

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XI. A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is

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Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel's recent "Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness," which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith's phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as follows: "Inner awareness is . . . an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode." And Kriegel describes Woodruff Smith's conception as denying inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious mental-occurrence instance's content. Unlike Woodruff Smith, Kriegel holds every conscious mental-occurrence instance presents itself therein too; it does so "secondarily," giving itself less attention than it does its primary object (e.g., the sun in a case of visual perceiving). I examine here three arguments that Kriegel discerns and opposes in Woodruff Smith's discussions in favor of inner awareness's being a part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience — which part is held to modify (or qualify) the (sole) presentation involved in the experience. In addition, I devote some attention to two positive arguments of Kriegel's against the thesis that inner awareness is such a feature. However, I do not find Kriegel's negative or positive arguments contra Woodruff Smith's account to be compelling.

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The just preceding article (Natsoulas, 2004b) in the present series (Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a) is subtitled "A Phenomenologist's Account of Inner Awareness," and it consists in large part of exposition and interpretation of the prominent American phenomenologist David Woodruff Smith's (1986, 1989) intrinsic-theoretical account of "inner awareness": the immediate cognitive apprehension each of

us has of some of his or her own mental-occurrence instances as they take place.¹ As explained in that article, every intrinsic theorist of inner awareness holds inner awareness to be a property intrinsically of each conscious mental-occurrence instance; accordingly, merely the conscious mental-occurrence instance itself needs to take place for there to be inner awareness of it (see, too, Natsoulas, 1996a). Among the intrinsic theorists whose proposals these articles discuss, Alston (1991), Brentano (1911/1973), Gurwitsch (1985), and Woodruff Smith (1989) are included. Motivating the present installment, as well as the just previous one, is the recent publication in this journal of Uriah Kriegel's (2003) article "Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness," which consists of a defense of six theses about "the content of inner awareness." As is stated in my preceding article, I want here to address the first of Kriegel's six theses, along the same lines as he does: with special reference to Woodruff Smith's (1986, 1989) account of inner awareness. That "inner awareness is . . . an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode" (p. 193) is Kriegel's (2003) first thesis. He argues contra Woodruff Smith that inner awareness, although an intrinsic feature of every conscious mental-occurrence instance, is an intentional directedness upon an additional, separate, secondary content. Also, he describes his foil as denying that inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious mental-occurrence instance's content: as proposing, rather, that it is an aspect of a different, integral part of that mental-occurrence instance. Kriegel claims, unlike Woodruff Smith, that every conscious mental-occurrence instance therein presents itself too — albeit "secondarily," giving to itself less attention than to its outer object (such as the sun). The basic intrinsic-theoretical thesis, to the effect that each conscious mental-occurrence instance possesses what Woodruff Smith calls a "reflexive character," Kriegel expresses in terms of the instance's being bi-directional, intentionally directed inward as well as directed outward. In my article immediately before this one, I do not say much directly about Kriegel's account, but that installment does serve as propaedeutic for the present purpose. I often refer here to arguments I make there concerning Woodruff Smith's account and conclusions I reach there about it.

¹Intrinsic theory holds inner awareness (as defined in the text) to be occurrent, that is, not merely the "automatic and silent" (i.e., non-experiential) acquisition of knowledge which O'Shaughnessy (2000) argues takes place immediately upon an experience's occurrence. In three prior articles of this series (Natsoulas, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a), I consider O'Shaughnessy's remembrance account of inner awareness, and his arguments against conceptions of inner awareness that propose inner awareness to be experiential and either concomitant with or an aspect of the experience that is its intentional object.

A Diagrammatic Representation of Inner Awareness

Kriegel's (2003) opening section includes an effort to diagram the "intentional structure" of a conscious perceptual awareness that has a cube in the environment for an intentional object.² In this and three other figures with similar purpose, a thought bubble is used to represent the mental-occurrence instance, and arrows represent the latter's intentional directedness. Since a conscious perceptual awareness is what intrinsic theorist Kriegel is diagramming, he must show it not only as an apprehension of its external object, but also as an apprehension of itself; the intrinsic sort of theory of inner awareness holds such a mental-occurrence instance to be, in itself and at the same time, both of these two kinds of awareness.

Accordingly, in both text and figures, Kriegel contrasts (a) those accounts that conceive of inner awareness as an intrinsic property of each conscious mental-occurrence instance, with (b) what I call, following Sigmund Freud, the "appendage" kind of conception of the same. It is the thesis of every appendage theory that the inner awareness requisite for a perceptual awareness's being conscious takes the form of a distinct mental-occurrence instance directed on the conscious perceptual awareness from outside it, and that this is the case for every kind of conscious mental-occurrence instance. To represent that the conscious mental-occurrence instance is a perceptual awareness and, at the same time, an inner awareness, Kriegel employs a single thought bubble — not two, as an appendage theorist would — with two arrows emanating from that thought bubble. One arrow is straight and points to the cube in the environment, whereas the second arrow turns around on the mental occurrence itself.³

This same diagram is employed twice in Kriegel's article. (a) One use, as is stated above, is proposed to represent the intrinsic-theoretical kind of conception of the intentional structure of a conscious perceptual awareness. The diagram shows the latter mental-occurrence instance with two intentional objects; the cube is one of these, the perceptual awareness itself is the other. (b) Kriegel's first

²That is how the figure is characterized in Kriegel's text. The title of the figure is different, for it speaks, instead, of the intentional structure that, according to intrinsic theory, belongs to the kind of consciousness that I call "inner awareness" (see initial paragraph of present article). The first of these two characterizations would seem to be the better one since the figure contains a thought bubble representing the mental-occurrence instance and two arrows for the perceptual awareness and the inner awareness, respectively, that the mental-occurrence instance instantiates.

³Kriegel's contrasting diagram for the appendage kind of theory of inner awareness also contains two arrows that point, respectively, to the cube and to the conscious mental-occurrence instance itself. But, the arrow pointing to the latter comes from a second thought bubble, thus representing that a conscious mental-occurrence instance is always an object of inner awareness in the form of a separate mental-occurrence instance.

major section (titled "Inner Awareness: Content or Attitude?") also uses this same diagram, except that the two arrows are assigned names. The arrow terminating upon the thought bubble itself bears the label "awareness;" the one pointing to the cube is labeled "perception." It thus appears as if the represented mental-occurrence instance consists of a perceptual awareness and a distinct inner awareness. However, as would be expected from an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness, the diagram consists of a single thought bubble from which both arrows emanate. The mental-occurrence instance is proposed to be unitary. Somehow, in this single mental-occurrence instance, which is a conscious perceptual awareness, the two distinguished intrinsic awarenesses are not mutually distinct; they are unified with each other. As it is sometimes expressed, the one conscious perceptual awareness is seamlessly both an inner awareness and an outer awareness.

