

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: IX. Further Discussion of an Equivocal Remembrance Account

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I go on here with my endeavor to ascertain intrinsic-theoretical elements that are explicitly or implicitly present in O'Shaughnessy's (2000) remembrance account of inner awareness, or the immediate cognitive awareness that we have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. According to an intrinsic theory of such awareness, a directly apprehended state of consciousness (to use James's concept) includes in its own structure inner awareness of itself. I seek to understand those distinct mental-occurrence instances which O'Shaughnessy holds are the cognitive inner awarenesses of our experiences. They are memory experiences, he claims, owed to latent knowledge of one's experiences that is acquired automatically as a direct effect of their occurrence. These remembrances are more akin to thought experiences than to perceptual experiences that apprehend their objects directly; indeed, they seem to be, strictly, actualizations of conceptual capacities. So, queries regarding their contents revert to queries regarding the latent knowledge that informs them. How does our author propose one directly gains this latent knowledge of experiences? This question leads us back to what the cognitive effects may be of the purely extensional, non-intentional awareness that he posited both in the perceptual and in the reflexive case. It turns out that the latent perceptual beliefs are directly acquired only via perceptions-as, which are occurrent cognitive effects of basic, purely extensional, perceptual experiences. Also, they are conceived of as instances of both outer and inner awareness. Otherwise, the respective acquired perceptual belief would not be able to pick out the outer object that it is about; the corresponding perception-as concretely singles out its outer object as what is being perceptually experienced. Similarly, and after all, O'Shaughnessy allows a spontaneous thought experience is often inner awareness of itself; he proposes it usually has a single proposition as its whole content and comes to its owner standing to the world in the truth-relation. This would seem to make of most such thoughts, awarenesses with outer objects and themselves as objects of inner awareness. I conclude that O'Shaughnessy has not managed to sustain his denial of cognitive inner awareness that takes place along with directly apprehended experiences as each of these transpires.

Key words: consciousness, inner awareness, intrinsic theory

This series of articles (Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b, 1998b, 1999a, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 2003b) addresses the case in favor of the “intrinsic theory” kind of account of “inner awareness.” Inner awareness is the occurrent cognitive awareness immediately had of some (Franz Brentano [1911/1973] would say “all”) mental-occurrence instances just as they take place. The paragraph that follows appears near the close of the introductory section of the eighth and most recent previous article in the present series:

A purpose of this article and the next one in this series is to develop the final section of the preceding article (Natsoulas, 2003a [pp. 21–25]). Thus, I am seeking to uncover further “intrinsic elements” within [Brian] O’Shaughnessy’s [2000] account of inner awareness, such elements as are explicitly or implicitly contained therein or as may be needed in order for that account to work. Finding such elements in a theory alternative to intrinsic theory can amount, in my view, to an argument supportive of intrinsic theory. When an important theorist is led to introduce or imply intrinsic elements even while distinguishing what he or she proposes from intrinsic theory, there is something added to the positive case for intrinsic theory. I realize the presence of such elements does not necessarily show weakness in the alternative theory. Because it contains intrinsic elements, a theory of inner awareness may be stronger than otherwise it would be, and the best such theory may ultimately turn out to be purely of neither kind but a combination of both. (Natsoulas, 2003b, p. 293)

I continue to pursue here the mentioned effort undertaken in the preceding article. Before I do so, I would like to state, once more, what it is that I have in mind by an “intrinsic” theory of the kind of consciousness which I have been calling inner awareness, in these articles and elsewhere (e.g., Natsoulas, 1998a). This time, let me identify the intrinsic kind of conception of inner awareness in terms of William James’s (1890/1950) concept of a state of consciousness, although it is true that he did not espouse in *The Principles* an intrinsic theory of inner awareness (Natsoulas, 1995–1996b, 1996–1997). Indeed, he referred to Brentano’s view, and strongly expressed opposition to those accounts of apprehending one’s states of consciousness that locate the inner awareness in the very state of consciousness that is the inner awareness’s object (James, 1890/1950, pp. 189–190).

The Intrinsic Theory Sort of Account of Inner Awareness

The basic durational component of James’s famous stream of consciousness is nothing more than a single state of consciousness. In constituting the stream, the states of consciousness follow one upon another in tight succession, except when there is a “time gap,” and the stream stops for a longer or shorter time, and no state of consciousness transpires in the person unless, at the same time, another stream of consciousness flows in him or her (Natsoulas, 1994–1995, 1995–1996a). A state of consciousness typically has several intentional objects; there are several items that the state is about or, at least,

that it appears to be about; consistently included among them is one's body, or features or parts thereof.

Nonetheless, each one of the states of consciousness is proposed to be a unitary awareness. It would be erroneously understood as a system of awarenesses occurring simultaneously "side by side" (contrast Gurwitsch, 1985; Natsoulas, 1996b, 1998b; see O'Shaughnessy, 2000, about "the attention"; Natsoulas, 2002c, 2003a, pp. 3–4). A small part of what James (1890/1950) has to say about the states of consciousness is the following:

Our own bodily position, attitude, condition is one of the things of which *some* awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We think and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat of the thinking. (pp. 241–242)

In contrast to many other psychologists who accept that one has inner awareness of some of one's mental-occurrence instances, James (1890/1950) explicitly tells us how he understands this inner awareness to occur (e.g., pp. 189–190). His view is of the variety which I have been calling the "appendage" kind (Natsoulas, 1993) owing to an early statement of Sigmund Freud's (1895/1966, p. 311). Requiring a further state of consciousness, James rejects the hypothesis that a state of consciousness can have itself among its several intentional objects.

A state of consciousness is never an occurrent cognitive inner awareness of itself. James is highly skeptical of this possibility. Yet, he allows it may be the case that a state of consciousness "feels" itself.¹ But, such feeling would not be cognitive; it would not involve any actualization of conceptual capacities (McDowell, 1998; Natsoulas, 2002a); it would not qualify as a true case of inner awareness. So, James is not an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness. Any inner awareness always, for him, requires the occurrence of two states of consciousness; one of these would be an intentional object of the other.

The above James quotation may suggest otherwise: that he implies a state of consciousness is an awareness not only of the body, also of the body in relation to the mental activity the state itself consists of. But, a consistent reading of James requires that whatever immediate awareness of a mental

¹Compare with O'Shaughnessy's (2000) positing a noncognitive inner awareness that is intrinsic to every occurrent experience and has that experience as "extensional" (versus intentional) object. This reflexive awareness has no interpretational feature, which means it is not about its object, or about anything at all. In contrast to cognitive inner awareness, extensional inner awareness of an experience "includes no occurrent belief that such and such is the case about the experience: not even a recognition of [it], an apprehension of [it] as anything" (Natsoulas, 2003b, p. 293). I do not consider O'Shaughnessy's intrinsic reflexive extensional awareness, purportedly belonging to all experiences, to be that inner awareness with which I am occupied in this series of articles. When I refer to "inner awareness" in the present text, I do not mean to include it.

happening exists must be attributed to the “perceiving” of one state of consciousness by another. The ongoing total brain process produces these two states of consciousness within a short space of time. So, the “perceiving” I just mentioned should not be taken literally. There is no direct causal relationship between the two states of consciousness.

