

CHAPTER TWO

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS THE KEY DISCIPLINE

In its “classical” period (ca. 1896-1920), and prior to revisions made by Freud and others, psychoanalysis emphasized the sexual etiology of the neuroses, the reality of libido, the omnipresence of sexual thinking in fantasy, dreams and even in cognitive thought, and the failure of civilized morality to understand what sex was about. The theory of Oedipal dynamics entails a potentially strong criticism of the role of the father in culture, inasmuch as it posits an initial gratifying state of contact between the mother and the infant, rudely disrupted by the father with his patriarchal authority at about the time that the infant reaches the age of 3. The father was thus perceived as introducing the first of a long series of adjustments which look suspiciously like denials of the infant’s sexual wishes. These adjustments had to be made by the child, in his or her own mind and body, but without effective conscious awareness of what was being denied. Repression was a sexual matter. The whole theory of repression raised a question that continues to prove threatening to normal assumptions about human life in its sociocultural contexts: was sexual denial warranted? Denial *for what?*

A psychological theory which placed that much emphasis on sexuality was fated for misunderstandings. It took some time before the Freudians outlived their early, unwarranted reputation of being in favor of “free” sexuality. Frequently their efforts to avoid the label have caused them to retreat too far. Marthe Robert, in her exposition, *The Psychoanalytic Revolution*, is at pains to attribute the objections about sexuality that Freud has drawn from his critics

to a simple mis-reading on their part. She claims that Freud really intended to reserve the word "sexuality" for only the last phase of psychological development, in which the genital organs are important; in infants these organs "play only a relatively minor role . . ." (Robert, 1968, p. 187). Such assurances can hardly be taken seriously. For one thing, Freud's attention to the phenomenon of sexual gratification at the breast, on the part of the human infant (Freud, 1905b, p. 179), is not offered in the spirit of assurance that such activity is only a minor matter. Freud's texts by no means neatly dispose of sexuality the way Robert suggests, nor is the sexuality of the infant, notwithstanding the infantile physiology of the genitals, any the less sexual for all its being infantile. Philip Rieff, a moralist-interpreter of Freud, attempts to de-emphasize the sexuality by claiming that Freud was not interested in it "as such," but in "the contradictory attitudes toward it" (Rieff, 1961, p. 180). Rieff may have felt better with such a division, but it hardly represents Freud's interest in the interconnections of exactly that which Rieff sunders, sexuality and the human mind. Many readers today would see Rieff's distinction as ridiculous, even without any reiteration of Freud. If that is the case, it is due to a widely diffused popular understanding of Freud (Alberoni, 1983, p. 10) that complicates our perception of sexuality. I suspect that few readers with any interest in psychology would place credence in the advice of a recent non-Freudian writer on effective sex-education, namely that children be taught to think of sex as defined solely by anatomy and reproduction (Bem, 1983, p. 612). It was Freud who taught us better than this, even if the lesson is still unacceptable in many ways of thinking.

Freud on the Sexual: 1921, 1916-17, 1909

Three of Freud's statements on what "sexual" means are pertinent here. In 1921, or a year after he had formally introduced the strange concept of a "death instinct" into his theory, and thus jarred the theory off its moorings (Freud, 1920a), Freud nonetheless strongly defended the "sexual" basis of his thinking. He explained that "libido" is "the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love'" (Freud, 1921, p. 90); by "love" psychoanalysts include both the ordinary language term, with its "nucleus" that "naturally consists . . . in sexual love with sexual union as its aim . . .," but also, and inseparably from this ordinary concept, all other forms of love:

Our justification lies in the fact that psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctual impulses . . . (Freud, 1921, p. 90)

The reason psychoanalysis "gives these love instincts the name of sexual instincts" is that the whole corpus of its evidence points to such a usage. No

doubt, Freud remarks, this will continue to lead to "the reproach of 'pan-sexualism'," but there is no way to avoid that reproach without dishonestly trying to protect the theory from criticism by presenting a "nomenclature" that might cause less offense (Freud, 1921, p. 91).

A few years earlier, in the *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* (Freud, 1916-1917), Freud also described sexuality as a topic of multidisciplinary dimensions; it has no clear definition but yet holds a central place in psychoanalytic theory. "You must not forget" he tells his audience at the University of Vienna, "that at the moment we are not in possession of any generally recognized criterion of the sexual nature of a process . . ." (Freud, 1916-1917 p. 320). Freud does not sound in the least bit worried about this fact. It is misleading to say, as Laplanche and Pontalis do in their learned glossary of Freudian terms, that Freud was "forced to acknowledge" a gap here, or that his "thinking seems to have come to a dead end both as regards the essence of sexuality . . . and as regards its genesis . . ." (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 420). Freud if anything is more than glad to "acknowledge" these things, since he believes psychoanalysis is bestowing on the term sexuality its true breadth of meaning (1916-1917, p. 319, conclusions of Lecture XX). As for the discomfort that his refusal to demarcate it would cause, Freud regarded this as a challenge to the disciplines, including biology and physiology, as well as psychology. He enjoyed moving back to the gut-level connotation of "sexuality" and out again into its conceptually unsettled aspects. Thus, he says to his Viennese audience, in the midst of discussing the problematic of sex, "On the whole, when we come to think of it, we are not quite at a loss in regard to what it is that people call sexual" (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 304).

This remark is not one that Laplanche and Pontalis quote. Their emphasis is on fantasy, not sexuality; and so wherever Freud warns that sexuality is *more* than biological reproduction, they transform his meaning in their paraphrases, to the proposition that sex is not "solely" or "not only" to be understood biologically, by which they signal their own turning away from biology. But Freud had a more disturbing approach than they allow. By blasting the definition wide open but also putting it in touch with the commonsense "sexual," Freud was allowing for future developments, such as "sexual politics," which would have been unheard of in his time, but which in our day has become a field of inquiry (Brake, 1982; Schwartz, 1984).

In 1909, Freud also explained the sexual in an important series of five lectures given at Clark University, where he came as a guest of the American psychologist, G. Stanley Hall (Ross, 1971). These lectures are not often quoted in present-day psychoanalytic literature, although they contain some of Freud's most sprightly writing (Mahony, 1982, pp. 141-142; Malcolm, 1982, pp. 10-11), and even an innovation in theory (Malcolm, pp. 31-32). They were published in the *American Journal of Psychology* as "The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis" (Freud, 1910a), a title little reflected by the

one chosen later in the *Standard Edition* of Freud where they are called, blandly, "Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis" (Freud, 1910c). That title corresponds neither to the American translation, nor to the German pamphlet edition, published very shortly afterward: *Über Psychoanalyse* (Freud, 1910b). It is odd that these lectures are not contained in the widely distributed 5-volume set of Freud's *Collected Papers* published by Basic Books. Yet the editors of the *Standard Edition* translation of Freud's works say that "these lectures still provide an admirable preliminary picture which calls for very little correction" (Freud, 1910c, p. 5). I will quote from the historic American journal version (1910a).

