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The Mind-Body Problem in Lawrence, Pepper, and Reich

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The inherently interdisciplinary problems of mind and body can be approached intelligently only by admitting the personal, bodily dimension of our stance toward these relations into our thinking about them. In a critique of Whitehead, D.H. Lawrence showed that the "body" term in philosophical formulations refers to an estranged entity. S.C. Pepper offers the best strictly philosophical resolution of the problem in a special version of the neural-identity theory. Pepper's approach requires a sensitivity toward our continuous stream of felt qualities. As Reich knew, that sensitivity is not likely to be encouraged in our culture, unless we should succeed in adapting to the demands of adult sexuality. In three very different approaches to the mind-body problem, Reich pointed toward such adaptation. Reich's version of the identity theory is stronger than Edwards (1967) recognized. Clarification of Reich may be obtained through Pepper's use of "disposition," a category he developed within a new world hypothesis grounded in a sense of body that is not subject to Lawrence's accusations. But Reich's therapeutic, preventative, and ultimately commonsense recommendations remain essential to any progress into this unavoidable problem of mind-body.

Convenient and habitual though it may be, it is probably an error to even refer to the mind-body problem as if there were one such entity clearly set out in philosophy. There is instead a whole group of problems whose interrelations continue to shift; philosophical efforts to find a central point within this group, to bring about a resolution of the perplexities, never seem to pass the test of agreement amongst the philosophers themselves. It is surprising that more discussions have not reached the "give it up" conclusion of Jerome Shaffer, who ended his article on "Mind-Body Problem" for the standard reference work in the field, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, by saying:

> The mind-body problem remains a source of acute discomfort to philosophers. There have been many attempts to prove that it is a "pseudo problem," but none has stood up under scrutiny. There have been many attempts to solve it, but at present no solution stands out as markedly superior to the others. Nor does it seem that new empirical information will furnish a decisive test for one theory or another. It may well be that the relation between mind and body is an ultimate, unique, and unanalyzable one. If so, philosophical wisdom would consist in giving up the attempt to understand the relation in terms of other, more familiar ones and accepting it as the anomaly it is. (Shaffer, 1967, p. 345)

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This acceptance I suppose could not sit well with philosophers; in fact, it did not seem to be advice that Shaffer himself could take. In later articles, he has defended one subvariety of one of the solutions, namely the so-called "identity" theory (Shaffer, 1974). This is an important and promising theory which holds, roughly, that mind and body are one and the same entity observed in two different modes. One form of the identity theory was held by Wilhelm Reich, who was accorded a full entry in the same *Encyclopedia*, written by its editor-in-chief, Paul Edwards; another form, that of the "neural-identity theory," was held by Stephen C. Pepper, who would hardly be thought to have affinity with Reich. I will show that such an affinity does exist, and an instructive complementarity of approaches as well, not only for these two but for the novelist D.H. Lawrence.

In attempting to consolidate the thought of these three men, I will not propose still another "solution" to the relationships of mind and body. Instead I will try to show that the three offer a fairly coherent confrontation of a problem that by its very nature, as a question of both mind and behavior, requires a multidisciplinary approach. Among the most challenging of these disciplines is self-awareness toward the ways in which one's mind and one's body are experienced. Considered in this light, the problem is anything but a scholastic or academic one.

Efforts to argue the matter in any separate discipline — most obviously in philosophy itself — continually prove to be futile. Is there not a lesson here? The reader will have little surprise in learning that Shaffer's defense of the identity theory soon brought on a number of grave, seemingly insurmountable objections. They came from R.T. Hull (1973, 1974). Inevitably, the debate between Shaffer and Hull produced a specialists' standoff. Each seemed to have a perfectly unassailable position, opposite that of the other. The situation must recall the book by C.D. Broad (1925) which came out over 50 years ago; in it some 24 "solutions" to the mind-body problem are assembled, many of them apparently logical, but none sufficiently convincing.

My choice of Lawrence and Reich as "non-specialists" who along with Pepper will help us see around, if not get around, the impasse over mind and body is deliberate. Both of these thinkers resist classification within a single discipline. Lawrence's philosophical and psychological speculations — what he called his "polly-analytics" — are credited by a recent psychoanalytic critic (Schwartz, 1977) with opening a serious dialogue in opposition to psychoanalytic thinking that is still in progress. His deeper sources in a long but suppressed tradition of psychosomatic science have only recently been uncovered.[1] Wilhelm Reich is not only a social thinker who wrote *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* at a time when other members of the therapeutic community were concentrating on the prudent survival of their professional work; he also moved into bodily medicine,

[1]See Christopher Heywood (1979). Also Bruce Clarke (Note 1) who traces Lawrence's roots in the speculative physiology of Johann Reil, G.H. von Schubert, as well as Bichat.

physics, and meta-physics in a series of investigations whose value remains controversial, though it is gathering confirmations that will give pause to anyone who has imagined that this side of Reich could be safely ignored.[2] Reich has also been accorded a certain status as a philosopher; it is important to recall that Paul Edwards wrote (a decade prior to his *Encyclopedia* article) that "As a philosopher specializing in the mind-body problem, I can state that I learned more from [Reich's writing on character analysis] "than from all professional philosophers I have ever read" (Edwards, 1957, p. 7).

Lawrence's Position

Lawrence's quarrel with the philosophers is brought out in the following passage taken from a modern philosophical work that is actually quoted in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. Clifford, who is Connie's husband and the presiding spirit of the industrial god of our time, is reading this just published book to Connie. I shall omit for now Connie's interruptions and objections, and quote only that which Clifford reads:

> The universe shows us two aspects: on one side — it is physically wasting, on the other it is spiritually ascending. It is thus slowly passing, with a slowness inconceivable in our measures of time, to new creative conditions, amid which the physical world, as we at present know it, will be represented by a ripple barely to be distinguished from nonentity. The present type of order in the world has risen from an unimaginable past, and will find its grave in an unimaginable future. There remains the inexhaustive realm of abstract forms, and creativity with its shifting character ever determined afresh by its own creatures, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend. (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 296-297).

Obviously if the physical is going to become next to nothing, almost a nonentity, the physical reality of the body will disappear, too. Connie, becoming aware of her sensual feelings, will have none of this. Clifford tries to write her objections off, but he gets back a lot more answer than he has been bargaining for:

> "But then, I suppose a woman doesn't take a supreme pleasure in the life of the mind."
> "Supreme pleasure?" she said, looking up at him. "Is that sort of idiocy the supreme pleasure of the life of the mind? No, thank you! Give me the body. I believe the life of the body is a greater reality than the life of the mind: when the body is really awakened to life. But so many people, like your famous wind-machine, have only got minds tacked on to their physical corpses." He looked at her in wonder.
> "The life of the body," he said, "is just the life of the animals."
> "And that's better than the life of professional corpses. But it's not true! The human

[2]Reich's claim that temperature inside an Orgone Accumulator differs from room temperature in a way that cannot be explained in conventional physics, has been confirmed recently in an extensive series of experiments with stringent controls by Mann (1979). The effects of Reich's "Cloudbuster," a weather control device based on the assumptions of Orgone energy, have been partially confirmed by DeMeo (Note 2). William Tiller, chairman of material physics at Stanford University, in an address given at the Boston Museum of Science in May 1977, argued for the existence of an as yet unknown energy which he acknowledged "may be the same as, for example, what Reich called orgone." The unexpected results of Solar research of the last few decades are explained in detail within a Reichian framework by Konia (1979).

