

## Ibn Khaldun and Vico: The Universality of Social History

Robert E. Lana

*Temple University*

Ibn Khaldun developed a theory of social history of the Arabs of North Africa which included a reasonably objective account of their social development. His work stands in contrast to the ideal of Plato's Republic. Plato believed that a rational state could be achieved even though it would eventually fall. Giambattista Vico used the idea of historical cycles to develop both a theory of social change and an epistemology for the study of social context which is useful today. Vico held that societies not only move through cycles of development, but explanation concerning societies moves through similar cycles.

In the history of ideas, discussion often concerns questions of priority and similarity. This search for influence is often fascinating and sometimes productive in allowing us to understand systems of explanation that have withstood the vicissitudes of time. Occasionally a theorist's position is so vital that it seems to encompass ideas developed by both past and future thinkers. Such may be the case in the unlikely juxtaposition of Giambattista Vico, the early 18th century Italian rhetorician, and the 14th century Berber, Ibn Khaldun. Although it is doubtful that Vico knew of Ibn Khaldun's work, there is sometimes a striking resemblance between their two efforts. It is my contention that the epistemological grounds upon which social theory develops is partially revealed by examining the theses of Vico and Ibn Khaldun together. Vico (1961 translated edition) has taken his rightful place (Tagliacozzo, 1983, 1985) in the history of ideas concerning the manner in which human beings live together—and contemporary social psychologists (e.g., Lana, 1986; Rosnow, 1978; Shotter, in press) have acknowledged his contribution. The comparison in this paper of Vico's and Ibn Khaldun's ideas is offered in that spirit of acknowledgement.

### *Ibn Khaldun*

Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) was a Spanish-Arab Berber who lived in Southern Spain and North Africa. Without any apparent direct intellectual mentors,

Ibn Khaldun created an extraordinary theory of social development, a system which was to anticipate some of the elements of Vico's views, but without apparently influencing Vico nor achieving Vico's epistemological complexity.

Ibn Khaldun's (1967 translated edition) major work, the *Muqaddimah* [Prolegomena to History] is both a monumental history of the Arabs of Spain and North Africa and a theory of social development. It is apparently the first major theory of society which was neither Platonic nor theological. As we shall see, Ibn Khaldun's system both emerged from within a Muslim context and departed from it in significant ways. The result is an extraordinary vision of societal development which exhibits characteristics suggestive of the later theses of Machiavelli and Vico. I hope to show how Vico's concept of the *ricorsi* [historical cycles] is analytically, contextually, and epistemologically relevant to Ibn Khaldun's theses. Ibn Khaldun's system supports Vico's notion that people live through many of the same experiences which yield an objective context, a social system, that tends to be cyclical because human beings are limited in the way they are able to react to one another. These limits are both describable and universal. It is Vico who understood the nature of this universality. Ibn Khaldun's position is both an anticipation of Vico's *ricorsi* and is accounted for epistemologically by them as we shall see below.

Ibn Khaldun's discussion of the development of North African Berbers describes the fundamental motivations of people living in primitive social conditions before the development of cities, independent of religious influence (Schmidt, 1930). Ibn Khaldun's view begins with the description of the nomadic, but eventually sedentary, Arabs that inhabited his own underdeveloped North West Africa.

### *Early Social Conditions*

People lived together in order to procure food and to defend themselves, tasks which were difficult to accomplish alone. These first people were nomadic Bedouins characterized by a feral ferocity which encompassed a dependency only on their own and their compatriots' abilities at arms. Their values were straight-forward and their needs minimal. The Bedouins were brave in battle, honest in their dealings with one another, and disdained all but the simplest goods. Ibn Khaldun, however, is quick to indicate that this feral purity could not endure since the nomadic Bedouins soon became sedentary when they realized that their simple needs were more easily satisfied by farming and trade rather than by herding and frequent marauding. Values changed when settlements were established. Skill in battle of all the male members of the tribe was no longer attainable since many were needed to till the soil and engage in commerce. Increasingly, defense was left in the hands of a few, and the few decreased when an urban center was eventually formed. The building

of walls and fortifications around the settlement further reduced the need for extravagant bravery. Significantly, values of courage and defiance in the face of an attacker gave way to values of appeasement and compromise. The greater riches produced by an urban center were accompanied by an increased desire to acquire them, and a decreased interest in fighting and self-sufficiency. A more or less permanent leader emerged when cities became comfortably settled, and a dynasty developed which was given more and more to the accumulation of wealth. Eventually this society decayed and became susceptible to attack and occupation by foreign groups which were still nomadic, aggressive, and self-sufficient. The cycle then began again.