"Inner awareness as an aspect of content" is the title of Kriegel's diagram in its second use. This title causes one to expect the mental-occurrence instance's "content" to be depicted therein, and the inner awareness somehow represented as an "aspect" of that content. Though the arrows do show the mental-occurrence instance's intentional directedness, one comes to wonder whether the thought bubble is being used in this case to represent not the mental-occurrence instance but its content. Be that as it may, this second use of the same diagram is not successful in depicting inner awareness as an aspect of content. Based upon Kriegel's statement that the arrows in all the figures represent a mental-occurrence instance's aboutness, the diagram seems merely to display that the conscious perceptual awareness has the cube and itself for objects. Analogously, in the instance of a corresponding non-conscious perceptual awareness, the same pictorial means would show only the cube as its object. In the instance of a non-conscious perceptual awareness having two objects, the cube and, say, the sun, Kriegel would presumably use two arrows to diagram the intentional directedness of this mental-occurrence instance as well, although the second of these arrows would point to the sun, not to the perceptual awareness itself. Kriegel's diagram fails to show us, as it is intended to do, two essential features of his account of inner awareness. (a) The diagram does not represent the conscious mental-occurrence instance's content, which is that of which inner awareness is proposed to be an aspect — unless the meaning of a thought bubble is varied to represent that content. (b) Nor does the diagram show how inner awareness is related, qua aspect of content, to that content. Two arrows emanating from what may be a representation of content does not even begin to hint at what it means to claim inner awareness is, as proposed by Kriegel, an "aspect" of this content.

Perhaps giving some attention to Kriegel's immediate context can improve comprehension of his second use of the diagram. At this point, he is engaged in drawing a contrast between his own "traditional" account of inner awareness

and Woodruff Smith's "non-traditional" account. To represent pictorially the latter account, he finds that he requires a different diagram than he does for intrinsic theory generally. He believes Woodruff Smith's account calls for just a single arrow, running, in the example, from the perceptual awareness to its intentional object the cube. Kriegel labels this arrow "self-conscious perception" and he titles the diagram as a whole "Inner awareness as an aspect of attitude." It seems arrows cannot adequately represent the intentional directedness of a conscious mental-occurrence instance; to complete the job, words are enlisted. However, notwithstanding the suitable label "self-conscious perception," the absence of a second arrow could produce the erroneous understanding that Woodruff Smith conceives of a conscious perceptual awareness of (just) a cube, to have only the cube as its intentional object. This would be a miscomprehension of Woodruff Smith's conception of inner awareness because he holds — being an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness — that a conscious perceptual awareness has itself too for an intentional object. I bring out in my prior article (Natsoulas, 2004b) Woodruff Smith's insistence that a conscious perceptual awareness should not be conceived of as, also, a perceiving (e.g., a seeing) of itself. In the example Kriegel uses, it would be a perceiving of the cube alone. Nevertheless, a conscious perceptual awareness, as do all conscious mental-occurrence instances, has reference to itself as well.

Let me mention that, in my prior article, I "try out" a certain interpretation of the Woodruff Smith conception of inner awareness. This tentative interpretation is that a conscious perceptual awareness, in its own structure, involves a reflexive way of being aware of its primary, external object — analogously to there being a visual way in which one is aware of a cube when one has a visual perceptual awareness of it. This interpretation has as a basis Woodruff Smith's central proposal that a reflexive character and a particular sensuous (e.g., visual) character are two parts of the modality of presentation in a conscious mental-occurrence instance such as having visual perceptual awareness of a cube.

A Basic Question Is Addressed

Kriegel (2003) introduces his article by stating its main concern to be a certain feature of the intrinsic sort of theory of inner awareness, namely, "how an intrinsic theorist should construe the precise intentional content" of the inner awareness that, he or she maintains, is built into each of the conscious mental-occurrence instances (p. 171). Kriegel writes,

The question to be pursued is this: What is the exact content of inner awareness? When we have a conscious experience of, say, a yellow ball, the content of the experience's outer awareness is something like <yellow ball>, or <this is a yellow ball>. But what exactly is the content of the inner awareness? (p. 172)

He also states, prior to the above, that a conscious mental-occurrence instance includes in its own structure immediate awareness of itself, thus seeming to suggest that a conscious perceptual awareness of a yellow ball has a content that is something like (appropriating Kriegel's mode of expression) <this experience of a yellow ball>. But, the latter suggestion, which resembles what Woodruff Smith would say, is unlikely a correct construal of Kriegel's view. Rather, he implies that, in contrast to the mental-occurrence instances that are not conscious, each of the conscious mental-occurrence instances has not one but two intentional contents. Indeed, Kriegel (2003, p. 172) explicitly states that a conscious mental-occurrence instance "involves a twofold intentional content."

Thus, we find an important resemblance to the appendage kind of theory of inner awareness, which Kriegel diagrams using two thought bubbles and two arrows. One of the thought bubbles represents a conscious mental-occurrence instance, specifically, a perceptual awareness. From it, an arrow emerges and points to a cube. And this bubble is itself the target of an arrow emanating from a second bubble, which represents a distinct mental-occurrence instance that is, or includes (see, e.g., James, 1890/1950), the inner awareness directed upon the perceptual awareness. Since appendage theory maintains that two distinct mental-occurrence instances are involved in every case of a conscious mental-occurrence instance, such cases are accurately described, appendage-theoretically, to have a twofold intentional content. But does intrinsic theory, too, so imply, that is, a twofold intentional content in every conscious mental-occurrence instance? Kriegel believes it does; at least, his own version of the theory does, as well as the "traditional" form of intrinsic theory. Indeed, he declares, with reference to his example of a conscious perceptual awareness of a cube, that this awareness "is intentionally directed at *two separate contents*, (i) the cube and (ii) itself" (p. 175; italics added).

Certainly the awareness in his example has two objects, two items that it is about. Understandably, one might speak of it as instantiating a bi-directional intentionality. However, can one successfully contend that this conscious mental-occurrence instance has two contents, in the sense that two mental-occurrence instances may be said to have two contents? Are the cube and the conscious mental-occurrence instance itself usefully conceivable to be contents of that conscious mental-occurrence instance? Relevant to number of contents per conscious mental-occurrence instance is some material (see immediately below) from the just prior article of the present series (Natsoulas, 2004b).

