

Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity

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Searle restricted intrinsic intentionality (intentional contents, aspectual shapes) to occurrent neurophysiological states that are conscious in the sense that their owner has awareness of them when they occur; all occurrent nonconscious states of the brain have, at most, a derivative intentionality by reliably producing, unless obstructed, conscious intentional states. The grounds for thus restricting intrinsic intentionality are explored, and traced to Searle's conviction that aspectual shapes (intentional contents) must be "manifest" whenever actually exemplified by an instance of any mental brain-occurrence. By "manifest," Searle seems to mean that aspectual shapes must be not only contents but also, at the same time, objects of the very states whose contents they are. This is accomplished due to the self-intimating character of all conscious states, that is, their individually including awareness of the state itself. The question is why manifestation in this sense is necessary for an occurrent mental state to possess intentionality. Why cannot an occurrent (nonconscious) mental state possess intentionality without also "manifesting" the aspectual shape that it exemplifies? If contents (including aspectual shapes) depend for existence on the individual's being aware, why must this be inner rather than outer awareness? Why can the essential awareness not be awareness of something outside the mental state, rather than awareness of the state's intentional content itself? Outer awareness should be able to accomplish in this regard all that inner awareness can accomplish.

In an article entitled "Ontological Subjectivity," I recently discussed certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity (Natsoulas, 1991a). These are the relations that John R. Searle has lately been calling to our attention with the highly ambitious purpose of inducing a major reorientation of cognitive science. Searle (1989, 1990a) has been arguing, *inter alia*, that some occurrent (mental) neurophysiological states possess irreducibly subjective features. In considering Searle's views, I distinguished, therefore, between "objective neurophysiological features" and "subjective neurophysiological features." By an irreducibly subjective feature, Searle

means that *no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the individual and his or her brain and behavior could possibly result in a description of this feature except by a process of inference that depends on having firsthand acquaintance with this feature* (Searle, 1990a, pp. 587–588).

Of course, not all features of a mental brain-occurrence are irreducibly subjective, since mental brain-occurrences are brain occurrences in the usual sense that involves neuronal impulses. Our brains and the brains of many animals are characterized by both objective neurophysiological features and entirely distinct subjective neurophysiological features. Thus, Searle would seem to be advocating a kind of property dualism though, as will be seen, Searle has vigorously objected to such a categorization of his view.

Some brain occurrences with irreducibly subjective features are the conscious intentional states on which Searle's numerous discussions of the mental have focused. This category of mental states includes perceptual experiences, thoughts, and intentions. Other brain occurrences that also possess irreducibly subjective features are mental states that lack intentionality. Examples of occurrent nonintentional mental states are "nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety" (Searle, 1983, p. 1). In contrast to intentional states, a nonintentional mental state is neither about nor could be about anything beyond itself.

Except at one point in the final section of the present article, I have not put to use, in the present article or in its predecessor, the distinction between intentional and nonintentional mental states, because nonintentional mental states do not figure in Searle's recent and most relevant articles. However, I understand that Searle will be returning to nonintentional mental states, as well as intentional mental states, in a forthcoming book. And, in a recent article on Sigmund Freud's conception of consciousness, I have myself given some attention to certain mental states that are purportedly lacking in all cognitive content (Natsoulas, 1992). I argued that a view of inner awareness like Freud's, according to which any conscious mental state bodily includes immediate awareness of it, implies that no conscious state lacks all intentionality and cognitive content; whether intentional or nonintentional, a conscious state is always at least in part about itself.

My previous discussion of Searle and ontological subjectivity was based especially on two of his recent articles (Searle, 1989, 1990a) as well as on a number of his other publications (Searle, 1980a, 1980b, 1983, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1990b). After my previous article was in press, Searle (1990c) published "Who Is Computing with the Brain?" Thus, we now happily have Searle's responses to more than thirty commentaries on Searle (1990a) by biologists, linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and others. These exchanges between Searle and his critics provide me with additional material that is useful for elaborating and clarifying my discussion in "Ontological

Subjectivity." The present article is a sequel to that article and draws on the recently published material in order further to pursue discussion of Searle's views on intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity.

This discussion is worth pursuing for, among other reasons, the following reason that Searle (1990a) expressed:

If you come to cognitive science, psychology, or the philosophy of mind with an innocent eye, the first thing that strikes you is how little serious attention is paid to consciousness. Few people in cognitive science think that the study of the mind is essentially or in large part a matter of studying conscious phenomena, consciousness is rather a "problem," a difficulty that functionalist or computationalist theories must somehow deal with. Now, how did we get into this mess? How can we have neglected the most important feature of the mind in those disciplines that are officially dedicated to its study? (p. 585; cf. Searle, 1984, p. 16)

Searle wants to rectify what, I agree, is a very unfortunate situation. Searle believes that, with his highly critical approach, he might help to return consciousness to its rightful centrality in the study of the mind. He believes that he may help to accomplish this result notwithstanding the fact that he is adopting and urging others to adopt *a much narrower conception of the mental than currently prevails in psychology and allied fields*. Although Searle would object to my expressing his view as follows, it is nevertheless true that Searle's conception of the mental eliminates all occurrent mental states other than those that are "self-intimating" (see Natsoulas [1988, 1989a]; term borrowed from Ryle [1949]). In effect, Searle *rejects the existence of all instances of "consciousness"—in the sense of someone's being occurrently aware of something—that are not, individually, immediate awarenesses of themselves as well*. (See Natsoulas [1983, 1986–1987] for relevant distinction between concepts of consciousness₃ and consciousness₄.)

Here is another way of putting the same point: in Searle's view, any purportedly nonconscious mental state is, at most, a purely neurophysiological state, that is, an occurrent state that lacks all intrinsic mental features (cf. Dulany, 1984, 1991). Searle would object to how I am expressing his view because he insists on saying that certain purely neurophysiological states, too, are intentional states, because, unless obstructed, these nonmental, purely neurophysiological states reliably cause really intentional conscious states to occur.

Whether or not one supports Searle's effort, one must acknowledge that his is a very courageous undertaking. Searle is opposing a strongly entrenched and widespread orthodoxy; and, evidently, Searle is challenging a great number of people all on his own. However, I have doubts that the way to improve the status of consciousness in the study of mind is to argue, as Searle has argued, that the great majority of researchers in that field have not been, a great deal of the time, actually treating of the mental since they have not been treating of conscious intentional states.

Of course, Searle contends that only occurrent conscious states possess real intentionality; thus, his advice to psychologists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists is not arbitrary. But I shall argue that Searle's grounds for restricting real intentionality, as he has stated these grounds, require much more work to be rendered plausible. In the meantime, those who agree with Searle concerning the neglect and importance of consciousness must proffer other reasons, than the coextension of the conscious and the mental, for the return of consciousness to its rightful place in the study of mind (see, e.g., Marcel [1988]; Natsoulas [in press-a]).

A number of the commentators on Searle (1990a) questioned in various ways Searle's notion of consciousness. In his response to this category of criticism, Searle (1990c) in effect combined at least three ordinary concepts of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1983, 1986–1987); thus, the following three items might be called three dimensions of Searle's (1990c) explicit concept of consciousness.

1. "By consciousness I simply mean those subjective states of awareness or sentience that begin when one wakes . . . and continue until one falls into a dreamless sleep, into a coma, or dies" (p. 635).

2. "Once conscious, the system functions like a rheostat, and there can be an indefinite range of different degrees of consciousness, ranging from the drowsiness before one falls asleep to the full blown complete alertness of the obsessive" (p. 635).