According to James, all inner awareness would be a case of what William P. Alston (1991) calls a “mediated immediacy.” In order for the individual to have inner awareness of one state of consciousness, another such state is required. But no mental mediation intervenes between them. As an intrinsic theorist, Alston maintains inner awareness to be rather an “absolute immediacy.” Thus, any mental-occurrence instance of which you have inner awareness gives you awareness of itself, along with whatever else it also gives you awareness of. Contrary to what is contended by James and others (e.g., Rosenthal, 1986, 1993), inner awareness requires no additional mental-occurrence instance.

A Remembrance Conception of Occurrent Cognitive Inner Awareness

One can express one’s view as O’Shaughnessy (2000) does in the following sentence yet not be an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness: “Before all else and for most of our waking lives we are absolutely immediately aware of great slices of the present contents of our own minds” (p. 105).² What kind of awareness is O’Shaughnessy describing as being absolutely immediate? It is more unambiguously spoken of as knowledge or belief. He says that acquiring this knowledge is absolutely immediate, because he is convinced the acquisi-

²O’Shaughnessy (2000) distinguishes the stream of consciousness from “consciousness *per se*.” The latter term refers to a general state of waking consciousness within which the stream flows, as it does in other general states (e.g., dreaming sleep; Natsoulas, 1999b). Thus, he characterizes (p. 273) the stream as “the visible or experiential face [or the phenomenal core] of the continuous occurrent complex whole” that is the general state waking consciousness. Neither with respect to the stream of consciousness nor inner awareness, is O’Shaughnessy’s conception of the different general states entirely the same. Therefore, what I state in the text that he is claiming about inner awareness or the stream of consciousness should be understood to have application to the general state I have elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1981, 1983, 1999b) called “the normal waking state” and tried to describe there assisted by two of O’Shaughnessy’s earlier writings (1972, 1986). This does not mean, of course, that my statements of his views do not apply in some part to those other general states too. Similarly, these theses have application to the individuals O’Shaughnessy (2000) has identified as the self-conscious conscious, who are distinct from those creatures having a merely animal consciousness: the not self-conscious conscious (p. 102). Which does not say, again, that the views I discuss here do not have some application to some of the latter individuals as well. (A similar footnote appears in the two immediately prior articles in this series; the same limited applicability of claims is intended there too.)

tion takes place with an experience's occurrence and as an immediate effect of this occurrence. But, he does no justice to his own view by adding, quickly after the above, that he knows what he is thinking now because "just now [he has] observed such and such, immediately and automatically and as a complete matter of course" (p. 105).³

The part of this statement that would seem not to fit O'Shaughnessy's actual view is that he knows *by observation* items belonging in a strict sense to his stream of consciousness. If he has the thought that it is raining right now in London, he immediately acquires latent knowledge that this thought has occurred to him. But, he emphasizes that he cannot observe this thought; there is no such inner sense. He experiences the thought but has no experience of the thought unless a remembrance of it comes to follow. The only form in which occurrent cognitive inner awareness of the thought exists is the latter.

O'Shaughnessy repeatedly insists: his firsthand acquisition of knowledge of his stream of consciousness as it flows along is "no-how." "Just like that" and "silent and automatic" are his other terms for this absence of mental mediation. He maintains that no cognitive inner awareness attends and refers to the above thought, nor does it attend and refer to any part of the stream of consciousness. But, owing to the immediately acquired knowledge of the thought, one can later remember having that thought. According to O'Shaughnessy, the cognitive inner awareness that we have of our present mental contents consists simply of such experiences of remembering.

In the two just preceding articles of the present series, I classified O'Shaughnessy's account of cognitive occurrent inner awareness as being a "remembrance theory" of such awareness (cf. Dulany, 1991, 1997; Natsoulas, 1986, 1998a, 2001b; Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, 1997). And I distinguished this kind of theory from the intrinsic kind (e.g., Sigmund Freud [Natsoulas, 1984]; Woodruff Smith, 1989) and the appendage kind (e.g., James, 1890/1950) of accounts of the same phenomenon. According to both of these, we are possessors of an immediate experiential access to our mental-occurrence instances. In the second of my two articles, I defended these two kinds of theory against an objection implied by O'Shaughnessy's claim of having avoided a regress of experiences by proposing a "no-how" knowledge acquisition (Natsoulas, 2003b, pp. 297–302).

³In the rest of this article, all of the bare page references are to the O'Shaughnessy (2000) book. All mentions of O'Shaughnessy simply by name are also references to the same book.

The Present Purpose

In the first of those two articles on the O'Shaughnessy account (Natsoulas, 2003a), my focus was on the consciousness that he held to be intrinsic to every experience and to not involve inner awareness of it. I did not deeply consider there O'Shaughnessy's occurrent cognitive awareness of experiences that he proposed to be an effect of the experiences' depositing automatically and silently as they occur a knowledge of their occurrence. In the article prior to this one (Natsoulas, 2003b), I continued my examination of O'Shaughnessy's account of inner awareness; but, for the most part, I argued that something experiential is necessary to the process of acquiring firsthand knowledge of an experience, and this according to his own account of environmental perceptual awareness. And I summarized my case as follows. I stated that at the core of O'Shaughnessy's perceptual account

is the thesis that the basic perceptual experience, the primary component of a perception, is a nonconceptual and noncognitive noticing of present sensations produced by environmental items. This first component evokes a second, cognitive component of the experience that is a recognitional awareness of the first component. Only in this way could perception perform its cognitive function, according to the theory, which is to yield knowledge of sensations and their causes in the environment. But the recognitional awareness, the "interpretative" component, clearly is experiential and an inner awareness. Moreover, O'Shaughnessy does not appear to view this component as resulting in an infinite number of inner awarenesses perhaps because implicitly he considers it to be intrinsic to the perceptual experience. (Natsoulas, 2003b, p. 289)

I seek here an understanding of the mental-occurrence instances O'Shaughnessy held to be occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses of our experiences. Above, and earlier, I have brought out, in different words, that they are not absolutely immediate awarenesses; they are not intrinsic to the experiences of which one has inner awareness. And they are not mediately immediate either; this would be the case if no other mental event was required for inner awareness except a distinct mental-occurrence instance that was the inner awareness of them. In contrast, the O'Shaughnessy inner awarenesses do depend on the occurrence of mental events intervening between experience and inner awareness of the experience.