> body is only just coming to real life. With the Greeks it gave a lovely flicker, then Plato and Aristotle killed it, and Jesus finished it off. But now the body is coming really to life, it is really arising from the tomb. And it will be a lovely, lovely life in the lovely universe, the life of the human body."
> "My dear, you speak as if you were ushering it all in! True, you are going away on a holiday: but don't please be quite so indecently elated about it. Believe me, whatever God there is is slowly eliminating the guts and alimentary system from the human being, to evolve a higher, more spiritual being."
> "Why should I believe you, Clifford, when I feel that whatever God there is has at last wakened up in my guts, as you call them, and is rippling so happily there, like dawn? Why should I believe you, when I feel so very mkch the contrary?" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 297-298)

Burns (1966) has pointed out that here Connie realizes how her own body experiences, her "guts," provide an unanswerable refutation of Clifford's ideals. However, in the latter part of her answer, Connie has started to have it both ways: she can reject the philosopher's conclusions simply because they go against her purely personal subjective experience, and also, un-simply, because there is going to be " a lovely, lovely life in the lovely universe." Having criticized the philosopher as a "little conceited consciousness" who pretends "to know what was happening" in the whole universe and "as slowly as all that!" — she proceeds to pretend to know "all that" herself.

The philosopher here called a "famous wind-machine," is Alfred North Whitehead, and the passage quoted is the conclusion of his book, *Religion in the Making* (Whitehead, 1926). The quotation was not identified until the early 1960's, when it became a forgotten curiosity in *Notes and Queries*. But it is important that Whitehead wrote that passage. For one thing, it does sound incredibly vague. Connie caricatures it easily because it lends itself to her derision: "What a lot of stuff! — Unimaginables, and types of order in graves, and realms of abstract forms, and creativity with a shifty character, and God mixed up with forms of order! Why, it's idiotic!" (Lawrence, 1959, p. 297). I must agree that Whitehead's argument is anything but clear. It is obscure on behalf of the great Platonic wish that the body will go away. This is shocking, considering Whitehead's sophistication and his reputation as one who has a sleek, comprehensive notion of the human organism as a unified one, mind and body, located securely within the cosmic categories of his own metaphysics. We have here a philosopher going on at two levels, his formal and body-accepting metaphysical level, for which he is known, and his gut-level, where he is trying to get away from the body altogether. I do not think that is unusual. I can think of another philosopher who formally and even joyously accepts the body, and all its connections with natural rhythm, with energy, and with satisfying aesthetic forms — namely John Dewey. But in *Art as Experience*, whenever Dewey (1934) deals with such topics as nudity and orgasm, he shows an unacknowledged hatred of the body.[3]

[3]See John Dewey (1934) on the need to raise sex above the "animal plane" by infusing it with material that is "practically irrelevant to its direct object and end"; that naked female

Whitehead and Dewey should be a warning, because both thought that there was no mind-body problem. There is a unified organism, a unity confounded in the false categories of Western thought, but unified all the same. Once the categories were cleared up, there would be no need to think in terms of a mindbody split. Dewey would have been quick to add that his kind of thinking is only a preliminary for bringing about the necessary change in culture; his philosophy cannot heal the mind-body split but it can at least stop philosophy from being crippled by it. Thus philosophy could become one tool for restoring a natural unity.

Lawrence, however, simply did not accept the premise; his writings on mind and body show him insisting that the split is real and not totally healable. In his "Study of Thomas Hardy," (Lawrence, 1936, p. 473) he claims that there is an "eternal non-marriage betwixt flesh and spirit," and in *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (Lawrence, 1960) he is definite that there are different centers of consciousness in the body, the brain being only one of these. *Fantasia* is a kind of plan for raising children so that the mental consciousness up in the brain does not become the king and autocrat of the organism. In *Chatterley*, the novel's hero Mellors complains, 14 chapters into the book, that "my mind mistrusts so thoroughly . . ." the reality and value of the sensual tenderness between himself and Connie, that he has a qualitative feeling of the split: "when my blood comes up, I am glad. I am even triumphant." Connie says "You don't mistrust with your body, when your blood comes up . . . do you?" To which he says, no — he mistrusts with his mind! Connie's impromptu answer to this I suppose no one could accept for long: "Let your mind mistrust. What does it matter!" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 263-264).

Of course one could change one's mind, so that it did not mistrust, or at least not so much. Some of the most challenging, original thinking in *Chatterley* is just to that effect. After coming back from loving sex with Mellors and then talking about Racine with Clifford, Connie's mind has a new quality. "Inside herself she could feel the humming of passion, like the after-humming of deep bells." It is probably what Reich calls streaming sensations, post-orgasmic. It alienates Connie from Racine and makes her drowsily turn off to Clifford's talk of his "classic control" of emotions (Lawrence, 1959, p. 188). Earlier, Connie has been able to focus her dissatisfaction with her life by responding to her own awareness of her body. As she looks at herself nude, in the mirror, again after coming back from contact (though not sexually consummated) with Mellors, she feels "the sense of deep physical injustice" against Clifford and "against all the men of his sort who defrauded a woman of her own body" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 111-113). Her mind is infused with a universal quality, injustice, that is physically direct, not ideologically abstract, and is strong enough to be generalized to all the men of a class who would and do carry out that phy-

bodies are ugly; [and] on a painting by Matisse showing naked dancers out of doors: "no such scene ever occurred" (pp. 76-77).

sical injustice on her body. Eventually Mellors does make the commitment to trust his blood, when it is "up," to overrule his mind's distrust of the knowledge his body gives him, and to try to make a life with Connie rather than just be his lady's lover. Connie learns the same thing, and by the end, the mind's distrust of body has begun to be overcome or at least controlled.

The important thing is that the distrust was there and had to be controlled. Where does that distrust come from? What do we have, as human beings, that motivates us to try to overcome the split? Connie *could* have moved in the other direction, toward the detached, satiric consciousness that she has when "her spirit seemed to look on from the top of her head, and the butting of his haunches seemed ridiculous to her, and the sort of anxiety of his penis to come to its little evacuating crisis seemed farcical" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 226-227). She credits this perception as fully as any, even thinking that evolution will surely eliminate the sex act, much as Whitehead's fantasy suggests, although she hasn't yet heard Clifford read that to her. Of course Connie's acceptance of the instance of bad sex at its satiric face value, and her generalizing of it, separates her own mind from her body. She is saved from her mind's sadistic derision of sex and the body only through her feeling of dehumanization, the consequence of her creation of a gulf between herself and her lover; Mellors, she feels, is "ebbing away, leaving her there like a stone on the shore." In short, all she has to go on, all any of us have, is a felt disposition to be with someone sexually. Without our acting on this disposition, the split within us would remain untreated, as far as Lawrence (or Reich) is concerned.