In these lectures, Freud was providing the "first extended synthesis" of his work (Hale, 1971, p. 5). He was also doing it somewhat spontaneously: he did not prepare his presentations during the eight-day ocean voyage from Bremen to the United States, as he had intended to do (Clark, 1980, p. 267). Ernest Jones reports that finally Freud prepared each lecture just beforehand in the course of a half hour walk with Sandor Ferenczi (Jones, 1955a, pp. 58-59). They were delivered without notes. They also went off beautifully. I mention these details because they may suggest that Freud, who was more than aware that these lectures were an important chance for him, somehow wanted to let loose, to say what psychoanalysis was, without the care and caution that he usually felt forced upon him in Vienna. As he put it a few years later, "In prudish America it was possible, in academic circles at least, to discuss freely and scientifically everything that in ordinary life is regarded as objectionable" (Freud, 1914, p. 39). The irony about "prudish America" is a feature of Freud's hostility to American culture, but he knew, by the time he stepped to the platform for the first of the lectures, that his reception in the U.S. was one of warm recognition. Hall had assured him that there was "a wide and deep interest in your coming to this country, and you will have the very best experts within a wide radius" (quoted in Clark, 1980, pp. 263-264). G. Stanley Hall, the president of Clark University, had already given a series of lectures there on sex, in 1904, and had mentioned and praised Freud in his key work, *Adolescence* (Clark, pp. 262-263). At Clark University, Freud must have felt he was on safe enough territory to speak on some of the most threatening topics in a straightforward manner.

Aside from the professional significance of the American visit, there was also a personal context for Freud. His own sexual life had been recently renewed, as he indicates in his statement to Jung, in a letter written after the return to Europe, but not published until 1974. This renewal was not to last for very long: "My Indian summer of eroticism that we spoke of on our trip has withered lamentably under the pressure of work" (Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 292, letter dated Feb. 2, 1910; see also discussion by Mahony, 1979, p. 568; Mahony is the first to recognize the importance of the quoted passage). Freud's "Indian summer of eroticism," occurring when he was in his 50's, was

thus part of the underlying *ethos* of his lectures in the U.S. It may have disposed him to argue not only the importance of the sexual body, but in support of the positive value of sexual experience as well.

An extraordinary context for these lectures is thus indicated throughout the preparatory moves. The very topic of the lectures was not even selected by Freud until he had arrived in the U.S. and was encouraged by Ernest Jones to deliver a general rather than a limited presentation (Jones, 1955a, pp. 59, 211-214). Although it was not unusual for Freud to speak brilliantly without notes, there is a quality of spontaneousness to his style in these lectures that is unusual. Some of Freud's major rhetorical modes, such as the heavy use of suggestion, and "the dialectical movement of starts, modifications and resumptions," (Mahony, 1982, pp. 42-43) are little in evidence in the 1909 presentation.

Freud organized these lectures to emphasize sexuality as the endpoint in the series. Moreover, it was the damage to human life which results from sexual repression that he deliberately ended on, after leading up to it skillfully. Freud arranged the five lectures to follow an order that would become increasingly challenging to his audience, beginning with the medical origins of psychoanalysis in its early work on hysteria, then taking up dream interpretation in lecture #3, and going on to "his most explosive subject in his fourth lecture, the existence of sexual impulses in the child" (Hale, 1971, p. 9). After giving an exposition of this topic, Freud said:

You will now perhaps make the objection: "But all that is not sexuality." I have used the word in a very much wider sense than you are accustomed to understand it. This I willingly concede. But it is a question whether you do not use the word in much too narrow a sense when you restrict it to the realm of procreation. You sacrifice to that the understanding of perversion; of the connection between perversion, neurosis, and normal sexual life; and have no means of recognizing, in its true significance, the easily observable beginning of the somatic and mental sexual life of the child. But however you decide about the use of the word, remember that the psychoanalyst understands sexuality in that full sense to which he is led by the evaluation of infantile sexuality. (Freud, 1910a, p. 211)

Ernest Jones, who took notes during Freud's delivery, reports that Freud's answer to the rhetorical question of why it could not be the case that some neurotic symptoms had causes other than sexual, was more personal and playful than the printed text indicates. Freud said "I don't know either. I should have nothing against it. I didn't arrange the whole affair. But the fact remains . . ." (Jones, 1955a, p. 213). Jones in fact supplies Freud's wording in the original German: "Ich weiss es auch nicht. Ich hätte nichts dagegen. Ich habe die ganze Sache nicht gemacht. Aber Tatsache bleibt . . ." (Jones, 1955a, p. 213).

Freud went on to discuss what he variously called the "*Nuclear complex*," or the "*incest complex*," elaborated by means of the myth of Oedipus and the

drama of "Hamlet." He still had not used the term "Oedipus complex" in his work. The term "incest complex," one of the designations with which he confronted his American audience, is probably a more directly threatening one, in terms of the traditional family and conventional sexual thought. At least Oedipus is a character in an ancient play; the name thus provides a slightly "high culture" overtone to what turns out, in Freud, to be a desperately intimate matter. But "incest complex" is a term without any such buffer. Inasmuch as Freud never at any point in his career gave a full, formal exposition of the Oedipus complex (Sheleff, 1981, pp. 73-74), the paragraphs he spends on it in his 1909 lecture, in the context of this first public synthesis of his work, form a notable text.

By 1909, Freud knew that infantile sexuality was central, and that this meant that the "sexual" was now a vastly problematic area. Nor did he imagine that this fact could be disconnected from the need for social change. In the fifth and last of the Clark lectures, he emphasized the harm done by sexual repression and the need to let up on the pressure. Even Freud's less threatening hypothesis of the creative sublimation of sexual instinct is presented in a way that would not be reassuring for those who would want to emphasize conscious controls: "A repression taking place at an early period excludes the sublimation of the repressed impulse; *after the removal of the repression the way to sublimation is again free*" (Freud, 1910a, p. 217, emphasis added). Hale (1971), whose detailed account of Freud's 1909 visit to the U.S. is highly informative, nonetheless overstates the "ambiguity" of this final Freud lecture to his American audience (Hale, 1971, pp. 11-12). Not only did Freud end by saying that we should not "go so far as to fully neglect the original animal part of our nature" and that "The claims of our civilization make life too hard for the greater part of humanity" (statements which Hale quotes); Freud also says that "A certain part of the suppressed libidinous excitation has a right to direct satisfaction *and ought to find it in life*" (Freud, 1910a, pp. 217-218, emphasis added). Hale quotes that statement only in part, omitting the punch line in the last clause. Further, Freud goes on to say that we should waste little effort as builders of culture in trying

to separate the sexual impulse in its whole extent of energy from its peculiar goal [i.e., sexual intercourse]. This cannot succeed, and if the narrowing of sexuality is pushed too far it will have all the evil effects of a robbery. (1910a, p. 218; this also is *not* quoted by Hale)

