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The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution

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Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and contingent. I argue that an adequate account of unity would require internal or conceptual relations between the aspects of emotion, and I suggest that such an account can be found in Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of emotion, and specifically, in his form and matter distinction. After I show that emotions are intentional pleasures and pains or distresses, I argue that the characteristic intentional pleasure and pain of an emotion, along with its other intentional elements (beliefs, thoughts, mental pictures, etc.), are the form of the emotion, whereas the bodily feelings are its matter. Form and matter constitute a conceptual unity, which cannot be accounted for in conglomeration accounts that see emotions as mixtures of different parts related only through efficient causation.

Keywords: Aristotle, causation, unity of emotion

Most researchers agree that emotions are multifaceted phenomena, composed of cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc., as well as non-cognitive, affective states such as bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions.^{1,2}

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¹A "cognitive evaluation" is any state directed toward the object of the emotion that involves a cognition (or information processing) and some type of evaluation, e.g., evaluative belief, judgment, thought, mental picture, etc.

²Davidson and Ekman illustrate the point nicely in their excellent edition *The Nature of Emotion*. In particular, they state that most researchers of emotion agree that emotions involve multiple elements, such as evaluation, physiological changes, feelings, etc. See Davidson and Ekman, 1994, p. 412.

However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion (see Adamos, 2002). The most popular approach is the causal view, which sees emotion as a conglomeration of different parts, mediated by efficient causation (Davis, 1988; Goldstein, 2002; Lyons, 1980; Schachter and Singer, 1962). According to this view, a mental state is an emotion when the evaluative intentional state (with its relevant desire) causes the bodily feelings and behavioral expressions. I have elsewhere argued against this view and shall assume here that the view faces enough difficulties to call for an alternative theory (Adamos, 2002). So, bypassing detailed discussion, I would like to sketch here two kinds of problems facing the causal view.

a) *The problem of accidental causal connections.* Consider the following example. Suppose X receives news that her paper has been accepted for publication, evaluates this positively, and she feels relief, as she thinks that now she can take some time out from research and go dancing. When she does so, a few days later she finds herself positively evaluating the physical exercise of dancing and a smile breaks out on her face along with various bodily feelings related to joy. Even though the good news about the acceptance of her paper is a causal factor in her dancing and subsequently her joy, she is taking joy *in dancing* and cannot be said to be feeling joy *that her paper was accepted*. That is, if "X feels joy that her paper was accepted" is taken to mean or is conceptually analyzed as "X evaluates the acceptance of her paper positively," and this evaluation *causes* the bodily feelings characteristic of joy, one would (mistakenly) have to say that X is feeling joy that her paper was accepted, when in fact X is feeling joy about dancing. The main problem I think is that insofar as causal chains between evaluations and feelings can be expected to have many links, the causal view is unable to distinguish between accidental and non-accidental causal chains between the evaluations and the bodily feelings. Although one may object that the above example is an aberrant way in which an emotion could arise, my point here is that if the causal view is right, then it will result in identifying the wrong object of the emotion. According to the causal view the minimum requirement for "A is scared of the snake" to be true is that A has a negative evaluation of the snake, which causes the bodily feelings and behavior characteristic of fear. However if the negative evaluation of the snake and the feelings and behavior characteristic of fear are not intimately connected and, thus do not engender a single unified state whereby the feelings and behavior are infused by the negative evaluation, there would not be fear present. Since the above cases demonstrate that efficient causation cannot bring about the unification or infusion of the evaluation and feelings, then it follows that even in other cases where (a) an evaluation causes the bodily feelings, and (b) the bodily feelings are unified or infused with the evaluation, the infusion and the unification cannot be accounted for simply on the basis of the evaluation *causing* the bodily feelings. Hence, efficient causation is not sufficient to explain the emotion.