It is the recurrent disposition or need to get together ihysically, sexually, with another, and not simply the intensity of the feelings and emotions within sex itself that provides the key. Lawrence goes to some lengths to show feelings and emotions just as strong as those in sexual love, occurring in relationships that preserve the split. Thus Clifford "educating" his servant Mrs. Bolton in the ways of his industrial aristocratic world provokes feelings just as powerful as those felt by Connie and her lover. Indeed Mrs. Bolton's feelings might be stronger. "There was no mistake that the woman was in some way in love with him . . . " It had a "genuine thrill" to it that "roused in her a passion of excitement and response much deeper than any love affair could have done" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 144-145). This passion is anti-body; it thrills instead on the gossip that violates people's sex lives — a low and dirty form of sublimation. But for Mrs. Bolton, and for the purposes of social control, it works. The only thing Lawrence can really say against it is that generalized into a way that everybody acts, it can't work indefinitely; society becomes more and more insane. Clifford's attempt to deny body and be a ruler makes his judgments so detached from reality that he is only going to lead his society, sooner or later, over some cliff.

It is important to see that Clifford does not think he is denying the body; he is only evaluating it correctly as the hostile, dirty thing he sees it to be.

His grim Platonism is a direct outgrowth of the evaluation. Mrs. Bolton's gossip, Clifford realizes, "is as if the events of other people's lives were the necessary oxygen of her own." Such oxygen makes Clifford feel suffocation. Only when I am released temporarily, he writes to Connie, "from the current of gossip, I slowly rise to the surface again" able to breathe the true air" that the "soul" needs. "It is our mortal destiny, I suppose, to prey upon the subaqueous life of our fellow man, in the submarine jungle of mankind. But our immortal destiny is to escape, up again into the bright ether, bursting out from the surface of Old Ocean, into real light. Then one realizes one's eternal nature" (Lawrence, 1959, pp. 333-334). To Clifford, the body and the passions associated with it are honestly perceived as just part of what is imperfect and unsatisfying. In one whole tradition of Western thought, he is right in the swim: many philosophers (including Kant) have thought just that. Kant (quoted in Kaufman, 1966, pp. 5-6) is certainly no less crazy than Clifford in maintaining that "Passions are dangers for pure practical reason and often incurable . . . the passions are not only, like the affects, unfortunate moods that are pregnant with evils, but also, without exception, wicked, and the most benign desire . . . as soon as it degenerates into a passion, [is] not only *pragmatically* pernicious but also morally reprehensible. An affect brings about the momentary collapse of freedom of the dominion over oneself." But that is just Lawrence's point: in pondering mind/body, philosophers have not known the body, except as a derived concept from a culture that is anti-body, and are thus easily able to view the body as wild and destructive.

Barring that, they may view it in one other mode, as an abstraction derived from Western science, where the body is taken apart, like a machine that always operates in the same way. What Lawrence is showing is the reality of *a variable body*, in which it makes all the difference whether a man's "blood is up." Generalized, it is Reich's distinction between the body as armored with its biological functioning seriously blocked, or the body with its internal "streamings," its orgasms and its rhythmic breathing all there. Philosophers continue to ignore this difference, but as long as they do, Reich and Lawrence are showing their speculations will be hopelessly out of touch, their minds "tacked on" to bodies that may as well be Connie's physical corpses.

All this talk about when a man's blood is up may seem to be hinting at an ideology of sensualism, a constant immersion in sex. Anyone familiar with Lawrence's work would not make that assumption, however. The point is that the human body is a sexual body, and any thinking about how the mind is related to the body has to recognize this. The adult body is not a continuous blob of bones and blood and flesh, but has some parts that are more sensitive to erotic feeling than others. Reich not only investigated this by measuring charges of energy on different skin surfaces; he also noted at once that the intensity of these charges, even at the same body site, varied entirely with fluctuations in energy that are always occurring in a human body.

Even a minimal understanding of the body's complexity must include recognition of the recurring cycle of energy charge and decrease at the skin surface, the varying capacities of areas on that surface, and the relations of body surface to visceral interior. Where is the recognition of any of this in philosophical discussion of the body? Lawrence's depiction of Mellors as John Thomas, his penis, and of Connie as Lady Jane, her vagina, is real and true enough to recall that sexual arousal implies some other body than the uniform one that is generally assumed. Lawrence is indicating that any humanly useful work on the mind-body problem — aside from giving "acute discomfort" to philosophers — is going to have to take a whole new look at what body is.

Lawrence's own interpretation might be labelled *residual a-symmetrical dualism: dualism* because he sticks to the repeated experiential evidence that mind seems disposed to fight body (or vice versa) — the feeling, in other words, that impulse is closer to body than is impulse-control, which is closer to mind, at least as they seem to feel to a person undergoing a conflict of the two; *a-symmetrical* because of the powerful need or disposition in favor of creating a felt unification of mind and body, with a value-preference for the body as the element that should condition the mind, but which could never absorb it; *residual* because the unification is temporary and the split seems to recur pretty easily. What he does not do is pursue the line of reasoning that the Whitehead quotation suggests, however backwards it must appear to be; that is, Lawrence does not do much in *Lady Chatterley* with the historic or evolutionary origins of the split. But Lawrence cannot allow his fictional creation, Connie, to elaborate upon speculations of this kind. He has to concentrate in this novel on the historical context of our own Industrial era. It took Reich to carry such speculations back into the prehistoric past, and when Reich did that, he arrived — much to his own surprise I should think — at a residual a-symmetrical dualism very like Lawrence's.

Philosophy Makes a New Start Into the Problem

The necessity of my return to Reich at the end of the present argument will become more understandable after I look at some formal philosophical efforts of a few modern thinkers who did try to apprehend a body that involved feelings, even feelings of a sexual nature. For Herbert Feigl (1961, pp. 3435), who seems to be the philosopher who made the strongest case for an "identity" theory of mind and body, the very problem is the relationship of "raw feels," or qualitative immediacy, to "neurophysiological processes." The term "raw feels" seems to have come from the psychologist E.C. Tolman; I think we are all indebted to him for its fine suggestiveness. But the philosophers — including even so sympathetic a figure as Merleau-Ponty (1962) — do not seem to be able to make use of the implication in order to get back to a sense of the human body that is specifically sexual rather than just a location for experiencing all sorts of phenomenal processes. Feigl made a start. He argued that

mind-body is *not* a pseudo-problem, and that Wittgenstein (1958, p. 124e) was just dodging that fact, though Wittgenstein admitted in the *Investigations* "The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process." This "idea of a difference in kind is accompanied," Wittgenstein went on to say, "by slight giddiness." But then Wittgenstein dismissed his own feeling as merely "logical sleight-of-hand." For Feigl, "the crucial and central puzzle of the mind-body problem since Descartes," is defined just in that relationship of raw feels to the physical reality that science could perceive.