Ibn Khaldun both describes the cycles of the development of Arab civilization and makes value judgements regarding their characteristics. An infant is said to be born in a natural (good) state—and the adults of the “beginning part” of social development, i.e., the nomadic Bedouins, are closer to this state than are the sedentary people they will eventually become. Ibn Khaldun values self-sufficiency, as most of us do, even in the face of the social necessity of creating societies which minimize the need for this characteristic. He sees the necessity, the inevitability, for the growth of the city, i.e., civilization.

The nomadic Bedouins are good, natural, physical, and courageous. The sedentary people are unnatural, contemplative, and depend upon others for protection. Nomads always carry weapons, sedentary people do not. Nomads act upon their own decisions while sedentary people act from decisions based upon the rule of law. Sedentary people develop not only political laws, but the laws of science and religion as well.

Because these cycles involve people of the same origin over time, Ibn Khaldun is careful to indicate that the differences in the attributes of nomadic and sedentary people are due to differences in habit rather than to differences in natural disposition. This point is further supported by his conclusion that ancient people were not better nor inferior in abilities to the people of his own century, since Muhammed and his followers were as wise and fit as any one could possibly be. There is no progress in human ability, only change; and this change is cyclical and needs to be described independently from the development of religion, mathematics, and science. Ibn Khaldun is vividly aware of the need for a “new science” of the nature of society. He held that knowledge of social conditions was prerequisite to knowledge of historical events. “We must distinguish the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization as required by its very nature” (*Muqaddimah*, p. 77).

### *The Cycles Described*

Ibn Khaldun emphasized that differences among people are largely cultural and depended upon a process called *assibya*, which is translated as “group

solidarity", or "*esprit de corps*" (Becker and Barnes, 1952). This group solidarity changed as people moved from nomadic primitive conditions called *badawa* to a civilized sedentary existence called *hadara*.

People living in a state of *badawa* were straight-forward, courageous, virtuous, rough, undisciplined, and backward in a technological sense. Primitive groups, because they are nomadic, encountered one another and were in conflict until the roughest with the strongest *assibya* won out and presided over the others. This resulted in a loose confederation of nomadic peoples. The nomadic group eventually moved against a neighboring, established civilized culture (*hadara*) and the strongest tribe gained control. Irrevocably, however, the group in *badawa* moved toward the condition of *hadara*.

In the primitive group (*badawa*) *assibya* or group solidarity results from the blood-ties among group members. Although *assibya* is also built as a result of alliance and clientship, these relationships produce weaker *assibya* than do the blood-ties. *Assibya* among primitives builds group strength since being nomadic, they have not developed the technology with which people in *hadara* defend themselves. The natural product of *assibya* is royal power. When power is achieved by a single person or family, *assibya* is a vehicle of transition from *badawa* to *hadara*, which when reached, puts an end to *assibya*.

The walls of the *hadara* town generate feelings of security and create a dependence of the majority of the population on a few of its members for protection. Police and an army are formed. There are no police nor soldiers among the men of the *badawa* because all men are both. Stable ways of earning a living in the town develop instead of the looting and herding of the *badawa*.

Central political power replaces *assibya* and the decline of the newly formed civilization has already begun. The lineages of the population mix and further decline occurs as *assibya* continues to weaken. Foreigners are welcomed for their skills and more people seek greater luxury. Mercenaries are hired to do the fighting. Common cause and group solidarity are lost. Vigor can only be reintroduced in the group by its being conquered by an external, more primitive invader. Thus the cycles begin again.

Ibn Khaldun concluded that the cyclical process that he described was natural and necessary with little chance of interruption by plan. Groups could not, by being aware of the causes of their potential decline, thereby adjust group life so as to prevent the process. Decline was inevitable. It is with this naturalistic observation that Ibn Khaldun both separates himself from his Muslim contemporaries and establishes his secular, deterministic perspective.

Ibn Khaldun's separation from his Islamic contemporaries is perhaps best illustrated by his understanding of *assibya* in historico-social terms and his explanation of why *assibya* was seen as a threat to Islam by its leaders (Rabi, 1967). If blood-ties create *assibya* as the guiding principle of an Arab society, God becomes secondary. Therefore, Islam must deny and repress *assibya* and

must provide a stronger sense of group solidarity through belief in God. It is through such a belief in the laws of God, regardless of blood-ties, that is intended to produce the cohesion of a Muslim society.