(b) *The problem of first person authority over one's emotions.* If I suddenly step on a snake while hiking in Big Sur and fear the snake, I have a special first person authority over my fear. Perhaps this special authority does not extend over the entire domain of emotions, but it exists in many (and possibly standard) cases of emotions. Such authority is not infallible, but has a privileged status. The causal view proposes to analyze the *meaning* of "I am afraid of the snake" as the evaluative state (my negative evaluation that the snake is dangerous, and my desire to avoid being bitten) causing the bodily feelings and their behavioral manifestations (pounding of the heart and fleeing behavior). If this were the case, however, I should have a special kind of first person authority over the causal connections involved. But surely we do not have any special first person authority over such a causal chain. One could object here that people systematically misidentify their emotions, and therefore the causal view's inability to account for our first person authority over our emotions is not a major problem. However, though we certainly lack a first person authority over the identification of many emotions, and consequently our first person authority may not be infallible, even in the most favorable situation, it can still be shown that I can surely know without investigation that I am angry with my husband for having insulted and embarrassed me in front of others. I do not need to determine that the bodily feelings and flushed face were caused by my negative evaluation of my husband's behavior (and in fact I know nothing about the physiology of these sensations).

The above problems indicate that the causal view faces insurmountable difficulties. But, then, how are we to understand the meaning of expressions such as "fear of X," "anger at X," or "joy about X"? Furthermore, if emotions are unified states where the bodily feelings and their behavioral manifestations are infused by positive or negative evaluations, and if efficient causation cannot account for such unity or infusion, then how are we to understand the key notions of unification and infusion? More importantly, how can states as diverse as evaluations and bodily feelings be united to constitute the oneness of an emotion?³

I would like to suggest that the main reason the causal view fails is that it doesn't provide for a conceptual relation between the different parts of the emotion, since causal relations are inherently empirical and, therefore, contingent. But is it possible to find non-empirical, conceptual relations between the evaluations and the bodily feelings? Since bodily feelings lack intentional objects, feelings of an accelerated heartbeat and contractions of muscles are perfectly intelligible without any evaluative beliefs relating to an insult or

³Here I am concerned with standard cases of emotions. As Kenny (1963) showed, when a case fulfills all the conditions it becomes the standard or paradigm case, and by reference to it cases which do not fulfill all the conditions become intelligible.

injustice.⁴ Nor can any specific range of bodily feelings be conceptually entailed by evaluative intentional states or desires, since creatures can have such states or desires even if they have very different bodies and bodily feelings. What is needed, then, is a way in which intentional states and their relevant desires can be internally or conceptually related to the emotion's bodily feelings and behavioral manifestations. I shall propose that through Aristotle's metaphysics as well as his theory of emotions we can locate the needed unity of the aspects of an emotion. In particular, I shall concentrate on Aristotle's distinction of form and matter and propose that it provides the conceptual relations needed between the bodily feelings and the other aspects of the emotion. Following Aristotle, I will claim that the intentional states of emotions are the form of the emotion and the bodily feelings and their behavioral manifestations are its matter.^{5,6} Form and matter constitute a peculiar unity, which is characteristic of emotions and it is through this unity that bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions can acquire the required infusion with the other aspects of the emotions.

Aristotle's Account of Form and Matter: A Brief Summary

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle, following his predecessor Plato, argues that the human soul has two parts, the rational and the non-rational (EN 1102a28). Yet, unlike Plato, he thinks that the two parts necessarily form a unity. This is evident in emotions, which seem to be constituted by both a rational (in the sense that they involve reason or the intellect) element such as beliefs, or thoughts, and non-rational elements such as bodily feelings. Characteristically, in *de Anima* 403a16–25, Aristotle notes: "It seems likely that the affections [*pathe*] of the soul are all with body — anger, tranquility, fear, pity, boldness, again joy and both loving and hating . . . From all this it is clear that the affections,

⁴Prinz, following Dretske's theory of intentionality, suggests in "Which Emotions are Basic?" that bodily feelings could also be intentional and representational: "A perception of a patterned bodily response can represent danger in virtue of the fact that it has the function of serving as a danger detector" (2004, p. 82). I would like to resist such a view, for even if the bodily feelings are intentional, they exhibit a different type of intentionality than the one required in emotions. My goose-bumps when my team won, certainly were not the goose-bumps of winning, neither were they about my team's winning the game, although they might be the goose-bumps of excitement.

