ."

Hence, inner awareness does not consist in a second presentation, a presentation of the experience itself, accompanying or following the primary presentation in the experience (here, the presentation of “this frog”). (1986, p. 150)

At times a similar view seems to be propounded by Natsoulas:

[There is a] phenomenology of those visual experiences that are a product and part of a kind of seeing that is different from straightforward seeing: a kind of seeing that takes place usually upon adopting an introspective attitude with reference to one’s seeing. Elsewhere, I have called such seeing “reflective seeing.” (1996b, p. 385)

That is, while tradition construes x ’s self-conscious perception of a cube as in Figure 3:




Figure 3: Inner awareness as an aspect of content.

Woodruff Smith thinks we should construe it as in Figure 4:




Figure 4: Inner awareness as an aspect of attitude.

The difference is that the mental state in Figure 3 is intentionally directed at two separate contents, (i) the cube and (ii) itself, whereas the mental state in Figure 4 is intentionally directed only at the cube. This does not mean that the mental state in Figure 4 involves no inner awareness, but rather that the inner awareness it involves is not an aspect of its intentional content, it is an aspect of its attitude. Is this model of inner awareness plausible?

In Defense of the Traditional View

In Woodruff Smith's (1986) paper, three different arguments for his view can be discerned. The first argument is purely phenomenological: Woodruff Smith claims (in the last passage quoted) that "the experience itself is not in any way *presented* in the experience [of a frog] — what is presented is 'this frog'" (our italics). This strikes us as plainly false. The experience does not constitute the *focal center* of its own content, but the experience is nonetheless presented *peripherally* in it.

Consider the following analogy. Suppose a subject stands at the feet of the twin towers in Kuala Lumpur. When the subject raises her eyes and looks at tower A, she is aware mainly, or *primarily*, of tower A. But she is also aware, peripherally (hence more vaguely), or *secondarily*, of tower B. In cognitivist jargon, B is represented in peripheral vision, whereas A is represented in foveal vision. But both are represented in one and the same conscious experience. Intrinsic theory is founded on the observation that the subject's experience includes not only peripheral *visual* awareness, but also a peripheral *self-awareness*. The subject's awareness of herself as seeing the twin towers in Kuala Lumpur enjoys a status similar, in some respects (though clearly not in every respect), to her awareness of tower B: both awarenesses are peripheral components of the subject's overall state of consciousness at the time.

This reply to Woodruff Smith's first argument depends on a distinction, which virtually all phenomenologists interested in self-awareness appeal to, between the *focal* and *peripheral* contents of conscious states. This distinction shows up in different terms in the works of different theorists: Aristotle calls the peripheral content "incidental" or "on the side," claiming that conscious "knowing, perceiving, believing, and thinking are always of something else, but of themselves on the side" (*Metaphysics* 12.9, 1074b35–36); Brentano (1874/1973) calls it "secondary" or "incidental"; Husserl (1928/1964) calls it "unthematized"; Gurwitsch (1985) and Brough (1972) call it "marginal"; Caston (2002) and Kriegel (2002) call it "peripheral." Whatever the terminology, the point is that in every conscious state there is a primary object represented focally, but a myriad of items represented peripherally, or as James (1890) put it, in the "fringe of consciousness." What Brentano claims is that awareness of one's own current experience is a permanent element in the fringe of *every* conscious state we have or even *can* have. And while it would be justified to say that a conscious experience is not presented *primarily* or *focally* by itself, it would be mistaken to suggest that it is therefore not presented *at all*. The latter is what Woodruff Smith claims, so his argument is unsound.

It may be objected that the distinction between primary and secondary intentionality is an ad hoc move which only gives a misleading impression

that something has been explained. However, the distinction between primary and secondary content can be glossed in terms of the distribution of the subject's attention resources. Suppose you have a conscious experience of a big pink Cadillac driving by. You may be focusing your attention on the color and shape of the car, and not so much on the indistinct sound of its engine. But you nonetheless consciously hear the engine, and this is a bona fide part of your conscious experience. At the same time, there is clearly a difference in the status of the representation of color and shape in your experience and the representation of the engine sound. The former are paramount in your awareness whereas the latter is peripheral or, indeed, incidental. We can model this difference in status between the representation of color and shape and the representation of sound by saying that you are primarily aware of the color and shape of the pink Cadillac and only secondarily aware of the sound of the Cadillac's engine. By extension, since most of your attention is directed to the color and shape of the Cadillac, and only a little of it is directed to yourself, you can be said to be primarily aware of the color and shape of the Cadillac, and only secondarily of yourself as the experiencing subject. The representation of the engine sound and the representation of yourself are on equal footing: there is relatively little attention dedicated to either. In a fuller account, the dichotomy of primary–secondary will give way to a multigradient spectrum of different degrees of attentiveness. The distinction between primary and secondary intentionality can thus be construed unmysteriously in terms of the well-studied psychological mechanisms of attention.

In conclusion, the distinction between primary and secondary intentionality is a sound one, and when taken into account, it is easy to recognize that while a conscious mental state is not presented *primarily* in inner awareness, it is presented nonetheless — *secondarily*. This in fact provides positive evidence in favor of the view that inner awareness is an aspect of content.