3. "We know our conscious mental states . . . but the . . . distinction between the act of perceiving and the object perceived . . . cannot in general be made for our conscious states" (p. 635).

Thus, it would seem that by consciousness, Searle means, *first*, individual occurrent conscious mental states, such as thoughts, visual experiences, feelings, desires, intentions, and so on, which take place during dreaming, for example, or during full blown waking alertness, drowsiness, meditation, alcoholic intoxication, or during many other general states of consciousness (and "unconsciousness," as we sometimes say, dreaming being considered an example of the latter kind of general state; see Natsoulas [1983, pp. 47–53]).

These general states correspond, as I see it, to the system's general operating modes, and not simply to the system's "degrees of consciousness." The system functions more intensely in the fully alert obsessive person but, also, it functions differently than it does during the same person's general state of drowsiness (cf. O'Shaughnessy, 1972). I believe that Searle means by consciousness, *second*, these different general states of the system's functioning. (Cf. sections of Natsoulas [1983, 1986–1987] on concepts of consciousness₃, consciousness₄, and consciousness₆.)

Also, Searle has in mind, *third*, the property of consciousness that conscious mental states individually possess, the property that gives to the per-

son immediate, direct, nonperceptual awareness of any conscious mental state, and that distinguishes conscious mental states from nonconscious mental states (assuming, contrary to Searle, that the latter exist [cf. Smith, 1989]). As Rosenthal (1990) stated, "Despite connections between them, what it is for [an occurrent mental] state to be conscious is distinct from what it is for a creature to be conscious" (p. 622).

In the present article, I shall say nothing more about the second of these three concepts or dimensions of consciousness, that is, about general states of consciousness, or the system's various general modes of functioning. My reason is that I am concerned in the present article with the consciousness and subjectivity and intentionality that, according to Searle, distinguishes individual occurrent conscious states, such as thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences, from other individual neurophysiological occurrences. I am not concerned here with how the mind functions when dreaming, versus when fully awake and alert to the environment, versus when meditating, and so on, because such analyses and comparisons have not been the context of Searle's considerations of intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity. However, the first and third dimensions of Searle's (1990c) explicit concept of consciousness, namely (a) occurrent awareness of something or that something is the case, and (b) inner awareness of one's occurrent conscious mental state, will indeed receive further attention here because they are directly relevant to Searle's main thesis about our mental life.

A "Naive" View of Nonconscious Intentional States?

Judging from the commentaries on Searle (1990a), Searle (1990c) acknowledged that the views he had presented for criticism (Searle, 1990a) were difficult to understand and required a clearer statement. By way of clarification, he stated, for example, the following:

When my mental states are conscious, the nature and role of aspectual shape is reasonably clear Most of my intentional states are unconscious most of the time, however. They continue to exist even when unconscious, and furthermore, they sometimes even cause my behavior when they are unconscious. (p. 633)

But readers with some knowledge of Searle on intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity may well find this passage surprising. Understandably, they may take the passage to imply that *the same intentional state is sometimes occurrent and conscious and sometimes occurrent and nonconscious*. Some readers may well have thought, instead, that, according to Searle, an intentional state can either occur consciously or has, merely, the potential to occur consciously but can never occur nonconsciously; *a conscious intentional state that is not now occurring has, at most, only potential existence and never has an occur-*

rent *nonconscious existence* (cf. Dulany, 1984, 1991). The latter is the view I ascribed to Searle (Natsoulas, 1991a).

Searle (1990a) himself called "naive" the alternative view that the same intentional state can occur either consciously or nonconsciously. At one point, Searle wrongly attributed this alternative view to Sigmund Freud (see Natsoulas [1985]). Searle (1990a) stated, "Pretheoretically, I believe most people follow Freud in thinking that an unconscious mental state has exactly the same shape it has when conscious" (p. 586). In the above quoted passage, however, Searle (1990c, p. 633) seems to be saying, similarly to those who hold the "naive" view, that a conscious intentional state often continues to exist (or it recurs) as a nonconscious intentional state, and may have behavioral effects in both its conscious and nonconscious occurrent actualizations. This further suggests, correctly or not, that, in Searle's view, not only is it true that nonconscious intentional states each possess "an aspectual shape"; it is true, as well, that nonconscious intentional states each possess "an aspectual shape" in the same sense and in the same way as conscious intentional states each possess "an aspectual shape." That is, *there is only one property called by Searle "having an aspectual shape," and this same property characterizes both conscious intentional states and nonconscious intentional states.*

Is this a correct understanding of Searle? Indeed, Searle (1990a) had emphasized, "*Intrinsic intentional states, whether conscious or unconscious, always have aspectual shapes*" (p. 587). Every intentional state, whether conscious or nonconscious, has as an essential feature a particular "aspectual shape:" "Whenever we perceive anything or think about anything [etc.], it is always under some aspects and not others that we perceive or think [etc.] about that thing" (p. 587). The aspectual shape of a mental state is the same property as has been called the intentional or cognitive or semantic or representative content of a mental state.

Indeed, Searle (1990a, 1990c) appears to be saying that both conscious and nonconscious intentional states are intrinsically intentional. Thus, the property of consciousness (i.e., an intentional state's being conscious as opposed to its being nonconscious) appears not to be a requirement for an intentional state's possessing an aspectual shape as an essential feature in a single unequivocal sense of aspectual shape. However, as will be seen below, despite appearances, the latter is not Searle's position. Given Searle's actual position, *it is misleading for Searle to speak of nonconscious intentional states, to say that any nonconscious state of the brain is intrinsically intentional, or to say that a nonconscious state of the brain possesses aspectual shape.* Searle (1990c) has not changed his view from the one I mentioned in the introduction to this article. He still holds what I called above the alternative to the "naive" view.

In their commentary, Zelazo and Reznick (1990) invited Searle to adopt a more consistent usage: that is, no longer to refer to any nonconscious state as

intrinsically intentional. However, Searle (1990c) resisted their suggestion, calling it “fascinating” and equivalent to “the Cartesian idea that the conscious and the mental are coextensive” (p. 639). Searle explained that he wants to be able to say that someone still possesses a particular belief at those times when he or she has no conscious thoughts or other occurrent mental states that correspond to the belief. But Searle admitted the issue is terminological, which was tantamount to saying that Zelazo and Reznick are right. Those neurophysiological states Searle invokes as causes of conscious intentional states are intrinsically nonintentional except for purposes of terminological convenience.

Can Nonconscious States “Burst Out” In Behavior?

That Searle adopts the “naive” view of nonconscious intentional states—that nonconscious intentional states are “just the same as conscious [intentional] states only minus the consciousness” (Searle, 1990a, p. 586)—may also be suggested by another aspect of Searle’s discussion. Searle (1990c) admitted nonconscious states, as well as the conscious, can “burst out” in behavior.

Searle (1990c) responded with agreement to Dreyfus (1990) and other commentators who argued for the behavioral causal efficacy of nonconscious intentional states. Dreyfus (1990) gave the example of Bill who, at a family dinner, “‘accidentally’ spills a glass of water into brother Bob’s lap because, as Bill’s therapist tells him later, he has an unconscious desire to annoy Bob” (p. 604). Since Searle (1990c) accepted such cases as *actual cases of nonconscious intentional states’ causing behavior directly (i.e., not through producing or affecting conscious intentional states)*, they must be instances of Searle’s “intentional causation.” Here is how Searle (1990c) explained the distinct character of intentional causation:

This level of causation, though realized in the physical system and, in that sense, physical itself, is nonetheless different from other forms of physical causation. For example, the actual intentional or semantic content of the mental state can function causally in the production of the very state of affairs that it represents; it can cause its own conditions of satisfaction. Thus, for example, my desire to drink can cause my drinking. (p. 633)

In the example, it is supposed that the unconscious desire to upset Bob causes Bill’s behavior of spilling water on Bob in the same sense of “causes” as Searle’s desire to drink causes Searle’s behavior of drinking. That is, the unconscious desire’s particular aspectual shape functions to produce the unconsciously motivated behavior.