⁵My discussion of Aristotle should not be taken as an exhaustive analysis of Aristotle's metaphysics. Here I am only borrowing the concepts of form and matter from Aristotle, because I think that they provide a solution to the problem of unity of emotion. So, the analysis and the solutions I propose should not be understood necessarily as something Aristotle would endorse.

⁶However, unlike Aristotle, I will omit a reference to emotions as states of the soul, and instead I will refer to them as mental states involving a certain form and matter, without committing myself to any particular theory regarding the mind–body relation.

are formulae in matter [*logoi en hulei*].” Aristotle argues that rational states, bodily motion and physiological changes, are inseparable constituents of emotion, and that while the rational [intentional] states are the form of the emotion, the bodily motion is its matter (DA 412a19).

Likewise, in his discussion of change in *Physics* I 7, Aristotle incorporates the notion that in every change, something changes and something remains the same. He explains that what remains or persists through change is the matter, whereas the characteristic that changes is the form. For instance, in material things such as a brazen statue, the underlying thing is the bronze, and the thing changing, i.e., the form, is the shape of the statue. The resulting object (or “substance” in Aristotle’s terminology) will be the compound of the form (i.e., shape) of the statue and the matter of bronze (Phys. 191a7–12).

Accordingly, any chunk of matter or stuff can have at t^1 one form, and at t^2 , another. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle maintains that there is no particular form that a certain matter must have, even if it only and always appears in a particular form. In this way, matter is indeterminate and a mere potentiality, since it is able to take a variety of forms (Meta. 1037a27). In order to understand what Aristotle means here, let us consider an example: a wooden table. The wooden table can be analyzed into two components, the woody matter, and the form or shape of table. We can imagine that a lot of things could be made out of wood: chairs, beds, houses, etc. At the same time, we can imagine that the form or shape of the table could enform many different materials: plastic, bronze, iron, etc.⁷ The matter “wood” (before it becomes a table) is a table only potentially, in a way that the matter “water” is not. Consequently, water, unlike wood, plastic, iron, etc., can never be the matter of a table. When the wood acquires the form of the table, it becomes a table in actuality, or its potentiality of being a table becomes actualized.

What makes an object the kind of thing that it is, or what identifies it as *this* particular object, is its form and not its matter. For according to Aristotle, the definition of a perceptible, material thing has to include its essence, and the form is the only candidate that can be mentioned in the definition: “It is now clear that a definition is the formula stating the essence of a thing . . .” (Meta. 1031a10–14).

However, for Aristotle, a perceptible, material thing (i.e., a “substance” in Aristotle’s terminology) is not to be identified with the sum of its parts. A house, that is, is something over and above the conglomeration of bricks, windows, cement, and columns. For if we are to identify the house as something whose parts present a certain continuity, we do not really explain why this continuity of materials is a house as opposed to just walls made of bricks. Since what we are trying to explain is the unity of the compound, an expla-

⁷“To enform” here means “to bestow with a form, or to give a form to a certain matter.”

nation of the unity of the materials that make up a house, does *not* at all constitute an explanation of the house, or the compound, but only of its matter. Aristotle thinks that the material, sensible objects (i.e., the compounds of form and matter) are more than anything else qualified as being called one, unified, or whole, because they are actualized in just one form:

[T]he things that are primarily called one are those whose substance is one, — and one either in continuity, or in form or in formula While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e., unless it has one form; e.g., if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same . . . we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and have thereby some one form. (Meta. 1016 11–16)

Aristotle's point here is that the continuity of the material parts of the compound does not really show the wholeness and oneness of the particular thing. That is, we can imagine the parts of a shoe being materially continuous, but not amounting to a shoe. Unless we are able to see the thing as one, will we be able to see that its material parts belong, as it were, to it. The material parts of the shoe do not only have to be continuous; we cannot call the combination of them one specific and unified whole unless they are so arranged as to make up the form of the shoe.