Woodruff Smith's second argument starts with Hume's celebrated passage in which he denounces the existence of an introspectible sense of self as a piece of philosophical mythology:

There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume, 1738/1978, I.4.vi.)

Woodruff Smith claims that Hume's fallacy was to presuppose that the self is part of a content of experience, when in fact it is part of the attitude. Woodruff Smith is implying that if the self figured as an aspect of the *content*

of conscious experience, then Hume's point would be right on the mark. And this is a reason to reject the notion that the self figures in the content.

However, Woodruff Smith's diagnosis of Hume's fallacy is inadequate. It is unclear how the difference between content and attitude is supposed to affect Hume's argument, given that attitudes are just as introspectible as contents. When a person desires *x* rather than believes *x*, the person can tell by introspection that her attitude toward *x* is that of desire and not belief, just as much as she can tell that what she desires is *x* and not *y*.

A better diagnosis of Hume's fallacy is that he fallaciously inferred from the fact that the self cannot be introspected that there is no such thing as self-awareness. The fallacy is to suppose that the only form of self-awareness is introspective, or reflective, self-awareness. Another way to put the point is the following. We have distinguished above between primary and secondary awareness. To say that the self cannot be introspected in an attentive act of reflection is to say that there can be no primary awareness of the self. But this leaves open the possibility of secondary awareness which is not grounded in a distinct conscious state, but rides the original conscious state.³

Woodruff Smith's third argument is similar in strategy. He notes that certain philosophers have alleged that self-awareness is paradoxical, since it requires that the self be represented as subject of consciousness, yet once the subject is represented, it becomes an object. Once it is an object, however, it is no longer represented as *subject*. Again, Woodruff Smith (1986, p. 152) is implying that the only way to dissipate the paradox is to build the self-awareness into the attitude, not content.

This is, to my mind, Woodruff Smith's strongest argument. Observe, however, that it depends on a certain dichotomist thinking about subject and object. It is clear that in most mental events, there is a principled gap between object and subject. And it is also clear that there is something very special about self-awareness, which distinguishes it from most mental events. One way to signal the specialty of self-awareness is to say, as we have in the opening, that in self-awareness the self is represented as subject and not as object. But another way to signal this specialty may be to say that in self-awareness the gap between subject and object collapses, such that the self is represented both as subject and as object. One may protest that this would make self-awareness quite mysterious, and will attribute to it a unique intentional structure. But then self-awareness is quite mysterious, isn't it, and its intentional structure is indeed unique. That is to say, this suggested treatment of the alleged paradox does do justice to the data, insofar as there are any.

³Curiously, this diagnosis of Hume's fallacy is offered by Woodruff Smith himself, before he introduces the idea that reflexivity is an aspect of attitude not content: "[Hume was] looking for the self in the wrong place. For self-awareness is already part of (normal human) consciousness itself" (1986, p. 149).

In conclusion, all three arguments adduced by Woodruff Smith to support his peculiar conception of inner awareness as an aspect of attitude and not content are unpersuasive. At the same time, there are positive reasons to doubt that inner awareness is an aspect of the attitude.

Paramount among them is the fact that the notion is empirically implausible. If inner awareness was an aspect of the attitude, there would be twice as many attitudes as are recognized today. For instance, there would not only be the attitude of desiring, but also the attitude of self-consciously desiring; not only anticipating, but also self-consciously anticipating; not only fearing, but also self-consciously fearing; etc. This argument can be formulated as follows:

- (1) If inner awareness was part of the attitude, there would be twice as many kinds of attitudes;
- (2) It is empirically implausible that there are twice as many kinds of attitude; therefore,
- (3) It is empirically implausible that inner awareness is part of the attitude.

It is difficult to see which premise Woodruff Smith could attack.

Furthermore, it is unclear how one would explain the notion of attitude if inner awareness were construed as an aspect thereof. One straightforward way to explain the notion of psychological attitude is in terms of *directions of fit* (see Searle, 1983, ch. 1). The explanation goes something like this. A belief has a mind-to-world direction of fit: the mind is supposed to fit itself to the world in order for the belief to be correct. A desire, by contrast, has a world-to-mind direction of fit: the mind is in such a state that the world is supposed to fit *it* in order for the desire to be satisfied. This is why desire is intrinsically motivating to action, whereas belief is not. The nature of belief is to fit itself to the world, whereas the nature of desire is to have the world fit it. Other mental states have appropriate combinations of these two directions of fit. Thus, being disappointed that p involves (even if it is not exhausted by) believing that p and desiring that not- p . Therefore, disappointment with p involves a world-to-mind direction of fit toward not- p and a mind-to-world direction of fit toward p . And so on and so forth. However, what direction of fit is supposed to be involved in, say, self-conscious desiring, and how is that supposed to differ from the direction of fit involved in unconscious desiring? There seems to be no available account of such a psychological attitude. The argument can be laid out as follows:

- (1) If inner awareness was part of the attitude, the direction-of-fit account of attitudes would not work;

- (2) There is no plausible account of attitude other than the direction-of-fit account; therefore,
- (3) If inner awareness was part of the attitude, there would be no plausible account of attitude.