One such event is the experience's leaving a memory trace. Firsthand knowledge-acquisition yields the memory trace and is more than the transpiring of the experience. The knowledge state acquired, O'Shaughnessy describes as being "a change located elsewhere in the mind than in the stream of consciousness" (p. 107). Whereas knowledge onset is a mental event, it is not in itself experiential; therefore, it cannot be an object of immediate inner awareness, nor can it even be an object of inner awareness of the remembrance kind. Between experience and occurrent cognitive inner

awareness of it, there must occur, in addition, some mental event that causes memory-trace activation and the respective inner awareness to occur. This inner awareness is proposed to be a memory experience and part of the stream of consciousness; as is, too, the experience that is its object, and as is not the knowledge-change that is claimed to accompany every experience. No differently than is proposed to be the case for the remembered experiences, there is no immediate inner awareness of the remembrance experience either. It, too, must produce latent knowledge of itself that enables cognitive occurrent inner awareness of it in the form of a further remembrance.

O'Shaughnessy's Occurrent Cognitive Inner Awareness

A way to inquire into the character of such occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses is to seek to learn what these remembrances are specifically about and in what their contents consist. But this way brings us right back to the knowledge of the experience that is held to be acquired in the mere having of an experience.

Taking Place in the "Dark"

Before I continue, let me again state how much of direct present interest occurs in the "dark" according to O'Shaughnessy.

1. No experience of whatever kind is in itself, at its point of occurrence, an intentional object of occurrent cognitive inner awareness. Every experience is said to have the immediate effect of knowledge onset about itself. But this event is automatic and silent. Which means, *inter alia*, the event is not an occurrent awareness of its experiential cause or of anything else. Absent a certain more subsequent event, from the first-person perspective, it is just as if the respective experience did not transpire.

2. That more subsequent occurrence is an occurrent cognitive inner awareness. It, too, takes place, always, in the "dark." The only way in which this inner awareness is apprehensible itself is via the activation of the memory trace that it leaves because it too is an experience. Thus, an inner awareness does not make any greater reference to itself than to the non-experiential effects of the experience that is its intentional object. Which is no reference at all.

3. The event of knowledge onset proposed to occur as a consequence of every experience is not for O'Shaughnessy an experiential occurrence. And so, no knowledge is at once acquired of the knowledge onset itself. We learn of it by inference and scientific means. For example, one infers that one gained knowledge of the experience as it occurred from having remembrances of the experience.

4. Also, O'Shaughnessy states that the event of knowledge onset that takes place silently and automatically owing to the mere occurrence of any experience leaves a memory trace. But this is not a memory trace of the knowledge onset itself (p. 106). The memory is about the experience, not about the knowledge-onset event. Thus, so far as the occurrent cognitive inner awareness is concerned that the memory makes possible, it is as if the knowledge onset did not occur; for the memory trace, too, that is deposited by the event of knowledge onset is not something we have any inner awareness of.

The Contents of the Special Remembrances

O'Shaughnessy speaks of the normal waking state (see my footnote 2) when he asserts that we self-conscious beings gain "knowledge of present mental contents under ultimate or adequate headings" (p. 107). We acquire this knowledge immediately and silently and simply by undergoing the respective experiences. O'Shaughnessy writes as follows:

Experiences have certain typifying properties. In particular, they are closely linked to contemporaneous occurrent knowledge of themselves and to persistence in short-term memory — provided we are speaking of self-conscious beings. Normally I know, not everything that went on in my mind ten seconds ago, but the experiences of that recent moment. Normally one carries with one an ongoing continually mutating short-term memory whose content precisely is of one's recent experiences (*and* the outer objects of perceptual experience!). (p. 300)

What then do we come thereby to know about our mental contents and, specifically, about our experiences? What, exactly, do our special remembrances disclose of these intentional objects of theirs? What are the contents of these further experiences that are said to be occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses of our previous experiences?

Let me make three comments on the above quoted matter. (a) There is a "contemporaneous occurrent" knowledge of an experience only in the sense of one's acquiring this knowledge just as one's experience takes place. Only the event of knowledge onset occurs contemporaneously with the experience. This knowledge is actually latent. It may come into active play later in the subsequent memory occurrence that is a cognitive inner awareness of the experience.

(b) Those remembrances that O'Shaughnessy considers to be our occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses have as their intentional objects recent experiences plus the objects of these recent experiences insofar as the latter are perceptual. Moreover, through inner awareness we find that "outer perceptibles [are] as near to us experientially as our very own thoughts!" (p. 300). Surely, O'Shaughnessy does not intend to suggest that, in contrast, the (real or merely apparent) objects of our non-perceptual experiences do not

get apprehended as such by inner awareness. It is true the apprehensible presence of perceptual objects in our experience of them is of cognitive and of adaptational importance. But, it does not follow that objects of our non-perceptual experiences do not have some kind of presence to awareness. What we are currently imagining is known to us often even in those cases in which what we imagine is something without possible existence. And we distinguish experiences from their existent or non-existent objects. This O'Shaughnessy implies when he reports that the perceptual objects of his experience seem to be equally near to him as his experiences. They seem to inhabit his stream of consciousness just as his experiences do.

(c) Those memory experiences that are our occurrent inner awarenesses of other experiences have contents that are both of the respective experiences (of which they are remembrances) and of those experiences' objects. Thus the question comes up of how that which inner awareness is about is present to this awareness of it. Does it just instantiate an "intentional in-existence as the content of a conceptual act" (Sellars, 1978a, p. 178; Sellars, 1978b)? Is the object of an inner awareness present to this awareness simply as thought of?

How does an occurrent cognitive inner awareness manage to be *of* its experiential object and *of* the object or objects of the experience? How does this inner awareness, which is clearly not a perceptual awareness, acquire its content? O'Shaughnessy evidently holds the knowledge that is acquired simply by the occurrence of any experience, enables somehow the specific actualization of conceptual capacities that the inner awareness is (cf. McDowell, 1998; Natsoulas, 2002a). The inner awareness would seem to be a kind of thought; for it is not a perception and not analogous to a perception. O'Shaughnessy insists there exists no inner sense by which mental occurrences can be perceived. It must therefore be via concepts that inner awareness gets its content, and this content includes what the objects of inner awareness are.

The knowledge produced simply by undergoing an experience, and that has the experience as its object, must be the guiding source in line with which the corresponding inner awareness takes its specific form. This guidance makes possible what would seem to be an awareness of purely conceptual kind to single out its object, the experience, and to apprehend its properties. For example, O'Shaughnessy suggests that inner awareness reveals the presence in the stream of consciousness of perceptual objects. He speaks of their presence so vividly one imagines him not merely thinking about his experience but re-experiencing it. He can now notice features of the experience. At the point when knowledge of it was being acquired, he could notice nothing about it; for no possible occurrent inner awareness of the experience was possible, *ex hypothesi*. It was not possible until after the event of knowledge acquisition and the formation of a memory of the experience.