1. In that article, I make some mention of William James's (1890/1950) understanding in *The Principles of Psychology* of the successive basic durational components of his now famous stream of consciousness. James conceives of each of these component "states of consciousness," however complex it may be, as being a unitary, integral awareness. I explain that my reference to James

is not owed to his being an intrinsic theorist — he is, clearly, an appendage theorist of inner awareness (Natsoulas, 1995–1996b, 1996–1997). It is owed, rather, to how he conceives of, as it were, the total experience of the moment to be. In his conception, this experience, or state of consciousness, does not comprise in its structure more than a single content. Thus, although an experience is very frequently directed intentionally on more than one item, the experience is not to be construed as being a dual or multiple awareness. The “width” of a state of consciousness is not comprised of awarenesses that occur simultaneously, side by side (Natsoulas, 2000). In any stream of consciousness as it flows, there is only one awareness taking place at a time. There is just the total experience of the moment, although James (1890/1950) acknowledges that, in some individuals, a second stream of consciousness may also flow (cf. James, 1902/1982; Natsoulas, 1994–1995, 1995–1996a).

2. I also write in my prior article that I risk misleading the reader whenever I characterize a particular conscious mental-occurrence instance as consisting of both inner awareness and outer awareness, as though it were made up of distinct awarenesses. Since it is intrinsic theory I am writing about, it is misleading for me to seem to suggest that the mental-occurrence instance of interest, which is, for example, a conscious visual-perceptual experience of the sun, is the object of an awareness, intrinsic to it, that is a distinct awareness from the awareness, intrinsic to it, that is directed upon the sun. Somehow, those two awarenesses are really just a single awareness with complex content and two (or more) objects. One of the two objects of awareness is the mental-occurrence instance itself.

3. Regarding Woodruff Smith’s account of inner awareness, I state the following, which is pertinent to the question of the number of contents instantiated by a conscious mental-occurrence instance:

The problem with which Woodruff Smith did struggle is how a unitary awareness can be an awareness of, say, Lake Fuschl and, at the same time, an awareness of itself. The solution that he proffered was that an experience, although it does not present itself, can be an awareness of itself by “modifying” the presentation of which it consists. I have been construing this “modification” of a presentation as a matter of the experience’s taking the object that it presents in a certain way: as the object of this experience. Does this interpretation hold up when tested against Woodruff Smith’s (1989) fuller exposition of his account? How should inner awareness qua “modifier” be understood? It is one thing to say that the reflexive character of an experience is responsible for that experience’s having itself as a secondary, non-presentational object, and another thing to say how this is accomplished by “modifying” the presentation of its primary object in the experience. (Natsoulas, 2004b, p. 116)

It would seem that every intrinsic theorist must work toward eliminating from his or her analysis, any reliance, whether explicit or implicit, on dual contents that are instantiated by a single mental-occurrence instance. My latter asser-

tion does not contradict intrinsic theory so long as it is clear that each object of a mental-occurrence instance does not constitute a different content. Kriegel, therefore, might want to consider Woodruff Smith's conception of inner awareness as worthy of an effort to improve on it, rather than simply rejecting it on the basis of its understanding of inner awareness as a "modifier" of the presentation in a conscious mental-occurrence instance.

Woodruff Smith's effort to treat of how a conscious mental-occurrence instance is a unitary awareness involves, Kriegel believes, a rejection of the valid thesis: inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious mental-occurrence instance's content. (One naturally wonders, at this point, what it is for inner awareness to be an aspect of a content. Would a sensuous visualness, too, which characterizes a certain mental-occurrence instance, qualify as an aspect of its content in Kriegel's sense of content?) Kriegel describes Woodruff Smith as conceiving of inner awareness as being, rather, an aspect of a different feature of a conscious mental-occurrence instance. Whereas he does quote "In this very experience I see this frog" from Woodruff Smith's (1986) phenomenological description of a certain case of seeing a frog, Kriegel does not acknowledge that this utterance is an expression of a content something like <this experience of a green frog> (compare: <green frog>, <this is a green frog>). Kriegel (2003, p. 173) implies that because the inner awareness is, for Woodruff Smith, "an aspect of the *psychological attitude* or *mode*" that a conscious mental-occurrence instance "involves toward [its intentional] content," inner awareness is not an aspect of its content.

By using the phrase "not an aspect of the content," Kriegel seems to be saying, moreover, that Woodruff Smith's account conceives of the conscious mental-occurrence instances as not being intentionally directed each of them on itself. This would mean that Woodruff Smith is in contradiction of a fundamental thesis of intrinsic theory. In the case of Kriegel's example of a mental-occurrence instance, it would be, according to this interpretation of Woodruff Smith, only the cube, not the mental-occurrence instance, that is an object of awareness. Kriegel states that, according to Woodruff Smith, the mental-occurrence instance is "intentionally directed only at the cube" (Kriegel, 2003, p. 175). But, Kriegel immediately explains: one should not take him to be suggesting that Woodruff Smith is proposing inner awareness is not intrinsically a property of the conscious mental-occurrence instances. Yet Kriegel does seem to ascribe to Woodruff Smith the view that the inner awareness that is involved does not turn around on the mental-occurrence instance as intentional object, that a conscious mental-occurrence is not an awareness of itself in addition to whatever other object it may have.

Perhaps Kriegel means that Woodruff Smith's account has the latter implication although it does not seem so to its author. Otherwise, Kriegel needs to argue that a presentational content cannot be so "modified" by inner aware-

ness that it includes reference to the mental-occurrence itself. Accordingly, in the example, only that which is seen (e.g., the cube) can be an object of a conscious mental-occurrence instance, unless one adds theoretically to the features of the mental-occurrence instance a second content.

The Modality of Presentation in a Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instance

The two main terms Kriegel employs to describe Woodruff Smith's account, *psychological attitude* and *intentional content*, are not terms Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) uses in making his case for his phenomenological account of inner awareness. Instead, for that purpose, Woodruff Smith devises his own related terms: *modality of presentation* and *mode of presentation*. Moreover, again and again, he provides sentences that give expression to part or the whole of "the phenomenological content" of a mental-occurrence instance. Kriegel asserts, based upon a certain footnote, that the terms *psychological attitude* and *intentional content* are "interchangeable" respectively with the Woodruff Smith terms *modality of presentation* and *mode of presentation*. That footnote states (a) that the latter distinction can be found in publications of Husserl, Meinong, and Twardowski and (b) that John R. Searle (1983) also "makes the same distinction [in terms of] psychological mode and intentional content" (Woodruff Smith, 1986, p. 155, fn. 7). The footnote goes on, "To my knowledge no one else has extended the distinction in the ways I have," and calls attention to a book soon to appear (Woodruff Smith, 1989) where the distinction is explained and developed more fully.