Again, neither premise looks vulnerable.

This problem does not present itself to the traditional view that inner awareness is an aspect of content. For according to this view, a mental state of self-consciously desiring that p involves a world-to-mind direction of fit toward p and a mind-to-world direction of fit toward itself. Similarly, self-conscious disappointment with p involves a world-to-mind direction of fit toward not- p , a mind-to-world direction of fit toward p , and a mind-to-world direction of fit toward itself.

In conclusion, there are several powerful arguments for the view that inner awareness is an aspect of content, whereas the arguments for the view that inner awareness is rather an aspect of attitude are unimpressive. It would therefore be wiser for the intrinsic theorist to continue to adhere to the traditional view that the reflexive character of conscious states, the inner awareness they involve, is an aspect of their content, rather than of their attitude.

On the Exact Content of Inner Awareness

Having established that inner awareness is an aspect of conscious states' content, let us consider the specific content involved. In pursuing this matter, there is much to be learned from work already done by appendage theorists. In particular, Rosenthal (1986, 1993, 1997, 2004) has dwelled quite a bit on the specifics of our inner awareness of conscious mental states. He has advanced several important, and highly plausible, theses about the precise content of what he takes to be an appendage to those mental-occurrence instances. At the same time, appendage theory appears to run into a number of formidable difficulties. A partial list includes objections developed in Rey (1988), Aquila (1990), Natsoulas (1992, 1993), Dretske (1993), Goldman (1993), Byrne (1997), Neander (1998), Carruthers (2000), Levine (2001), Moran (2001), and Kriegel (2002, 2003b). However, Rosenthal's various theses about the specific content of inner awareness can often be readily transposed into the framework of intrinsic theory.⁴ In this section, various theses advanced by Rosenthal will be discussed from within the framework of intrinsic theory.

Before starting, however, let us recapitulate on what has emerged in the literature as the most troubling difficulty with appendage theory. According

⁴It is for this reason that it would be wise, in the present context, to set aside the differences between intrinsic theory and appendage theory, in pursuit of a better fleshed-out elaboration of intrinsic theory.

to appendage theory, when a mental state is conscious, the subject must have a second mental state, such that the latter is a representation of the former. Thus, if a person enjoys a conscious visual experience of a tree, she not only harbors a representation of the tree, but also a second representation, namely, a representation of the representation of the tree. According to intrinsic theory, the subject need only harbor one representation, which doubles as a representation both of the tree and of itself. The problem that faces appendage theory is that the existence of a second representation introduces the possibility of *misrepresentation*, and it does not appear as though a satisfactory account can be given for certain possible cases of misrepresentation.⁵

To appreciate the difficulty here, it is important to distinguish two kinds of misrepresentation. One is when the subject misrepresents the way her other representation is. For instance, the subject may harbor a representation of a tree but misrepresent it as a representation of a house. This kind of misrepresentation is unproblematic and may take place in everyday life. For instance, if a person picks up a Sprite can filled with chocolate milk, in the first moment of drinking she may readily misrepresent the way in which the liquid coming out of the can tastes to her.⁶ A second kind of misrepresentation is more problematic, however, and involves the subject misrepresenting the very *existence* of another representation. What could the appendage theorist say about the possibility that a subject should represent to herself that she harbors a representation of a tree when in reality she harbors neither a representation of a tree nor a representation of any other external object? This does not normally happen, to be sure, but within the framework of appendage theory, there is no way to rule out the possibility of an exotic syndrome bringing about such a state of affairs. In dealing with this sort of case, the appendage theorist faces a theoretical dilemma: Is a person who harbors a second-order representation but no first-order representation conscious or unconscious? It seems that the appendage theorist must claim that such a person is not conscious but is nonetheless under the impression that she is conscious.⁷ Yet this is evidently absurd: there is nothing to being conscious over and above being under the impression that one is conscious.

⁵For different versions of this argument, see Byrne (1997), Neander (1998), and Levine (2001).

⁶Thanks to Josh Weisberg for the particularly vivid example.

⁷This is effectively what Rosenthal says:

Strictly speaking, having a HOT [higher-order thought] cannot of course result in a mental state's being conscious if that mental state does not even exist . . . Still, a case in which one has a HOT along with a mental state it is about may be *subjectively indistinguishable* from a case in which the HOT occurs but not the mental state. If so, folk psychology would count both as cases of conscious states. (1997, p. 744; italics ours)

This problem does not arise within the framework of intrinsic theory. Here a conscious representation of a tree represents both the tree and itself. This allows, in principle, for the possibility that the representation would misrepresent itself to be a representation of a house when in fact it is a representation of a tree. That is, intrinsic theory does allow for the possibility of misrepresentation of the first kind. But its advantage over appendage theory is that it does not allow the possibility of misrepresentation of the second kind. It is impossible for a representation to misrepresent itself to exist when in fact it does not: if the representation did not exist, it would not be able to represent itself (or any other thing, for that matter).

Intrinsic theory thus allows us to avoid some foundational problems with the model offered by appendage theory. There are other difficulties associated with appendage theory, but let us not focus in this paper on the negative aspect of appendage theory. Let us focus instead on the positive aspect of intrinsic theory.