An Aristotelian Model of the Unity of Emotion

The Aristotelian form and matter distinction seems promising. According to the Aristotelian view, an emotion can be taken to be an ontologically unified whole, where the evaluative intentional states (along with the relevant desiderative states) are the form of the emotion, and the bodily feelings, its matter. The form of the emotion makes the emotion the kind of emotion it is, and differentiates it from other states and emotions. Likewise, the matter of the emotion is the bodily feelings (along with their physiological changes and behavioral expressions), which through the intentional states become the emotional feeling peculiar to a given emotion. The bodily feelings are able to make the emotion concrete in embodied beings such as humans.

So, in the case of anger we have the belief (or another pertinent evaluative intentional state) that someone has insulted us and the relevant desire for revenge, and these intentional states together inform the bodily feelings, which are the matter peculiar to anger. Alternatively, in the case of joy we have the belief (or other evaluative state) that something good has happened (e.g., that one received an unexpected legacy) and this intentional state informs the bodily feelings (and their behavioral expressions such as a smile), which are the matter peculiar to joy. Precisely because the form is actualized in the bodily feelings and behavioral manifestations, the feelings and the manifestations can now

partake in whatever conceptual relations the form, i.e., the evaluative intentional states, participate in.

However, it seems that the Aristotelian model faces a problem, since it is evident that evaluative intentional states comprising an emotion can exist outside the emotion. For, certainly, it is possible for one to have the belief that one is in danger, without feeling fear. Yet, according to the Aristotelian model, if the form is peculiar to a particular emotion, and in fact makes the bodily feeling the kind of emotion it is, then it cannot exist by itself, but only when it informs certain bodily feelings. But, if the form of the emotion exists by itself without informing the bodily feelings, and hence without being the emotion, then this means that the form of an emotion does not really make, nor define the emotion as the kind of emotion it is, which, of course, would destroy the inseparable oneness of the emotion. As we have seen, according to Aristotle, if there is a form present, so is the particular thing present. If the form of the house is present, so is the house, and if the form of the statue of Hermes is present, so is the statue of Hermes.

Of course, the Aristotelian model could be saved, if one showed that the evaluative intentional state could not exist, unless it is embodied in some feelings. But this is counterintuitive. One could surely evaluate negatively a person's offensive action, without becoming angry. Indeed, just for this reason we cannot dispense with feelings. Thus, I must allow that evaluative intentional states can exist independently of the emotion and the bodily feelings an emotion informs. The only conclusion to draw is that evaluative intentional states cannot really be the form of the emotions, and another candidate for the form of the emotion is needed, which would be immune to this problem.

The Role of Pleasure and Pain in Emotion

Most contemporary analyses of emotion ignore the fact that emotions do not merely require intentional evaluative states and bodily feelings, but also certain pleasures and pains, or distresses. When we feel a joy for winning the lottery, it is not that we simply have a certain belief (or similar evaluative state), and bodily feelings. It also feels *good*. That is, there is a particular pleasure in our joy. Without it, joy would not qualify as joy, so to speak. Likewise, when we feel angry at our boss for having insulted us in front of the customer, we do not only have the particular belief that she treated us wrongly with the corresponding desire and the bodily feelings. We feel *bad*. We feel a particular pain or distress. Without such a distress the anger would not really make sense.