Extending a distinction may result, of course, in its no longer being "the same" as it was in previous use. Therefore, I want to comment on Kriegel's psychological attitude and intentional content and compare his distinction to Woodruff Smith's, which Kriegel states is the same as his own. Kriegel uses three kinds of mental-occurrence instances for examples, in spelling out his two features of every mental-occurrence instances. They are a believing that . . . , a hoping that . . . , and a desiring that The terms *believing*, *hoping*, and *desiring* specify the psychological attitude that the respective mental-occurrence instances involve, and these are further identified by entering a clause after the verb, thereby giving expression to the intentional content that is a further feature of the respective mental-occurrence instance. One of Kriegel's examples is "Brown hopes that it will be sunny tomorrow."

Using psychological attitude and intentional content to describe the Woodruff Smith account of inner awareness, Kriegel says that if a conscious mental-occurrence instance is one of hoping, the inner awareness involved therein is, for Woodruff Smith, an aspect of the mental-occurrence instance's psychological attitude (of "self-conscious hope"; see below) and not an aspect

of its intentional content. Let me make the following brief comment on the latter interpretation before picking up the thread again:

Kriegel's interpretation seems to me to amount to saying, on Woodruff Smith's behalf, that the intentional contents of two mental-occurrence instances one of which is conscious and the other not conscious, need not differ at all from each other. Thus, since, inner awareness is purportedly just a matter of how (the way in which) one is hoping, the intentional content of an instance of conscious hoping that tomorrow will be sunny can be precisely the same as the intentional content of an instance of nonconscious hoping that tomorrow will be sunny. I am almost certain that Woodruff Smith would reject the latter thesis as an implication of his thought. The mode of presentation in an experience and the intentional content instantiated by an experience are, very probably, not terms equivalent for him.⁴ I return to this point very shortly.

Contrasting Woodruff Smith's account with the "traditional" intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness, Kriegel (2003) states the following about a conscious experience that is a case of hoping:

According to the tradition, Jones's mental state should be understood to involve (i) an attitude of *hope* toward the possibility that tomorrow will be sunny and (ii) an attitude of *awareness* toward itself. But according to Woodruff Smith, it should be understood to involve an attitude of *self-conscious hope* toward the possibility that tomorrow will be sunny and no attitude toward itself. (p. 174)

He believes the above is true about Woodruff Smith's understanding of inner awareness because it is the latter's thesis that inner awareness is part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience. This contention is a crucial part of how Woodruff Smith (1986) seeks to explain the "reflexive character" of conscious experiences: "the consciousness-of-itself that is constitutive of consciousness" (p. 149). Accordingly, two distinct features of each experience are the modality of presentation in the experience and the mode of presentation in that experience. Perhaps these features are so similarly named to remind us that they are conceived of, more specifically, to be different features of the one and only presentation that constitutes any experience.

The two features are distinguished and spelled out using a certain communicative device that Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) applies throughout. Here is how I introduce this device in my just preceding article:

One communicative aspect of his exposition was use of first-person, single-sentence descriptions of the phenomenological content of mental-occurrence instances. For example, this statement: "Phenomenally in this very experience I see this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad," would express all of the aspects of the content of a certain mental-occurrence instance that Woodruff Smith used in making his case. A

⁴In the remainder of this article, I use the less cumbersome term *experience* interchangeably with the term *mental-occurrence instance*. Thus I speak of "conscious experience" and "nonconscious experience," since Woodruff Smith countenances both of these kinds of experience.

part of the content that is so expressed is owed to the inner-awareness feature. This feature is evidently not the equivalent of the content of the mental-occurrence instance or of any part of the content. The mental-occurrence instance is a seeing as well as an inner awareness; and so, its visual character would, analogously, be responsible for an aspect of the total content but would not be equivalent to that aspect. (Natsoulas, 2004b, p. 104)

The above expression of the full content of a certain experience contains a phrase informing us as to the mode of presentation in the experience: "this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad." The phrase specifies for Woodruff Smith that which is presented in the experience: what is seen as it is seen to be in having the experience. Mode of presentation in an experience, he explicitly defines to be: "'what' is presented [therein] 'as' it is presented" (Woodruff Smith, 1989, p. 17). And he explicates the latter "as" with a reference to the "description" under which what is presented in the experience is presented.

The distinct modality of presentation in an experience should not be conflated with the mode of presentation in the experience. Woodruff Smith (1989) defines the modality of presentation as "the way" in which what is presented in the experience is presented. This "way" is not captured by the description under which what is presented in the experience is presented. Accordingly, the modality and the mode of presentation in an experience, both contribute to the experience's total content, which is unitary. This joint determination is clearly reflected in the phenomenological description "Phenomenally in this very experience I see this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad."⁵ The phrase "in this very experience" corresponds to the reflexive character of the experience, whereas "see" corresponds to the experience's visual-perceptual character. Both of these two characters are said to be parts of the modality of presentation in the experience. As already indicated, neither of them is presented in the experience. Whereas Woodruff Smith does indeed propose that there is intrinsic awareness of every conscious experience per se, he does not conceive of the conscious experiences as themselves seen. In the example, that which is seen, in his view, is only "this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad." Just as Kriegel states, the experience's inner-awareness feature would seem not to be, according to Woodruff Smith, an aspect of the experience's content. Inner awareness is, rather, an experience's feature that plays a certain role in the determination of the phenomenological content of the experience; so too, the experience's visual-perceptual character is not an aspect of its content, but has an effect upon the content. It follows that, absent the inner-awareness

⁵Here is how Woodruff Smith (1989) introduces this form of description of an experience:

The structure or content of an experience can be unfolded in a *phenomenological description* of the experience. This will be a careful description of the experience exactly as it is experienced by its subject: a "subjective" description from the "first-person" point of view. (p. 14)

feature of a mental-occurrence instance, the latter would have, for that reason, a different phenomenological content than the corresponding conscious mental-occurrence instance has.⁶

Although I say that the inner-awareness feature belonging to a conscious experience seems not to be according to Woodruff Smith an aspect of the content of the experience, he also gives a different impression. Let me explain by means of a set of comments.

1. Regarding the part of a conscious experience's modality of presentation inner awareness is proposed to be, Woodruff Smith states, "The overall . . . content of an intentional experience divides into two fundamental components, which we shall call the 'mode' and the 'modality' of presentation in the experience" (1989, p. 16). Is inner awareness, therefore, one part of the second component of a conscious experience's overall content?