Inner Awareness As Self-Awareness

Rosenthal's first thesis about the specific content of inner awareness is this: the content of inner awareness refers not only to the subject's conscious state, but also to the subject whose state it is. Here is how Rosenthal states this view:

When the mental state is conscious, it is not simply that we are conscious of the state; we are conscious of being in that state. This places constraints on what the content of [inner awareness] must be; [its] content must be that one is, oneself, in that very mental state. (1997, p. 741)

That is, what inner awareness presents is not only the mental state in which one is, but also the fact that this mental state is one's own.

According to Rosenthal, not only is one aware of oneself, one is specifically aware of oneself *as* the owner of the mental state in question. The content of the inner awareness built into, say, Rosenthal's visual experience of a white wall is <I am, myself, seeing a white wall>, *not* <David Rosenthal is seeing a white wall>. Rosenthal states that "only if one's thought is about oneself as such, and not just about someone that happens to be oneself, will the mental state be a conscious state" (1997, p. 750). This is an important point. If Rosenthal was somehow hit with amnesia, and could no longer remember he was David Rosenthal, his experiences of white walls could still be conscious. Yet he would be unable to harbor the inner awareness whose content is <David Rosenthal is seeing a white wall>. What he would not lose, however,

is the ability to have an inner awareness whose content is <I myself am seeing a white wall>. We can state this thesis as follows:

- (R1) The content of inner awareness is that one is, oneself, the subject of that state.

What is required in inner awareness, then, is a *demonstrative* reference to oneself, as opposed to reference to oneself through one's proper name or some other description. The content of inner awareness is thus *de se* content, to use Castañeda's (1966, 1969) term: it is awareness of oneself *as oneself*.⁸

Not everybody would agree. Sartre (1937) argued that consciousness is not "egological," that is, that inner awareness does not involve awareness of one's self.⁹ So what is Rosenthal's argument for (R1)? One forceful consideration is phenomenological: from the first-person perspective, it does seem as though our immediate awareness of our conscious states is a form of *self-awareness*: we appear to be presented to ourselves as the subjects of experience. Rosenthal, however, is generally suspicious of phenomenological considerations, and so resorts to a different line of argument:

Independent considerations point to the same conclusion. One cannot think about a particular mental-state token, as opposed to thinking simply about a type of mental state, unless what one thinks is that some individual creature is in that mental state. So [inner awareness] will not be about mental-state tokens unless [its] content is that one is, oneself, in the mental state. (1997, p. 741)

Rosenthal's argument is straightforward: thinking about a *particular* (token) mental state — as opposed to thinking about the *kind* (type) of mental state it is — without thinking that it is someone's mental state is impossible; therefore, the content of immediate awareness must be *de se*.

The thesis seems phenomenologically accurate, but is Rosenthal's argument sound? The argument can be laid out as follows:

- (1) It is impossible to think about a *particular* mental state without thinking about the subject whose mental state it is;
- (2) In inner awareness, one is aware of the *particular* mental states one is in; therefore,

⁸Castañeda argued that *de se* content is irreducible to any other kind of content. This is thoroughly criticized by Lycan and Boer (1975). However, we need not take a stand on this issue. Whether or not *de se* content is reducible, that is the content of immediate awareness. All we are claiming that if it is reducible, then the content of immediate awareness is also reducible, and if it is not, then the content of immediate awareness is also not reducible.

⁹See Zahavi (1999, ch. 8) for a thorough discussion of Sartre's position and its disadvantages.

- (3) In inner awareness, one is aware of oneself as the subject whose mental state the mental state one is aware of is.

Premise (2) is hard to deny: it does not seem as though inner awareness is only an awareness of a general kind of experience, and not specifically of the particular experience one is undergoing. Premise (1), however, is more suspicious. Suppose one is having a visual experience of a white wall. Then according to Rosenthal, it is possible to think of the general *kind* of experience — visual experience of white walls — in abstraction from its being *someone's* experience, but it is not possible to think of any *particular* instance of a visual experience of a white wall in abstraction from its being this or that person's experience. This is not clearly true, but in any event, even if it is not strictly *impossible* to think of a particular mental state in abstraction from the subject whose state it is, it is surely *abnormal* for a human thinker to do so. And the mitigated premise — urging only the abnormality of such thoughts — is enough to sustain an argument to the effect that *normally*, the content of inner awareness is that one is, oneself, the subject of the conscious state (although it might be possible, in principle, to have an immediate awareness of the conscious state without being aware of oneself). The argument would be this:

- (1) It is *abnormal* to think about a *particular* mental state without thinking about the subject whose mental state it is;
- (2) In inner awareness, one is *normally* aware of the *particular* mental states one is in; therefore,
- (3) In inner awareness, one is *normally* aware of oneself as the subject whose mental state the mental state one is aware of is.

In this revised argument, the premises are highly plausible.