On the Right Track?

This line of thought leads to wondering whether I am on the right track when I suggest that O'Shaughnessy holds occurrent cognitive inner awareness to be purely conceptual. If I am on the right track, it would seem correct to understand this inner awareness as, using O'Shaughnessy's contrast, a "thought-experience" rather than a perceptual experience. One of the differences that he emphasizes between these two experience kinds is their "constitution." Here is what he writes about the latter dimension:

Unlike the thought-experience, perceptions exhibit a certain independence of concepts at their core. Even though it is true that "intuitions without concepts are blind," intuitions [in the Kantian sense] cannot be constituted out of concepts alone. (As soon be made of words!) In the typical . . . developed cases of perception concepts are somehow *impressed upon* the experience. They constitute a mutation in its character, but have no part in constituting the bearer of that interpretation Perception does not *as such* need concepts, and needs them only if it takes the meaning-laden and cognitively valuable form it typically adopts. But the meaning is in all cases imposed. This is because intuition is acquaintance with its object, not merely in the *particular*, as in indexical thought, but in the *concrete*. The indexical thought "that is a real back-hand" (watching Donald Budge) is not to be confused with the perception which provides its concretely given content. (pp. 327–328)

Is the occurrent cognitive inner awareness of experience which O'Shaughnessy countenances an acquaintance with the experience in the "concrete" or just in the "particular?" Is one's short-term remembrance of an experience like an indexical thought or like a perception?

These occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses are intentionally directed experiences. They are directed on very recent experiences and the objects of these experiences. This directedness does not require that the respective experience still exists at the instant when the remembrance occurs. Neither does the notion require that the objects of the experience remembered exist now or have existed in the past. However, to be such, the object of an intentionally directed experience must instantiate "a specific mode of presentation." A more specific statement from O'Shaughnessy is this: "The object must be affectively or perceptually or imaginatively or conatively presented to awareness. It cannot *just* be intentionally given" (p. 304).

How, then, is an experience of which one has inner awareness presented to that awareness? I am not asking about the respective latent state of knowledge of that experience. I want to know about the occurrent kind of cognitive inner awareness enabled by that knowledge. We have seen O'Shaughnessy distinguish "short-term memory" from the knowledge of experience responsible for the emergence into the stream of the occurrences constituting short-term memory. As regards the distinct "present-tense knowledge-of and short-term memory-of experience" here is a quite relevant statement: "These cognitive

recordings actually occur, and *mutate*, and for the most part *fade away completely* as new experiences fill consciousness” (p. 55). This statement should not be understood to suggest the consciousness stream itself is occupied by knowledge or cognitions about present experiences. O’Shaughnessy proposed all immediate knowledge we acquire of our experiences is latent until the remembrances occur that are his cognitive inner awarenesses.

Self-Knowledge and Extensional Inner Awareness

The remembrances about which I am inquiring are determined by memory traces left by the event of knowledge onset that the remembered experiences originally produced. How the latter experiences are presented qua objects to these remembrances might therefore best be determined by attending to the knowledge of the experiences that is said to be acquired when they occur.

Is Such Knowledge Possible?

O’Shaughnessy maintains that one thereby knows, *inter alia*, of the occurrence of each of the experiences that occur to one. I have previously expressed doubt that such knowledge could be acquired if matters were as the theory asserts. The experience is not about itself, according to the theory, in the sense of its being its own intentional object. Nor does O’Shaughnessy countenance appendage-type inner awareness that might serve as a basis for the acquisition of knowledge of an experience’s occurrence. Absent occurrent cognitive awareness of the experience it would not seem possible to gain immediately knowledge of its occurrence or of anything else about it. So I argued (Natsoulas, 2002b, p. 55).

A reply to my objection might start with the following words:

O’Shaughnessy has theoretically introduced a special kind of occurrent inner awareness that each experience instantiates. Each experience is claimed to include awareness of itself, in a certain sense, along with whatever else it may be an awareness of. This awareness could be the source of that immediate self-knowledge of the experience’s occurrence that is claimed by O’Shaughnessy to be acquired automatically in the case of every experience occurring in the self-conscious conscious individual when in the normal waking state. Like a perceptual experience’s extensional awareness of an outer event, an experience’s extensional awareness of itself would cause a latent state of knowing the experience occurred to one. An onset of intentional knowledge can be directly produced by extensional awareness without mediation by occurrent intentional awareness.

Easy to say, but we need to find out how such knowledge of experience is possible if every experience occurs in “darkness,” understood as there being no intentional occurrence directed on the experience. How does the mere extensional self-awareness of an experience cause acquiring knowledge of the

experience's occurrence? O'Shaughnessy maintains that the proposed intrinsic awareness is of the same kind that all perceptual experiences provide of their outer objects, even when the experiences are non-cognitive. In contrast, O'Shaughnessy's occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses do have a cognitive dimension; their intentional object is the respective remembered experience.

The purpose of the next section is to try to find out whether extensional awareness has been conceived of in such a way that it can have cognitive effects of relevance to present issues. These would be effects without any mediation by experiential occurrences that involve actualization of conceptual capacities. I shall come to focus again on our basic perceptual experiences understood to be simply extensional awarenesses of their objects. To produce their cognitive effects do these perceptual experiences need help from experiences that do actualize conceptual capacities? And help also from intentional inner awarenesses that more immediately apprehend their objects than do the special remembrances of O'Shaughnessy's account?

Cognitive Effects of Extensional Awareness

It would seem to be with implicit reference to the extensional kind of inner awareness that O'Shaughnessy describes experiences as being "those psychological phenomena of which at any moment we are conscious . . . and . . . they are that out of which the whatever-it-be that we describe as the 'stream of consciousness' is constituted" (p. 278). An experience's intrinsic awareness of itself makes us "conscious" of the experience at the moment of its occurrence despite the wholly non-cognitive character of this inner awareness. In O'Shaughnessy's view, the extensional self-awareness is comprehensible on the model of the most fundamental outer awareness involved in every sense-perception. Such awareness is "something other than that of insight or 'grasp'" (p. 291). A fundamentally perceived object is a real phenomenal item of which some occupant of the stream of consciousness is "merely an awareness of" (p. 292). That is all perception basically is. It is "some phenomenal reality becoming object for awareness" (p. 293). A basic perceptual awareness has an object but is not an intentional experience. Rather, it is of the same extensional kind as the awareness that we intrinsically have of our experiences as they are occurring.