Stephen C. Pepper, who discussed the neural-identity theory with Feigl for many years, eventually formulated it with a significantly differing emphasis. In 1960, Pepper published an article entitled "A Neural-Identity Theory of Mind." The theory was designed to eliminate the mind-body puzzle in philosophy. And it pushed a little closer to body. Like Feigl, Pepper is trying to relate "the 'private' sensations of the observer to the 'public' systems of physics — the modern version," he says, "of the old mind-body problem." To do this, Pepper thought it would be best to step away from the field-theory (operationalism) of Dewey, because the open field concept, in which no boundaries — not even the human skin — could be assumed, seemed to fly in the face of the facts when body was concerned: "the physiological organism seems to be too stable and predictable a physical structure to be reasonably reduced to a schema of operational procedures." We have to start off, Pepper thought,by recognizing "the confinement of our personal qualitative experiences within the space-time volume of our bodies." But the privacy, he insisted, is "provisional, not ultimate" (Pepper, 1960, p. 47). The public and private could be correlated and understood, with neither being denied.

Neural-identity is a theory with a complexity of its own. Rather than expound it — something that Pepper himself does more than adequately — I will try to indicjte the way, and even the place, in which it began veering away from the physical, as in almost all other discussions on the mind-bodz problem. Pepper wanted to show that in theory, there is no reason to suppose an unbridgeable gap between a report given subjectively and a description of a mental event given in standard scientific terms. Psychophysical parallelism, in other words, did not necessarily arise out of having dual accounts.

With a philosopher's instinct, he constructed a brief paradigmatic illustration, a simple pictorial analogue. The intent behind an effort of this sort is to announce dramatically a theory which can be expressed (and perhaps has to be expressed) in terms that seem to confound common sense, but is fully defensible by the philosopher who understands the grounds. Yet I have never found anyone who is not made suspicious by what follows:

> Stated very briefly and in pictorial terms, the idea is this: Supposing we know the neural activity correlated with an immediately-sensed quality, then if the brain were

> exposed so that this neural activity could be seen by a man in a mirror, the man would be viewing in the mirror in visual perception exactly the same activity he was feeling introspectively as a qualitative immediacy. On first thought this seems an utterly fantastic idea, and obviously based on a confusion of thinking. But I believe the confusions of thinking arise on the part of those who find the hypothesis fantastic, and this with certain ramifications consonant with the theory is what I shall seek to exhibit in the present paper. (Pepper, 1960, p. 49)

One might say that in Reich's terms, the neural event described anatomically and the mental event actually experienced are "functional equivalents." The issue obvioksly carries great import. But Pepper, throkgh his use of the picture of the man with a mirror, had given the discussion a turn toward that ponderous playfulness in earnest that philosophers so dearly enjoy. From that point, it became almost certain that his truly original development of this mind-body theory would get lost in the argumentation over the plausibility of an idea that he knew sounded "utterly fantastic."

It went unnoticed that Pepper proceeded to change the emphasis that Feigl had given the theory. Feigl had opted evenly for two different reports, that of the scientist observer and that of the one who feels the raw feels. Pepper believed it imperative to stress the latter, the feels. He thus seems to be paralleling Lawrence, arguing for an "a-symmetrical" relationship of two ways of knowing. You have two complementary ways of looking at the same things — a detached scientific way and a warm feeling way. The difference for Pepper, of course, is that this is no dualism. For Pepper it is important that the scientist's reports, in language, are symbols of the felt quality, but that the feelings themselves occur "devoid of linguistic convention" (Pepper, 1960, p. 51). They come first. Nonetheless what the scientist tells us in his language is often valuable because it clarifies the ways in which feelings occur, and (as in medical science) the things that go on in our bodies that affect our feelings. There are also the innumerable things we need to know that are beyond the immediate range of our perceptions and feelings. We need both the observation by someone wpo is not feeling what I feel, and also my report of what I feel. My report is the more immediate. When we see that both refer to the same event, we will realize that bodily events and mental events are one.

Pepper's presentation was followed immediately, of course, by grave philosophical objections. These were offered by Richard B. Brandt (1961). Later, Pepper (1967) presented the theory again, with a full answer to Brandt and other doubters, in his major work, *Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis*. Here Pepper was far more persuasive, but he went largely unread. Brandt told me (Note 3) that he was unaware of Pepper's later answer to his original objections. It is significant, however, that Brandt himself now holds a modified version of the neural-identity theory (see Brandt and Kim, 1969).

Pepper in his 1967 exposition is much more disposed to defend the irreducible fact of feeling as an integral part of consciousness. The passage

I will select is ostensively included as an answer to another philosopher, J.J.C. Smart (1959), who had argued against certain features of the neural-identity theory on the grounds that anything reported by the observer about her or his own feelings could eventually be described from outside, descriptively, or if it couldn't, it would turn out to be not important. But Pepper's answer goes well beyond the limited goal of answering Smart. It pertains, for example, to many "phenomenological" descriptions and to their virtual omission of the feelings. Almost alone among recent philosophers, Pepper attended to the feelings he felt in observing what others described as mere concept. But in doing so, Pepper courts still another resistance; he contravenes the long unexamined assumption that descriptive categories such as the "extensity" and "gradation" that he uses here, are feelingless abstractions. For Pepper, who had a lifelong interest in aesthetics, particularly in painting, that assumption is false. His mind-body discussion is thoroughly oriented to both mind and body: many of the examples could not occur in some location limited to the mind (whatever that might be) but inherently involve perceptual organs, while others connote the feeling of things happening in the body — as with rage or sex impulses.

> Our first point is to stress the inescapable immediacy of felt qualities and their pervasiveness in human experience. They are the immediate data of all human awareness. They comprise all sensory qualities, the hues of color and black, white, and gray, the feeling of *intensity* in the lesser or greater spread of a hue over a felt surface, the feeling of *gradation* or *contrast* of hues over an extended spread of colors, the feeling of the relation between two hues and of one hue as qualitatively *between* two others, the feeling of the *inclusion* of one colored surface within another. They include the feeling of boundaries separating hues, and of lines, and the movement of lines in following the dramatic swelling and contracting of a line as in a Japanese painting. They include feelings of pitch and intensity of sound and of the gradations and contrasts among these. They include the feelings of tastes and of odors and savors. Also, the feeling of pressure, and of warmth and coolness, and of the many nuances of pain, and of pleasure. Also the feelings of excitement and depression and of the many so-called organic sensations, and of hunger, thirst, and the urge of sex. Also the whole congeries of emotions, anger, fear, anxiety, pity, grief, joy, despair.
>
> I spread out this list to stress the voluminousness and impact of these felt qualities. The issue can be fought out over any one of these sorts of felt qualities. Dealing with color sensations alone or tactile sensations of temperature or pressure, alone, one may come to have the impression that these "nomological danglers" [i.e., unexplained but regularly occuring qualities in nature] are few and insignificant in the cosmic scheme. I wish it to be emphatically noticed that they permeate human experience which is the only experience men are immediately cognizant of, and that it is the concepts of physics that comprise the thin and meager ingredient in the living events and activity of ordinary men. To deny that such felt qualities exist then begins to look ludicrous. (Pepper, 1967, pp. 116-117)

Nothing I know of in all of recent philosophy quite so strongly integrates feeling with perception. It is true that Whitehead (one of Pepper's influences) and others who dealt with reality as "process" said something like it, but usually they went on to lose the immediacy they first gained in their acceptance of feeling by dissolving the human body and its sensory

capacities within the total cosmic energy field; they would often load this field with their further attributions of a cosmic progression toward some virtually divine purpose. This we have already noticed in Lawrence's argument against Whitehead. Pepper's focus on the "purposive act" that is carried out by human beings keeps body and mind together, in theory, and on a recognizably human scale.