Thus, Searle (1990c) again appears to have been implying that nonconscious intentional states differ from conscious ones not with respect to the

property of intentionality, but only with respect to the property of consciousness. This is the “naive” view. *If nonconscious intentional states can “burst out” in the form not simply of some sort of bodily reaction, but in the form of behavior in the sense of the individual’s doing something, then the nonconscious intentional states, no less than conscious intentional states, must literally and intrinsically possess aspectual shapes.* As Dreyfus (1990) put this point, Bill’s bodily movements are a case of Bill’s spilling water on Bob, and not simply a case in which Bill’s movements happen to produce a relocation in the environment of certain molecules of H₂O. If it is held, instead, that what caused Bill’s bodily movements were certain nonintentional brain occurrences, certain brain occurrences that did not possess actual aspectual shapes, then Bill’s movements cannot be construed as behavior, any more than the movements of a tree produced by the wind can be construed as behavior.

Therefore, it may give one pause to read an earlier remark of Searle’s (1990a, p. 590) to the effect that the nervous system’s functioning to produce conscious intentionality is not an instance of intentional causation. However, this remark expresses well Searle’s consistent view, which is that no nonconscious state possesses intrinsic intentionality. The interpretation of unconsciously motivated behavior as such—that is, as a case of the intentional causation of behavior by nonconscious intentional states—does not correspond to Searle’s consistent view. Searle’s (1990c) admission of Dreyfus’s example as an actual case of intentional causation requires a fundamental change in Searle’s conception of the mental, a change that Searle (1990c) has not yet made as of his latest publication. Truly to countenance Dreyfus’s example, Searle must recognize nonconscious intentional states that are intentional not only in a derivative causal sense.

“Subjective But Unconscious Mental Events”

It is not correct to represent Searle’s view as equivalent to the “naive” view. Searle does not really recognize intrinsically intentional nonconscious states. Nonconscious intentional states would have to possess aspectual shapes in the same way as conscious intentional states do. Such occurrent states would have to possess aspectual shape as an essential feature, whether or not they are causing behavior or conscious intentional states at the time.

Despite a number of misleading statements, Searle (1990c) did not postulate nonconscious intentional states, except in a clearly derivative sense. That is, their intentionality is not intrinsic to them but is one of their causal properties. *So-called nonconscious intentional states are only derivatively intentional in that they reliably cause (unless obstructed) really intentional states to occur.* The intentionality of nonconscious intentional states is no more the real thing than the intentionality—if anyone would call it that—of stimulus

energy fluxes that produce perceptual awarenesses (which, of course, do possess real intentionality).

To emphasize his rejection of aspectual shapes' belonging to nonconscious states on their own, independently of their effects, Searle (1990c) found it useful to criticize Sigmund Freud for adopting a different view:

When a state is totally unconscious, the only phenomena occurring right then and there are neurophysiological events in neurophysiological architecture. On my reading of Freud, he denies this very point. He apparently thought that subjective but unconscious mental events were going on in addition to any neurophysiological occurrences that might also be going on. I think this amounts to a form of dualism, and I believe it represents an abandonment of his earlier project of a scientific psychology. (p. 634)

Searle will seem to be suggesting that Freud's unconscious mental events are not neurophysiological. This would not be fair to Freud, who was a materialist (Natsoulas, 1984; see next section).

Searle's criticism of Freud rests on Searle's own requirement that, for aspectual shape literally to exist, it must exist relative to the unique first-person (subjective) perspective on the respective mental state. As I discussed in "Ontological Subjectivity," Searle clearly considers aspectual shape to be an irreducibly subjective feature of mental brain-occurrences (Natsoulas, 1991a). Therefore, Searle must reject any intentional states that are nonconscious and that, at the same time, literally possess an aspectual shape—as only conscious intentional states are supposed to do; only conscious states involve the first-person (subjective) perspective on them.

The reference by Searle to "subjective but unconscious mental events" requires comment. Searle's characterization of Freud's unconscious mental events as subjective is misleading, though I understand why Searle so characterized them: according to Freud, unconscious mental events possess aspectual shapes; and, for Searle, aspectual shapes are subjective because intentionality is inseparable from consciousness and subjectivity. There is no unconscious subjectivity, Searle would say. And Freud's view is "dualistic" because Searle, not Freud, requires any truly mental occurrent states to stand in the very same relation—object of privileged first-person apprehension—to its owner as do conscious mental states. Thus, the introduction of "subjective but unconscious mental events" would imply a dual subjectivity—two independent first-person perspectives in the one person, perhaps a homunculus as the subject of the unconscious events. As Dulany (1991) objected:

So when *we* don't search, compare, infer, and decide, if all those things are done outside our awareness, who does them? Who in particular would interpret those unconscious representations? There is nobody home but us—unless some unsensed homuncular agent, the embodiment of those mental episodes, does all those things for us. (p. 105)

However, according to Freud, nonconscious mental states *do not possess phenomenal quality*, and the person whose nonconscious mental states they are *does not have inner awareness of them* (cf. Smith, 1989). *Nor is there any kind of inner awareness of them by anything or anyone*. Therefore, how are they subjective? On what grounds, besides their each having a particular aspectual shape, does Searle call Freud's occurrent nonconscious mental states subjective? It should be hard to see how Freud's nonconscious intentional states can be considered subjective—except for the following good reason, which I believe Searle did not have in mind.

In my view, Freud's nonconscious intentional states and all occurrent mental states are products (and small parts of) large mental-physiological processes (e.g., thinking, willing, desiring, and the reflective varieties of each of these; Natsoulas [1989c] on the visual activity of "reflective seeing"). These large processes ultimately constitute the subject of those nonconscious mental states and all other occurrent mental states (Natsoulas, 1991b; cf. Dulany [1991] on the person as embodiment of "mental episodes"). Thus, the Freudian unconscious wish has a subject, namely, the person who wishes unconsciously—and not a second subject of consciousness, a distinct subject of Freud's nonconscious mental states. The Freudian unconscious wish is subjective in the sense that it has a subject no less than conscious wishing has a subject; but no homunculus (Searle, 1990a, p. 590) is needed for unconscious wishing, any more than a homunculus for conscious wishing. In conscious wishing, the person has inner awareness of wishing a certain wish, expressible as "would that such and such were so." In unconsciously wishing, there is no inner awareness of a certain wish that the person is no less wishing. *Wishing is personal in that it requires someone who is wishing, but it does not require someone who has inner awareness of the particular wish that he or she is wishing.*

Thus, I think of nonconscious wishes as personal in the sense of their having a subject, but also as impersonal in the sense of their making no mental reference to the person who is wishing, except as the state of affairs wished for includes the subject. The wished-for state of affairs need not include the subject of the wish—as, for example, in the case of a nonconscious wish that a certain other person were dead (with no specification of his or her mode of dying, which might require the subject take necessary action).