2. He goes on to speak of different "species" of experiences, such as judicative experiences vs. visual-perceptual experiences, and states that they present in some cases the identical state of affairs, notwithstanding their content's being different in part. They present the identical state of affairs differently, for example, visual-perceptually vs. judicatively, as in seeing that Lake Fuschl is frozen vs. judging that Lake Fuschl is frozen. Taking Woodruff Smith's own perspective, I do not believe calling inner awareness a part of the content of a conscious experience (as the above quotation from his page 16 implies) is accurate. It is no more accurate than if he called judging (or seeing) a part of that content. To do so would be to conflate with each other the species of an experience and a phenomenological feature of the experience.

3. With reference to my latter statement, consider the analogy between inner awareness and seeing. Woodruff Smith says regarding both of these that they are components of the modality of presentation in certain experiences. Does he not really mean they should be conceived of not as parts of the content of the experience, but as features of the process that the experience is, albeit features that directly help to determine its content? For these features are said to determine "the way" that which is presented in the experience is presented therein. This may be presented visual-perceptually, for example; or "reflectively presented"; or in both of the latter "ways" at once, as occurs in the case of consciously seeing that Lake Fuschl is frozen.

4. *Reflectively presented* is my term. I mean to say that if the particular mental-occurrence instance is a conscious experience, then its phenomenological content includes what the phrase "in this very experience" expresses in Woodruff Smith's phenomenological description of the total content. And that is to say,

⁶Contrary to Brentano (1911/1973), Woodruff Smith maintains that not all mental-occurrence instances possess the feature of inner awareness. See in Natsoulas (2004b) the subsection titled "Unconscious Mental-Occurrence Instances."

the experience is an awareness of whatever may be presented in the experience *as such*: as its being presented in that experience. Compare with the visual-perceptual component of the modality of presentation. This component defines the experience's species, in part, and it determines how what is presented is presented, namely, visual-perceptually, with all that this implies.

Kriegel's Defense of the "Traditional" View of Inner Awareness with Critical Reference to Three Arguments of Woodruff Smith's

Kriegel (2003) adopts what he calls the "traditional" intrinsic-theoretical conception of the inner-awareness feature held to belong to every conscious mental-occurrence instance. Spelling out his view, he says each conscious experience that occurs possesses a *second* content, which he identifies as the experience itself; a conscious experience possesses in this sense both a reflexive content and a non-reflexive content.⁷ On page 175, Kriegel characterizes these contents as "two separate contents." Accordingly, the particular visual-perceptual experience which he uses as an example (a) has a cube physically present in the environment for one of its contents "at which it is intentionally directed," and (b) has itself as its own second content in the same sense. Kriegel also expresses this thesis by stating that the external cube and the inner experience itself are both "aspects" of the intentional content that is instantiated by the experience. In defense of his view, he challenges three arguments pro Woodruff Smith's "non-traditional" intrinsic-theoretical view that he discerns to be present in Woodruff Smith's (1986) article.

Kriegel's Introduction of First Argument

Here is how Kriegel (2003) introduces the first argument he attributes to Woodruff Smith (1986) in support of the thesis: inner awareness is a feature of a conscious experience's modality of presentation:

The first argument is purely phenomenological. Woodruff Smith claims (in the last passage quoted) that "the experience itself is not in any way *presented* in the experience [of a frog] — what is presented is 'this frog'" (our italics). This strikes us as plainly false. The experience does not constitute the *focal center* of its own content, but the experience is nonetheless presented *peripherally* in it. (p. 176)

And here are my comments on this introduction to the argument.

1. Kriegel's statement that Woodruff Smith's claim is "purely phenomenological" evidently means Woodruff Smith is proposing one can tell firsthand the experience itself is not presented therein and, for example, the frog is pre-

⁷As I would put it, although my own view of inner awareness is not the same as Kriegel's.

sented therein. Although having a conscious perceptual experience of a frog necessarily means having inner awareness of the experience, this awareness does not find the experience to be presented to one, as it does the frog. Thus, one can directly tell that one is differently aware of the two items in the experience.

2. That Woodruff Smith's phenomenological claim is "plainly false" is phenomenologically based also. Kriegel and others whom he consults do not find their conscious visual-perceptual experience of a frog to be as Woodruff Smith does. Instead, they find both frog and experience to be presented in their experience. Albeit, they are presented differently, according to Kriegel; the frog is "focally" presented in the experience whereas the experience itself is "peripherally" presented therein.

3. Relevantly to my initial paragraph of the present main section, let me note the indication in the above quotation that Kriegel (2003, p. 176) evidently has in mind just a single content per conscious experience — rather than "two separate contents" as he states in his characterization of the traditional view on the previous page. His claim now is that, in having conscious experience of a frog, (a) there occurs awareness of the frog in one way ("centrally") and of the experience in a different way ("peripherally"), and (b) frog and experience are both constituents of the single content belonging to the experience. Thus, Kriegel would reject the phenomenological claim of an appendage theorist that two separate contents are distinguishable firsthand in the case of each conscious experience; that is, one does not have perceptual awareness of the frog and, thereupon, a separate awareness of this perceptual awareness, thus a perceptual content and then a distinct reflexive content.

4. One wants to know what the sense is of the frog's being, as Kriegel states, *central* to the content of the experience whereas the experience itself is a constituent of the identical content at its *periphery*? Does his use of spatial terms here help us to comprehend *the two different ways* in which the frog and the experience are proposed to be apprehended in having the conscious kind of that experience?

5. Does Woodruff Smith hold that they are differently apprehended? Well, he does reject the notion of a perceptual experience's being itself presented in the sense he is using to state that the frog is presented in the experience. However, he conceives of the involved inner awareness not as distinct from the visual-perceptual awareness of the frog. In his view, there exist not two awarenesses per conscious perceptual experience, but just one. It may be best to express his view as follows: in having this one and only awareness, one is therein aware differently of the frog and of the experience itself. One does not see the experience.

How Kriegel Proposes the Inner Awareness Is Different

The difference between being aware of the frog and of the experience itself, Kriegel (2003) explains starting with an analogy to foveal vs. peripheral vision. Thus, a single visual-perceptual experience can have, not unusually, more than one environmental object as object of awareness, or that "at which it is intentionally directed." For simplicity's sake, I restrict discussion to just two distinct objects of awareness per experience. Kriegel has in mind seeing something that lies more or less at one's line of sight and, at the same time, seeing something else that is radiating or reflecting light which, for most of its part, constitutes one's field of view near the latter's left or right edge (Gibson, 1979/1986).