Indeed in the past philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hume, have suggested that emotions are particular pleasures and pains and that to feel an emotion is to feel such pleasure and pain. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines fear as a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or

painful evil in the future (Rh. 1382a21–22), and shame as “pain or disturbance in regard to bad things whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit . . . [W]e feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves and those we care for” (Rh. 1383b15–19). Also, he defines anger as a desire for revenge for an apparent insult at the hands of men who have no right to slight oneself or others, which is accompanied by pain (Rh. 1378a30–b1). But anger, according to Aristotle, is not accompanied only by the feeling of pain. It is also “accompanied by a certain pleasure — that which arises from the expectation of revenge” (Rh. 1378a4–5).⁸

A similar account of emotion in terms of pain and pleasure is given by Spinoza: “Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause,” and “hatred is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (1677/2003, p. 37). Likewise, Spinoza defines hope as “an inconstant pleasure that arises from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue,” and fear as “an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue” (p. 37). Also, Spinoza defines joy as “a pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope” and pity as a pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (p. 38). Spinoza similarly defines emotions such as despair, humility, and shame as instances of pain, and honor as an instance of pleasure.

Likewise, Hume argues that pleasure and pain are essential to emotions. In his explanation of direct and indirect passions he notes: “By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities” (1739/2003, p. 276). Hume stresses the point later, when he discusses the emotions of pride and humility: “pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain there is in reality no pride nor humility” (p. 47). According to Hume “the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very appearance, gives pleasure, as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility” (p.48). Likewise, Hume defines love and hatred as instances of pleasure and pain respectively: “T will be sufficient to remark in general, that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy. We may also suppose with some shew of probability, that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being, and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure, and of the latter a separated uneasiness” (p. 53).

⁸Although Aristotle defines anger as a desire for revenge, he includes both pain and pleasure as parts of the definition.

All the above accounts of emotion make it clear that pleasure and/or pain are essential elements of emotion. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case of emotion that does not involve some type of pleasure or distress. Emotions such as joy and pride seem to be inherently pleasurable, whereas anger, fear, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, jealousy and envy seem to be inherently unpleasant and distressful. It follows, therefore, that pleasure and pain or distress surely are essential features of emotions.

However, in claiming that pleasures and pains are essential for the emotions, I do not mean to suggest that bodily pleasures and pains are essential to the emotions. Purely bodily pleasures such as sexual gratification and the bodily pleasure of a warm bath are not essential components of emotions; nor is a headache or the distress of a bloated stomach. What are essential to the emotions are the pleasures and pains that are intentional and that involve an object. That is, what is essential to joy is the pleasure of having won the lottery, or having achieved a difficult goal. When I am afraid of the snake, I feel distressed about encountering the snake. When I am ashamed at what I have done, I feel distressed about what I have done, and when I am angry that he insulted me, I feel distressed about his having insulted me. It is these intentional pleasures and pains that are essential to the emotions.

How do the intentional pleasures or distresses fit with the overall conceptual scheme of the emotion? The intentional pleasures and pains, like the emotions, logically presuppose an evaluative intentional state. Take a case of joy. Say that I feel joy for having won the competition. According to the aforementioned view, this would translate into "I am pleased that I won the competition." But unless I evaluate positively my winning the competition, I would not be pleased, and, subsequently, I would not feel joy. Consider another example. I am angry about my friend's betraying my secret. This is analyzed as being distressed that my friend did not keep her word. If I had not evaluated negatively my friend's not keeping her word, then I would not have felt the distress. Thus, just as emotions logically presuppose evaluative intentional states, so, too, the intentional feelings of pleasure and/or distress logically presuppose evaluative states.

Now, one might object that sometimes a person can be pleased about something she evaluates negatively, or distressed about something she evaluates positively. Say that a man is very pleased about his seeing his mistress, even though he evaluates seeing his mistress negatively. In the same vein, a woman might be distressed for having to see her sick father, although she evaluates seeing her sick father positively. In such circumstances, in order to keep up with the usual sense of the words, we need to say that the man must evaluate, at least in part, seeing his mistress positively, or the woman must evaluate in part seeing her sick father negatively. If there are no respects whatsoever in which the man and woman see their objects of pleasure and distress positively and neg-

atively respectively, we are at loss of how to make sense of their pleasure and distress. If we are told that one is pleased for winning the competition, but one does not believe (think, see, etc.) that winning the competition is a good thing in any respect whatsoever, we would need an explanation, or, otherwise we would find the statement unintelligible. Therefore, it appears that as emotions presuppose evaluative intentional states, so do pleasures and distresses.