Smith (1989) thinks of nonconscious wishes differently than I do. He thinks of them as personal in two senses. They have a subject and they give their subject *a minimal acquaintance with himself or herself*; that is, nonconscious wishes, as well as conscious wishes, possess *a minimal egocentric modal character that is sufficient for acquaintance with oneself*. Nevertheless, in Smith's view, nonconscious wishes do not include inner awareness of themselves and a reflexive phenomenological character. Reflexive content is the necessary phenomenological concomitant of inner awareness; that is, with

inner awareness, there occurs mental reference to oneself as the subject of the wish. This mental reference is grounded on the minimal self-acquaintance or egocentric modal character that, according to Smith, both conscious and nonconscious wishes possess.

Of course, all talk of nonconscious phenomenological contents would be considered self-contradictory by Searle (cf. Dulany, 1984, 1991). As I shall later express Searle's view in this regard, *actual aspectual shape cannot but be manifest; there is no aspectual shape except from a point of view, from a perspective on it.*

A few paragraphs back, I mentioned that, for Searle, real intentionality is inseparable from consciousness and subjectivity. In his commentary on Searle (1990c), Rosenthal (1990) objected that, since both aspectual shape and consciousness are properties of conscious intentional states, which are neurophysiological states, why cannot a neurophysiological state have an aspectual shape without also being conscious? I shall address this point in the final section, urging that Searle should give an adequate reason.

Who is a Dualist?

It is somewhat disconcerting to find Searle calling anyone a dualist for the reason that he called Freud a dualist. Look again near the start of the preceding section at the quoted passage in which Searle (1990c, p. 634) did so. Does not Searle himself think that subjective conscious mental events "are going on in addition to any neurophysiological occurrences that might also be going on" (Searle, 1990c, p. 634)? Does this claim by Searle make him a dualist? All by itself it does not, because subjective conscious mental events are occurrent neurophysiological states, as well as being mental states. Searle (1990a, p. 596) stated that his contrast between mental and neurophysiological occurrences is like contrasting humans and animals with no implication that humans are not animals.

But so, too, did Freud consider to be mental brain-occurrences the non-conscious intentional states that he introduced. Also, as I have pointed out, these nonconscious mental states are not, for Freud, "subjective" in the full sense that Searle means when Searle says conscious intentional states are subjective. According to Freud, there is no unconscious subjectivity in Searle's sense of subjectivity. In fact, Freud repeatedly attacked as incoherent the notion of a second consciousness, which others had proposed (e.g., James, 1890; see Natsoulas [1989a]).

Later, Searle (1990c) stated that he can no longer use words like *materialism* and *dualism* "with a straight face" (p. 639; cf. Searle, 1984, p. 14). This produces uncertainty regarding what Searle meant about Freud's view of nonconscious intentional states when Searle (1990c) stated, "I think this

amounts to a form of dualism, and I believe it represents an abandonment of his earlier project of a scientific psychology" (p. 634). If dualism is an inappropriate, even laughable, category to apply to Searle's introduction of irreducibly subjective properties into a biological system, then is not dualism an inappropriate category to apply to Freud's introducing nonsubjective (in Searle's sense of subjective) nonconscious intentional states into a biological system?

Uleman and Uleman (1990), among others, suggested that Searle's mind-body position may be in fact, though not in intention, a kind of dualism. They wondered "whether aspectual shapes aren't just the sort of ethereal apparition that commits Searle to a dualism that he wants to avoid" (p. 628). Along the same lines, I argued in "Ontological Subjectivity" that Searle would seem to be conceiving of aspectual shape as purely apparential—in the same sense that a hallucinated fire-breathing dragon is purely apparential. That is, *there is nothing more to either an aspectual shape or a fire-breathing dragon than how they seem, no distinction between appearance and reality in the case of either of them*. But Searle holds that only aspectual shapes exist and have effects, not fire-breathing dragons, despite aspectual shapes' being purely apparential like fire-breathing dragons (Natsoulas, 1991a).

One has to wonder how Searle will explain the causal role of something that has no reality beyond its appearance. For aspectual shape itself is supposed to function causally (intentional causation). Perhaps Searle's emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity in this connection derives from his thinking that *he needs consciousness to make aspectual shape "work."* A nonconscious aspectual shape would be one about which, ordinarily, the individual would not normally know, and the individual could not base his or her actions on it. If aspectual shape is conceived of *as purely apparential and having its effects due to inner awareness of it, and not independently of inner awareness of it*, then perhaps its being purely apparential is not a problem for Searle. Of course, in that case, Searle would not have the option of assigning aspectual shape to nonconscious states to allow intentional causation without consciousness. As I noted in the context of Bill's unconsciously motivated spilling of water, Searle seems, for reasons that are not clear, to want to allow intentional causation without consciousness.

"Aspectual Shape Manifest as Aspectual Shape"

In his response to those many commentators, Searle (1990c) used the notion of an aspectual shape's "manifesting" itself. For example, against Freud, Searle (1990c) stated, "No sense can be attached to the notion that aspectual shape can be both manifest as aspectual shape and yet totally unconscious" (p. 634). For Searle, if an aspectual shape literally characterizes an intentional state, then the aspectual shape of the intentional state must

be "manifest." In fact, aspectual shape would seem to exist only in the form of being manifested; aspectual shape seems to be a kind of manifestation. What does this "manifestation" amount to? Searching for a handle, as we say, I think of Freud's concept of a mental state's intrinsic consciousness. Is Searle's concept of manifestation analogous or equivalent to intrinsic consciousness or, at least, to certain dimensions of Freud's intrinsic consciousness?

According to Freud, there is no inner awareness of any nonconscious (pre-conscious or unconscious) mental state. The person does have such inner awareness, necessarily, if his or her mental state possesses qualitiveness; but no nonconscious mental state possesses qualitiveness, according to Freud. In this sense, a mental state's qualitiveness must be "manifest" to the person; that is, a qualitative mental state is "present to the mind" in its qualitative dimensions and the person has conscious inner awareness of the mental state, including awareness of its qualities and of its aspectual shape (Natsoulas, 1989b, pp. 620–623). (For Freud, what applies to qualities does not apply to aspectual shape: nonconscious mental states possess aspectual shapes; consciousness is not a requirement for aspectual shape.)

Perhaps, aspectual shapes, in Searle's book, necessarily must be manifest analogously to qualitiveness's being necessarily manifest according to Freud (cf. Smith, 1989). *Qualitiveness is a kind of "appearing"—which requires that it somehow "appear" to someone. Perhaps, analogously, an aspectual shape is a kind of "meaning"—which requires that it "mean" to someone.* In that case, contrary to Rosenthal (1990) on Searle (1990a), consciousness in the sense of the inner awareness that one has of one's conscious mental states may be of help to Searle in explaining aspectual shape. We need to look more closely at Searle's notion of the manifestation of aspectual shape.

Negative Characterization of Manifestation

1. Searle (1990c) tells us that unconsciously motivated behavior "does not wear its aspectual shape on its sleeve" (p. 634); that is, we have to *interpret* this behavior in terms of unconscious mental states and their aspectual shapes. The fact that we perceive this behavior or any behavior as such, as something that someone does or is doing, does not mean that the behavior manifests an aspectual shape. Accordingly, manifestation is not, so to speak, in the eye of the beholder, but is more intimately related to an aspectual shape.