Freud is thus taking a problematical yet radical stance in these and his many other statements on sexuality. There is sexual union to consider, the limitations imposed upon it by civilization, the costs of those limits, the ubiquitous psychological meanings of sex in language and symbol, particularly its interplay with maturation and emotional/mental development, and the extension of the category "sexuality" into the areas of childhood and infancy. But the

limits of the term's expansion are deliberately not stipulated. A year earlier, Freud had published his famous essay, "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness" (Freud, 1908), but that essay, justly considered a radical criticism of sexual repression under the rule of "civilized" mores, and noted by Ernest Jones as Freud's first "pronouncement on social problems" (Jones, 1955a, p. 343), is not as far-reaching a statement on the sexual body as are the 1909 lectures in the U.S. The essay clearly protests against repression, and it implies that "revolutionary changes in society" are needed as countermeasures (Jones, 1955a, p. 294), but it does not take Freud's greatest radical step, the expansion of the term sexuality to cover a virtually unlimited psychosocial area of reference. At the same time, the need for radical change in society is still evident in these lectures, just as it had been in the 1908 essay. Hale's comment that Freud showed a clear "devotion to civilization," and that "at Clark he voiced his full acceptance of the 'higher' aims of culture" (Hale, 1971, p. 15) is not born out by anything Freud actually said in the lectures. Nor does Hale attempt to quote from the lectures in support of this claim. The "higher" aims of culture were subordinated in those lectures to the claims of the sexual body.

Popular Freudianism and Research on the Sexual Body

Since Freud, expansions of the meaning of the term sexuality have proven to be enormous. Masters and Johnson, following Kinsey, using an approach to the study of the sexual body that differs in almost every respect from Freud's, brought about one of the largest expansions. Suddenly, as a result of their research the common sense notion that the sexual body was *not* the human body in old age, became very dubious. Such findings extend the common sense meaning of the "sexual body": common knowledge that sexual intercourse is a continuing practice throughout the adult life cycle assures a tacit definition of the body as sexual, rather than functionally nonsexual after age 50, just as it had been considered to be sexual prior to that age. But the findings do not in themselves lead to a theory of the sexual body commensurate with what we also know of infantile sexuality, psychosexuality, and the sexual basis of political movements such as Fascism (Reich, 1933). Within theories such as Kinsey's or Masters and Johnson's, the full psychological and social dimensions of their own findings are not approachable. Masters was not unaware of this problem: as far back as 1969, he said, in an interview, that "there is no such thing as the pure physiology of sexual response, except as a textbook concept. From a functional point of view, the correct terminology is the psychophysiology of sexual response" (Masters, quoted in Hall, 1969, p. 54). But in the same interview, answering a frequent question about the quality of orgasm, he showed that he could not enter into that psychophysiology, given the nature of his work:

I have been challenged by some attractive guy in the audience who says, "But I enjoy orgasmic intercourse more with one woman than another." And I say, "But I am not talking about what you enjoy. I am talking about what you experience in terms of intensity and duration of experience." (quoted in Hall, 1969, p. 54)

Experience without considering what is enjoyed is hardly the full range of experience, sexual or other. Nor would academic empirical psychology be able to claim, after 80 years, that it has taken up the topic of child sexuality and made Freud unnecessary. It has been pointed out by Goldman and Goldman (1982), for example, that a bibliographical survey of some 5000 articles in child psychology based on the work of Piaget contains virtually nothing on childhood sexuality. New disciplines such as sociobiology seem even wider of the mark. It is all very well for the sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson to say that "Sex is central to human biology and a protean phenomenon that permeates every aspect of our existence and takes new forms through each step in the life cycle" (Wilson, 1978, p. 121). But sociobiology, precisely because of its effort to develop a comprehensive theory on the basis of genetic determinist considerations, was in no position to deal with the protean psychological aspects of sexuality. In fact, in response to his critics, Wilson finally had to admit that there is something beyond the genetic dimension, something which he calls "gene-culture coevolution" (Lumsden and Wilson, 1982)—thus opening the Pandora's box of theory he had tried to avoid. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, chose to open the box at the start. Psychoanalysis is notorious for its "unscientific" forays into speculations going far beyond what the observed facts would justify, but it also has the merit of that defect: it can keep in view the whole range of the sexual.

Nor has this willingness to depart from empirical norms produced a theory without empirical support. Notwithstanding the perpetual debates over whether or not psychoanalysis is scientific, evidence is mounting for many components of Freudian theory. This is shown with great force by Paul Kline in his stringent reviews of the experimental evidence for the numerous theories and behavioral descriptions of psychoanalytic psychology (Kline, 1972, 1981). The second edition of Kline's work (1981) is 500 pages long. He critically evaluates the research on psychoanalytic concepts, rejects many of the experiments (including some of his own) as faulty, acknowledges that some of the metapsychology such as the pleasure principle may be beyond the reach of confirmation, and discredits numerous studies based on tests and measures of doubtful validity such as the TAT and the Rorschach test. He does not accept clinical evidence or diagnoses as empirical evidence. Thus many of the studies claimed as supporting evidence for psychoanalysis by Fisher and Greenberg (1977) are rejected under Kline's standards. Kline is forthright in reporting that some research seems to refute certain aspects of Freudian theory, such as Freud's belief that the function of dreaming is to be "the guardian of sleep" (Kline, 1981, p. 315), and he scrupulously notes other

aspects in which evidence fails to support the theory, such as on the doctrine of penis envy (p. 427). Yet with all these cautions, Kline has pointed to an impressive number and variety of carefully controlled studies in which the results, pointing clearly toward the confirmation of psychoanalytic theory "*should be acceptable to unbiased psychologists of whatever persuasion . . .*" (1981, p. ix, emphasis added).

Kline's work seems to have been little noticed. Grünbaum's highly theoretical probing of the validity of psychoanalytic theory (1983) has attracted much more attention. Grünbaum discusses Kline only to dismiss him as another of the psychoanalytic supporters who are unable to see the difference between the mere existence of repression, a psychological mechanism, and repression as the major etiologic force in the development of psychoneuroses (Grünbaum, 1983, pp. 188-189). Although Grünbaum scores a good point here, and even though the problem of the etiology of the neuroses is certainly a key one, his commentary regarding Kline is seriously misleading. Kline, exactly like Grünbaum, has recognized that the verification of psychoanalytic theory cannot depend on clinical evidence because such evidence is contaminated by the huge powers of suggestion inherent to the psychoanalytic process. Hence Kline relies on none of the clinical evidence, but provides a book full of controlled experimental evidence which confirms various parts of psychoanalytic theory. In other words, Kline has already supplied, in large part, the kind of evidence Grünbaum repeatedly calls for: "*extraclinical evidence*" (Grünbaum, p. 189).

As time goes on, in fact, psychoanalytic empirical investigation is becoming more sophisticated and ingenious. The intensive work of Silverman using subliminal tachistoscope projections of key messages, such as "Mommy and me are one," signals a new breakthrough that will be very hard to dismiss (Silverman, 1971; Silverman, Lachman, and Milich, 1982; Kline, 1981, pp. x, 226-228, 347-349). Work going on in Scandinavia on the "percept genetic" approach is also impressive from an empirical standpoint (Kline, 1981, pp. 229-237, 386-388; Kragh and Smith, 1970). Kline's review of all this work tells us that it is time for those psychologists who have rejected psychoanalytic theory on empirical grounds to admit that they may be losing their battle on those very grounds. There is a booklength refutation of Kline's first edition by the anti-psychoanalytic psychologist Eysenck (Eysenck and Wilson, 1973), but it is effectively rebutted by Kline (Kline, 1981, pp. 389-400, 433-434, 441-442; see also Rosenzweig, 1954). The controversy will undoubtedly continue; those who support Eysenck are by no means ready to concede defeat, but it does appear that psychoanalytic empirical research has entered a new era in which outright dismissals are no longer in order.