There is still a problem, however, in the *inference* to (3). For (3) would follow from (1) and (2) only on the assumption that the only way to be aware of a mental state is by *thinking* about it. There is a long tradition of conceiving of first-person awareness of one's mental state as a quasi-perceptual activity, rather than as a kind of thinking. This is often called the *inner sense* theory. In arguing the way he does, Rosenthal is effectively assuming that the inner sense theory is mistaken. But Rosenthal is not by any means suppressing this assumption. He explicitly argues for it. We now turn to examine his argumentation in this regard.

Is Inner Awareness Intellectual or Perceptual?

The self-awareness built into conscious states is awareness of oneself as the subject of a mental state one is in at the time. Now, there are two ways in

which one may be aware of anything: perceptually or intellectually. The question arises, then, of whether the content of inner awareness is of the former or latter sort. Rosenthal poses this very question within the framework of appendage theory. He asks whether the inner awareness, which in his view is a distinct higher-order mental state, is a higher-order thought or a higher-order perception.¹⁰ But the question can be posed within the framework of intrinsic theory as well. The question would be: Is the inner awareness built into conscious mental states perceptual or intellectual in nature? Rosenthal claims that it is intellectual:

(R2) The content of inner awareness is intellectual rather than perceptual.

His argument for his claim proceeds as follows:

The perceptual model fails Perceiving something involves the occurrence of some sensory quality, which in standard circumstances signals the presence of that thing. If our being conscious of a mental state is like perceiving something, our being conscious of it will involve the occurrence of some mental quality; otherwise the analogy with perception will be idle. (1997, p. 740)

Rosenthal goes on to say that there is no such mental quality, and therefore the appended mental state must be intellectual in nature (a thought). The argument can be reconstructed as follows:

- (1) If inner awareness is analogous to perception, then it exhibits some perceptual quality;
- (2) Inner awareness involves no perceptual quality; therefore,
- (3) The analogy between inner awareness and perception is idle.

Both premises here are problematic. We take them up in turns.

Rosenthal defends the first premise by noting that, unless inner awareness exhibits a perceptual quality, the analogy between it and outer perception would be idle, in the sense that there would be no genuine or significant similarity between the alleged analogs. It would be quite arbitrary, in his view, to call a mental phenomenon perceptual that does not feature a perceptual quality.

In responding to Rosenthal's argument, appendage theorists who take the appended state to be perceptual have been quick to claim that higher-order perception, unlike first-order perception, need not involve a perceptual qual-

¹⁰That mental state is not higher-order in the sense that it is particularly complex or sophisticated, but in the sense that it has a mental state as its object.

ity (see, for instance, Lycan, 1990). What they do not address, however, is Rosenthal's claim that without making this assumption there would be no genuine or significant similarity between the relevant higher-order states and perceptual states. That is, appendage theorists who take inner awareness to be perceptual do not indicate in what respect inner awareness is crucially like perception, if not in exhibiting a perceptual quality.

One way inner awareness may be analogous to perception is in the kind of intentional content it has. In particular, it could be claimed that, like perception and unlike thought, the content of inner awareness is *non-conceptual*.¹¹ We argued above that inner awareness is *self-awareness*. Whether the content of inner awareness is conceptual or not may be determined by examining the sort of self-awareness involved. Here there are two possible approaches. One, classically exemplified in Kant, takes the self of self-awareness to be a purely "formal" self: one is aware of oneself as *the thing that does the experiencing*, or *the thing that undergoes the present experiences*. The second approach, present in Locke, conceives of the self as a "biographical" self: one is aware of oneself as a particular *person*, a person with a certain life experience, personality structure, etc. One is not explicitly representing to oneself one's life experiences and character traits, of course, but what one represents to oneself is a very personal and familiar self, a self who is crucially the kind of thing that carries a baggage of life experience and emotional makeup. In a

¹¹Some philosophers (e.g., Evans, 1982; Peacocke, 1992) have claimed that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual, in that it represents the subject's environment in ways that outstrip the subject's conceptual repertoire. Michael Tye (1995) gives the following example. When you look at a lemon, the lemon does not just appear yellow to you — it appears a specific shade of yellow, say, yellow₁₇. If it were put next to another lemon, which happens to be yellow₁₈, you may be able to discriminate their colors, even if you would not be able to recognize their shade across time. Thus if you were presented with a third lemon an hour later (in the absence of the former pair of lemons), which was yellow₁₇, you would most probably be unable to tell whether the new lemon's color is the same as the first or second lemon's color. Nonetheless, your experience of the third lemon represents the third lemon the same way your experience of the first lemon represented the first lemon — even though your experience does not represent the third lemon as being the same color as the first lemon (it only represents it as being yellow₁₇). This suggests that the content of your experience outstrips your conceptual capacities, since the capacity of reapplication across time and contexts is often taken to be a necessary condition on concept possession (see Evans, 1982, and his discussion of "the generality constraint"). Other philosophers, however, claim that all intentional content is conceptual (e.g., McDowell, 1994). Thus, it has been claimed that your experience of the third lemon employs the demonstrative concept "this color." It has also been claimed that it employs a short-lived concept of yellow₁₇ — a concept which the subject possesses only for the duration of the experience and loses immediately thereafter. If so, then the content of experience is conceptual after all. We are going to avoid the debate over the existence of non-conceptual content here. We are only interested in the way the notion might be employed in tackling Rosenthal's argument. One philosopher who actually argues for the existence of a non-conceptual form of self-consciousness is Bermúdez (1998).

way, the first approach conceives of the self of self-awareness as *impersonal* ("the subject"), whereas the second approach conceives of it as *personal* ("me").