2. Searle also tells us that when nonconscious intentional states "burst out in the form of unconsciously motivated behavior . . . there is no aspectual shape manifested then and there" (p. 634). This behavior can serve as reason for believing in the occurrence and efficacy of a nonconscious intentional state, but neither the behavior's occurrence nor the unconscious intentional state's occurrence is a manifestation of aspectual shape. For that matter, nei-

ther unconsciously motivated behavior nor the postulated unconscious states that explain the behavior literally possess aspectual shapes. Therefore, nothing of the aspectual-shape kind exists then and there that could manifest itself. Of course, Bill may be having various conscious mental states at the same time as he "accidentally" spills water on Bob, but these conscious mental states are not causing the unconsciously motivated behavior—as I understand Dreyfus's description of his example, which Searle accepted as a genuine case. These conscious states, the intentional ones among them, will manifest aspectual shapes according to Searle.

3. Nor is our being conscious of a nonconscious intentional state, in the sense of making inferences about it or of thinking about it, a case of its aspectual shape's manifesting itself. Searle (1990c) responded partly as follows to Block (1990) and others who suggested that the nonconscious states cognitive scientists postulate can be objects of consciousness (thought) and must therefore have aspectual shapes: "But simply because they can be the objects of intentional states, in the sense that cups can be, it does not follow that they are themselves mental states" (p. 634). Again, aspectual shape is not simply a matter of having awareness of something that performs a certain function.

4. Even in the case where a nonconscious intentional state produces a counterpart conscious intentional state that manifests the same aspectual shape as is said to characterize, though not literally, the nonconscious intentional state, there does not occur, as it were, a double manifestation of the aspectual shape, a manifestation by the conscious intentional state and a manifestation by the nonconscious intentional state. Only conscious intentional states manifest aspectual shapes.

5. The same obtains when, not a nonconscious intentional state but something else, such as stimulation in the visual sense receptors, or an electrode lowered into the brain, produces a conscious intentional state. We are not tempted to assign aspectual shapes to complex spatiotemporal patterns of stimulation in the photoreceptors, nor to flows of electricity that affect the brain and produce conscious intentional states.

Searle (1990a) stated, "the nonconscious processes in the brain that cause visual experiences are certainly mental in one sense, but they have no mental content at all and thus in that sense are not mental processes" (p. 592). It seems to me that we should avoid calling any process mental that lacks all content, qualitative and intentional. Otherwise, we fall into misleading forms of expression, and may ourselves come to believe that a cause of a mental state's occurrence is itself mental since it is such a cause.

6. The manifestation of aspectual shape is not due to introspection. Searle rejects any model of how we know our conscious mental states that requires "a distinction between the act of perceiving and the object perceived

That distinction cannot in general be made for our own conscious states" (Searle, 1990c, p. 634). There is no such activity as introspecting conceived of as a perceptionlike process (see subsection on "mental-eye" views in Natsoulas [in press-b]). The manifestation of an aspectual shape is not a result of, or a part of, a mental state's being introspected.

7. Also, Searle (1990c) rejected Block's (1990) "accessibility" concept of occurrent conscious mental states, saying there is no such sense of consciousness in his view. What Block had in mind was that Searle's consciousness might amount to particular mental states' being causally connected to other states that are involved in reasoning and reporting processes. These processes would allow reasoning and reporting about only those mental states that are connected to them. But Searle rejected this sense of consciousness, as Block anticipated that he would (see below).

"*Becoming conscious.*" Searle (1990c) spoke of a nonconscious intentional state's "becoming conscious" when it produces a corresponding conscious intentional state. However, no nonconscious state literally becomes conscious, no matter what effects it may cause. For it to become a conscious intentional state, it would have to, impossibly, either manifest an aspectual shape it does not possess or acquire an aspectual shape to manifest. When it causes a conscious state to occur, it does not cause this state by retroactively transforming itself into the state it produces. Rather, it occurs and, consequently, the respective conscious state occurs.

Compare this with my discussion (Natsoulas, 1985) of Freud's concept of a nonconscious mental state's "becoming-conscious." For a nonconscious mental-occurrence instance to "become-conscious," according to Freud, it must produce on the spot (though in another location of the psychical apparatus, i.e., in the perception-consciousness system) a suitable conscious mental-occurrence instance, what I have called a "conscious representative." But only the latter is actually a conscious occurrence (in Freud's sense of the occurrence's [a] being qualitative, [b] giving inner awareness of itself, and [c] involving tertiary consciousness, or the subject's knowing that he or she is so aware; see Natsoulas [1989b]). This means that Searle (1990a, p. 586) is mistaken when he says that Freud's nonconscious mental states are potentially conscious. Nonconscious mental states do not, according to Freud, ever get literally converted into conscious states (Natsoulas, 1985). Their "becoming-conscious" is a matter of their producing in the perception-consciousness system, a conscious representative when they occur.

Searle (1990a) expressed his view of the once-removed intentionality of nonconscious intentional states in such a way as would seem to be in agreement with the Freudian notion of the conscious representative. Searle (1990a) stated, "When we describe something as an unconscious intentional state we are characterizing an objective *ontology* in virtue of its *causal* capaci-

ty to produce consciousness" (p. 588). Of course, Searle means by consciousness here an occurrent instance of a conscious intentional state. That is what nonconscious intentional states do to qualify as intentional, to be not simply physiological; they produce an occurrent conscious intentional state. However, there is something odd about Searle's (1990a) saying, "The concept of unconscious intentionality is that of a *latency* relative to its *manifestation* in consciousness" (p. 588). The nonconscious intentional state is occurrent and what is manifested is the aspectual shape that the nonconscious state does not itself possess except for producing a distinct occurrence that does have and does manifest an aspectual shape. *The concept of nonconscious intentionality in Searle is that of a nonintentional cause that produces an intentional effect.*

Skepticism. According to Bridgeman (1990) in criticism of Searle (1990a), the manifestation of an aspectual shape is in any case illusory. There is no aspectual shape to be manifested. Consciousness exists as a "system" in the brain, and gives us the impression of real intentionality in the brain, but consciousness is badly mistaken in this regard because the intentionality of anything that proceeds in the brain is a metaphorical intentionality. The manifestation of aspectual shapes is a kind of mis-taking there to be aspectual shapes (i.e., intentional contents).

I believe that this is as far from Searle's view of the mental as anyone can get, since Searle (1990c) holds, "Real (subjective, inner, honest-to-john) mental states exist and should not be confused with things that have no mental reality but that can give rise to a lot of metaphorical talk" (p. 639; cf. Searle, 1983, p. 262). In his response to commentators, Searle (1990c) did not defend the veridicality of consciousness's taking there to be occurrent conscious intentional states. Instead, without reference to Bridgeman, Searle (1990c) stated, "I assign no epistemic privilege to our knowledge of our own conscious states. By and large, I think our knowledge of our own conscious states is rather imperfect" (p. 635). However, Searle has no doubt that many of our conscious states are literally and intrinsically characterized by intentionality.

Thus, Searle (1990c) might have replied to Bridgeman by asking *how anything can consciously seem to us to be the case (including intentionality and other purported illusions) if the respective conscious states, involved in the conscious seeming, were not literally and intrinsically intentional.* Bridgeman did say that intentionality is a "result" and does not apply to processes or states of the brain; he seemed thus to suggest that there is a place in the world for non-metaphorical intentionality. But he also predicted the "disappearance" of intentionality. Does this mean scientists will someday no longer believe that *anything seems in any way to anyone?* For without intentionality, there would be no intentional content, no aspectual shapes, no intentional states.

Positive Characterization of Manifestation

I take it, therefore, that *conscious intentional states manifest their aspectual shapes simply in their own occurrence and not because they are somehow "viewed" or responded to*. That is, Searle is neither a "mental-eye" theorist of consciousness nor an "appendage" theorist of consciousness (see Natsoulas [in press-b]). I believe Searle well grasps that "viewed" or responded to mental states are themselves nonconscious, that to "view" or respond to them does not change their status as nonconscious. Analogously, *seeing or responding to a bolt of lightning does not render the bolt of lightning conscious*.