It is to the point of the present study that in a number of experiments discussed by Kline, while it is feasible to *include* the results within nonpsychoanalytic learning theories, it is not possible to *account* for them, nor to have

predicted them, on the basis of such theories. These experimental results typically are in the areas of libido or sexuality (Kline, 1981, pp. 441-446).

To the extent that other approaches to psychology have not dared to depart from the range of the immediately empirically verifiable, they have been forced to pursue inherently unlikely hypotheses. The substantial work of Izard on emotions has been based on facial expression (Izard, 1971), to the detriment of attention to the rest of the affective psychological repertoire, partly because the face can be observed, whereas subjective emotional states, especially in the infant, seem to be out of observational range (Cicchetti and Pogge-Hesse, 1981, p. 250). This choice finally has not saved Izard from constructing highly theoretical models of neural-emotional development, but it has given his theory an implausible cast because of its excessive concentration on the face. In the field of the study of sexuality, let me mention here the volume *Love and Lovesickness*, where an excellent non-Freudian researcher and theorist of sexuality, John Money, once more takes the typical behaviorist pledge:

There is an emphasis throughout this book on behavior rather than on thoughts or feelings. The reason is pragmatic: if you can't see, hear, touch, smell or taste it, then there is nothing about another human being that you can know, the claims of the occult notwithstanding. (Money, 1980, p. 13)

Actually, Money's book is illuminating precisely because he violates this pledge on almost every page. He does say a lot about behavior, but rather than stopping there, he also gives his thoughts and feelings, some of which are consonant with a philosophy of self-regulation in sexual matters. He reports on how orgasms feel; "They keep getting better and better" (p. 119). Such feelings are "behavior," but are inseparable from subjectivity. This whole subjective side of Money's book would have to be rejected by anyone following his own declaration of emphasis on the "behavior rather than thoughts or feelings," and researchers who abide by the behavioral science pledge normally do not write about how orgasms feel to them. Money is successful in his effort to discuss sexuality comprehensively only because of his idiosyncratic combination of behavioral commitment and personal reportage. But outside of the psychoanalytic tradition, there are no theories which offer a basis for dealing with sexuality in all its dimensions.

Freud and the tradition of therapy he started comprise the first group of professional scientists and/or medical practitioners faced with the set of problems entailed by a multiple and yet unitary approach to sex. In a sense, such problems would be more difficult than those faced by an outright sexual reformer like Havelock Ellis, or even by a later believer in libido (later Orgone) like Wilhelm Reich. For these, there could be no question of intellectual gymnastics or moderation or compromise or revision; sexuality has to be central for them. But by concentrating upon it, they may not have felt

the same challenge as the psychoanalysts, who have related sexuality to the most remote, apparently asexual, aspects of the mind. Nor would other depth-psychological theories, where sex is not emphasized, be of much use here. Jung, for example, went on record in a key presentation of his analytic psychology at the Tavistock Clinic in London in 1935. He finds the sexual most repellent.

I never could bring myself to be so frightfully interested in these sex cases. They do exist, there are people with a neurotic sex life and you have to talk sex stuff with them until they get sick of it and you got out of that boredom. Naturally, with my temperamental attitude, I hope to goodness we shall get through with the stuff as quickly as possible. It is neurotic stuff and no reasonable normal person talks about it for any length of time. It is not natural to dwell on such matters. Primitives are very reticent about them. They allude to sexual intercourse by a word that is equivalent to 'hush.' Sexual things are taboo to them, as they really are to us if we are natural. (Jung, 1968, p. 144)

This could hardly be clearer. Discussion of sex, perhaps the very thought of sex, repels Jung. Jung of course is not fairly represented by this one statement, and interesting comments on sexuality may be found in his voluminous works. But neither the openness toward understanding sexuality in all its manifestations, nor the profound interest in it which we find in classical Freud, is present for Jung.

That commitment and interest, however, remains a problem for the theorist who wishes to abide by the essentials of Freud, who realizes that Freudian theory is still developing and changing, always subject to new evidence and theoretical considerations, and who still would like to have psychoanalysis become a respected member of the psychological sciences. Here the problem becomes that of accepting the challenges of the Freudian emphasis on sexuality and revising that theory so that it meets current societal imperatives. By now, sexuality has become excised in some few responses to the challenge (e.g., Schafer, 1976), while in most others, it is brought to subordination within a theoretical system by a number of typical strategies (not always chosen consciously). The psychoanalytic theorist Joseph Lichtenberg, for example, recently has discussed at some length the question of whether psychoanalysis has or implies any special "Weltanschauung," or (as Pepper would phrase it), any world-hypothesis of its own (Lichtenberg, 1983b). But despite a few glancing comments on sexual concepts such as castration (pp. 222, 230), Lichtenberg never mentions sexuality or the sexual body at all, let alone as an inherent concern of psychoanalytic theory. In his book on psychoanalysis and infant research, also published in 1983 (Lichtenberg, 1983a), Lichtenberg discusses such sexual body topics as "genital awareness" (pp. 127-131) and "psychosexual development" (pp. 153-156), but does not treat sexuality itself as an important category or as a topic requiring any theory whatever.

Yet the original sexual emphasis does not seem to be vanquished. The popular idea of psychoanalysis as a preeminently sexual psychology has never died out. Whether there is basis for it in current theory or not, I suggest that this persistence of the myth be taken as an indication that the myth is not groundless. Pepper, writing about psychoanalytic theory in 1958, still took seriously the possibility of gratification (sexual and other) without repression (1958, pp. 237-242); he was one of the few to argue that this could be part of a workable system of civilized values. Pepper would have known, through his inveterate conversations and continuous learning, that by 1958, most psychoanalytic theory had come around to endorsing repression and calling it an inevitability. In fact, only a year later, Norman O. Brown, in *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History*, argued for the position taken by Pepper (without making reference to him), but presented this position as a radical overhaul of psychoanalytic theory (Brown, 1959). Brown was correct, but Pepper may have been calling on the strongest line of argument within the theory.

More recently, the sex therapist Avodah K. Offit (1981, p. 14) has told of her early momentous reading of Freud at age 12. From that reading, she was "indoctrinated," as she puts it, to believe that "Sex was not only the province of psychiatry but also the source of all that was good in human achievement. I still believe this." For her, Freud is no longer the ideal figure he once was, but his central meaning is still there. Interestingly, Offit's popular book, which does not have a single footnote, contains invaluable data on female psychosexuality that is seldom mentioned, to my knowledge, in any but the most extremely specialist source. I shall refer to this data below, in a discussion of the adult sexual body.