Pepper, however, also very nearly loses what he has gained lhen he goes on to insist that all the qualities of feeling are spatially localizable in only one part of the body, namely the brain. In localizing feeling in the brain, Pepper maintained he was following evidence that had been developed empirically, namely the brain surgery experiments of the late Wilder Penfield. Penfield could stimulate a part of the patient's brain and get him to feel this stimulation as if it were movement in various parts of the body. For Pepper this was evidence that "the place for human qualitative immediacy is in the living human brain." To which I want to answer, yes but it isn't qualititatively felt that way! An ominous note here is that Penfield (1975, p. 80) himself concluded, in one of his last books, *The Mystery of the Mind*, after years of looking for mind-body unity, that we are made up of "two fundamental elements," mind and body.

I will not review here the cogent arguments Pepper gives for his positioning of feelings inside the brain. In the absence of a counter-presumption that would bid both the philosopher and the brain researcher to look to the whole organism in its energy field, little would be gained by such a review. Tradition has already determined that it will be one organ of the body only, the brain, that will be argued over, even in discussions that are supposed to be about the entire body. In theory, even Pepper can concede there is no reason for this practice. "There is no a priori reason," he says, "why the meeting place" [of concept and quality] "should be limited to the brain. It might have spread out over the whole body or have extended far into the environment" (Pepper, 1967, p. 71). It is the strong empirical evidence from neuroanatomy that dictates the brain as his only responsible choice. Yet Pepper's wording of this conclusion is hedged with alternatives that seem to imply more "give" in the system than what he is maintaining: "all qualitative human experience is based upon or correlated with or somehow identifiable with specific activities located in the human brain" (Pepper, 1967, p. 75). I hardly need stress that something "based on" or "correlated with" the brain, is not the same as something going on in it.

I want to suggest that Pepper was trapped, finally, within the conventions of discourse to which he chose to relate. If you look inside a standard case-book for philosophy students, on the modern version of the mind-body problem, you will find that the entire discussion assumes that mind is brain. The "raw feels" are not mentioned. Thus, in *Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem* (Rosenthal, 1971), you will find Descartes, of course, and a few other giants — namely Spinoza and Hobbes — as well as two of the philosophers I have been talking about: Shaffer and Smart. Some of

the further articles are replies to Shaffer and Smart. Pepper is not mentioned. The reasons are at least two: (1) the philosophers don't feel the raw feels — or rather, they undoubtedly do feel them but mistakenly ignore them as somehow unworthy of analytic attention. They refer abstractly to "sensations" instead, confining themselves, as Pepper observed, to some one sensation, deceptively simplifying the pervasiveness of feeling. The sensation might be, for example, a single viewing of the color red. (2) On the other hand, Pepper's insistence on the raw feels, the massiveness of qualitative immediacy, must have struck philosophers as something outside their operating paradigms. And it is outside. Pepper knew that; it was obviously one of his main reasons for writing *Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis*. Until he published an article that later was to become a key chapter of that book (Pepper, 1963) Pepper had managed to stay within the confines of the four major metaphysical positions that he outlined in 1942, in his book, *World Hypotheses*. In *Concept and Quality*, he moved far beyond his previous work as an original philosopher. With a strong commitment to empirical method, and a commitment as well to the reality of the mind, Pepper moved discussion of the identity theory to a plane that has not been given consideration.

It is just here, at the borderline between the old and the new theories that Pepper stands, and it is just here that he should be supplemented by what Lawrence and Reich have to offer. In this light, let us now observe the next paragraph in Pepper's argument, just after the passage on qualitative immediacies that I have already discussed:

> Notice that I am not arguing on the basis of the indubitable character of any of these felt qualities. The introspective report about any of them may be in error and frequently has been. I am arguing on the massiveness and inescapableness of their import. We may be well assured there are felt qualities, even though we may have doubts about our descriptive reports concering any selected one of them. (Pepper, 1967, p. 177)

Pepper, in his comment on the way our own reports about our feelings can be "in error," is confident that if there's an error of that kind, we can eventually correct it. Here he is assuming something that neither Reich nor Lawrence would assume: if the brain is living, it is working all right, basically.

In contrast to that position, Lawrence and Reich assume that the variability of the body state is radical in its effect on the brain. A Clifford Chatterly will perceive and feel things differently than will someone like Connie, and his ability to correct the errors of perception is also much different, and much less. Clifford, for example, will not experience Connie ebbing away from him and his own aloneness, as she does in regard to Mellors. When Clifford feels threatened with being alone, he still believes that he is above and beyond the body, or at least that some day he might be, given enough emphasis on the emergence into the soul's "true air." The disposition to unite sexually with another does not occur to his consciousness. His rigidities, which Lawrence intends as an epitome of the

technological personality of our time, prevent feedback of information about feelings, whether his own or those of others. He actually has his crippled body reduced to an invariable state and can observe all bodies with invariance as his assumption. The exceptions to invariance that he perceives in others, their sexual passions, he can write off as temporary disturbances without significance — or as Pepper might have phrased it, as "nomological danglers."

Reich's Multiple Approach to the Problem

Reich's several explorations of the mind-body problem can be seen not only as clarification and improvement of the identity theory but as an indication of why a philosophical solution — even if there could be one — would not in itself answer to the human problems that have gathered around the conflict of mind and body.

If we accept Paul Edwards' account, we will find that Reich's work finally meant little, philsophically speaking. From having said that he learned more about mind-body from Reich than from any philosopher, Edwards retreated very far indeed in his *Encyclopedia* article. Edwards still claimed that Reich showed a functional identity between character and physiology: states of consciousness have body correlates in the sense that character rigidity is anchored in muscular rigidity — in body "armor," as Reich called it. In the orgasm, the peaceful feeling of gratification after the climax is functionally identical with the return of energy from the genitals to the rest of the body. Although Reich thought he had solved the mind-body problem through his functionalism, Edwards (1967) says that his theory could be reconciled with a sophisticated dualism.

Inevitably, the opposite has been asserted: Olds (1974) claims that Edwards could countenance dualism on Reich's behalf only by ignoring the materialist element, the physical energy theory in Reich's conception of mind in its relation to body. It does seem that Edwards missed the greatest possibility in the theory, because he claims that the functional identity theory is not nearly as extreme a position as the neural identity theory. Therefore he asserts that it is not a true identity theory. I should think he could have said the opposite: that a theory which gets out of the neurological events in the brain and takes in the whole body, is even more extreme, and is in fact the true form of an identity theory.