According to Searle, our "access" to the aspectual shapes of conscious intentional states is not, so to speak, from "outside" them. We know our conscious mental states "from the inside," simply by having them. Indeed, Searle does what he must do, according to Block (1990), to get his argument off the ground: "He must take consciousness [i.e., the manifestation of aspectual shape] to be an intrinsic property of a conscious state, not a relational property" (p. 597). Block, however, interprets this intrinsic property as the conscious mental state's qualitiveness, or "what it is like" (Nagel, 1974) to have the particular mental state. However, what Searle is largely concerned with is aspectual shape (intentional content) and its manifestation. And Searle may not agree that manifestation depends on qualitiveness; he may not hold with the following statement from Smith (1989), who makes manifestation dependent on the qualitative dimension of a mental state:

The phenomenal quality of an experience [or conscious intentional state] is a property that involves the overall [phenomenological] structure [or content] of the experience *qua* conscious. The various features of the experience are *phenomenally* present in the mind, "appearing" in consciousness somewhat as if a light were radiating from them. When the light is on, the mental process is conscious, in all its [phenomenological] structure [or content], and when the light is off, the mental process is conscious. (pp. 96-97)

By light, Smith means the overall qualitative character of the occurrent mental state. And a nonconscious mental state, according to Smith, has a phenomenological structure (i.e., aspectual shape), despite the fact that this phenomenological structure does not "appear" since all nonconscious mental states are lacking in qualitative character. In contrast, Searle holds that no aspectual shape exists except if it is "manifested." Unlike behaviors, occurrent conscious mental states do wear their aspectual shapes, which only they ever possess, on their sleeves.

As stated, perhaps Searle will not agree with Smith that it is qualitiveness that makes the manifestations possible of aspectual shapes; aspectual shapes are clearly themselves subjective characteristics. It would not be something else that makes aspectual shapes manifest themselves, that is,

another ingredient of the intentional states that does the job of causing their aspectual shapes to manifest themselves when the intentional states occur—unless I am correct that, for Searle, *a certain objective feature of conscious intentional states, namely, their literally and individually including inner awareness of themselves, makes their subjective feature of aspectual shape possible* (see final section). Or unless, contradicting Searle, I am correct that an aspectual shape is (a) *actual and manifest* when the respective intentional state includes inner awareness and (b) *actual but not manifest* when the intentional state includes outer awareness but no inner awareness. In either case, *the phenomenological structure (character, content) of an intentional state would be brought into existence by the intentional state's objective nature of being an instance of consciousness qua (inner or outer) awareness* (see final section).

I described aspectual shapes early in this article as equivalent to what has been called intentional or cognitive contents. It is time to add that, for Searle, aspectual shapes would seem to be reflexive contents. That is, the intentional content of one's conscious state is as it is because the conscious state gives awareness of itself along with whatever else it may be awareness of, for example, the tree in the garden that one is visually perceiving. Each conscious thought, each conscious perceptual awareness, each conscious desire, and so on, is a consciousness of the thought, the perceptual awareness, the desire, and so on.

Perhaps it is the fact that aspectual shapes are contents that leads Searle to hold that an intrinsically intentional state must be conscious. Perhaps the existence of a content implies for Searle that *someone has awareness of that content; that is, it must be the content of someone's awareness and the individual must have awareness of all contents of his or her consciousness when they are contents*. This conviction may be the simple source of Searle's far-reaching rejection of nonconscious intentional states (see final section).

The Distinction Between Content and Object of Consciousness

The remainder of this article will put to use a certain distinction Searle (1990c) emphasized in responding to some of his critics. He offered to clear up a misunderstanding by helping his critics to become less vulnerable to "a systematic ambiguity in such expressions as 'conscious of' or 'accessible to consciousness'" (p. 634). Several of his critics had argued along the following lines:

In Searle's own sense and contrary to what he has been arguing, all occurrent nonconscious neurophysiological states can become conscious, can be brought to consciousness. Searle distinguished between neurophysiological states that can and those that cannot be "brought to consciousness," by their causing corresponding or counterpart conscious mental states. We know that all neurophysiological states can be brought to consciousness, because we are already having, as theorists, thoughts about them, and can have thoughts about any one of them. They all are, therefore, the potentially con-

scious kind of occurrence to which Searle ascribes aspectual shape in the derivative causal sense. Potentially, any one of them can cause a corresponding conscious mental state to occur. Thus, none of them is inaccessible to consciousness in principle, as Searle proposed that some of them are.

Searle (1990c) replied to this objection by saying that his critics had ignored the difference between something's being the object of a mental state and something's being a mental state. Not everything of which we are conscious is a mental state; not everything that is an object of a mental state is a mental state. *Being conscious of something is not enough to bring something to consciousness in the sense of the latter that Searle meant.*

In this section, I try to spell out what I understand to be Searle's line of thought on the latter point. However, in this case, I am not concerned with whether Searle's reply to his critics is an adequate one. The purpose of this section is as preparation for (a) an attempt to grasp Searle's manifestation requirement for aspectual shape, and (b) a discussion of what is needed in order for Searle to improve the plausibility of his requirement. These are the topics, respectively, of the following two sections.

The main examples that I use in the present section are Searle's, namely, the example of a cup as an object of visual perceptual awareness, the example of the myelination of axons as an object of thought, and the example of pain as a mental state. To these examples of Searle's, I add a past pain that one remembers and a fire-breathing dragon that one hallucinates. Here is a brief preliminary comment on each of the latter two examples.

1. Present pain is both an object and content of consciousness, while a past pain can only be an object of consciousness, not a content of consciousness, once the pain is past. In other words, the aspectual shape of a mental state does not include the object of the mental state as an ingredient—unless one considers, with Brentano (1911/1973), the mental state itself as the "secondary object" of the mental state, as I believe that Searle does (cf. Searle, 1983, p. 49).

2. The same is true in those cases where the ostensible object of a mental state does not exist. A hallucinatory fire-breathing dragon *does not exist either outside or inside* the mental states that constitute the hallucinator's respective hallucinatory experience. A hallucinatory fire-breathing dragon is *neither the object nor the content* of the mental states that the hallucinator has in hallucinating the dragon. Rather, a fire-breathing dragon is a *nonexistent* something of which one *can only seem to see* its shape and colors, hear its roar, smell its burning breath, and feel the heat of the flames it produces (cf. Searle, 1983, p. 17).

When I am perceptually (or in thought) conscious of a certain cup on the table, this cup is the intentional object of those of my conscious intentional states that are constituents of my present activity of perceiving (or thinking about) the cup. When, in contrast, I am conscious of a pain that I am now

having, which consciousness occurs due to inner awareness intrinsic to the pain, it is the case that the pain is my mental state, that the pain is identical with the mental state of my being conscious of it, and that, as Searle says in a different though completely relevant context, the pain is a content of my consciousness. Recall Searle's (1990c, p. 635) statement quoted early in the present article to the effect that, with regard to immediately apprehending our conscious mental states, the distinction cannot be made between them and the act of being aware of them. Thus, inner awareness is not a distinct existent from its object.