Although, for his analogy to work, Kriegel requires the two objects be experienced together in a single experience, I infer that he also requires the object at one's line of sight be the one of which one is "mainly," or "primarily," aware, and the other be the object of which one is aware "peripherally," or "secondarily." For it sometimes happens that (a) one stares at something lying straight ahead and reflecting light that largely reaches the foveal region of one's retinas while (b) one is primarily aware of something else that lies or is occurring where it affects largely the light near the edge of one's present field of view. In such a case, would it not be rightly said that one is mainly aware of the object of which one is peripherally aware?

The analogy Kriegel draws is between inner awareness and the visual-perceptual awareness one has of something projecting light peripherally in one's field of view. He asserts, "Intrinsic theory is founded on the observation that the subject's [conscious] experience includes not only peripheral *visual* awareness, but also peripheral *self-awareness*" (p. 176). The inner awareness involved in having conscious experience is as well proposed to be "peripheral," yet not, Kriegel states, in exactly the same sense as the analogous visual awareness. But, then, what does it mean for inner awareness "to enjoy a similar status" to a visual awareness?

Woodruff Smith proposes, in effect, that the similarity for which Kriegel is reaching is to be located, as it were, with reference to the modality of presentation in the experience. The latter is a matter, in Husserl's terms, of the "thetic character" of the mental act, which corresponds to the "species" of a mental act. Some examples of different species of mental act are judging, hoping, imagining, and perceiving. In so being, they have different thetic characters. I expressed, in my just prior article, some of the relevant thinking available in Woodruff Smith's monograph (with Ronald McIntyre, 1982) about Husserl's account of intentionality:

The thetic character of a mental act was also described as “the generic ‘way’” in which the subject has awareness therein. A mental act also instantiates other “act characters,” besides the generic thetic character that determines its kind or species. For example, another act character is the degree of attention that a mental act involves. This, too, is part of the total way of givenness of the respective perceived object. Another part, another act character, is the way this attention is distributed among the features of the object. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) listed several of the act characters that Husserl had proposed. In the list, two were identified as follows: “and apparently also the subject’s awareness of himself as subject of the act . . . and of the act’s position in internal time, its temporal position in the stream of consciousness” (Woodruff Smith, 1982, p. 132). Let me not pursue Husserl’s account of the act characters now but come back to it later in this series. But, I should point out that those two act characters that I last mentioned would seem to imply that Husserl too held, as Woodruff Smith did, that inner awareness is a part of the thetic character of a mental act, which is the total way of givenness of the primary object of that act and is distinct from whatever the act may be said to present. (Natsoulas, 2004b, p. 107)

I go on in that article to interpret Woodruff Smith’s account of inner awareness in terms of there being a reflexive way in which one undergoes awareness of the primary object (e.g., the frog) of a conscious experience. On my construal, the similarity for which Kriegel is reaching between an inner awareness and a certain kind of visual-perceptual awareness amounts to their being features of how (the way) what is presented in the experience is apprehended.

This notion contrasts with the heavy emphasis that Kriegel places on inner awareness as an aspect of the intentional content of a conscious experience, on which items are apprehended in having a conscious experience. However, the Woodruff Smith account of inner awareness does not reject that there is awareness of the experience itself in every conscious experience. Recall how Woodruff Smith expresses the total phenomenological content of a conscious experience. What he does deny is the following idea that Kriegel evidently adopts: all of that which one is aware of in having an experience is presented in that experience. According to Woodruff Smith, it is, rather, in having awareness of other, presented objects that experiences enter the picture qua objects of awareness. The other, presented objects are apprehended as objects of experience, of this very experience, as Woodruff Smith expresses it.

In one paragraph, Kriegel cites and quotes from a number of authors who have brought out that conscious experiences have both primary and secondary objects, that is, items of which there is, in some sense, more awareness vs. less in the one experience. Some describe inner awareness and its object as secondary in this sense. Others speak more generally of the focus vs. the fringe of awareness, or the like. From these distinctions, which are drawn by various authors, Kriegel believes himself to be justified in concluding that Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological argument is “unsound.” But, Kriegel’s reasoning to this conclusion is implicit and remains unclear. The paragraph makes one wish he had given attention, instead, to Woodruff Smith’s key concept of the modality of presentation.

Kriegel would seem to be suggesting, contrary to Woodruff Smith, that the apprehension in a conscious experience of its primary object and its apprehension of itself differ with respect to the amount of attention given to these two objects of awareness. He has not given an alternative account of inner awareness, aside from saying, on the contrary, the experience itself is presented; apprehending it is not a function of Woodruff Smith's modality of presentation. Kriegel seems to realize his omission when he writes,

It may be objected that the distinction between primary and secondary intentionality is an ad hoc move which only gives a misleading impression that something has been explained. However, the distinction can be glossed in terms of the distribution of the subject's attention resources. (2003, p. 176)

He proceeds so to gloss but, in fact, leaves proposing an account of inner awareness for later. To say that inner awareness is like being perceptually aware of something with less attention than to something else at the same time, is not to say how inner awareness occurs. Apparently, Kriegel holds that inner awareness, like visual-perceptual awareness, causes its object to be presented in a conscious experience of which it is an intrinsic feature. Woodruff Smith holds inner awareness is a feature of the presentation in the conscious experience of its primary object, determining the way in which this object is presented; but the object of inner awareness, the experience itself, is not presented in the experience.

Kriegel's Introduction of Second Argument

Here is how Kriegel (2003) introduces the second argument he attributes to Woodruff Smith (1986) in support of the thesis: inner awareness is a feature of a conscious experience's modality of presentation. After quoting Hume's famous passage about not encountering a self when he engages in introspection, Kriegel states,

Woodruff Smith claims that Hume's fallacy was to presuppose that the self is part of the content of experience, when in fact it is part of the attitude. Woodruff Smith is implying that if the self figured as an aspect of the *content* of conscious experience, then Hume's point would be right on the mark. And this is a reason to reject the notion that the self figures in the content. (p. 178)

And here are my comments on the introduction to this argument.

1. Woodruff Smith (1986) recognizes that a conscious experience's total phenomenological content normally, if not always, includes a reference to oneself. This is owed to the experience's having an "egocentric character" — in addition to a reflexive character and species character (i.e., a visual-perceptual

character in his prime example). All three of these characters are conceived of as parts or aspects of the modality of presentation in the conscious experience. Although they determine the experience's phenomenological content, they are not in themselves aspects of that content. However, I believe they are process features of the whole experience, and am confident that my process interpretation is a fair implication to draw from Woodruff Smith's discussions.