Likewise, the relation from the evaluative intentional states to intentional pleasures and pains seem as loose as the relation between such states and the emotions. Certainly, there is not entailment. One may evaluate something negatively, and yet not feel distress, or, alternatively, evaluate something positively and not feel pleasure. For instance, I may evaluate my winning the competition positively and not feel pleasure, or, I may evaluate the snake in front of me negatively and yet not feel distress. Just as purely "rational" creatures such as Mr. Spock in "Star Trek" might make evaluations without having emotions, it seems possible that such creatures might not have intentional feelings of pleasure and pain. Indeed, the question of whether there is any kind of conceptual sufficiency from evaluations to emotions seems to correlate with the corresponding question of the sufficiency of evaluations for feelings of pleasure and pain. So far, the conceptual relations between evaluative states and emotions (or lack of such relations) parallel the conceptual relations between the evaluative states and the intentional feelings of pleasure and pain, and this supports the suggestion that the emotions are the intentional feelings of pleasure and pain. Thus, it would seem that we could define the emotions in terms of intentional feelings of pleasure and pain or distress. According to the revised Aristotelian model that has emerged, the inward and outward bodily expressions and indications of the emotion would be the matter of the emotion, whereas what defines the emotions would be the form. And, as we recall, this is precisely what we were seeking: namely, an alternative to the evaluative intentional states as the form of the emotions.

The Aristotelian Model Reconsidered

According to the revised Aristotelian model emotions would be analyzed as follows: in the case of fear of the snake the form would be the intentional distress about the dangerous snake, whereas the matter would be the bodily feelings and expressions characteristic of fear. In the case of joy in winning the prize, the form would be the pleasure in winning the prize, whereas the matter would be the bodily feelings and expressions characteristic of joy. In the case of anger about my friend's betraying my secret, the form would be the distress about my friend's betraying the secret, and the desire for revenge, and possibly, the matter would be the bodily feelings characteristic of anger. The connection of an emotion to other intentional states and actions is assured by the fact that

the intentional feelings of pleasure and pain or distress (with the addition of the desires) have the same conceptual relations as the emotions themselves.

However, two more questions need to be addressed: (1) Do intentional pleasures and pains actually enform the bodily feelings, rather than merely co-existing with them? (2) Can intentional feelings of pleasures and pains exist independently of *bodily* feelings? It seems that question 1 is a bit easier to answer. As we have already noted, if the bodily feelings are to be the matter of emotions, we must be able to point to some significant difference between, say, a heartbeat, which is enformed by the form of fear, and a heartbeat which is not so enformed. But we have already seen a fast heartbeat is not by its very nature pleasant or distressful. It is distressful when we are afraid of the snake, and pleasant when we are going to the airport to see our beloved. This certainly indicates that the *quality* of the bodily feeling (i.e., its being pleasurable, distressful or neutral) depends on whether one has the intentional feeling of distress at meeting a dangerous snake or the intentional feeling of pleasure at the prospect of meeting one's beloved, or the absence of any intentional pleasure or distress. Again, one may cry either from grief or joy, and while the inward and outward expression of grief feels bad, the expression of joy feels good. One may clench one's fist and feel anger, but one may also clench one's fist and feel joy at having accomplished some difficult goal (as it is the case with athletes when they accomplish a goal). Consider how one's hand feels when it is held by one's lover, and when it is held by a lecherous boss; one feels wonderful, while the other feels awful. This is because the bodily feeling is enformed by the pleasure of love in one case, and the distress of a boss taking advantage of his position in the other. In all such cases the content of the bodily feeling may be the same, but its quality is different — the one feels bad because it is enformed by the intentional feeling of distress, while the other feels good because it is enformed by the pleasure of having succeeded.