Whereas my consciousness can be about a cup or about a pain, whereas these latter can both be objects of my consciousness, only my pains, not cups or anyone else's pains, exist as literal parts of my consciousness. Of course, we may say, "I now have in my consciousness the cup on my desk," but this only means that I am now having thoughts or other occurrent mental states that are about the cup. The idea of one's having something in one's consciousness is often used in a nonliteral and sometimes misleading sense. For, with all due respect to many psychologists, *there just is no inner space of the mind in which can reside the intentional objects of our intentional states*. Our ability to imagine an environment different from the environment in which we live and breathe does not bring this alternative environment into existence, any more than hallucinating a fire-breathing dragon brings it into existence.

Sitting here completely free of all pain, I can now consciously think about one of my past pains. However, when I do so, that past pain of mine is not a part of my present mental states which are products and parts of my activity of thinking about my past pain. The past pain is not identical with my present thoughts about it. My past pain is not a content of my present consciousness. *Past mental states, no matter how vividly they are recalled or, as we say, reexperienced, are not parts or contents of present consciousness*. Of present mental states, past mental states can only be the objects. Past mental states can be the objects of later mental states, "as can anything in the universe" (Searle, 1990c, p. 634). Reexperiencing a previous experience however realistically ("as though I were there") is to have now a similar experience to the one in the past that one is now "reexperiencing."

The cup that I see—or, for that matter, the myelination of my axons that I think about—does not qualify as a mental state no matter how much time I spend in being aware of it. *There is no way possible by which either cup or myelination can cross the line from object to content of my consciousness*. This applies equally to those nonconscious occurrent states that, against his view, some of Searle's critics have proposed that we can be conscious of. *We can be conscious of them, but they cannot be conscious states because they cannot be contents of consciousness*. They cannot be, as conscious mental states are, both objects of consciousness and contents of consciousness. They can be known only

from outside them. They are not, as all conscious mental states are, according to Searle, objects of inner awareness. Only mental states, including their contents, can be objects of inner awareness.

Aspectual Shapes Must “Matter” To The Agent

Actual aspectual shape (not the merely causally derivative kind) belongs only to conscious intentional states, according to Searle; that is, actual aspectual shapes only exist when manifest. Why should this be? Are not aspectual shapes properties of certain occurrent neurophysiological states, just as inner awareness is a property of certain neurophysiological states? And so, just as inner awareness can be present or absent as a property of neurophysiological states, why cannot aspectual shape be present or absent independently of inner awareness? As mentioned, this was Rosenthal's (1990) question.

Clearly, I am taking Searle to mean by manifest something more than merely actual-as-opposed-to-potential; not everything that is actual is manifest. For example, nonconscious neurophysiological states and their properties are actual when these states are occurring, but these states and their properties are none of them manifest even at those times. Why could not aspectual shapes, too, be exemplified without their being manifest as well?

Searle (1990c) may well be right when he states, “It seems clear to me that within our current nondualistic conception of reality no sense can be attached to the notion that aspectual shape can be both manifest as aspectual shape and yet totally unconscious” (p. 634). Indeed, this notion will not make sense if we rightly refuse, as Freud refused (see Natsoulas [1989a]), to postulate a second consciousness, a conscious unconsciousness. *Both Freud and Searle rejected a second subject to whom nonconscious intentional states would manifest their aspectual shapes.* However, Freud did not hold, as Searle does hold, that the actualization of an aspectual shape requires not only that a mental state exemplify that aspectual shape but also that the aspectual shape be manifest. Thus, Freud did not rule out nonconscious mental states with actual aspectual shapes, with real intentionality. For Searle, however, actual aspectual shapes cannot be exemplified except in the mode of being manifest; for actual aspectual shapes to exist is for them to be manifest.

Some of those objectors to Searle (1990a) who insisted that there are occurrent nonconscious intentional states meant that certain nonconscious states possess the very same property of having one or another aspectual shape as conscious intentional states possess. The difference is, in their view, that the aspectual shapes of nonconscious intentional states are not manifest; that is, the individual whose nonconscious intentional states they are does not have inner awareness of them; the aspectual shape of a nonconscious intentional state does not “appear” to the owner of the state.

Why does Searle (1990c), contradicting his critics, maintain the manifestation requirement? He admits there are “problems connected with conscious aspectual shape” (p. 633) but does not state or address these problems. Consequently, his main proposal is implausible. *His case for reorienting cognitive science depends on showing aspectual shapes cannot be actual unless manifest.*

Previously and at the same point in his argument, Searle (1990a) was almost as brief, concluding that “it is reasonably clear how this works for conscious thoughts and experiences” (p. 587). He had just stated,

Notice also that the aspectual shape must matter to the agent. It is, for example, from the agent's point of view that he can want water without wanting H₂O. In the case of conscious thoughts, the way the aspectual shape matters is that it constitutes the way the agent thinks about or experiences a subject matter: I can think about my thirst for a drink of water without thinking at all about its chemical composition. I can think of it as water without thinking of it as H₂O. (p. 587)

The clear implication is that no nonconscious state “works” in this way. The manifestation of aspectual shape, or the respective intentional state's being conscious, is necessary in order for Searle's above description to apply.

However, it might be proposed against Searle that the above description includes *no necessary reference to consciousness in the sense of the agent's having immediate awareness of the respective mental states*. At what point in the way that aspectual shapes “work,” does manifestation or consciousness necessarily enter the picture? The examples Searle uses in the above passage are (a) wanting water (or H₂O) and (b) thinking about one's thirst for a drink of water. The latter example does imply that one has acquaintance with one's mental state of wanting water. However, does thinking instead about a different kind of subject matter, a subject matter having nothing to do with oneself, does this thinking, too, require such acquaintance, namely, with one's thoughts about that subject matter? For that matter does simply wanting water, the first example, require that the desire for water be both actual and manifest? Is not actual enough?

The answer to this question may be found in the first two sentences of the above quoted passage. According to Searle, the aspectual shape must “matter” to the agent. Evidently, the agent's “point of view” is involved. But the agent's point of view on what? In what sense do aspectual shapes have to “matter” to the agent? It is difficult to interpret those two extremely important and undeveloped sentences of Searle's in any other way than that they are expressing Searle's view that *the aspectual shape of any occurrent mental state must be an object of the individual's inner awareness*. That is, given Searle's self-intimational understanding of inner awareness, the aspectual shape of a mental state is both a content and a kind of object (a “secondary” object; Brentano, 1911/1973) of that mental state of which it is a content. This is, it

would seem, the mode of existence of any aspectual shape whenever it is exemplified, given the manifestation requirement for aspectual shape.

And a particular aspectual shape that a particular mental state exemplifies is the aspectual shape that it is because this aspectual shape seems as it does to the owner of the mental state. Or so I gather from a slightly earlier article of Searle's (1989) where he stated, "How [the aspectual shape] seems to the agent is essential to its identity" (p. 201). In this article, Searle also stated, "The aspectual feature must matter to the agent. It must exist from his/her point of view" (p. 199). Thus, there is no aspectual shape without a point of view on it. Is that correct? Is aspectual shape a property of a mental state giving its owner acquaintance with the state's aspectual shape? Or must Searle introduce a second dimension of the mental state that provides acquaintance with its aspectual shape? *Does not Searle need, for the present purpose, the distinction between inner awareness as an objective feature and aspectual shape as a subjective feature of a conscious mental state?* I address this question in the next section.

Intentionality and Awareness, But Not Necessarily Inner Awareness, Give Aspectual Shapes

Clearly, Searle is suggesting that a particular aspectual shape's being a content of a particular mental state requires that this aspectual shape also be an object of this mental state (though not, of course, the exclusive object of this mental state). Something can be an object of a mental state without its being a content of the mental state, as Searle (1990c; see above) explained to some of his critics; but *the individual must have awareness of any content of any mental state*—so Searle would seem to be suggesting.