2. Thus, because the experience has a reflexive character, whatever it is that is presented in the experience is presented therein as being an object of one's experience. This is clearly what Woodruff Smith means when he explains the modality of presentation in an experience to be the way in which the experience presents what makes up its mode of presentation. As I state in the just preceding article of the present series,

- (a) the reflexive character of the experience determines the subject's taking the primary object of the experience to be the object of this very experience.
- (b) The species character of the experience determines how the primary object of the experience is experienced.
- (c) The egocentric character of the experience determines who it is who seems to the subject to be experiencing the primary object of the experience in that way. (Natsoulas, 2004b, p. 115)

3. What Woodruff Smith is arguing regarding Hume's problem with the self is that Hume was mistaken insofar as he expected that the self qua subject of experience would be presented alongside of his experiences, "a 'bare' self apart from its experiences" (1989, p. 72). Woodruff Smith credits Bertrand Russell for this latter argument. Russell stated that what Hume expected is like expecting to be able to observe a tree in isolation from its properties and parts. Hume was wrong to expect to discover among his experiences something that resembles a visual-perceptual awareness of the self itself. His failure to find such awareness does not show that experiences lack a subject who experiences.

4. What Hume should have anticipated was this: in undergoing awarenesses of other things, such as a frog or a lake or even himself, he would apprehend the awarenesses as belonging to the self, as having the self for their subject. Woodruff Smith (1989, p. 88) suggests that no other way exists to make observations of the self as subject; there is no other way than the apprehension of its experiences. He describes the intentional character of experiences in terms of their emanating from a subject and their being directed upon their respective objects. In a conscious experience, this intentional structure is apprehended since the experience intrinsically instantiates a reflexive character. One of the aspects of a conscious experience's modality of presentation is the inner-awareness function. That is to say, the perceived frog, for example, is not simply apprehended as an item at a certain location in the environment, but also as an object of one's experience.

Kriegel's Response to the Second Argument

Kriegel makes short work of Woodruff Smith's analysis of Hume's failure to locate a self in experience: he claims the content–attitude distinction — which he has attributed, for purposes of argument, to Woodruff Smith as equivalent to the latter's distinction between mode and modality of presentation in an experience — is unclear in its implications for Hume's case against the self. He points out in this connection that an experience's attitude feature — his examples are desiring and believing — is no less introspectible than its content is. That is, as part of the experience of consciously desiring *x*, one apprehends the attitude involved therein as being an instance of one's desiring, just as well as one apprehends *x* to be what it is that one therein desires.

But, Woodruff Smith could respond as follows: Hume surely found taking place in him not just impersonal instances of desiring *x*. They possessed an ego-centric character; they possessed an intentional structure having a direction of subject to object; they had a personal source, which he took to be himself; he did not show confusion regarding whose experiences they were. Yet, he claimed not to find a self, on the grounds, Woodruff Smith suggests, that none of the experiences he introspected involved a presentation of the self.

Kriegel offers a "better diagnosis" of Hume's fallacy. He states that it is a fact that the self cannot be introspected. What there is, rather, is "self-awareness." This statement is based on his distinction, which is introduced on the first page of his article (Kriegel, 2003, p. 169), between (a) his main topic, which is the inner awareness intrinsic to every conscious experience, and (b) what he calls "the introspective or reflective awareness in which the subject voluntarily focuses on her internal goings-on." Inner awareness is described, in contrast, as being "effortless and involuntary."

Indeed, inner awareness is instantiated every time a conscious experience occurs, whether (a) the conscious experience takes place spontaneously, automatically, or simply in reaction to an event in the environment or body, or (b) the conscious experience takes place as a consequence of some kind of deliberate activity, such as looking for something, reading a book, engaging in a conversation, or engaging in the activity of introspecting the basic durational components which make up one's stream of consciousness. Whereas the activity of introspecting can affect which of the many possible experiences one's stream of consciousness contains, we have inner awareness simply because a conscious experience of ours has occurred.

Kriegel (2003) asserts that "to say that the self cannot be introspected in an attentive act of reflection is to say that there can be no primary awareness of self" (p. 178). This statement is not accompanied by an explanation of why Kriegel holds that there can be no primary awareness of self. He seems

to accept this as a fact. Woodruff Smith's alternative view is that the self as the subject of an experience is not presented in that experience. So, someone trying to introspect the self as subject finds that his or her experiences present other items than the item being inquired about, and he or she may conclude that there is no self, having ignored the egocentric way in which that which is presented, is presented, that is, the intentional structure of the experience from subject to object.

Kriegel's Introduction of the Third Argument

Here is how Kriegel (2003) introduces the third of the three arguments that he attributes to Woodruff Smith in favor of inner awareness as being a part of the modality of presentation in an experience:

[Woodruff Smith] notes that certain philosophers have alleged that self-awareness is paradoxical, since it requires that the self be represented as subject of consciousness, yet once the subject is represented, it becomes an object. Once it is an object, however, it is no longer represented as *subject*. Again, Woodruff Smith (1986, p. 152) is implying that the only way to dissipate the paradox is to build the self-awareness into the attitude. (p. 178)

And here are my comments on this introduction:

1. When one has inner awareness, as one does in undergoing any conscious experience, one therein apprehends the items presented in the experience in a reflexive and egocentric way, that is, as being the present objects of one's experience. Woodruff Smith describes this apprehension as being a grasping of oneself in the role of subject of the present experience.
2. But this grasping does not imply the self is in itself presented; rather, the grasping is one of the features — namely, inner awareness, the experience's reflexive character — qualifying the presentation in the experience, that is, a way in which what is therein presented is presented.
3. This is not to say, according to Woodruff Smith, that the self qua subject of experience cannot be presented. It can be presented, as when one *thinks* of the self as the subject of various experiences or of a particular experience. No doubt, one can have such a thought experience that is either conscious or unconscious.
4. Suppose, on a particular occasion, there comes to mind the self and its being the subject of a certain experience that one has previously undergone. That is, one has a thought experience regarding the self as being the subject of that experience. In Woodruff Smith's view, this thought experience does indeed present the self as subject. It presents the self as being the subject of that experience. If it is an unconscious experience, then one may have no

inner awareness of it; one may not have awareness of what is presented in it (i.e., the self) as being (as it is) an object of one's present experience.⁸

5. If it is a conscious experience, one does have that inner awareness. With reference to the conscious instance of the case I am now discussing, having inner awareness means (a) awareness occurs of the thought experience that I have described as having for its presented object the self as subject of a certain experience, and (b) this awareness is a matter of one's being aware of the presented thought experience as having the self as subject. Of course, the thought experience is about the self as subject of a different experience. As Woodruff Smith (1986) states, "I can easily be both subject and object of an experience and apprehend myself as both" (p. 152).