The objection would still be made that any given thought is not "identical" with the status of energy in the human body at a given moment, but I doubt that either Reich or the holders of the other versions of the identity theory seriously meant to aim for identity in this total, literal sense. Moreover, even a sophisticated dualism would be unable to account for the limitations on the mind-body disparity that Reich (1973b) claims to have found; thus a truly gratified man would not have an impulse to commit rape, and would not dwell on thoughts of rape, but a badly frustrated man who knew that it was possible to commit rape would be likely to dwell on such fantasies and even develop impulses in that direction. This example

suggests that there would be a great many thoughts correlated in a general way with body states and not explicable through dualism.

Reich never withdrew his claims to have dissolved the mind-body problem. But he did not rest upon them; apparently he felt something else was needed. In fact, despite Reich's stylistic habit of presenting his claims as solutions, he acted much more as if he were looking for an answer, right down to the end of his life, rather than as if he had it in hand. One whole side of his approach, overlooked by Edwards, is given tersely in *Character Analysis*, where Reich (1972, p. 354) says that what he means by "solving the problems regarding the relationship of body and soul," actually is "mastering them in such a way that a clear-cut policy of dealing with them is the result, no idle theories."

In *Function of the Orgasm*, Reich searches for the present-day relationships of mind and body, both in their pathological aspects and their healing ones. His position is complicated and by no means simply monist. At one point, he first maintains: "That the soma influences the psyche is correct, but it is one-sided. The reverse of this, i.e., that the psyche conditions the soma, can be seen again and again." But he immediately goes on to deny that psychic laws could be made so important enough to be valid in the body. Rather than claiming only a functional *unity* of mind/body, as Edwards might lead you to think, Reich (1973b, p. 266) argues that there is also an antithesis or tension of psyche and soma. Going further, he says, "I asked myself how the [body's] organs would formally function in pleasure and in anxiety, and in which way the autonomic innervations would have to take place in the process" — toward expansion with energy moving outward from the inside, or inward from the body surface toward its core. Both kinds are needed. There is a healthy continuous oscillation between "parasympathetic expansion (*exhalation*) and sympathetic contraction (*inhalation*)" (Reich, 1973b, p. 295). In armored persons or those suffering from sexual impotence, basic biological processes, including breathing, are interfered with to some extent. Physic conflicts (which are not simply in the mind, but represent mind-body conflicts originating in the interference with the organism through sex-negative upbringing) do influence the body.

What he does not yet ask is *why* the antithetical side of the mind-body relationship exists in such a way as to be susceptible to these efforts of society to make the organism rigid. Why does the normal contraction phase of the pulsation become hardened? Wouldn't survival, biologically, be better served by an organism that did not even have such a capacity? And why for thousands of years have human societies blocked the natural pulsation and reduced the body pleasure of the people who made up the societies? Reich was one who knew enough to suggest "dumb" questions like that. His philosophic questioning of the mind-body problem is thus complemented still further, not only by a therapeutic goal of a "clear-cut policy" for dealing with the relations of soma and psyche, but with historical and anthropological inquiry.

Possibly, mind and body were once in harmony in an earlier social order, but specific events in history inaugurated the long tradition of repression. In 1932, Reich had indeed tried that type of historical explanation (Reich, 1971). Following Engels, and Morgan and Bachofen before him, he argued that there had been "an invasion of compulsory sex-morality" into a previous sexually positive primitive society. But such explanations depended on some undependable assumptions: That at one time there had been matriarchal societies (a point no longer claimed by any anthropologist, even feminist ones), and that the earliest origin of patriarchy could be understood in Engels' terms. Even Kate Millet (1970), who used Engels in her own account in *Sexual Politics*, admits that the explanation falls down. In *The Invasion of Compulsory Sex Morality*, Reich begins his explanation on the strong empirical grounds of Malinowski's ethnographic description of Trobriand society, in other words in anthropological work that is still very highly regarded (Harris, 1967) despite continuing reinterpretations of the data. He ends by having to resort to speculations about a prehistorical period of primeval communism of which practically nothing is known. Yet Reich's inconclusive beginning in historical reconstruction still speaks to an immensely important fact, namely that some societies have found it feasible to encourage through the institution of the adolescent "youth house" a degree of sexual freedom that is incompatible with the many cultural justifications for repression that have always been produced. In our own day Rene Girard (1977, p. 35) asserts that "Sexuality leads to quarrels, jealous rages, mortal combats. It is a permanent source of disorder even within the most harmonious communities." This is a generalization worthy of Lawrence's character Clifford and his belief that "It is our mortal destiny . . . to prey upon the subaqueous life of our fellow men, in the submarine jungle of mankind." Were Girard right, then Trobriand society should have been extremely ferocious, which it was not. Girard has acquired a great vogue by supposing an inborn dualism, where the mind is inherently disposed to make human beings aim for gratifications that can only be achieved through acts of violence against the human body. Though Reich left his counter-anthropology in a partially unrevised state (he had replaced the Marxist terminology of 1932 with his later descriptive categories), he still confutes the mentality of 'Original Sin.'

In his fifties, Reich not only worked on revision of the 1932 theory to remove its Marxist bias and synchronize it with his later views concerning the social etiology of the individual's armor: he simultaneously began a whole new train of speculative thought about the prehistoric origins of the mind-body problem. For Edwards (1977, p. 105) those years in which Reich was investigating Orgone, an energy that permeates the cosmos and pulsates in all livng things, have "no philosophical interest."[4] The presupposition that cosmic energy has nothing to do with the mind-body

[4]In a later article, Edwards (1977), although still skeptical, has acknowledged that the Orgone Accumulator did have some inexplicable effects on him, as well as having similar

problem, however, is not one that Stephen Pepper would have accepted.

In the same chapter in *Concept and Quality* in which Pepper answers objections to the neural-identity theory, there is a whole section entitled "On the Cosmic Distribution of Qualities." The argument has an affinity with Reich's; it also claims to be compatible with conventional science:

> . . . the continuity of the conceptual physical descriptions goes on far below the level of human brain processes. . . there would be no ground to infer that the actual objects referred to by conceptual physical descriptions at the next lower level should be other than objects constituted of felt qualtities also. And so on down through all levels of physical description.
>
> Since no glaring gap appears in the system of nature as conceptually described between the neural processes of a man and those of an ape and so on down to the earthworm and even the virus, there is no ground for denying, and good ground for affirming, that all actual living objects are constituted of felt qualities. And since the gap between the organic and the inorganic is so slight and probably soon to be proved nonexistent, the same reasoning would carry felt qualities down through all the actual objects referred to by inorganic conceptual descriptions as well. (Pepper, 1967, p. 137)

Pepper holds on to the reality of the body as a location in space-time that is qualitatively felt by humans, while also acknowledging felt qualities all through nature.

By shying away from this possibility, Edwards, in his *Encyclopedia* article, did not permit himself to consider the original philosophical thinking on the mind-body problem that Reich performed in some of his later writings. The chapter "Animism, Mysticism, and Mechanistics," in Reich's (1973a) book, *Ether, God and Devil* contains the most serious explanation he gave of his practice of scientific method. In it, he points to the variable effects on perception that body attitudes, with their armoring, must have. Science cannot get away from the problem of these differences in basic outlook, within the consideration of scientific evidence itself. "The unarmored organism," Reich thought, "experiences the self mainly as a unity in motion." Motion is essential to life, and structuren though important, is "not basic" (Reich, 1973, p. 116).