It would be impossible to adjudicate this historical disagreement here. But there are clear connections between it and the question of conceptual content. On the Lockean approach, it would seem that in inner awareness, we do *conceptualize* the self of which we are aware. The Kantian approach, by contrast, portrays our awareness of ourselves as very much direct, non-conceptual, or pre-conceptual.

The second premise in Rosenthal's argument has never been put to question, to my knowledge. It seems curious to claim that inner awareness does involve a sensory quality. But this would be quite plausible if we took the content of outer awareness to be somehow *embedded* in the content of the inner awareness that accompanies it. This claim is made explicitly by Brentano (1874/1973). On his version of intrinsic theory, the content of a conscious state's outer awareness is embedded within the content of the state's inner awareness:

We have recognized that the act of seeing and the presentation of this act are connected in such a way that the color, as the content of the act of seeing, contributes at the same time to the content of the presentation of the presentation of this act. (p. 134)

That is, the content of the outer awareness involved in a conscious state is embedded within the content of the state's inner awareness of itself.¹² Thus, when we have a conscious perception of a white wall, the inner awareness involved in that conscious perception presents the whiteness of the wall just as much as the outer awareness does. We can represent this fact by stating the content of inner awareness, not as <I myself am seeing a white wall>, but as <I myself am *herewith* seeing a white wall>. If we do construe the content of outer awareness as embedded in the content of inner awareness, whenever the outer awareness features a sensory quality, the inner awareness will feature one as well — the very same one, in fact.

The suggestion is that inner awareness is perceptual when the outer awareness concomitant therewith is perceptual, but it is intellectual when the latter is intellectual. For the content of the inner awareness is partly inherited from the outer awareness. Thus, if we self-consciously think that $2+2=4$, there is no perceptual quality involved in the inner awareness of our thought, since there is no perceptual quality in our outer awareness of the fact that $2+2=4$. The view can be stated as follows:

¹²The idea that first-order content is often embedded in second-order content has recently been discussed by Shoemaker (1994).

(IA2) The content of inner awareness is intellectual when the content of outer awareness is intellectual and perceptual when the content of outer awareness is perceptual.

This is also the view taken by Caston (2002, fn 47).¹³

Might Rosenthal reject the notion that the content of outer awareness is embedded in the content of inner awareness? We believe not. To see why, consider what has come to be called *the transparency of experience*. G.E. Moore (1903) introduced this idea as follows:

[T]he moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as it were diaphanous. (p. 25)

This observation has been forcefully revived by Harman (1997):

Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree. (p. 667)

When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience. (p. 667)

When you introspect your visual experience of a tree, you fail to be aware of anything but what it is an experience of — that is, a tree. Thus Harman suggests that *there is no mental paint*: there is no intrinsic medium of representation which we can access introspectively. Although the experience of the blue sky patently deploys *some* medium to represent the blueness of the sky, this medium is not something with which we can become acquainted. In this sense, it is unlike the medium a painting of the blue skies deploys to represent the blueness of the sky, namely, the medium of paint, with which we can readily become acquainted.

If there is no mental paint, then it is impossible to be aware of mental paint through the sort of inner awareness characteristic of conscious mental states. If so, when we have such inner awareness of our conscious experience of the blue sky, the blueness presented in that awareness must be the blue-

¹³This view is also more plausible than Brentano's own view on the matter. According to Brentano (1874/1973, Book 2, chapter III, sections 1–6), there are in fact not one but *three* distinct inner awarenesses accompanying every outer awareness. One is perceptual (“a presentation”), one is intellectual (“a judgement”) and one is emotional (“a feeling”). This degree of complexity is unlikely and, so far as we can tell, nowhere attested to by the phenomenology.

ness of the sky itself, as opposed to any blueness of the *awareness* of the sky. Now, the blueness of the sky itself is precisely what the outer awareness presents. So, by presenting the blueness of the sky, the inner awareness of our experience presents the same thing its concomitant outer awareness presents. That is, the content of the outer awareness is embedded in that of the concomitant inner awareness. Therefore, the content of the outer awareness is embedded in the content of the inner awareness.

Rosenthal's argument for his view that inner awareness is always intellectual therefore depends on rejecting the transparency of experience. Accepting the transparency of experience leads to something like (IA2), rather than (R2). Since Rosenthal himself accepts the transparency of experience (1997, p. 744), he would be hard-pressed to defend (R2). But the transparency of experience may have further implications for the precise content of inner awareness.

Inner Awareness and the Transparency of Experience

The transparency of experience poses a certain problem for understanding the content of inner awareness. One way of construing this observation is as a claim to the effect that when we are aware of one of our conscious states, the content of that conscious state and the content of our awareness of it collapse into one. This, Caston (2002) notes, would be bad news for intrinsic theory, for it would not make the awareness in question "transparent," but *dissolve* it entirely. Thus, if the inner awareness of a visual experience of the sky presents the same blueness presented in the outer awareness of this experience, then it is unclear in what sense there are *two* different awarenesses here: both, after all, are awarenesses of the same blue expanse.