Which means that the fundamental perceptual experience is a double awareness in the sense meant here of extensional awareness:

The perceptual experience is an awareness which is at once (reflexively) of itself *and* of its objects. The objects of perception in a certain sense mimic the occupants of the [stream of consciousness]: mere things appear to jostle around in the stream of consciousness alongside thoughts and emotions, just as concretely given to the subject of experience as they: so to say, cuckoos in the nest of consciousness! (p. 297)

Those items whereof one is extensionally aware are given concretely. But that of which we have imagery is never given concretely in the respective imaginal awareness. In the latter case, just the awareness itself is concretely given to the awareness. Imaginal awarenesses are never like basic perceptual experiences. O'Shaughnessy conceives of the basic perceptual experiences as each of them being a double extensional awareness.

O'Shaughnessy detects no difference in the sense of *aware of* as used in the sentences: "We are aware of our own experiences" and "We are aware of what we perceive or notice." But he is unable to say what *aware* here means, and is convinced the concept at work in these usages is not analyzable (p. 298). Yet, he brings out that such awareness in both the perceptual and reflexive case requires that its object exists. In contrast, one can have intentional awareness of something although the latter has no existence.

O'Shaughnessy spells out another parallel between basic perceptual experience and intrinsic reflexive awareness ("the experiential awareness of experiences"). He seems to avoid applying a certain description to both phenomena: he considers the basic perceptual experiences to be "a natural foundation of knowledge" and "the bearer of interpretations," but, with regard to intrinsic reflexive awareness, he does not have at this point any more to say than this: "We know of our present and recent experiences precisely because they are experiences" (p. 299).

Thus, it seems that concepts may be involved in a perceptual experience as it brings its outer extensional object under a heading, but the same cannot be said about an experience's relation to itself as extensional object. O'Shaughnessy would want to reject the thesis that one knows of and about an experience as it occurs because the experience has itself as an extensional object and it is able to bring itself concretely under concepts. He would insist intrinsic extensional awareness of an experience is no more than just that. Yet, in the case of perceptual experience, he does allow more: perceptual experience can have a recognitional dimension, in addition to being extensional awareness of its outer object. Information on the difference between the inner kind and the outer kind of extensional objects, or the respective extensional awareness of them, should be helpful in the present connection.

Two Modalities of Concrete Presence in the Stream of Consciousness

What makes one of them amenable to an intrinsic cognitive apprehension? Why is the other not apprehensible in this manner, and must await a memory experience of it to become an object of inner awareness in the occurrent and cognitive sense? The just prior article of this series found O'Shaughnessy's experiential-regress argument not cogent. And, anyway, we need to know how he would characterize the experiences so that the claimed experiential

regress would be avoided. How is it that a perceptual experience can actualize conceptual capacities with respect to its outer extensional object and cannot do the same with respect to itself?

Let me return, as O'Shaughnessy does, to his phenomenological point regarding perceptual objects. The point is that they seem to us present in our stream of consciousness together with the experiences that constitute the stream. This time, he expresses his point in the following words:

In the place of concrete presence as *occupants of*, what we have in the case of perception is concrete presence as *objects of* [O]bjects are concretely given as objects to experience, the objects of perception appear directly in the stream of consciousness — as objects! They uniquely join experiences *qua* concrete presences Even though one phenomenon appears as object and the other as occupant, both concretely appear in the stream of consciousness. (pp. 312–313)

This view does not amount simply to the thesis that the stream of consciousness is constituted of experiences and objects of perception. It is not simply the idea: that the immediate outer objects of our basic perceptual experiences are really mental, rather than being parts of the environment or body. There seems to be more than the latter to the view O'Shaughnessy expresses as above. And this more pertains to the issue I am raising: Why does intrinsic inner awareness not involve cognition, whereas perceptual experience does?

O'Shaughnessy claims that both experiences and perceptual objects are concretely present to us. They themselves appear to us directly. He presumably knows this firsthand. Or, perhaps, he has to remember their concrete presence. As the respective perceptual experiences were taking place, he could not cognitively apprehend them in terms of properties that they instantiated. He had first to acquire knowledge of the experiences. Then he was able to remember what they were like notwithstanding his not having been aware of what they were like when they occurred. That both experiences and perceptual objects are present to one concretely is something we can know about. But the theory holds that the impressively similar appearance in the stream of experiences and perceptual objects is not grasped as the experiences are occurring.

Could remembrances of this property of theirs be of the sort where one re-experiences a past experience and notes facts about the present experience such as: that it is like a visual experience but is not itself a visual experience, that the present experience is an experiencing of certain outer objects, and that these objects are present concretely in the consciousness stream? On the basis of awareness of the present experience, one may infer about what the remembered experience was like, including its outer objects' concrete presence in the stream of consciousness.

But noting facts regarding an experience of remembering is also proposed to be owed to its yielding latent knowledge about itself. It is a matter of memory traces' getting deposited. And it is a matter of a further remembering. There must occur a remembrance of the remembrance of the experience remembered. Adopting a remembrance-type theory of occurrent inner awareness like O'Shaughnessy's does not put one in a position to assume that the first remembrance in the series can do what one holds that the perceptual experience is unable to do: which is to furnish occurrent cognitive awareness of itself. Nor, of course, does including further remembrances in the account get the account any nearer to allowing a kind of inner awareness (of an experience) wherein the experience is an extensional and an intentional object. One is left to wonder how there can be the kind of intimate cognitive awareness of an experience that seems to be the basis of some of O'Shaughnessy's claims concerning what an experience consists of.

In effect, O'Shaughnessy is putting forward the following: that the experiential constituents of a stream of consciousness cannot be the objects of cognitive occurrent inner awareness as they occur whereas an extensional outer object of a perceptual experience can be, also, an intentional object of that experience. This despite the fact that experiences are held to appear in the stream no less concretely than perceptual objects do. It is evidently not a difference in how they appear there that is responsible for an experience's inability to apprehend itself cognitively.

The same is suggested when O'Shaughnessy stresses two modalities of concrete presence in the stream of consciousness. These modalities are "occupant-of" and "object-of." Experiences are held to be not only occupants but also extensional objects of the stream. For each experience is of itself extensionally. If an experience is, in every instance, concretely present in the stream in the modality of object-of, as well as in the modality occupant-of, then why is it disallowed that it, too, can be an intentional object of intrinsic cognitive inner awareness?

How Does Perception-That Acquire an Outer Object?

In a further discussion of perception, O'Shaughnessy uses the term *intuition* to pick out what I have referred to as a basic perceptual experience. With "basic," I was implying that a kind of perceptual experience exists too that is not just an extensional awareness of its outer objects. This sentence is included in his introduction to this further discussion of perception: "A perception or intuition is an episode of consciousness, it is an experience, and it is of cognitive significance" (p. 318). He explains that other closely related phenomena have the sort of cognitive significance that the intuitions possess.

