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**The Multiplicity of Dreams: Memory, Imagination and Consciousness.** Harry T. Hunt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, 272 pages, \$27.50 hard.

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While at first glance, it may appear atypical and perhaps inappropriate to begin a book review by briefly reviewing a previously published work of another author, this seeming incongruence is, in fact, only apparently inappropriate. In a chapter from an edited book critiquing cognition and dream research in which I focused (Haskell, 1986) on the uneasy relationship between mainstream cognitive psychology and dream research, I mainly critiqued Foulkes' (1985) work because, I suggested, he had "become a kind of spokesperson for the mainstream approach to cognitive research as it applies to the study of dreaming" (p. 17). Indeed, Foulkes' book has remained the most cogently theoretical and elegantly reasoned exemplar of the mainstream cognitive psychology laboratory approach to the study of dreaming.

In that chapter, I did not systematically critique the opposing school of thought to Foulkes' position, the non-mainstream, phenomenological perspective on dream research. The reason for the omission was that, as I indicated at that time, "to date there is no single systematically obverse equivalent to Foulkes' work" (p. 17). With the publication of Hunt's *The Multiplicity of Dreams*, there is now a systematically obverse equivalent to Foulkes.

These two books, Foulkes' *Dreaming: A Cognitive-Psychological Analysis*, and Hunt's *The Multiplicity of Dreams*, stand as the twin peaks of analysis and theory in the cognitive psychology of dream research; both are formidable overviews of the most cardinal issues in the field; each is generated by different cognitive style, and epistemology.

I find Hunt's opus a virtual tour de force for the non-mainstream, phenomenological approach; I find it exciting and refreshing, creative, and often brilliantly reasoned. While Hunt's basic orientation is phenomenological, he is also a laboratory researcher. In large measure it is Hunt's attempted fusion of these two levels that gives the book its depth and force. He cogently roams over nearly the entire landscape of dream research, citing data and critiquing findings and conclusions from issues in REM research, dreams and meaning, whether animals dream, whether dreams are memory based or imagination based, cultural forms of dreams, and more. He then concludes with a theory not only of dreaming, but a theory of mind as a cross-modal, synesthetic process.

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According to Hunt, the mind, and therefore dreaming is not generated from a singular deep structure computational code; rather mind and dreams are generated from a top down functioning, that apparently operates on an interactive synesthetic *sensus communis*. I certainly have no problem with this interpretation of some available data, since I have suggested a similar theoretical position (Haskell, 1987, 1989). However, there is nothing to preclude a more primitive or abstract base underlying this middle-range theory (indeed, as Pribram's work suggests). Admittedly, Hunt does a first rate job of supporting and arguing his thesis.

There is one underlying aspect of Hunt's book, however, that I find disturbing. But this is to be expected. It is a broad ranging, first attempt that cannot be expected to fulfill an ideal. Notwithstanding that it is much easier to critique a work than it is to write one, the major disturbing feature is the book's off-handed identification and adherence to a so-called "post modern," "deconstructionist" epistemology currently popular in Europe and in some literary and rhetorical circles in the United States. As the so-called post-modern, deconstructionist view pertains to Hunt's approach, he says, "dream research stands as an object lesson in the necessary relativism and perspective of the human sciences" (p. 4). Hunt argues—in a "pre" post modern anthropological manner—that there is no "single truth about dreams" (p. 65); and that "dreaming has no fixed function" (p. 76). In an apparent parallel to Gardner's (1983) book on *Frames of Mind*, where intelligence is not considered to be a unitary phenomena, Hunt accordingly argues, as the title *The Multiplicity of Dreams* implies, that dreams have no singular deep-structure generational base.

Reading Hunt, one gets the impression that he all too easily accepts an anthropological relativism, and quite reflexively applies it to the dream process. Again, Hunt says, "In the mist of a postmodern rejection of all conceptual absolutes, dreams . . . deny any single fixed . . . underlying structure" (p. 208). It is one thing, however, to suggest that the meaning (or interpretation) of dreams is varied and relative, it is quite another to suggest that the dreaming *process* and the generational base of the imagery in dreams is not grounded in a fundamental code.