Carruthers (2000) offers a model of the content of inner awareness that takes the transparency of experience into account.¹⁴ For Carruthers, when you look at the sky, the outer awareness of your visual experience has the content <blue>, but the inner awareness has the content <seems blue> or <appears blue>. That is, Carruthers construes the content of inner awareness in terms of the *appearance* or *seeming* of the environmental feature presented in the outer awareness, not in terms of the environmental feature itself. The outer awareness of the experience presents the sky as *being* blue, its inner awareness presents it as *appearing* blue.

What does it mean to say that the inner awareness of the experience does not present the actual blueness of the sky, but the *appearance* of the sky's

¹⁴In his earlier work, Carruthers (1996) was more of an appendage theorist, but his latest book (2000) lays out a version of intrinsic theory (see especially ch. 9). Carruthers also explicitly argues for the transparency of experience (ch. 6).

blueness? A plausible interpretation is that the awareness does not present the sky's blueness as it is in itself, but rather presents the sky precisely *as presented to me*. The blueness is presented as the content of the outer awareness of one's experience. The general idea is that when a subject has an experience of an environmental feature *F*, the content of its outer awareness is *F* and the inner content is the fact that *F* is (therewith) experienced by the subject. It is when *F* is experienced by the subject that we can say that *F* *appears* to the subject. And *F*'s appearing to the subject is precisely the inner content of the subject's experience.¹⁵

According to the present characterization of the difference between the contents of outer and inner awareness, the former carries a certain presumption of mind-independent existence which is perhaps lifted, or indeed *suspended*, in the latter. Whereas the outer awareness of experience presents the object as an element of mind-independent reality, the inner awareness presents it as a mere content of experience. On this understanding, the inner awareness of an experience always presents the *bracketed version* of what the outer awareness presents. If the outer awareness presents feature *F*, the inner awareness presents [*F*]. In this construal, the inner awareness is also world-involving, in that it presents an element of the external world, but it presents it precisely insofar as it is an element presented in outer awareness.

If this construal is on the right track, then rather than representing the content of inner awareness as <I myself am herewith seeing blue>, we should state it as <blue is herewith being seen by myself> or <blue herewith appears to me>. This is just a device, of course, to signal that the focus of awareness is the external object even in inner awareness — as is required by the observation of transparency.¹⁶

¹⁵Note that, while this construal does avoid the dissolution of the inner awareness, we are entitled to wonder if it really makes room for genuine transparency. If it is right, then when we attend to our own experience, we take notice of more than just whatever is being perceived. What is perceived is a feature *F qua mind-independent feature*. But what we take notice of when attending to our experience is the feature *F qua perceived or experienced*. This aspect of *F*, of which we take notice upon attending to our experience, is no part of the content of the experience's outer awareness. So there are elements in the content of inner awareness that are absent from outer awareness, which means that they do not collapse into each other after all. There is no genuine transparency here.

¹⁶The focus of awareness is a psychologically real aspect of experience. Consider the following analogy. Suppose a pianist is moving to a new apartment. When the moving company arrives, the pianist is very concerned about their handling of her piano. When finally John lifts the piano and carries it out, the pianist may think to herself "the piano is carried by John." At the same time, John's friend, who sees him carrying the piano out of the apartment, may think to himself "John is carrying the piano." The thoughts that the pianist and John's friend are having are certainly very similar, but they are not quite the same thought. The pianist's

Does the Content of Inner Awareness “Tinge” the Content of Outer Awareness?

An interesting question regarding the contents of inner and outer awareness is how independent they are of each other. There are four possibilities:

- (i) The contents of inner and outer awareness are mutually independent.
- (ii) The content of inner awareness depends on the content of outer awareness, but not conversely.
- (iii) The content of outer awareness depends on the content of inner awareness, but not conversely.
- (iv) The contents of inner and outer awareness are interdependent.

If we accept the transparency of experience, and consequently the notion that the content of outer awareness is embedded in inner awareness, then we must concede that the content of the inner awareness is partly dependent on that of the outer awareness. This leaves open only (ii) and (iv). The question, then, is whether, conversely, the content of outer awareness depends on that of inner awareness. Here is perhaps Rosenthal's most interesting claim: he argues, within the framework of appendage theory, that the content of the appended state can affect that of the conscious state itself. Within the framework of intrinsic theory, the thesis would be put thusly:

- (R3) The content of the outer awareness in conscious states is dependent on the content of their inner awareness.

Within the framework of intrinsic theory, this claim will entail that (iv) is the correct view.

The thesis that the content of inner awareness influences the outer awareness is made also by Natsoulas (1998), who puts it by saying that the former “tinges” the latter. Natsoulas extracts from Gurwitsch (1985) the following argument for this view:

In the absence of these intrinsic reflective ingredients, the mental act would not, as it does, develop over time; instead, it would amount to a mere succession of unconnected events. Clearly, in Gurwitsch's own view, it is not true that the relation among the awarenesses that simultaneously make up a unitary objectivating act “consist only in these [awarenesses] happening to occur together.” . . . [A]n objectivating act is partly as it is because it contains, albeit marginally, inner awareness of itself. (1998, pp. 11–12)

awareness is focused on her piano, whereas John's friend's awareness is focused on John. Similarly, given that — according to the transparency of experience — the focus of inner awareness is still the external feature, its content is better expressed as “this external feature is experienced by me” rather than “I am experiencing this external feature.”