One such phenomenon is of the sort in which, for example, one sees that the traffic lights are green. Another such phenomenon is an experience of the sort in which, for example, one thinks, directly upon seeing a green light, that it must have changed from red some time ago. Proposed to engender these two cognitive phenomena is a perceptual experience that is distinct from them. Notwithstanding the name *perception-that*, this other phenomenon is held not to be a perception, and not even to be an experience. Consideration of this phenomenon here is useful, anyway, for it can shed light on both the contemporaneous and the remembrance kind of inner awareness of perceptual experience.

O'Shaughnessy uses a more simple example of perception-that than the one about the green traffic lights. He proposes that hearing-that-a-whistle-occurs is a belief acquisition and an effect of a perceptual experience that he calls hearing-the-whistle-(as-a-whistle). The relation between the hearing-that and the perceptual experience that is its cause is more than just cause and effect. In addition the auditory experience of the whistle (as a whistle) provides the hearing-that with its object.

How does it do that? "We indexically and concretely individuate or single out [its object, which in this case is the whistle, as] a something that is *already given* in the contemporaneous perception of the sound" (pp. 319–320). This statement seems to imply that, for a hearing-that to come into existence, there must be an occurrent cognitive inner awareness of its cause. Concepts surely need to be actualized for a present perceptual object to be taken as being the object of an experience. Such taking is more than just having an awareness of that object. It is occurrently to be aware of the experience as such, and of its object as such.

Is this inner awareness that makes a hearing-that possible, an experience of remembering the respective perceptual experience? O'Shaughnessy appears to believe, rather, that hearing-that-a-whistle-occurs is contemporaneous with hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle). In contrast, an inner awareness of remembrance-type requires causal mediation by the processes of knowledge onset, memory formation, and trace activation. It is not contemporaneous with the experience that is its object. And here is another indication the inner awareness in question is not a remembrance: the singling out of an object concretely, and as a perceptual object of a contemporaneous experience, surely necessitates having extensional inner awareness of the perceptual object and the respective experience, and intentional awareness of their relation to each other.

Recall that hearing-that-a-whistle-occurs is considered to be a cognitive phenomenon but not a perceptual experience. It is a belief owed to the occurrence of hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle), given that one knows one's hearing is reliable. Hearing-that-a-whistle-occurs is likely an event of knowl-

edge onset of the sort O'Shaughnessy claims occurs automatically and silently every time we have any experience. The thesis that this belief acquisition occurs loses plausibility when one imagines eliminating the cognitive occurrent inner awareness that I have suggested is involved in producing the above belief on the basis of O'Shaughnessy's own words. Let me explain.

Suppose only a basic perceptual experience occurred. Which is said to involve no concepts at all. On O'Shaughnessy's account, this experience would be doubly an extensional awareness. It would be an awareness of its outer perceptual object, and an awareness of itself. In such a case, how would the corresponding belief acquire its object? How would this belief acquire for object the outer object of the perceptual experience that causes the belief to come into existence? In no way? Just like that? Or would the belief gain its object as the following sentence implies? "We indexically and concretely individuate or single out the *object-referent* of hearing-that a whistle occurs *as*, a something that is *already given* in the contemporaneous perception" (pp. 319–320). The belief cannot do this, nor can the thoroughly non-conceptual basic perceptual experience. It would seem to require an inner awareness that concretely has hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle) as its object and can also distinguish conceptually the experience and its object, the whistle heard.

The Role of Perception-As

Next, I give attention to another feature of O'Shaughnessy's account, and I expand on my latter suggestion. Something else belonging to the account was mentioned earlier but now needs focusing on: in O'Shaughnessy's example, the whistle is heard as a whistle; the total perceptual experience does not consist merely of the occurrence of hearing a whistle. The total perceptual experience consists of two experiences that take place almost always together and stand to each other in an immediate causal relation. And the relation between them instantiates another feature that I shall be spelling out.

O'Shaughnessy does not conceive of the total perceptual experience of hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle) to include as third component the hearing-that-the-whistle-occurs. Although the latter is indeed a cognitive phenomenon frequently co-present with the two true components of a total perceptual experience, O'Shaughnessy does not consider it to be any kind of experience. It is an acquisition of the belief that a whistle is occurring, caused to take place by hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle). Regarding this particular case of belief acquisition, O'Shaughnessy states as follows: "If one hears a whistle as a whistle, and knows one's hearing is reliable, one believes simply for those reasons. They are enough." He then goes on to say more generally,

Is not hearing of a whistle *as* a whistle sufficient in normal circumstances to engender the knowledge, namely that a whistle occurs, that it is the function of such a perception to engender? The function of the object-content of the phenomenon of perceiving-*x-as-X*, the causal role of the *X*-interpretation imposed upon the bare givens of sense, the engendering — not of some intervening second awareness-event, viz. perceiving-that something (here and now, etc.) is *X* — (but) of knowledge that something (here and now, etc.) is *X*. The interpretational content leads normally and with absolute pellucidity to contemporaneous knowledge with identical object. (pp. 320–321)

This portion of text provides material relevant to the perceptual experiences that are perceptions-*as*, but also to matters I have considered previously, such as the latent knowledge that determines the contents of those remembrances proposed to be the only occurrent cognitive inner awareness that we have of our experiences. Here are two comments on the above textual material:

1. A perception-of-*x-as-X* engenders the knowledge that something (here and now, etc.) is *X*. This item, regarding which knowledge is acquired on the spot, is the object of the perception mentioned. The perception is an experience but O'Shaughnessy does not, at this point, mention that it produces knowledge of its own occurrence. Recall that every experience, according to his theory, is an extensional awareness of itself, besides whatever else it may be. But, it is held, also, never to be an intentional awareness of itself, never an awareness of itself as an experience. This may be why no mention is included at this point of the experience as an object of the knowledge. Perhaps, after all, experience-of-*x-as-X* is, according to the theory, necessary in order to acquire contemporaneous knowledge of *x* even when that *x* is the experience itself. This may be another case in which a theory is forced to acknowledge something it denies elsewhere in its structure.

2. In the above quotation, that perceiving-that is actually an experience (rather than the silent acquisition of a belief) is again rejected. At the same time, the quoted material does admit that a merely non-conceptual perceptual experience of, for example, hearing a whistle is not enough for acquiring any belief. This despite the fact that the experience has been said to be an extensional awareness of its outer object, and an extensional object of itself, as all experiences are. It will be noticed: the "interpretational content" is directly responsible for what gets acquired, whereas the basic perceptual experience serves to engender a perceptual experience with conceptual content. Moreover, what the acquired knowledge is about is identical to the perception-*as's* object, and is concordant with the indexically individuated content of the perception-*as*.