Yet, question 2 is much more difficult to answer with confidence. The above examples make it clear that in many cases an intentional pleasure or distress enforms the bodily feelings. But is it possible to have an intentional pleasure or pain without any bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions? I believe there is no simple answer, and that a careful phenomenological analysis of various emotions is needed in order to determine how and to what extent the revised Aristotelian model can take bodily feelings to be the matter of emotions. As a flavor of the kind of investigation that is needed, let us consider fear.

The initial bodily feelings, which tend to characterize fear, are the feeling of a missed heartbeat when we are alerted to the presence of a snake, or the feeling of the pounding heart when we walk through a dangerous neighborhood. Both of these feelings seem to relate to a state of excitation or arousal occasioned by the perceived danger. The missed heartbeat indicates the shift

from the relatively tranquil prior state to the arousal occasioned by the (suddenly) perceived danger, while the pounding heart is more indicative of the continuous state of excitation or arousal, as one hopes that the feared event will be avoided, that one will safely walk through the neighborhood, or that snake will slither away. How much of this is absolutely required for fear? Surely, what distinguishes fear from the cool appraisal of the danger followed by the coolly calculated avoidance of the danger is that fear requires a state of arousal or excitation (which can lead to outright panic). As such, the revised Aristotelian model defines fear as the more or less acute distress one feels by the prospects of the negatively evaluated outcome. But, surely, the more or less acute feelings of distress conceptually call for a state of arousal, and this is precisely what fear requires. Yet, it is a contingent truth for humans that the missed heartbeat and the pounding heart are the ways in which we are excited. We cannot rule out, that is, that creatures very different from us may feel fear by exhibiting a very different state of arousal from the missed heartbeat or the pounding heart.

Investigations along these lines will determine whether there can be intentional feelings of pleasure and pain that are not bodily feelings and the extent to which bodily feelings are essential to human emotions. What is clear is that insofar as many of our emotions involve enformed bodily feelings, the Aristotelian model has much to recommend it. By being the matter of the form-matter complex, which is the emotion, the bodily feelings and expressions acquire the conceptual relations to the other states of emotion through the form of the emotion. The revised Aristotelian model incorporates the evaluative intentional states insisted upon by the cognitivists, for the intentional pleasure or pain logically presupposes the evaluation, yet it avoids the flaw of strong cognitivism that denies any place for the feelings. In addition, the revised Aristotelian model overcomes the defects of the causal view that states that an emotion is simply a matter of the evaluation causing the bodily sensations, for it will not encounter counterexamples that show the accidental connection of the "antecedent" and the "consequent" of the causal relation. Because the revised Aristotelian model considers the form (qua pleasure or distress) and the bodily feelings (qua matter) as *one* and the *same* thing, it overcomes the causal view's inability to give an account of the first person authority we usually have over our emotions. For there is no room on the Aristotelian model for one to be aware of two things and wonder how they are connected. One cannot recognize, or have a first person authority over one's intentional pleasures and distresses, without having some awareness of the bodily feelings involved, in the same way that one cannot see the form of a statue without seeing the matter of the statue, or see the printed word without seeing the ink constituting such words. Seen in this light, when we have a first person authority over our feelings of pleasure and distress, we have a

similar authority over our bodily feelings. Thus, the revised Aristotelian model can accommodate bodily feelings, while insisting on the internal unity of emotion.

I hope I have shown that the revised Aristotelian model is highly plausible for occurrent emotions. Underlying our discussion is the idea that emotions conceptually involve arousals, which in human beings are expressed through bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions. This confirms our intuition that emotions involve our whole body, and are not mere cerebral occurrences. The Aristotelian model incorporates this intuition as well as what is right in other accounts, while avoiding the problems such accounts face. I therefore suggest that the Aristotelian model is the right account for our paradigm emotions.

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