Kriegel's Response to the Third Argument

Kriegel declares inner awareness of the self (which he calls "self-awareness") is mysterious and, in its intentional structure, unique. He believes the "dichotomist" kind of thinking in terms of self as subject and self as object, can be superceded by conceiving of what takes place in self-awareness as the collapse of a certain gap. The collapsed gap is said to be a principled gap that exists between subject and object in most mental events. Where there is inner awareness of self, however, Kriegel (2003) states, "The self is represented both as subject and as object" (p. 178). He would seem to be referring implicitly to his main thesis: that inner awareness is an aspect of a conscious experience's intentional content. That is, one apprehends the self and its experiences secondarily or peripherally yet alongside the primary objects of the experience, such as the cube in the perceptual example, presumably as parts of a single content.⁹ At the same time, self and experience are apprehended as constituting the subjective side, as it were, of the experience that is being apprehended.

This appears to me to be what Kriegel has in mind, although he spells his view out hardly at all and not as I have done for him. He characterizes the third argument he attributes to Woodruff Smith as being the latter's strongest argument, and his objection to the argument amounts to the statement that the argument involves the distinction between self as subject and self as object. I take it that, in his own view, Kriegel reduces that distinction to how the self is represented, rather than conceiving, as Woodruff Smith does, of

⁸The use of *may* here is owed to a certain aspect of Woodruff Smith's account to which I do not otherwise refer in the present article, except in this footnote. For some explanation, see Natsoulas (2004b) concerning unconscious experiences.

⁹In the main section of the present article titled "A Basic Question Is Addressed," I brought out that, also, there seems to exist in Kriegel's thinking some inclination to conceive of a conscious experience as having two separate contents.

the self as being the source of experience and of the intentional structure of the experience as reflecting this.

Two Arguments Contra Inner Awareness as Part of the Modality of Presentation in a Conscious Experience

Upon concluding that the three arguments he attributes to Woodruff Smith are unpersuasive, Kriegel (2003) formulates two positive arguments against inner awareness's being an aspect of the attitude that is involved in an experience. He makes his case, once more, using the concept of psychological attitude, which he considers to be equivalent to Woodruff Smith's concept of the modality of presentation in an experience.

1. The first argument is this: inner awareness as an aspect of attitude would mean that there exist double the number of attitudes than are "recognized today." There would be, for example, not merely an attitude of desiring (or fearing or anticipating) x , but also one of self-consciously desiring (or fearing or anticipating) x . Kriegel suggests that such a large number of unrecognized attitudes is "empirically implausible." He seems to believe that if the counterpart self-conscious attitudes existed, they would already be "recognized," even before the introduction of Woodruff Smith's understanding of inner awareness as a feature of the modality of presentation in some of our experiences. As is stated earlier, Woodruff Smith (1986) mentions that, to his knowledge, no other theorist extends as he does the distinction mode vs. modality of presentation though others (using different terms) do make the same distinction. One wishes there were more from Kriegel with respect to his argument. For example, is it not actually the case that non-conscious desiring and non-conscious anticipating are widely recognized, even in ordinary thought? Are these both not widely considered to be different attitudes than their conscious counterparts? Like Woodruff Smith, Kriegel accepts that there are conscious and non-conscious mental-occurrence instances. Would this not amount, for example, to a recognition of self-consciously judging as distinct from acts of judging that are not conscious? The latter acts transpire without inner awareness. They transpire without that which is judged — that which, according too Woodruff Smith, is presented — being apprehended as a feature of this judicative awareness.

2. The second argument concludes that there is no plausible account of the attitude if inner awareness is construed as an aspect thereof. Kriegel suggests that, for example, a self-conscious desiring and an unconscious desiring do not involve different attitudes, since for the desire to be satisfied in either case, the world must change in some way that yields that satisfaction. A useful line of inquiry in response to Kriegel's argument starts with the fact that, for Woodruff Smith, an instance of self-consciously desiring is not

simply about that state of affairs which would satisfy the desire; in the case of those mental-occurrence instances that are conscious, one aspect of the modality of presentation in the experience is inner awareness; this means the mental-occurrence instance also has itself as object. Relevant to my point is Woodruff Smith's expression for the phenomenological content of one of his examples: "Phenomenally in this very experience I see this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad." Thus, what Kriegel (2003) states about his own traditional view of inner awareness applies as well to Woodruff Smith's conception of inner awareness: "A mental state of self-consciously desiring that p involves a world-to-mind direction of fit toward p and a mind-to-world direction-of-fit toward itself" (p. 180). It therefore would seem that Kriegel's contrary understanding of Woodruff Smith derives from his belief that inner awareness qua aspect of the modality of presentation does not affect the phenomenological content, since its reflexive object is claimed by Woodruff Smith not to be presented. See in this connection the discussion contained in the section of the present article titled, "The Modality of Presentation in a Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instance." As I explain there, inner awareness is not an aspect of the phenomenological content of a conscious mental-occurrence instance; rather, it contributes to the determination of that content. Consistently with Woodruff Smith's account, I interpret inner awareness as a feature of the process that in itself the mental-occurrence instance is. Many a mental-occurrence instance is, for example, a conscious visual-perceptual experience; that is, it is that kind of process which, simultaneously and unitarily, is both a visual-perceptual awareness and an inner awareness. As stated in that section of the present article, if it lacked its inner-awareness feature, the experience would have for that reason a different phenomenological content than the corresponding conscious visual-perceptual experience.

Concluding Comment

Kriegel concludes his discussion of Woodruff Smith's account of inner awareness by stating that his discussion demonstrates (a) that the arguments pro that account are "unimpressive" and (b) that there are, in contrast, "several powerful arguments" that inner awareness is an aspect of the content of a conscious mental-occurrence instance. My disagreement with Kriegel's claims regarding his discussion should be evident. I believe he needs to inquire into the more that there is to a mental-occurrence instance than its content. To say that something is part of this content would seem to mean for Kriegel that it is a part of what one apprehends in having that mental-occurrence instance. Therefore, if one is an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness, then, of course, part of the content of an experience is the experience itself. Woodruff

Smith attempts to move on beyond this obvious thesis for an intrinsic theorist, to treat of what gives to a mental-occurrence instance its reflexive character. He argues that it is a feature of the mental-occurrence instance that determines the reflexive way that what is presented is presented in the experience.

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