For the conventional or "mechanistic" scientist, however, (and for the philosopher who limits himself to conceptual or terminological analysis) this emphasis on motion — particularly in its refusal to take the logical step toward regarding every structural scheme as automatically worthless — is viewed with disdain. It appears to be vague, irresponsible or both. In his own body image, such a scientist or thinker does not perceive a unity in motion, but a "hierarchy of organs in the body. The brain as the 'highest' product of development, together with the nervous system in the spine, 'directs' the whole organism." But, Reich points out in this scheoa: "How the brain itself receives its assignments remains a riddle." Metaphysical importations of the concepts of "purpose" and "in order to" merely cover the problem over. In Reich's judgement, the human organism is a "natural cooperative" of organs, without higher or lower centersm Indeed, "The in-

effects on an acquaintance. He now recommends investigation of Reich's later theories, rather than dismissal.

dividual organs are independent beings endowed with their own sensation and function. Experiments with the heart and muscle have unequivocally confirmed this" (Reich, 1973, pp. 116-117). Mind, in the tradctional sense of something localized in the brain, does not control the body, and the body has several cooperating centers, one of which is the brain and all of which comprise human intelligence. Thus it is not necessarily preposterous, as objectors to the more usual identity theories have supposed, "to ask where in the body the thought occured" (Shaffer, 1967, p. 339).

In the final chapter of another of his last works, *Cosmic Superimposition*, Reich constructs what seems to be his last effort to determine the origins of the mind-body problem. The chapter title "The Rooting of Reason in Nature," may recall C.D. Broad's book referred to earlier, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*. Reich (1973a) immediately gets to the life riddle that gives force to the philosophical problem of mind and body, but then chooses to put aside, or even to discard his earlier explanation. He asks, ". . . why does the armoring of the human species exist at all, since it contradicts nature in man at every single step and destroys his natural, rich potentialities?"(p. 288). Though we know that now it is social-economic influences that subject the organism to armoring, this fact does not mean that armoring necessarily began in human history in that way. "The process of armoring," Reich now thinks, "was there first," before society. We have to go back into evolutionary process to understand it. Like Whitehead, and Lawrence's Connie, Reich wants to consider the long, long haul. He is aware that in attempting this he has something "less than a practicable theory," but he is confident it is "more than empty speculation" (Reich, 1973a, p. 289).

The turning point in the evolution of organisms was reached when energy, which had at first not been confined in organisms at all, beg/n to occur in an organism that possessed self-perception both of the fact that a powerful energy flowed within itself, and that this energy was not subject to voluntary control.

> A worm or snail might well represent the stage of development where sensation was added to objective plasma current. This orgonotic sensation is most clearly expressed in the drive to superimposition in the sexual process. (Reich, 1973a, pp. 291-292)

Now "orgonotic sensation" is equivalent, in Reich's terminology, to the feeling of energy within oneself; it is related to, but broader than, such traditional terms as kinesthesia. What is especially worth noticing is his statement that it is in the superimposition, the temporary unification of two such organisms, in sex, that this sensation is most clearly expressed. There is a "drive" to do this super-imposing, periodically. There is what I have called a "disposition" toward these periodic blends of two sexual organisms, particularly in the human species. Certainly Reich assumed *not* some sort of hydraulic pressure requiring immediate relief, as Freud had assumed regarding instinctual drives. Reich gives a far more subtle

notion of sex instinct, as one that does require complete expression, but is still subject to rational and prudential considerations, and to some denials and delays that do not damage it. This he explains clearly in *Function of the Orgasm* (Reich, 1973b, pp. 180-182), in the section on the "principle of self-regualtion." Significantly, Reich claims that it was his espousal of this notion of sex as part of a natural, self-regualting process in humans, which aroused the greatest opposition to his work and to his own existence (Reich, 1973b, p. 185).

Lawrence's Connie also has what I called a disposition to get back to Mellors, sexually. Reich offers a clarification of what she wants in his own terms, but here both he and Lawrence must be supplemented by a philosophically and empiracally sound concept of "Disposition." The notion cannot be thrown into the argument, in other words, simply because it may be needed. There has to be a reason to assume it as a basic category of human existence. In Pepper's *Concept and Quality*, the chapter just following the two concerned with the identity theory and the objections to it, is entitled "Dispositions" (Pepper, 1967, pp. 145-170). It offers an argument in which that term represents a generic, irreducible trait of human being. Pepper does this without falling into the Aristotelian trap of supposing that there is an ideal potentiality toward which each organism is pre-designed to aspire. In Reich's argument, the "drive" toward sexual union is functional only within a larger rhythm of energy movement which includes the opposite phase, the movement away from such union; it is not an ideal state to be achieved and held. Contrary to popular image, Reich has nothing to say about trying to make the orgasm "greater." It is naturally functional, or at least it would be if the disposition toward it were not undermined by fear.

Reich's inquiry into the origin of such fear continues with the supposition that "Convulsion and discharge of surplus energy are already present" at the evolutionary stage that saw the development of the worm or snail.

> This phase must have lasted an immense period of time until it reached the stage of the higher animals. In a deer or an elephant, objective streaming of energy and sensation of streaming are still united. There is probably as yet no contradiction, no blocking, and especially no wonderment; only pleasure, anxiety, and rage govern the bioenergetic scene.
>
> Then man developed. At first, over long stretches of time, he was little more than an animal that had instinctual judgment, with the FIRST ORGONOTIC SENSE of orientation already in operation. There did not yet exist what we call *reasoned thinking*. This type of natural functioning must have slowly developed from the exact, sure contact between nature within and nature outside the orgonotic system . . . . (Reich, 1973a, p. 297)

At this hypothetical juncture, the mind-body problem becomes possible. "Reasoned thinking" is performed with the brain and is not the same as the intelligence of organisms more "primitive" than man; the brains of other animals, permit fully intelligent functioning, and one can even argue that single-celled organisms, which have no brains at all, exhibit the

characteristics of intelligent behavior. Reich is ready now to ask the scientific qustion of mind and behavior which others have usually not seen as a question or have consigned to the arguments of theology:

> Since we generally assume that *functioning precedes and induces the structural development of organs*, and not the other way around, we must ask what kind of functioning forced the animal brain into a higher or more complicated form of existence. Whatever the answer to this riddle may be, man slowly began to reason beyond his strong orgonotic contact and harmony with nature, which heretofore had been sufficient to keep him alive and to develop him further, even into a reasoning being. We know nothing and can know nothing about those distant times when man began to think. (Reich, 1973a, p. 292)

Here Reich postulates some unknown event that did something peculiar to human development. He seems to have dug himself into a speculative dungeon from which there can be no escape. As he reiterates a page later, "It is impossible to say what perpetuated this blocking of emotions and with it the loss of organismic unity and 'paradise.'"

We could simply reach for our Velikovsky at this point, but I prefer to be guided by Alex Comfort's (1961) speculative essay, "Darwin and Freud." Comfort gives some good reasons to suppose that the biological structure of human sexuality is a response to some emergency in evolution — say a response to a threat during some Ice age when human life could not just go on in normal evolutionary fashion but had to be adapted if there was to be survival. Why, Comfort asks, is there such a thing in humans as infantile sexuality, which has no reproductive purpose?