A belief in God's laws is the highest form of civilization human beings can attain. Since Muhammed and his followers were the most perfect in that respect, succeeding generations do not so much progress as cycle through societal development because people are susceptible to natural laws as explicated by Ibn Khaldun. Those who followed the laws of God and who were disciples of Muhammed were strong and uninfluenced by the *assibya* of the *badawa* because their strength and restraint came from within themselves as they were guided by the reading of the Qur'an. They were not influenced by technical instruction or education imposed from without as in *hadara*. Government and educational laws which were established during the *hadara* phase destroy fortitude because they are externally imposed. Ibn Khaldun apparently leaves open the question as to whether or not belief in God can remain a permanent substitute for *assibya* when society has cycled back to its more primitive stage. Nevertheless, his ability to separate religion from his new science was an event of enormous significance to the formation of an empirical attitude toward the structure of society—an attitude that was to be brilliantly utilized in ensuing centuries by Machiavelli and Vico.

### Vico's Ricorsi

Vico believed that each nation evolved its culture independent of all others. Nations and cultures followed sequences of development which are given by discoverable universal principles. The beginning of this sequence can be understood by analysis of the language of the ancient myths of a nation.

The poems of Homer, the first coherent written record we have of the history of a Western people, represent civil history as well as catalogues of the customs of the ancient Greek people. The law of the twelve tables serves as a similar data base for the ancient Romans. Analyzing those, as Vico did, gives us a picture of the origins of society of two cultures. The common nature of human institutions can be understood by analyzing the "mental language common to all nations" (Vico, 1961, p. 25). This common mental language or common perception of reality "grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life" (Vico, 1961, p. 25) and expresses this in a number of different ways in different languages. In short, to trace the development of a word is to trace the history of an idea.

The construction of laws and the development of language accelerated the speed at which a society changed. The development of language also interacted greatly with the development of social institutions and customs. Vico concluded that the changing structure of language reflected the changing struc-

ture of thought and society. For example, human laws unattached to the idea of a divinity are unknown in the Western World. With the connection between divinity and public order, it is natural to develop the concept of a hero who combines the qualities of divine origin, strength and bravery. Vico points out that every Western nation had its Hercules.

There are three fundamental cycles of human development in Vico's view. The first he called *poetic*, the second *heroic*, and the third *human*. At the beginning of social existence, reasoning is weak among the people and form is given to society by theological pronouncements based on the group religion. Consequently, the governing body is theocratic, deriving its power from the divine and holding it by piety. Divine ceremonies prevail which give rise to government by those who understand the divine mysteries. In ancient times, these priests, are said, "to enter into the mind of God." Revelation is the manner through which God's will is understood by certain people who then interpret it for the multitude. At the familial level the father is judge. Communication through writing is by mystical signs via hieroglyphics.

When a poetic age is established it provides the basis of the next cycle of human social history. The priests of the poetic era eventually arm and think themselves to be of divine origin. They regard the plebians, who have not received the Word, to be bestial in nature. The governing body is aristocratic, with a choleric, punctilious approach to governing. Force controlled by religion is given voice by heroic blazonings as in military speech. As an example, "The blood boils in my heart" communicates anger. Universals are described by reference to myth—as Achilles is a sign for valour and Ulysses a sign for cleverness. Understanding divine mysteries as a means of constructing laws in the poetic age gives way to law by precise formula. Jurisprudence develops in a manner which carefully uses the proper words and expressions to make legal points so that the formula of the law is satisfied. In short, the letter of the law is supreme.

The final stage of human social development occurs when the plebians revolt to insure rights for themselves encompassed by the aristocratic auspices. Marriage allows property to be passed on to one's kin and assures other rights as within the aristocracy. It is then that human intellect and reason culminating in the development of rational laws takes hold. Language develops into a vulgate. Laws are developed by reason and made applicable to everyone, not simply the aristocracy. Heroic speech ("The blood boils in my heart") gives way to the vulgar ("I'm angry"). The truth of facts allows the bending of the rule of law to the equity of the cause. Science is born because reason and logic prevail.

Eventually this final stage decays as a result of its success in obtaining the goods people desire and by its reasoned laws becoming abstract, and unconnected to social reality. This decay leaves the society open to encroachment

by a group at an early stage of development. There is a returned barbarism and the cycles begin again.