One might think, instead, that the consciousness of someone who is fully absorbed in watching a movie would be, at least much of the time if not continuously, entirely occupied with the events that are being portrayed on the screen. The person's stream of consciousness, during this period of immersion in the story, largely consists of intentional states that have the people and settings and states of affairs and events portrayed in the film as their objects. Why must these contents (aspectual shapes) not only perform their function of presenting the dramatic events to the absorbed viewer, but also must be themselves apprehended at the same time? Why the need for a reflexive content in order to have any content at all? *Searle may be suggesting implicitly that the mental states or their intentional contents cannot perform their presentational function unless they are also objects of awareness themselves.* Is this suggestion a result of Searle's confusing the contents and the objects of awareness? Or has Searle thought the matter through to the conclusion that *a point of view on content, on aspectual shapes, is essential to a point of view on the world?*

Perhaps, in this case, Searle has allowed how we know to affect his characterization of what we know. That is, he has built into aspectual shape, as an essential feature of any exemplification of a particular aspectual shape, how we normally know firsthand what the particular aspectual shapes are of our conscious mental states. Since we know the aspectual shapes of conscious mental states by having these mental states, and we do not know the aspectual shapes of our nonconscious states by having these states, nonconscious states do not in fact possess actual aspectual shapes.

I doubt that Searle would accept the latter line of reasoning. But might he be making, anyway, the kind of error that he corrected in some of his critics. In their commentaries, they had suggested to Searle that any neurophysiological state is a mental state if Searle makes accessibility to consciousness the criterion for mentality; that is, any neurophysiological state might cause a conscious mental state that has that neurophysiological state as its object. Searle replied that to be the object of a mental state is not to be identical to a mental state.

Perhaps Searle is making the same kind of error. He is identifying what we know with how we know it. Aspectual shapes are objects of an intrinsic immediate acquaintance; the very conscious mental state whose intentional content a particular aspectual shape is makes its owner aware of the mental state's aspectual shape. However, one cannot conclude that aspectual shapes are identical with the individual's immediate grasp of them. These are two features of the conscious intentional state, not the same feature.

As I have previously suggested, aspectual shapes are, for Searle, purely apperential (Natsoulas, 1991a). Aspectual shape is as it appears, in Searle's view, and there is no more to it than how it appears (except that it is [a] a very proximal effect of lower-order neurophysiological processes and, somehow, [b] may be a cause of other mental states and of behavior). However, a conscious mental state that exemplifies a certain aspectual shape, has many more features than this or any other contents it may have. The conscious intentional state is an occurrent neurophysiological state. It is a conscious state because of how it is internally organized, because of how the many neural impulses that constitute the state are spatiotemporally related to each other, because of what this occurrent neurophysiological state is at a level of description specifying the organization or patterning of the component neural activities.

And one high-level objective feature of a conscious intentional state is its feature of inner awareness, the feature that makes the intentional state a conscious state rather than a nonconscious state (Natsoulas, 1991a). Certainly, inner awareness is not a subjective feature. If Searle is correct in his self-intimational view of inner awareness, we can hope to learn eventually what it is objectively about certain occurrent neurophysiological states that gives immediate acquaint-

tance with them. That is, we will learn what inner awareness ultimately is. This seems entirely consistent with Searle's conception of consciousness as an objective property of brains.

If so, then he would distinguish (a) the subjective features of conscious intentional states from (b) that objectively characterizable dimension of conscious intentional states which gives one awareness of those subjective features. This does not contradict Searle's repeated insistence that we know firsthand our occurrent mental states by no means analogous to perceiving them. Indeed, he is right; we have acquaintance with our conscious mental states, and with their contents, in the very occurrence of having our conscious mental states. But to distinguish between dimensions of a certain occurrence, a dimension of apprehending and a dimension that is what is apprehended, is not to conceive of what takes place as analogous to perceiving. Dimensions of an existent are not necessarily distinct existences or distinct parts of the existent.

Consider Searle's conscious nonintentional states. These are mental states that, I take it, lack aspectual shapes. Searle (1983) wrote,

Some types of mental states have instances which are Intentional and other instances which are not. For example, just as there are forms of elation, depression and anxiety where one is simply elated, depressed, or anxious without being elated, depressed, or anxious about anything, so, also, there are forms of these states where one is elated that such and such has occurred or depressed and anxious at the prospect of such and such. Undirected anxiety, depression, and elation are not Intentional, the directed cases are Intentional. (p. 2)

Evidently, an occurrent mental state need not have an aspectual shape in order for it to be a conscious state in the sense of its being the object of inner awareness—which is another dimension of the mental state itself. Thus, one dimension of a conscious intentional state, namely, inner awareness, may also characterize another mental state without the latter's having to be characterized by a second dimension of the former, namely, having an aspectual shape. So to speak, *one could subtract aspectual shape from a conscious intentional state and still have a conscious mental state left over*. Does it not also make good sense from Searle's perspective that real aspectual shape can characterize an occurrent nonconscious mental state, that is, a mental state lacking the dimension of inner awareness?

In opposition to my last point, it may be argued *that it is inner awareness that brings aspectual shapes into existence—that in the absence of inner awareness, there must also be an absence of aspectual shapes*. Thus, it would follow that a perceiver could not see the tree in the garden in the absence of occurrent neurophysiological states involving, in their occurrence, the perceiver's inner awareness of these states and their aspectual shapes. A perceiver could not be simply visually aware of the tree in the garden. The

visual perceptual experiences that a perceiver does have individually give to him or her a kind of dual awareness, according to the self-intentional view of conscious intentional states. Visual perceptual experiences give the perceiver visual awareness of the tree in the garden and inner awareness of the visual experience itself including awareness of its aspectual shape (Searle, 1983, p. 49).

The question that Searle needs to address is, if an awareness dimension of a mental state is needed to do the job of bringing content into existence, why does not that dimension of the mental state that gives awareness of the tree not do the job? Why is inner awareness necessary? After all, the aspectual shape is nothing other than the intentional content of a visual perceptual experience of the tree in the garden. The aspectual shape presents the tree in the garden. *The crucial dimension of an intentional state that brings content into existence is its possessing the property of intentionality whereby the intentional state can give awareness of something that lies beyond the mental state.* It is true that our intentional states are perspectival; that is, we have a point of view on whatever we are aware of by means of them. But having a point of view does not require that the point of view itself be an object of awareness, as though one needed to have a point of view on one's point of view in order to have a point of view in the first place. The aspectual shapes of mental states do not necessarily have to seem some way to the agent in order for the world to seem some way to the agent by virtue of those mental states.

Consistently with what I am suggesting, Searle (1987b) earlier characterized subjectivity in terms of the individual's unique point of view *on the world*; although Searle (1987b) mentioned as well, as part of subjectivity, the unique access that we have to our own mental states, which no one else can have to them (only to his or her own mental states), he did not seem to conceive of point of view as deriving from this access, as though we can have a point of view on the world only through an inward subjectivity, an inner awareness that accompanies (intrinsically, of course) all instances of outer awareness.

Therefore, Searle requires, it would seem, another reason for aspectual shape's claimed necessary subjectivity—in the sense of there having to be a subjective point of view on aspectual shape in order for aspectual shape to exist in any and all instances of its exemplification. A fire-breathing dragon cannot seem to exist unless someone has awareness as though of it. Surely, Searle should consider why aspectual shape depends for its existence on whether it is apprehended. Surely not for the same reason that the seeming existence of a fire-breathing dragon depends on someone's having visual experience as though of a fire-breathing dragon.

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