Culture and Sexual Repression: The Question Resurfaces

A psychological theory capable of suggesting that sex is the source of all good in "human achievement" (Offit, 1981, p. 14) inevitably raised a radical question for the theory of culture: if sex is the source of good, why should there be sexual repression? Could it not be possible to create a society in which sexual repression is absent? And would not such a society be more sane, more humanly gratifying, and less violent, than the actual civilization we now live in? In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud himself answered that question with an ominous "No." But Freud would not even have come to give his answer had the question not emerged from the development of psychoanalytic theory itself. What this means is that some position concerning the cultural necessity of repression is part of the psychoanalytic world hypothesis.

Recent investigation into the cumulative store of anthropological research now indicates that it is possible to envision a different answer to the radical question of whether sexual repression is a necessary component for the "good

society”—specifically, for a society not rent with violence, and capable of generating genuinely affectionate relations among its inhabitants, who would exist in a state of social order. Although the question is obviously fraught with complications, there is at least one surprisingly comprehensive study of human cultures which *would* give an unequivocal “No” to the proposition that sexual repression is a necessity for the good society. I refer to the comprehensive cross-cultural study by James W. Prescott (Prescott, 1979); it is based on R.B. Textor’s invaluable work, *A Cross-Cultural Summary* (Textor, 1967), which compiles information about 400 cultures and some 20,000 correlations. Prescott found very high correlations between the deprivation of physical affection during infancy and the development of physical violence, in cultures where those two factors could be identified. Prescott also showed that there is a corresponding group of cultures in which we find a strong correlation between high levels of affectionate, somatosensory contact for infants, and very low levels of violence among adults. Prescott’s concept of “physical attention” involves overall approval and love for the infant’s physical body, including its sexuality. “Physical attention” does mean for Prescott “body touch, contact, and movement . . .” (p. 67).

According to Prescott, somatosensory contact, the one variable that would make the most sense of all anthropological findings on culture and touching, is absent from the social sciences. It is also largely absent from psychoanalytic thought as it exists today, well after Freud and his followers revised the classical theory. Summing up his work on physical affection and its deprivation, Prescott writes:

This writer is not aware of any other developmental variable that has this high degree of validity and predictability. Nor is he aware of any such variable in the social-behavioral sciences. Clearly not much more needs to be said except to point out that these findings are fully supportive of the position taken and advocated by Wilhelm Reich in *The Function of the Orgasm*. (p. 95)

This statement comprises a strong confirmation of Reich, not from within the circle of acknowledged Reichians, but from a neurophysiologist investigating anthropological research for the National Institute of Child Development and Human Development. From the theoretical perspective of the present study, it is not merely Reich who is confirmed; it is the original classical psychoanalysis of Freud, in its implications concerning sexuality, and now usually dismissed as a merely popular misconception of Freud.

There is however a complication in Prescott’s results which is of the greatest import for the sexual body. For a few societies, Prescott found “a failure of the infant physical affection variable to predict characteristics of sexual behavior” (p. 81). That is, some few cultures scored high on both physical affection to infants and on adult physical violence, including sexual violence. But further analysis revealed that those all were cultures in which there are “repressive premarital sexual behaviors” (pp. 82, 84).

Prescott's hypothesis is a major one. It has already shown its potential for the enrichment of research. Blackman (1980) has applied and extended Prescott's "global multi-casual view" (Blackman, p. 193) in an exploratory research project on affectional touching in 60 pre-school children, representing three different ethnic groups: white-American, Afro-American and recent immigrants from the Cape Verde Islands (p. 182). Among the findings is a confirmation that the white American parents touch their children less than the other two groups (p. 187). She also concluded that for some children, parental touching was less significant than parental hitting. Blackman refined Prescott's theory by making use of Jourard's (1966, 1968) method of analyzing parent-child touch dyads, and by taking into account the gender-cultural differences in the meanings of touching. For little girls, for example, being touched by their fathers and not being able to touch back reciprocally is part of the early enculturation of sexist values (Blackman, 1980, pp. 190-191). Blackman (p. 188) is aware that touching cannot be studied in itself, apart from the variables of culture, but she is nonetheless able to perform a valuable exploratory study that puts Prescott's theories to the test. Her work is only an indication of further research that could be carried out on the meaning of Prescott's theory of an affectional sensory contact variable in the social conditions of industrial society.

David Finkelhor, a leading researcher in the field of child sexual victimization, is also aware of Prescott's theory (Finkelhor, 1979, p. 15). Although Finkelhor gave only tentative assent to the theory in his book, he has followed with later comments which bear on the issues Prescott raises. For one thing, fathers who are child sexual abusers are very often products of a deprivation of affectional touching. In the U.S., fathers hug and kiss their children less than do mothers, probably because adult male sexuality is regarded as dangerous. Furthermore, abusive fathers have been

. . . weaned very early from nurturant and dependent physical contact with parents and adults, and . . . in early adolescence avenues of physical contact besides sex are regarded as unmanly. (Finkelhor, 1980, p. 645)

The typical mother of the girl who is sexually abused by a father, or other older male, is likely to be one who is sexually repressive. Finkelhor's research shows that "These mothers were the kind who warned, scolded and punished their daughters for asking sex questions, for masturbating and looking at sex pictures" (Finkelhor, 1980, p. 643). Sexual repressiveness is not the only risk factor by which girls might become victims of sexual abuse, but it is an important one in Finkelhor's sample. It appears to be related to Prescott's theory, in that these girls have difficulty forming a realistic sense of danger in sexual encounters with adults because their sexual bodies have been defined for them as very dangerous territory, to be avoided in touch and thought; their

natural curiosity for exploration through affectional contact has been put under prohibition. This makes them vulnerable to sexual exploitation. The research of both Blackman and Finkelhor provides corroboration (though obviously not "proof") of Prescott's theory of the importance of somatosensory touching and affection in childhood and in adolescence—and of the incompatibility of such touching and affection with sexual repression. (I will discuss Finkelhor's work further, in the chapter below, on "Challenges to Psychoanalytic Theory: Recent Developments.") Prescott's work has also been incorporated into a broad sociological description of currently changing lifestyles and religious attitudes in the U.S., by Robert T. Francouer. Francouer's interdisciplinary training includes theology, genetics, and experimental embryology (Francouer, 1983).

The recent research on verbal abuse as a form of child abuse would provide a good example of an area where somatosensory affectional contact is missing (Brody, 1983d). The child who is subjected to insulting scoldings or epithets is being assaulted vocally, and in many cases is being rooted to the spot at attention while the parent sermonizes at him or her. The problem is not just the *content* of the abusive verbal taunting—in fact, given a playful or a warm tone, that content might be overlooked—but the affective *quality* of verbal contact. It would also seem clear that such a child is not receiving much—if any—somatic affection from the abusing parent. I speculate on this topic in order to suggest that somatosensory affection is a subtle concept as well as a necessary one. Attempts to explain the effects of verbal abuse without such a concept must miss the way in which the child's sexual body is affected.