A return of societal forms and sensibilities is cyclical in the manner of a moving spiral returning to its origin, but always at a different level than the previous cycle. The spiral analogue also captures the dialectical aspect of the idea of *ricorsi*—each phase creating its antithesis and ultimately the synthesis achieved at a different level. Change is categorical for Vico.

The repetition of social explanation parallels the repetition of the developmental cycles of the social group in its concrete experiences. Vico's *ricorsi* predict that Ibn Khaldun, or someone else, would have needed to explain the development of groups by utilizing the idea of cycles, and this remains one of the major differences between the two theorists. That is, Vico's is an epistemological position as well as a description of concrete, historical, social reality. The *ricorsi* are part of the way people perceive the nature of social reality and, therefore, abstractly define themselves as a result.

### *Historical Cycle*

It is in "Book Five" of the *Scienza Nuova* that Vico applies the concept of *ricorsi* in his comparison of the birth of the gentile nations with the returned barbarism of the Dark Ages. It is in this analysis that the complexity of the Vichian system compared with Ibn Khaldun's cycles is most apparent. Vico creates method by his astounding philological analysis which, whether or not his etymology is sound, prepares the way for later analysts to examine languages and the formal aspects of society in unlocking the deepest concerns of a people living together.

Each succeeding *corso* in Vico's historical account provides the seeds for the growth of the next cycle which it becomes. The entire cycle of undifferentiated vigor to organized vigor, comfortable quiescence and dissolution found in advanced societies is expected, required: intrinsic dynamics necessary to society—and yet Vico, and Ibn Khaldun before him, value more the earlier rather than the later stages of this process. Mooney (1985) notes the conflict Vico apprehends between an essentially heroic age of bold ventures with an age with too much regard for consequences.

The science of social process does not exist outside of the process itself. Social psychology and social theory in general, are moments in the process of society unlike, for example, the science of physics which is not such a moment, except in a trivial way, of the process of objects in space. The methods and concepts of social science are only abstract for convenience, not, as in physics, by necessity. This recognition of the universality and applicability of Vico's concepts to modern social science is a reasonable

analogue to an epistemological *ricorso*—as is the reference backwards in time to Ibn Khaldun.

Observation of the human social context can be characterized by an alienating distance of the observer (Gadamer, 1975) from that which is observed. This is necessary for objective analysis, but it destroys the primary relation of belonging to the group observed. The observer has, therefore, altered or eliminated his or her relationship to the group and to the historical *per se*. There results a paradox of alienation, a tension between proximity and distance which is essential to historical consciousness and which Vico embodies perhaps more than any other observer of his kind.

### *The Systems Compared*

For Vico, Cartesianism represented an intellectualism divorced from time and spirit (Caponigri, 1968) that just might be signaling the beginning degeneration of society. For Khaldun, either the decay of *assibya* or of faith in God indicated the same process. (See Table 1 for a comparison of the two systems.) For Vico it is clear that the chaos of early social life had to eventually give way to the poetic and heroic forms of societal organizations as they in turn gave way to what he called “the age of man” with its eventual excessive refinement and decay.

The concept of historical cycles is, of course, the core of the similarity between the theses of Ibn Khaldun and Vico. The idea of a cycle, with its recurring forms of social action, allows for the discovery of the universal attributes of social change. These universal attributes are abstracted from concrete social reality as it is lived and are fundamentally historical in nature in that they are revealed only by examining a society over a long period of time. Experimental methods cannot discover these universals since experiments deal only with time-bound static characteristics of observed entities (see Lana and Georgoudi, 1983, for a fuller discussion of this issue).

Besides there being historical cycles of social activity, there are, for Vico if not for Ibn Khaldun, cycles in the explanation of social reality. Vico expects change in the nature of social analysis that will parallel, in dialectical form, actual social changes. This follows from Vico's contention that language both reveals and creates the means of social self description. Language used in describing society sets the terms for change and progress in future description. The repetition of social explanation parallels the development of the group in its concrete experiences.

Ibn Khaldun's system is itself a reaction to older forms of explanation of the nature of society. Plato serves as Ibn Khaldun's conceptual adversary, as Descartes and the French *philosophes* of the Port Royale logic are Vico's.