Certainly cultural relativism is empirically difficult—though not conceptually impossible—to argue against. One such argument is that raising relativism to an absolute is self contradictory: if all knowledge is culturally conditioned then so, too, is the notion of relativism culturally conditioned. Indeed, from the social-construction-of-knowledge point of view, it is perhaps no accident that a multiplicity-of-dreams perspective should become popular (a) in a politically democratic society, where absolutes are anathema, (b) in an increasingly ethnically pluralistic society where all views are popularly considered to be of equal value, (c) in a pop-culture psychology where increasing books on multiple personality are published, and (d) in a cognitive psychology zeitgeist where books like *Frames of Mind* deny a unitary core to intelligence. It follows from this context that just as there is a cultural pluralistic array of views and perspectives not generated by a common source, so too, are forms of dreams an array, with no common generative core. Hence, *The Multiplicity of Dreams*.

As in cognitive psychology research, so too in dream research. In the field of cognitive psychology the equivalent of the absolute versus relativism issue rages. There is the propositional/computational versus representational/imaginal views of the cognitive process. The former view holds that phenomenological data are like a surface array on a cathode ray tube, with the array being generated by a more abstract (neural) code; the latter view holds that there is basically only the surface array. Hunt clearly, but not quite so simplistically, belongs to the latter position (Foulkes to the former). Indeed, Hunt tackles this problem in his book, but does not resolve the issue. It is not resolved, in fact, because, as I suggested in a previous work (Haskell, 1986), "much

of the controversy in dream research seems to result from a lack of awareness regarding levels of analysis in scientific research" (p. 19).

In arguing the computational versus representational issue, Hunt—quite admirably—brings together data from many levels of analysis, but is not careful to make the appropriate distinctions among those levels, probably because he only briefly alludes to "levels of analysis" (p. 32) and concludes that "The only rule seems to be 'catch as catch can.'" The multiplicity of a post modern stance, not only in dream research but in other areas as well, I find a much too easy intellectual position, not to mention highly inelegant, theoretically. To "catch as catch can," while certainly consistent with a pluralistic-post-modern relativism, does not portend well for logical, theoretical, or operational rigor. But Hunt is not to be overly faulted for his post modern stance; it is nevertheless important to understand the epistemological context from which his work emerges.

The implicit power of this post modern view insinuates itself further. In justifying an attempt to construct an initial dream classification system, Hunt correctly points out that "Dream psychology, in haste for its own Darwin, has bypassed the necessary foundations of a Linnaeus" (p. 97). Indeed, picking up on Hunt's passage, Ernest Hartmann, a dream researcher of impeccable stature, says of Hunt (on the jacket of Hunt's book) that "Hunt can stake a claim to being the Linnaeus of Dreams." Clearly Hunt's book is a major work, but a Linnaeus classification system of dreams it is not. Hunt does discuss some current types of dreams, i.e., archetypal, titanic, culture pattern, etc., but with a couple of quite minor exceptions there are no genus-species relationships, as a Linnaean system would demand. If such a classification did exist, however, it would be congruent with Hunt's phenomenological-multiplicity perspective, with such a Linnaean system lacking a deep computational generative structure. In any event, it is unclear whether dream research needs a Linnaeus or even a Darwin as much as it needs a Mendel, or more importantly a Watson or Crick. *The Multiplicity of Dreams* seems based on a metaphor of Darwinian speciation, detached from its genetic (DNA) base.

*The Multiplicity of Dreams* contains a multiplicity of clearly stated issues. But more importantly, it advances an interesting phenomenological theory of dreaming based on cross-model synesthesia. It is a significant work that will undoubtedly elicit a multiplicity of responses.

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