There is, however, a pertinent irony in Prescott's work: the general direction of his results had been anticipated in earlier anthropological cross-cultural studies (though these could not be as comprehensive or as statistically sound as the one Prescott offers), and these earlier studies were undertaken from a psychoanalytic perspective (Whiting, 1963; Whiting and Child, 1953). What Whiting and Child were looking at, in their psychoanalytic cross-cultural studies, were such factors as sexual identity confusion. Prescott reanalyzes some of their data and concludes that their restricted hypotheses share "a common ground" in one significant variable, namely, "physical affection . . ." (1979, p. 70).

Prescott concludes his monograph by affirming the "morality of physical pleasure" (p. 128). Such a claim is hardly taken seriously by, and is certainly not central in, psychoanalytic thought today. The problem is that the claim lacks an adequate theoretical basis in any other discipline. Note that Prescott is not aware of any variable like affectionate touching in the *behavioral sciences at all*. We can think of some theories which might well accept the "morality of physical pleasure," and thus technically refute Prescott: Kinsey, for example, or other supporters of human sexuality such as Alex Comfort, or Masters and Johnson. However, their theories do not have adequate scope or precision

such as would lead to an in-depth understanding of the variable of "physical affection." Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, has a theoretical investment in the sexual body which permits the reconsideration of physical affection within a range of overlapping inquiries, such as the study of intrapsychic conflict, cultural values, aesthetic experience, and the relations between subjectivity and scientific observation.

The resuscitation of Freud's theory in its original form is not intended in the present critique. The point is that psychoanalysis by virtue of its early breakthroughs became the only psychological approach to promise a theory of human nature in which the sexual elements were fully credited—even if this meant threatening the forces of cultural tradition. As Maguire, a recent Catholic moral theorist has shown once more, changes in sexual mores are the most salient, intractable changes in what Maguire perceives as today's "Muddle in the Moralscape." As he also ruefully recognizes (quoting A. and M. Edel, 1959), "sex is nearly everywhere [in cultures] highly charged morally, for in addition to its high emotional potential, it is part of the most central nexus of human social interrelationships" (Maguire, 1978, p. 5). René Girard, a thinker whose work has had wide acceptance, has reaffirmed the sexual-moral nexus and reinforced the traditional negative evaluation of the sexual:

Sexuality leads to quarrels, jealous rages, mortal combats. It is a permanent source of disorder even within the most harmonious societies. (Girard, 1977, p. 35)

Girard's statement can hardly be misunderstood. He is generalizing on the basis of very wide reading in the anthropology of religion. He is also quite mistaken, as I have argued elsewhere (Efron, 1980, 1982b). The "youth houses" of the Trobriand Island culture did not produce a ferocious society, despite its encouragement of unsupervised sexual alliances among adolescents (Efron 1982b, pp. 176-177). But the Trobriand Island culture, before the missionaries put an end to the youth houses, was not living within a repressive sexual morality, either. Fears of radical change arising from a freeing up of sexual behavior, from heightened appreciation of the value of sexuality, and from the enlarged meanings of the term "sexual" since Freud, are all grounded in reasonable expectations. Traditional values, such as involuntary monogamy, and traditional beliefs such as the asexuality of the infant and the child, do in fact become threatened. Countless cultural changes occur. One example of a change that probably would not have been predicted has occurred in the high school from which I graduated in St. Paul, Minnesota. The school now has a daycare nursery for the convenience of its teenage mothers who need to finish their degrees. I doubt that adherents of traditional moral codes would find this a welcome institutional adaptation, though it may actually be more moral in practice than moralists would like to admit.

Issues Underlying the Rejection of Libido Theory

Psychoanalysis as a professional institution has become a tradition itself, largely unable to maintain its original critical edge toward culture; nonetheless that criticism, grounded upon its disturbingly amorphous discovery of what "sexuality" means, cannot be persuasively excised. The "nexus" is much too central in the theory. As one of the most respected among psychoanalytic theorists has put it, in a review of the phases of psychoanalytic theory, "*Classical psychoanalytical theory is a moral psychology . . .*" (Guntrip, 1968, p. 123, emphasis in the original). Its problem is "how to direct and control antisocial impulses," by which Guntrip, in accordance with traditional moral thought, means the sexual and the aggressive. How aggression made its entry into the formula is a problem I will take up shortly; here I wish only to point out that Guntrip as much as Girard sees the importance of sexuality in classic psychoanalytic theory, and realizes that the issue, given his own assumptions about "antisocial impulses," has to be a moral one. By 1968, when Guntrip published his statement, theoretical emphasis had shifted to the ego, in a move that Guntrip and many others recognized as a step away from the instinctual or the biological core of the classical theory. The libido had become passé. The move, in other words, was toward the human mind as the root metaphor of psychoanalytic psychology, in a way that de-emphasized the body and with it sexuality.

Today ego psychology itself is out of fashion, but the shift toward mind and away from the sexual body continues. I have heard the distinguished analyst and theorist, Otto Kernberg, declare at the outset of a presentation (Kernberg, 1981) that he could begin his presentation only if it were understood that psychoanalysis as he defines it is within the Cartesian metaphysical framework, the *cogito*. Obviously, the body and sexuality could not be considered central. To my surprise no one objected (although there was a question raised concerning the location of Descartes' *cogito* within psychoanalytic evidence premised on the mind of the infant!). Peterfreund, another theorist whose work I shall take up in a later section, has declared (1971, pp. 83-84) that most current psychoanalytic thought indeed is premised on the Cartesian worldview. This situation is one that Peterfreund, unlike Kernberg, finds intolerable. The historian of science James Blight (1982, p. 21) has pointed out that Cartesian dualism is in fact prevalent in much of current psychoanalytic theory, and notes that one result and intention of such dualism is to take psychoanalysis out of the disciplines of the natural sciences and place it within some other field, such as the humanities or religion. Incredibly enough, these efforts as well as others which are not attempting to be dualistic at all (sometimes the opposite) are often presented as rescue missions—ways of saving the Freudian heritage—in an age of new findings and assumptions.

The most common theoretical strategy of the past several decades is to

rescue Freud's theory from what is taken to be its hopelessly unscientific reliance on an energy concept of innate, biological "drive." It is widely believed now that Freud was a product of 19th century natural science, from which he took over a Helmholtzian concept of drive and discharge which is purely mechanical, and inept for the intricacies of the human psyche: it is also without empirical foundation. The "sexuality" he was concerned with, unfortunately, was closely associated with this drive concept. It is widely believed that sexual drive, energized by a force labelled as "libido," was presumed by Freud to operate "hydraulically," that is, as a simple biological force within the sexual body that always strove for immediate discharge. It seldom achieved this discharge, since repression, instigated by culture and internalized into the psyche, either blocked or delayed or re-channelled it.

As I read Freud, however, he was not overly reliant on Helmholtz. He maintained, even after his conservative metapsychology had been formed, a delicate theoretical realization that deliberately distinguished human biology from the concept of "instinctual drive," and still postulated that human biology and human psychology are inherently related. The instincts were postulated as the interfacing of psychological events (which can be inferred through analysis and self-analysis) with the sexual body, but were not thought to be observable directly.