The influence of classical Greek thought on Arab theorists during the early



Table 1

Ibn Khaldun's and Vico's Systems Compared

KHALDUN 14th Century	VICO 17th - 18th Centuries
<i>FIRST PEOPLE</i>	
<i>ARAB MUSLIMS</i> Feral, good, initially nomadic then sedentary	<i>GENTILES</i> Feral, fierce, cruel marauding and sedentary
<i>GROUP COHESION</i>	
<i>BADAWA</i> By <i>assibya</i> (group solidarity built by blood ties, alliances or clientship each weaker than the preceding,	<i>POETIC NATURE</i> By religion which aids social control through the offices of a pious clergy.
<i>HADARA</i> By law. Science and formal education flourish thereby weakening <i>assibya</i> . Single individual or family becomes very powerful.	<i>HEROIC NATURE</i> By aristocratic control. Aristocracy develops which sees itself as descendant from the Gods. People governed are initially without auspices.
	<i>HUMAN NATURE</i> By Law. Science, formal education and a sense of civil duty flourish.
<i>DECAY OF GROUP COHESION</i> By excessive stress on wealth, consumption.	<i>DECAY OF GROUP COHESION</i> By excessive stress on wealth, consumption and empty intellectual endeavors.
<i>RE-INVIGORATION</i> By conquest by more primitive neighbor in <i>badawa</i> .	<i>RE-INVIGORATION</i> By return, in a different manner, to poetic and eventually heroic forms.

Muslim era cannot be minimized. Ibn Khaldun is keenly appreciative of the Aristotelian contribution to logic and of the contribution of Plato to political and social thought. Ibn Khaldun, however, made a significant change in perspective from Plato's view of social organization as expressed in *The Republic*.

The union of political power with the love of wisdom culminating in the rational exercise of political decision is the ideal of the Platonic Republic. This rule of reason, we now understand, was possible as an ideal only for people who believed that rationality was a condition of existence itself which could be realized by an active effort of curbing passions and of self-interest. The degenerate forms of government listed by Plato—timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism—were all compromises or failures of the ideal republic based upon the known, but presumably eliminatable, foibles of human existence.

Ibn Khaldun fully recognized the impossibility of forming Plato's republic both because he believed the laws of God are closer to the truth of the way human beings should live, and because the very nature of human existence requires the cycles from *badawa* to *hadara* which are independent of rational choice. This break with the Platonic tradition is both clear and significant.

Where Ibn Khaldun provides us with descriptions of the process of societal development, Vico provides us with a method and a universal prospective on the process of societal advance and change. The method encompasses philological examination of the poetry and terms of understanding of older cultures and suggests limits to contemporary methods in social science (Lana, 1986).

Vico concluded that the Cartesian system was limited in a crucial way. This limitation is found in a conceptual area apparently ignored by Descartes: the social. While Descartes claims that error results from cycles of human explanation arising from social custom, Vico bases his system, in part, upon cycles of explanation. That is, Vico, as do contextualists in the modern era, accepted change as categorical. Descartes of course does not attempt to deal with social reality. For Vico, the history of social reality preceded and gave birth to the methods and concepts which are central to Descartes' thinking. Vico sought to supply what he perceived to be missing from Cartesian analysis. What was missing was the linguistic and philological (in the broadest sense) context from which logic, mathematics, and indeed, human sensibility are spawned. In brief, Vico's arguments are:

- (1) Mathematics and logic, although constructed by human thought, need not conform to any principle or to any natural phenomenon. They lack the same level of reality as that of empirical science.
- (2) An empirical science such as physics is concerned with the operation of objects not constructed by human thought, so objects can be known in a different way than mathematics, but incompletely (they are known only probabistically).
- (3) Social facts are both empirically observable and are constructed by humans, and hence are known in a third way different from the other two.

It is this third way of knowing that constituted Vico's *Scienza Nuova*. This new science was historical, philological, and focused particularly upon the human customs and sensibilities that developed at the dawn of particular civilizations and which therefore preceded the methods of philosophers and scientists. It is not that Vico rejected the use of mathematics, logic, and experiment in solving certain problems, but rather he attempted to provide an analysis of the social soil from which they grew.

One of the strongest similarities between Ibn Khaldun and Vico is the fact that they share belief in the mechanisms of change in the cycles. Success in

establishing social context changes human motivation and this provides the impetus, the unrest, which brings about the next cycle. Success in bringing to fruition the possibilities in each cycle requires that further successful change can only be made by ending that cycle and beginning the next.

Both theorists assume that human beings are limited in the way they can react to one another and thus develop similarly—even though one group may not actually influence another group or even have contact with it. It is these human limitations that give rise to the concept of cycles in both theories. That is, it is impossible to succeed, for example, in building a commercial city without the citizens losing a good deal of their enthusiasm for soldiering as a result. When this occurs, another cycle is already in the process of developing. Without the limitations of human reaction suggested by the idea of cycles, humans would be Gods which both Ibn Khaldun and Vico agree, is not the case.