It is as if we are biologically equipped with two different systems, one educative and non-reproductive and "morphogonetic," and a second, adult sexuality, that is planted on top of the first and which requires a violent change in psychological direction around the time of adolescence. Translated into Reich's framework, this means that the human being has to go through some extraordinary twists and bends in its growth from "pregenital" to "genital" sexuality, which make it likely that the mind's contact with bpological functioning will be disturbed. Comfort suggests that at one time the split had survival value. But it came at a cost.

Reich argues that the history of philosophy itself shows that human beings seldom take their ability to think about themselves as something that is natural. He stated, "To judge from the studies of the theories of knowledge, nothing can compare with man's amazement at his capacity to feel, to reason, to perceive himself, to think about himself and nature around him" (Reich, 1973a, p. 293). But this capacity has functional peculiarities; the processes of schizophrenia, which Reich had studied and treated, show that after a point, the attempt at self-perception induces a split in the unity of the organism.

> One part of the organism turns against the rest. The split may be slight and easily vanish again. Or it may be strong and persistent. In the process of this "depersonalization," man perceives his currents as an *object of attention* and not quite as his own. The sensation of bodily currents then appears, even if only in a passing manner,

> as alien, as coming somehow from beyond. There is much good reason to assume that in such experiences of the self *man somehow became frightened and for the first time in the history of his species began to armor against inner fright and amazement.* (Reich, 1973a, pp. 293-294)

This fear is not of freedom in the abstract, but of an "internal" movement of feeling that is intuited to be out of one's own control and connected with whatever energy is "out there" in the surrounding environment. Reich goes on to point out that certain limits in human curiosity are frighteningly good supporting evidence for his speculations: the fear, for example, that very often occurs when people think about themselves; the fact that for "millennia," human beings studied the stars, but not their own emotions. All this and more is part of "the terror that is connected with the deep experience of the self" (Reich, 1973a, p. 294). The terror is felt in the whole organism, but the brain seems to have an ability to be posed as the organ or site in which a "control" over this terror may be achieved, thus generating the illusion that interfering with the body's natural patterns will be a benefit. Reich, who seems here to be allowing that it is not entirely crazy to have experienced a fear of one's own body, makes some sense of the long history of culture's rejection of the body, and indicates why "accepting" one's own body is no simple step. After the initial effort at accepting it, we may well encounter a deeper terror and an impulse to run away from the sexual.

Lawrence's insight is also sharable: with no guarantee of permanently reaching some original human unity of mind and body, we still have to move in the direction of unity, in order to break out of the old cycle of denial of body, leading to stupidity in perception, leading to destruction. Lawrence, with his insistence that the "body" that had come down through tradition was a totally mis-perceived de-natured entity, is complemented finally by Reich, who reaches far into the past to urge that "mind" too, was long ago split off in its functioning from the needs of the human being. Both body and mind are terms that need radical re-defining, and it will take an interdisciplinary effort moving in something like the direction that Pepper was heading in his late explorations of the raw feels, the reality of dispositions, and the cosmic distribution of energies to clarify the numerous concepts that are components of the mind-body problem.

The implications — the human uses — of such an effort range from the personal to the cosmic. Certain meanings for social ecology already have been suggested, but are worth restating. Thus Pepper's necessarily new world hypothesis in *Concept and Quality* includes a recognition within the discussion of dispositions of the pervasiveness in nature of the "cooperating or integrating" qualities. Reich's finding — and its social overtones — of the organs in the body as a kind of natural cooperative, is paralleled here. "Integrative dispositions," Pepper (1967, p. 161) declares, are to be found all the way from molecules, on through cells, "and so on up the levels of inorganic and organic forms." The thought is an old one, but formerly it was locked within the politically disastrous state-as-society

assumptions of Organicism. Pepper's formulation will remain abstract, however, unless it is informed by a felt awareness of the functioning of the major body organs. As Reich argued, such an awareness is accessible to us. It offers a body image that would impell us to perceive social relationships within a model of mutuality and support, rather than one of hierarchical control (Reich, 1973a).

In their affinities, complementarities, and even in some of their differences, Reich, Pepper and Lawrence challenge us to imagine — and to feel — ways in which mind and body are one, but also to remain open to the possibility that this unity may not be quite the whole truth and that in fact, a residual a-symmetrical dualism may be the human condition. They also show that our awareness needs to be based on the body and mind alive, the whole man or the whole woman. So Lawrence said in many ways. But Reich goes beyond vitalistic exhortations to insist, on the evidence he had, that such aliveness in the adult human being depends on the functioning, or at least the felt memory of the orgasm. I suspect that this conclusion will be no easier to accept now than it has been at any time since Reich began saying it in the 1920s. The "clear-cut policy" Reich sought in dealing with the mind-body problem, meant getting the whole mind back in touch with the biological (and animal) organism by rebuilding it with knowledge incorporated from orgasmic sexual experience. Twenty-five years after Reich's demise, there is no avoiding this challenge; as Barbara Koopman (1979) has recently argued, alternative modes of energy expression in the adult human being, including the various Altered States of Consciousness, cannot substitute for the function of the orgasm. Her conclusion is that a great deal of the current interest in altering consciousness "appears to be a desperate effort to release energy" by re-programming the brain alone; the result will be an increase in the general feeling of contactlessness. At a popular level, there is always mkch duplication of the philosophic avoidance of a human body that includes genital organs in their adult formation. These are the organs, Reich (1973b, p. 274) pointed out, that have "great vascularity, dense ganglia, capacity for erection, and a musculature which is especially capable of spontaneous contractions." The great chain of fear of the feelings still exists; it includes a fear of this body, and certainly of its orgastic capacities. Hence, perhaps a reason for the constant efforts to ridiculously exaggerate the orgasm, to reduce it to a mechanical act, or to find excuses to ignore it. But with theoretical consideration of the place of the orgasm (C. Girard, 1977) the attempt to incorporate the adult body into the mind-body problem becomes more than a platitude. Thanks to the work of Reich, the writing of Lawrence, and of others, it is possible for perhaps the first time in history to realize that the "after-humming" of orgasm can begin to change one's mind and, that this change would go on, if attended to and not denied, to affect the way one's professional work is selected and carried out. Reich's original concept of an energy "oscillation" in the adult human between sexual expression and creative work, and its complemen-

tary insight that hindrances in the fulfillment of either of these vital needs will inevitably affect and distort the other (Reich, 1973b), is available as an alternative to the dubious theoretical separation of work and sex as well as to the psychoanalytic derivation of work energy by means of the sublimation of instinctual drives.

I hope I have said enough to show that if inquiry into the mind-body problem is to have human use (rather than uses limited to specialist disciplines) it will be informed by an experience of the continuous changes in the human body. That has not been a welcome fact for those who, like Whitehead, have celebrated the "inexhaustive realm of abstract forms," nor for the many who have regarded "the life of the mind" as the one bastion of the self that is safe from contact with the feelings. Yet we cannot avoid the complex body forever.

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