Perception-as is a useful term for that which, according to O'Shaughnessy, is the conceptual component of a total perceptual experience. The occurrence of a perception-*as* depends upon the occurrence of a basic perceptual experience (perception-of), but a perception-*as* is proposed to be a percep-

tual experience in its own right. As I have intimated, its dependency is dual on the basic perceptual experience; the content of a perception-as is indexically individuated by means of the content of the respective basic perceptual experience that engenders the perception-as.

Before proceeding, let me mention something regarding the event of knowledge onset of the occurrence of an experience. This is the event that makes possible the remembrances posited to be the occurrent cognitive inner awareness we have of our experiences. What I want to mention is that this event of knowledge acquisition may also depend, insofar as O'Shaughnessy's theory is rendered consistent, not only on the extensional awareness that an experience has of itself but also on a contemporaneous occurrent cognitive inner awareness with an indexically individuated content. I shall return to this point.

O'Shaughnessy next spells out what the content is of the perception-that belief. This helps in developing our grasp of perception-as and of the knowledge represented in the remembrances of special interest here. I shall be clarifying perception-as's role right away, although it figures in the following passage without explicit mention.

Hearing that (say) a miaow sounds, will generally be a believing that that (present, audible) miaow sounds, and this belief will be directly given to its possessor as immediately caused by the awareness of the very miaow it refers to Thus, it is evident from the above formulation that this example of perceiving-that — and, indeed, perceiving-that as such — finds its content (or topic) only through the agency of the distinct contemporaneous perception. [The perception-that] indexically singles out the object of the belief as what is there and then experienced in the contemporaneous perception: it discovers its referent so to say on the back of the intuitional awareness of the object. In a word, perceiving-that owes a double debt to the intuition. It causally owes its very existence, and it owes its topic or content, to a distinct contemporaneous intuitional awareness of a presence. (p. 321)

Belief as to the occurrence of the sound and how this belief came about are said to be gained in the form of the respective perception-that. The belief that *this* miaow occurs is owed to having an auditory experience of the miaow. But that is presumably not all that there is to producing the belief. For the belief is not simply of a miaow's occurrence but also picks out a particular miaow. The latter cannot be a consequence of the basic perceptual experience alone. This experience is caused by the sound heard but it does not refer to the sound. No basic perceptual experience is an actualization of conceptual capacities. It would seem that the job is done by a cognitive occurrent effect of the auditory experience that is produced prior to the corresponding knowledge onset. It is a hearing-as experience that picks out the sound as such "on the back of" the basic experience. The hearing-as is more proximately the cause than the basic perceptual experience is of the belief acquisition that is proposed to take place.

In effect, O'Shaughnessy states above that the acquired belief (perception-that) also *refers to itself* as well as its referring to the particular miaow. It is about itself *as* caused by the perceptual awareness of the miaow. Implied would seem to be that as part of perceiving the miaow not only an auditory experience (hearing-of) takes place but also a conceptual response to that experience (hearing-as) and an occurrent awareness of the perception. This inner awareness too would be a cause of the belief acquired. If the perception-that belief is concerned *inter alia* with what there and then is experienced, how otherwise would it be formed other than by having inner awareness of the experience itself?

Perception-As and Intrinsic Inner Awareness

My following suggestion on the role of perception-as derives from the preceding comments about how a perception-that belief is acquired: perhaps the perception-as experience should be conceived of in such a way as to include inner awareness of the perception. Hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle) would actually be an occurrent awareness not simply of the whistle as such but of the basic auditory experience as such that is the cause of the hearing-as. We would speak of the conscious occurrence of hearing-a-whistle-(as-a-whistle) as being both a hearing of a whistle as a whistle and an object of this experience.

Recall that a perception-as is an experience just as a perception-of is. And a perception-as is directly caused by a perception-of. The outer object of a perception-of is the outer object of the corresponding perception-as. A perception-as acquires its outer object "on the back of" the perception-of that is the immediate cause of the perception-as. Also recall that every perceptual experience is held by O'Shaughnessy to be a double awareness. The basic perceptual experience is claimed to be an extensional awareness of its outer object and at the same time an extensional awareness of itself. It would therefore seem consistent that a perception-as could acquire on the back of the respective perception-of not one but two outer objects in the sense of objects external to it. That the perception-of itself is an object of the respective perception-that would go a long way in explaining that the knowledge acquired on the spot not only concerns the perception-of's outer object but also it is about the perceptual experience itself.

O'Shaughnessy speaks of a recognitional seeing, analogous to the hearing of a whistle (as a whistle). It consists of two successive experiential components; an example of a recognitional seeing is a "seeing that is both *of* a tree and *as* a tree" (p. 323). In this context, it is made explicit that the seeing-that belief, which is immediately acquired, "finds its content through the

agency of, and owes its very existence to, the structured perception of a structured whole, namely to the recognition of a complex object" (p. 323).

Thus, the stress shifts to the seeing-as component — as it should if the contribution of this component to knowledge of the visual experience is to be acknowledged. Of course, I allude to my suggestion in the prior paragraph. The recognitional component of a perceptual experience is one place within O'Shaughnessy's theory where a cognitive occurrent inner awareness that is not remembrance must be found. In my view of O'Shaughnessy's theory as a more complex account of consciousness than certain of his declarations give one to understand, I am encouraged by the following: he next adds this very cognitive statement to his emphasis on the extensional nature of the awareness comprising the basic perceptual experience:

We should abandon forthwith those over-simple theories of visual experience which fail to appreciate the vitally important contribution of the intellect or understanding to the formation of perceptual experience. Perception may not be the same thing as discovery [i.e., perception-that], but no more is it of the ilk of a blow between the eyes! (p. 323)

I would add that one should discard too the over-simple idea that perceptual experience produces latent knowledge of itself in the absence of any occurrent cognitive inner awareness intrinsic to the experience.

O'Shaughnessy next takes a further step in the direction I am here advocating. He admits the necessity of positing something more that exists in such very common perceptual cases as one's seeing a complex structured object. Such cases might seem to suggest that perception-that is not a belief but something internal to perception-of. This would contradict the thesis that the latter is a purely extensional kind of awareness and make of it a perception of facts about its outer object. O'Shaughnessy explains that we do perceptually recognize giraffes for example and this requires that the outer object be perceived to possess a certain one or more properties. A basic perceptual experience that is purely extensional cannot be an (intentional) awareness that the latter is the case. It cannot itself apprehend that "this is how the object is set up or constituted" (p. 324). Therefore, O'Shaughnessy proposes that a seeing-that belief is made possible by a component of the total visual experience possessing a perceptual content determined by the actualization of conceptual capacities. The parts of the basic perceptual experience that are thereby related to each other so that knowledge of them is acquired on the spot "surface to view when we give a *full description* of the perceptual experience: that is, fill in the full content of 'see as—', e.g. 'I seem to see a painting *as* The Night Watch and *as* of a group [of people] etc.'" (p. 324). Note that the seeing-as or interpretative component of the total visual experience would seem to have reference to an occurrent inner awareness of

the experience. The same is suggested when O'Shaughnessy speaks in this context of perceiving-that as "belief-given-immediately-as-caused-by-a-now-noticing-of-that-something (or some such)."