Libido was regarded as the energy of the sexual body and hence of the mind as well. Too much has been made of Freud's abandoned project of 1895, published only in 1950, of a scientific psychology in which he imagined that it might be possible to "represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable particles . . ." (Breuer and Freud, 1957, p. 355). Although mechanistic biology was *one* of Freud's scientific inheritances, the same natural scientists—Helmholtz, Brücke, and later on Breuer—who are credited with being major sources of that heritage for Freud, have been shown to have also had strongly aesthetic, non-mechanistic lines of thought (Cranefield, 1966a, 1966b, 1970). Cranefield has shown that Heinrich von Helmholtz, far from maintaining a narrow mechanistic stance in his psychophysiological investigations, "was at every possible point aware of the psychological implications of his investigations and interested in their aesthetic implications" (1966b, p. 3). Ernst Brücke, Freud's professor of histology, had strong interests in philosophy and aesthetics; in fact, "most of his monographs had something to do with aesthetics or with philosophical questions" (Cranefield, 1966b, p. 5).

Freud's continued interest throughout his career in an eventual unified theory of psychology and physiology simply does not justify a narrowly mechanistic interpretation. I have quoted above his statement (Freud, 1921) that libido is "the energy, *regarded as a quantitative magnitude* (though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which *have to do with* all that may be comprised under the word 'love'," and that psychoanalytic evidence

warrants naming all of these instincts "sexual instincts" (emphasis added). There is no sharp separation to be made, Freud went on, between this terminology and the whole range of loves: "self-love . . . love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas" (Freud, 1921, p. 29). These are all called by the name "love" in popular usage, and this is "an entirely justifiable piece of unification . . ." (pp. 29-30). To refer to "love" in this way is quite in line with the tradition of Plato's "Eros," a definition of sexual love in a "wider" sense—but one that remains sexual. This statement illustrates Freud's willingness to be understood, to some extent, at a popular level, and it also shows his finesse in never substituting the physiological names such as "libido" and "sexual instincts" for the enormous range of meanings the sexual body has. In later critiques of Freud's energy concepts, however, (e.g., Peterfreund, 1971), especially those written after the surprise posthumous publication (Freud, 1954) of his 1895 "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (a title placed on the manuscript by the editors, by the way), Freudian libido is first reduced to an impossibility, a purely "mental energy" as Peterfreund (1971), for example, has it. I can only conclude that such a strategy for revision of Freud has been selected unconsciously by those who reformulated Freudian theory; there is an extreme scarcity of awareness, among revisionists who opt for this strategy, that if you eliminate the drive theory and the theory of the libido, then you will thereby lose touch with the sexual body, *unless* you do something to install new concepts that focus on the sexual. The many texts by those who reformulated Freud, such as the writings by the object-relations theorists, show little awareness of this loss. Revisionists were glad to get away from what they regarded as Freud's excessive "biologizing" of the psyche, but what they mean by his "biologizing" usually comes down to one thing: his introduction of an enlarged, problematical sexuality into psychological considerations.

One example of how the well-intentioned revision of Freud's alleged mechanistic thinking leads away from the sexual body, concerns the concept of *homeostasis*. Holt (1965), arguing for revision, rejects it as a "vague analogy," useless within modern physiology. I agree that there is vagueness within the concept, and there is an error—frequently pointed out—in Freud's assumption that the human nervous system is based on the energy principles of "constancy" and "inertia." These principles lead to the notion that the reduction of tension is always the aim of the organism, an untenable position. The energy theories may also be involved in Freud's belief that the human organism is fundamentally hostile to the experience of emotion, since that experience would contradict the constancy and inertia principles. (See Schachtel, 1959.) Despite these defects, there is implied within a postulation of homeostasis in an organism, a possibility of self-regulation. The body—the sexual body—has a capacity for regulating the excitations it experiences in a

healthy, sane manner. In this regard, it is significant that Josef Breuer, Freud's collaborator in the discovery of psychoanalysis, was a major scientific contributor to the understanding of self-regulatory "biofeedback" processes in the human organism, in the physiology of respiration (Cranefield, 1970). In the early book co-authored by Breuer and Freud (1957), Breuer's theoretical exposition of homeostasis is by no means limited to the notion of constancy in the sense of tension reduction (pp. 197-200). As Cranefield has pointed out, Holt seriously underestimated the sophistication of the physiological science with which Freud was most familiar, especially in Freud's relation to Breuer (personal communication, April 12, 1972).

But these are historical details. What is finally at stake in the concept of homeostasis is not its vagueness but its implications for a self-regulative capacity of the sexual body. Freud, we may speculate, could have been finding his way toward a homeostatic, self-regulating concept of sexual expression. Had he taken such a direction it would have been consistent with his strong sense, expressed in his 1909 Clark lectures, of the harmfulness of sexual repression, and its dubious social necessity. The self-regulation of sexuality may have been an underlying assumption of Freud's physiological thinking throughout his collaboration with Breuer and beyond. In his 1909 lectures, he shows no sign of being worried that sexual expression will become violent or destructive if repression is greatly reduced. Nor is the possibility of sexual self-regulation a dead issue today. But this possibility is lost sight of in the efforts to "rescue" Freud from the allegedly simplistic and supposedly outmoded physiological science of his early medical career.

In our own day, the rescue of Freud has been completed many times over. There are even some theories of psychoanalysis where revision has been carried beyond the point of no return. One example is the work of Roy Schafer. Schafer is interesting because he shows another aspect of the typical strategy of rescuing Freud from the drive theory: he does not make a clean theoretical break. Were he to deny that there are drives, then there would be a new confrontation in theory and evidence. But Schafer is not like Peterfreund or Lacan, who did in fact make a clean break. Schafer still acknowledges that "Drives appear to be incontrovertible facts of human nature." However, for Schafer, drives are not significant aspects of psychology. If we consider the example of "a man regarding a woman lustfully," and assume that "the physiological correlates are present," we will find that this man regards himself as "passive in relation to a drive," whereas, if he only chose to do so, he would accept instead that he is "a sexual agent, someone who lusts after a specific woman" (Schafer, 1980, p. 41). The man should (Schafer makes it clear) take responsibility for being a human agent. The moral concept of responsibility thus eliminates any consideration of sexual drive. The man should not hide behind the notion that he has been overcome by a "drive." With this sort of re-labelling, Schafer performs a theoretical ostrich-act

regarding sexuality; he is pretending that the sexual is no different than any other kind of action that people are responsible for as active subjects. In Schafer's theory, anything in biological or physiological process is unworthy to be ranked among the human events that lead to meaning. This position leaves him with a thoroughly mentalized version of sex; the sexual body is gone from it. As Kovel (1978) notes, Schafer's reformulation of psychoanalytic theory (Schafer, 1976) *in effect* eliminates drive and energy concepts.