The argument is that the inner awareness built into a conscious state *constitutes*, as it were, the state's temporal duration and internal organization over time. It is inner awareness which individuates conscious states across time.

To frame this argument more clearly, let us consider the difference between the following two scenarios. In the first scenario, a subject is put in an empty room, where she is told to stare at a white wall. If we take two moments t_1 and t_2 of her experience, such that t_2 occurs, say, one millisecond after t_1 , then it is plausible to say that her experiences at t_1 and t_2 form part of one single, temporally unfolding conscious state. In the second scenario, by contrast, a lion is let into the room at t_2 (or, rather, at t_2 the subject becomes aware of the lion being let into the room). Instantaneously the subject forgets all about the white wall and is completely engrossed in the lion and her intense fear thereof. In this second scenario, the subject's experiences at t_1 and t_2 form part of two distinct conscious states. There are, then, facts of the matter about what stretches in our stream of consciousness constitute single conscious states and what stretches constitute a succession of distinct conscious states. The question is, what governs these facts of the matter? Gurwitsch's answer, as interpreted by Natsoulas, is the content of inner awareness. It is (partly) because in the first scenario the inner awareness represents the subject's experience as one and the same at t_1 and t_2 that it is a single conscious state; and it is (partly) because in the second scenario the inner awareness represents the two states as different that they really are.

This argument appears cogent, but it only shows that the content of inner awareness influences the *temporal duration* of the subject's conscious states. It does *not* show that it influences the *content* of outer awareness of these states. An argument that would show that, if sound, is provided by Rosenthal:

Richer conceptual resources would thus expand the range of one's conscious states. Though this may initially seem surprising, on reflection it is plain that this happens in our own experience. Having more fine-grained conceptual distinctions often makes us aware of more fine-grained differences among sensory qualities. Vivid examples come from wine tasting and musical experience, where conceptual sophistication seems to generate experiences with more finely differentiated sensory qualities. (1997, p. 742)

On this view, when we have a sensory gustatory experience of a quality wine, the outer awareness of our experience presents the taste and texture of the wine, but the content of the inner awareness of the gustatory experience does more than that: it classifies the gustatory experience as belonging to a certain type of experience rather than to another. This classification alters the outer awareness of the experience, as we can all tell from our own experience.

One wonders, however, why Rosenthal thinks the concepts operative in modulating the gustatory experience are concepts that classify wine-tasting *experiences*, rather than concepts that classify the flavors of the actual wine.

When we acquire a more sophisticated taste for wine, we acquire an ability to tell apart the qualities of wines, not — not *only*, at any rate — an ability to tell apart our wine experiences. We have all the more reason to think so given the transparency of experience: the concepts with which we classify wine experiences must themselves be just the concepts with which we classify wine flavors.

In fact, the transparency of experience provides a strong reason to think that the content of inner awareness *cannot possibly* alter the content of outer awareness, since it is largely inherited therefrom. It is possible, of course, to reject the transparency of experience (see Block, 1996), but as long as we do not, it is quite impossible for inner awareness to affect outer awareness. We are left, therefore, with a merely temporal influence of inner awareness on conscious states: the former constitutes the temporal duration of the latter.

Conclusion

In this paper, work conducted within the framework of the appendage theory has been used to flesh out the specifics of an account of consciousness — in the sense of consciousness₄ — within the framework of intrinsic theory. We have defended several theses about the exact content of the inner awareness built into conscious states. First of all, this inner awareness is indeed an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode. Second, it is *de se* content, i.e., content of the form <I myself am experiencing the blue sky>. That is, inner awareness is *self-awareness*. Third, the content of a conscious state's outer awareness is embedded within the content of its inner awareness, so the latter is of the form <I myself am *herewith* experiencing the blue sky>. Fourth, this means that the content of the inner awareness is perceptual when the content of the outer awareness is perceptual, and intellectual when it is intellectual. Fifth, a further consequence of the fact that the content of outer awareness is embedded in the content of inner awareness is that the latter is world-involving content as well, that is, content of the form <the blue sky is herewith *appearing to me*>. Sixth, the content of inner awareness does not tinge the content of outer awareness, but it does play a role in the temporal individuation of conscious states. In general, the last few theses claim a relatively minor role for the content of inner awareness — as against accounts, such as Natsoulas', which attempt to construe it as somehow shaping ground-level content. In the present account, by contrast, inner awareness is mainly a silent dimension of consciousness, always there, sustaining the stream of consciousness, influencing its rhythm, perhaps, but never altering its course. Here, as elsewhere, a metaphor by William James (1890, vol. I, p. 630) captures perfectly the nature of consciousness: self-awareness is like a rainbow on a waterfall, a standing superposition never affecting the stream upon which it is reflected.

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