As we have seen, Vico believes that the cycles of social change are paralleled by cycles of explanation about social change. These explanatory cycles occur because of the great difficulty in a theorist maintaining both the social distance necessary for disinterested analysis while also participating in and being sensitive to the very society he or she is attempting to describe and explain. Thus, the *ricorsi* are both historical and epistemological in nature. Vico's epistemological interest leads him to examine closely the history of jurisprudence as well as the changes in language in general over a number of historical cycles. Ibn Khaldun does not speak of cycles of societal explanation.

By the 18th century, the opposition between the logician and rhetorician reached a peak which was followed by the triumph of the rational and the submergence of the social, pre-logical aspects of human existence. One legacy of this conflict is the recent re-introduction of the concept of social context (Rosnow and Georgoudi, 1986) into social psychological theorizing which currently emphasizes contextualism in social explanation. In short, experiment and logic are juxtaposed with social context and language analysis as mutually exclusive approaches to studying the human socius.

### Conclusions

The absence of a concept such as a cycle or *ricorso* implies that explanation concerning social phenomena takes one or more of the following forms:

- (1) A social moment is unexpected and unrepeatable and can only be recorded and added to other unrelated, unrepeatable social moments such as wars, political events, etc.
- (2) A social moment is exclusively part of the biological and behavioral characteristics of the human organism and is, therefore, predictable

and potentially explainable by experimental analysis which excludes the historical (in the sense used in this paper) and, therefore, the possibility of cycles in social change.

- (3) A patterned, orderly progression of social change which allows for prediction, but without cyclical change.
- (4) Chaos. Social reality follows no discernible patterns.

Gergen (1973) has dealt with the first form, and the history of modern American social psychology encompasses forms 2 and 3. Form 4 removes us from the field of inquiry and for that reason alone is unacceptable. It is the cyclical explanation which provides us with a new, fifth possibility by reintroducing the old idea that social process, although constantly changing, returns to similar forms again and again. Forms 2 and 3 above, along with the idea of social history occurring in cycles, allow for order and universality in explaining human beings living together. These forms assume that social behavior is both orderly and that the patterns of order are knowable. The application of the techniques and concepts of experimental science to social data is the core of assumptions 2 and 3. The concept of cycles in the history of social affairs yields another possibility for discerning order in social existence.

### References

- Becker, H., and Barnes, E.H. (1952). *Social thought from lore to science*. Washington: Harren Press.
- Caponigri, A.R. (1968). *Time and idea: The theory of history in Giambattista Vico*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Gadamer, H.G. (1975). *Truth and method*. New York: Seabury.
- Gergen, K.J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 26, 309-320.
- Ibn Khaldun. (1967). *Muqaddimah: An introduction to history* (3 vols.) F. Rosenthal, [translator]. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Lana R.E. (1986). Descartes, Vico, contextualism and social psychology. In R.L. Rosnow and M. Georgoudi (Eds.), *Contextualism and understanding in behavioral sciences: Implications for research and theory* (pp. 67-85). New York: Praeger.
- Lana, R.E., and Georgoudi, M. (1983). Causal attributions: Phenomenological and dialectical aspects. *Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 4, 479-490.
- Mooney, M. (1985). *Vico and tradition of rhetoric*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Rabi, M.M. (1967). *The political theory of Ibn Khaldun*. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Rosnow, R.L. (1978). The prophetic vision of Giambattista Vico: Implications for the state of social psychological theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36, 1322-1331.
- Rosnow, R.L., and Georgoudi, M. (Eds.). (1986). *Contextualism and understanding in behavioral sciences: Implications for research and theory*, New York: Praeger.
- Schmidt, N. (1930). *Ibn Khaldun: Historian, sociologist, and philosopher*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Shotter, J. (in press). Vico, moral worlds, accountability and personhood. In P. Heelas and A.J. Lock (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: Implicit views of mind and human nature*. London: Academic Press.
- Tagliacozzo, G. (1983). *New Vico studies, 1983*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Institute for Vico Studies and Humanities Press.
- Tagliacozzo, G. (1985). *New Vico studies, 1984*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Institute for Vico Studies and Humanities Press.

Vico, G. (1961). *The new science of Giambattista Vico*. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch, [translators]. Garden City, New York: Anchor.