Concluding Comments

After O'Shaughnessy has addressed his distinction between (a) perceiving-of and perceiving-as, on the one hand, and (b) perceiving-that, on the other hand, he proceeds in the same vein to another major distinction between perception and its closest mental neighbours having cognitive significance. How do a perceptual experience and a thought experience differ? The specific kind of thought experience of interest here is a very common one that "arises [spontaneously] to the surface of one's mind." We are told that a proposition one believes to be true is the full content of most such thought experiences.

From the intrinsic-theory point of view, the latter is an important fact regarding such thought experiences, for the reason that it is consistent with the thesis that this thought-experience kind is an intentional awareness of itself, as well as being an intentional awareness of something else. If a thought experience has reference to itself and its "entire content" is a proposition, then is it not perforce an intrinsically conscious experience? So it would seem to me. A thought experience of the kind discussed by O'Shaughnessy in this context would have itself not only as an extensional object but also as an intentional object.

It appears that, after all, O'Shaughnessy does allow our having contemporaneous occurrent cognitive inner awareness of such thought experiences. Consider in this connection the following sentences from his discussion of these thought experiences:

The thought-event comes to its owner *as*: that which is capable of agreement or disagreement with Reality in the special mode of truth (a property it shares with beliefs in the self-conscious) It is not just that the thought-event may or may not truth-agree with Reality [I]t is that it is given to its owner *as*, what may or may not so agree. Indeed, this inner event is *experienced as* standing at such a remove from the World — almost like a sentence or a sense-datum! It is, in essence, in this regard, disengaged; or in a state of cognitive suspension, rather like a photograph or experimental "mock-up" of the real thing, even though typically it is experienced as in agreement with fact. (p. 326)

I gather that this takes place at the point when the thought experience transpires. It does not need to be remembered for it to be given to its owner's occurrent awareness in the way described above. What of O'Shaughnessy's denial that experiences as they occur can be the objects of an occurrent cognitive inner awareness on the grounds this would begin a regress of experi-

ences? Perhaps this amounts in the end just to a preference for an intrinsic account of inner awareness as opposed to an appendage account requiring that a distinct mental occurrence do the job.

Note in the above quotation the aspect that especially supports interpreting O'Shaughnessy's position as I have now: I mean his idea that the thought experience comes (is given) to awareness in a special certain way. This sounds very much as though he is saying that how it is grasped is an intrinsic feature of the thought experience. It is the kind of thought experience it is because of how, in its very occurrence, it is experienced-as. Simply in the having of such a thought event, one experiences it as related to the world in the way O'Shaughnessy describes above. A thought of the kind discussed comes to one's attention with reference to itself already built into it.

The passage from which I quoted above directly continues with this sentence: "But the truth-characteristic is absolutely indelible to the thought-experience." What truth characteristic is this? Not merely that the thought experience may or may not agree with fact. Its "indelible" feature is its being experienced *as* standing to the world in the way O'Shaughnessy described.

Is not the above indented quotation an obvious admission that, in fact, many of our thought experiences are objects of contemporaneous occurrent cognitive inner awareness? And does not O'Shaughnessy's indelibility statement, taken in context, amount to an acknowledgment that the latter inner awareness is intrinsic to the thought experience and has the thought experience as its object?

I raised the following question earlier about the remembrances held by O'Shaughnessy to be our only occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses of our experiences: I asked whether those short-term remembrances that are a consequence of the immediate acquisition of a belief as to a certain experience's occurrence are like the experiences remembered or like having mere thoughts about those experiences. On the assumption of their being thought experiences, how much would they be capable of? Having a thought that one is or was undergoing a certain experience seems to be far less than the intimate contact we seem to have with our experiences. Thinking the experience is of a certain kind and has certain properties and objects, does not get us any closer to it.

We would thus remain well away from the experience if one compares with how close up to seeing-of seeing-as seems to be as O'Shaughnessy described them. Also, consider how close we are proposed to be to our spontaneous thought experiences. We are told almost as close as we are to a sense-datum of ours. And recall the implied nearness of our stream of consciousness when we are described as noticing how our perceptual objects "appear to jostle around in the stream of consciousness alongside thoughts and emotions, just as concretely given to [us] as they" (p. 297).

When we are merely having thoughts about our experiences, as opposed to being aware of them from the inside, our cognitive distance from them is like our cognitive distance from the experiences of other people. We can think about other people's experiences too. And we often remember experiences that someone else described to us or that, from observation, we concluded took place.

From a deeper O'Shaughnessy perspective a thought experience can evidently be not merely an extensional awareness of itself but also an intentional awareness of itself. The suggestion that I have made in this section is that O'Shaughnessy in effect includes the latter proposition in his remembrance theory of inner awareness. Given that a thought event is both kinds of awareness of itself, it is open to O'Shaughnessy to claim a thought experience concretely finds its reflexive target. And through being present concretely to itself it can also cognitively apprehend itself and some of its own properties. Of course a thought experience needs to actualize certain conceptual capacities in order for such inner awareness to take place.

Reflexive awareness of perceptual experiences-of receives a similar characterization though there are important differences. The basic perceptual experience is an extensional awareness of itself as well as of its outer perceptual objects. But this experience is not able to have itself as an intentional object for it is not an actualization of conceptual capacities. On my understanding of O'Shaughnessy's conception such an experience cannot produce acquisition of knowledge on the spot regarding itself except by its giving rise to another experience that is an occurrent cognitive inner awareness of it. This is one of the things that O'Shaughnessy's perceptions-as accomplish. Perceptions-as are our occurrent cognitive inner awarenesses of our perceptual experiences. They are cognitive awarenesses of both themselves and of the basic perceptual experience that is their cause and provides them with their outer perceptual object.

Perceptual experiences-as and thought experiences are cognitive reflexive awarenesses that make it possible immediately and automatically upon their occurrence for beliefs about them to be gained. And the persisting states of belief enable experiences to occur that are remembrances of the perceptual experiences and thought experiences that caused acquisition of the respective beliefs. Consistently with the theory it would seem remembrances of experiences are themselves thought experiences and determined by the perceptions-that and by analogous beliefs acquired on the spot about the perceptual and other experiences that are now remembered.

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