Schafer's major work of revisionist theory, *A New Language for Psychoanalysis* (1976), not only subordinates the sexual body to the generalized category of action; it does not so much as discuss sexuality at all, except in passing. The book has several chapters on the redefinition of emotion (where, presumably the problems of sexuality might be serious), but these fall to the level of vigorously asserting that while emotion may appear to almost everyone to be an experience with passive, uncontrollable elements rather than an action taken, it is no more than another kind of action. By thus making sexuality one more part of the supreme metaphor of "action," the same as anything else, and simultaneously maintaining that in healthy functioning, action is what you learn to take responsibility for (with the help of psychoanalytic therapy), Schafer converts psychoanalytic theory into another recycling of traditional moral-didactic thought, untroubled by the sexuality that bothered Freud. And suddenly, psychoanalysis is put into the service of pre-Freudian reason: action, Schafer explains, is "doing things for reasons" (1976, p. 139). Schafer's solution to the challenge of the sexual body is thus to eliminate it, not as a fact, but as a part of psychoanalytic discourse.

It does not appear, however, that Schafer's theory is acceptable to the discipline of psychoanalysis. As Farrell (1983) comments, it simply will not do to "smother" every problem under the category of "action."

Although psychoanalytic theorists have sometimes been tempted to think that they could dissolve the problems of the sexual body by inventing new terminology, there is a rich tradition within psychoanalysis of genuine struggle and confrontation with the challenge of the sexual body. That is why I maintain that psychoanalysis is the key discipline of the sexual body. Its theorists are members of the first discipline ever to have had to face the larger psychological implications of sexuality in a systematic way; possibly they are the only such group. Their attempts to meet and evade the challenge are rich in implications for the rest of us, both as researchers in other areas and as people living our lives.

Even in present day context, the original emphasis is still visible in the work of some psychoanalytic theorists, although these tend to find themselves in a situation reminiscent of the year 1900. Two researcher-theorists engaged in the study of infancy, Herman Roiphe and Eleanor Galenson, put the matter thus, in their volume, *Infantile Origins of Sexual Identity*:

One may well ask, as we have so often asked ourselves during the many years of our study, why the army of infant observers and researchers have with a few notable exceptions, overlooked these astonishingly protean manifestations of early sexuality. Once again, Freud seemed to have understood the problem when he stressed the ubiquity of repression of infantile sexuality. His observation seems to apply to not only adults in general situations but to adults as they relate to children. (Roiphe and Galenson, 1981, p. x)

Roiphe and Galenson are restating here the original challenge Freud raised. Their immediate contention is directed at "the army of infant observers and researchers," some of whose work I will examine. But ultimately the Freudian challenge as I have represented it is toward authoritarian controls of whatever kind, within culture, over the sexual body, whether it be adult, infant or adolescent.

Of Paradigms and World Hypotheses

Once we begin talking of the whole of culture, it becomes apparent that we are dealing with something larger than a theory of psychology. The expansion of focus is partially a matter of drawing together in some relationship the many disciplines that have something to do with the sexual body and creating an appropriate interdisciplinary field. The theoretical assumptions in such an expansion are not simply additive. It must be said that the claims of psychoanalytic theory are so basic and all encompassing that they amount to a worldview. This is not to suppose that all the claims can be made good. In certain areas the theory probably still falls short of the necessary scope and precision. Validity is not the issue for the moment; the point is that psychoanalytic theory, however much it may emerge from clinical evidence, is far more than a theory of therapy. To use Pepper's distinction, psychoanalysis is not a "restricted" scientific hypothesis; it is a theory striving to be a *world hypothesis* (Pepper, 1982). There is, for example, a series of volumes entitled *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society* (Muensterberger, Boyer, and Grolnick, 1984), the contents of which would be difficult to reconcile with non-psychoanalytic sociology or anthropology. Nor could Norman O. Brown's psychoanalytic theory of history (1959) be reconciled with non-Freudian historiography. The details of Brown's proposal drew numerous objections particularly over Brown's denial of the possibility of genuine gratification through sublimation, and hence his denial of the possibility of happiness in any culture which attempts to first repress and then make social use of sexuality. But no theorist of psychoanalysis and no psychoanalytic reviewer countered by saying that there should *not* be any special psychoanalytic theory of history. In the same volume, Brown's review of the anal irrationality of the "science" of economics points to another feature of the psychoanalytic world view as it invades still another discipline. In theory of science, Kohut has

argued that the scientific method of psychoanalysis is fundamentally different than that of other sciences and that other sciences must learn to model themselves, in some respects, on the innovation in method that Kohut believes psychoanalysis to represent (Kohut, 1977). On the other hand, there has been frequent acknowledgement in the psychoanalytic literature, beginning with Freud, that the theory does not contain an adequate account of artistic or scientific creativity. Kris (1952, p. 20) acknowledged that "we do not at present have tools which would permit us to investigate the roots of gift or talent, nor to speak of genius"; his own theory of "regression in the service of the ego" moves away from Freud's emphasis on primary process thinking in the creative process but does not account for its occurrence. At least one theorist I discuss below (Holland, 1975b), now proposes that this gap has been closed. But even if psychoanalysis cannot account for creativity, its theorists realize that it somehow, some day, must do so, because it is a world hypothesis rather than a limited theory of only certain areas of mental functioning.

This leads me to two questions: as a world hypothesis, can psychoanalysis accept changes demanded by new evidence in other disciplines, such as the study of infancy? And, is psychoanalysis today essentially the same or a different (not merely revised and refined) world hypothesis than it was when Freud centered it, in his classical period, on the sexual body? In light of the first question, the suggestion of Milton Klein (1981b), namely that the current paradigm (in Kuhn's sense) for understanding the infant be revised to conform to the new facts of infant research, is problematical. The new research would indeed indicate that it would be best if psychoanalytic theory could reverse itself on the question of whether the infant has a rudimentary "self" at birth. As Klein realizes, Kuhn's theory hardly encourages the expectation that change at a basic level can be made peacefully and constructively by practitioners within an established theory. The deeper issue, however, is the nature of psychoanalysis itself. A scientific theory is a *restricted* hypothesis, whereas a world hypothesis is in principle *unrestricted* (Pepper, 1982). A world hypothesis must accommodate the data of all fields. But such a hypothesis cannot be brought into line with "science" simply by adjusting its components, because some adjustments are contrary to the theory as a whole, or to its root metaphor. The postulation of a self at birth is part of some larger set of categories. It will be evident from arguments to be presented later, that psychoanalytic theory *as it stands* could not possibly absorb the category of a self within its theory of the infant. The theory would be destroyed rather than revised. That the infant has a sexual body would be a particularly un-absorbable fact. There is another possibility to be considered, however: what we have today as psychoanalytic theory has already been transformed drastically, over the years, from the early paradigm of Freud. That earlier paradigm might be part of a world hypothesis quite different from its later, transformed version.

Could a self be posited of an infant, in theory, for classical psychoanalysis? I would suggest that it could and should, given the perspective of the sexual body.

In my concluding chapter I plan to return to the question of what designations should be applied to the current as well as the original psychoanalytic world hypothesis, and what the implications of that naming are. To anticipate, the perspective of the sexual body may lead to a modified version of a world hypothesis favored by Pepper in his later years, which he called Selectivism (Pepper, 1967). But Selectivism would require no small amount of new learning on the part of those working within the many disciplines which make up, or impinge upon, the perspective of the sexual body.