

A New Kind of Transference

Lauren Lawrence

The New School for Social Research

This paper advances a demythologization of transference to undermine the confidence of its process. Herein, it is viewed as an alienating mechanism of illegitimate proportion. *Self-transference* is exemplified as an alternate to the transference event which may present itself during *third person analysis* wherein the analysand refrains from using the first person construct in favor of the third person pronoun in an attempt to broaden the range of consciousness and objectivity. A transference here will be aimed at the third person pronoun of whom the analysand speaks.

The process of transference, during the analytic session, should in no way be perceived as a knowledge, but rather as the forestallment of a knowledge that could be overtly rather than covertly revealed to the analysand. Transference, it should be stated, is actually an enemy of resolution which functions as a temporal deception with the effect of alienating the self from its present status. Similarly, transference is an attachment to the metaphoric, or symbolic cherishing of the past with its aggression or love vented toward a *substitute* as opposed to an *actual* persona. The occurrence of transference merely designates the fact that inaccessible experiences of the past, which can no longer effect replication with any value or satisfaction, have been switched with those of the inapplicable yet accessible present, as applied to the prototypical person of the present, namely the analyst, and to what the analytic situation represents in the symbolic.

In this transference, then, the feelings and reactions meant for an *actual*, in being transferred elsewhere, are thus missing their mark, which, it must be pointed out, will only leave indelible frustrations on the analysand. We cannot, therefore, undervalue that which has thus far been overvalued, the form of resistance involved in this strategy which allows the analysand to become subsumed in the unreality of what I view as an *impaired temporality*

(Lawrence, 1991). This impaired temporality brings with it the unfortunate quality of being neither here, in the present, nor there, in the past. In other words, the present is being blocked by an unapproachable view of the past. Unapproachable, in that the past, being overshadowed by the present, can never be the same past. Thus, trying to re-enter the past is like trying to step into the same water twice, which as Heraclitus found, cannot be done. In this convoluted past, this is where the analysand can establish false connections, which have at their aim, maintaining some obscure desire that at best is untenable and/or uncertain.

Thus, in the quest of reviving and recomposing the past, the subject must necessarily translocate the present. But, in translocating the present the aggression vented toward a substitute is no longer of the qualitative maturity needed to produce an immediate understanding or gratification. And thus, what I want to say, is that the so-called transference is really no more than an unconscious sublimation in which the subject phases into pretenses and misunderstandings. In other words, where others have idealized the transference, as the instrument that will emotionally unburden the analysand from the past inaccessible experience, I am denouncing it as an alienating process. Any measure of regression that demands an acceptance of its neurotic conditioning yet which still leaves at its base an alienated ego should not be sanctioned for there is here a certain amount of illegitimacy. The dialectic of the transference is nothing more than an emotional circumlocution, an indirect and evasive communication.

What is really harmful is that transference reconstitutes the subject's initial subjection to the actual which reconfirms the parental dominance of the actual over the subject when the desire is really to be free from the demand for retribution and/or recognition. What is viewed as submissive behavior can only limit the subject's sense of being. Similarly, anger, in its discharge can never duplicate what conditioned it and therefore must experience a failure at the attempt. A cure can only be achieved when there is a neutralization of the origins of frustration and disturbance, not through the negation or through the over-valuation of another but through the positive valuation of self. The subject trying to rejoin with the wrong image of the past is like Narcissus leaning over the lake to kiss the reflection of another face.

It is important to remind ourselves that not only are transferences sublimational in nature but are also a form of projection (Jung, 1946/1959, p. 401) which is permissive of dissociation, subjective in origin, and in which there can only be an abstract envisioning as opposed to a concrete realization of distorted truth. Projections serve only to obscure meaning from both analyst and analysand. This behavior, then, is not to be encouraged due to its projective tendencies but rather to be viewed as an affect that the analysand has activated from the past to interpret perhaps what was not previously allowed

interpretation. However, having become detached from the *original* should not necessitate the desire for reattachment. Afterall, this is counter-individuation at its very best, and yet this is what shamelessly occurs when a transference during the analytic situation is not only encouraged but also indulged. One need not re-establish a bond that grew out of an infantile relationship to adduce that there was, and is, indeed, a maladaptive bond functioning at a subliminal level at present. And, in transferring the experiences of childhood onto the analysand, a maladapted style is perpetuated. This suggests a neurotic desire to bond with the analyst in an attempt to bond with the deficit of all the analyst does not know. It becomes a way to establish, as Jung (1946/1959, p. 406) has written, an analyst/analysand relationship founded on mutual unconsciousness, where, in addition, there exists the illusion of mutual approval, and the consensus of misapprehension. What should be relied upon is the analysand's own insight into the recollection, albeit, without implied comparisons, in an effort to enlarge a conscious attitude which will enlist the cooperation of the unconscious.

As Jung (1946/1954, p. 402) has noted, transference is not absolutely indispensable for a cure, and should be treated carefully if there is to be one. And if we are to allow for the "unconsciousness" of the analyst then the transference action is no longer to be considered as satisfying instinctual impulses for it now begs to be granted meaning and authenticity which the analyst is unable to fulfill. When the analyst is invited into the family nucleus, as it were, the analyst loses the status as an analyst and concurrently loses the power inherent in the analytic situation. Here, the establishment of unreal intimacy between the analyst and the analysand can only serve to arouse resistance and doubt. This, in turn, will imbue the analyst with an unknowable disposition which might promote a loss of initiative in the analysand.

Self-Transferencey

During *third person analysis*¹ (Lawrence, 1990) the transference event, due to an alienated ego, either in its positive or negative manifestation, will be localized away from the analyst in that the narrating analysand will be ascertaining his/her will against the *other* he/she speaks of in the third person which is none other than the analysand. Here, the dual relation is not between analysand and analyst but rather between the analysand and the narrating projected third party, which is the introjection projected outwards. Thus, the annexing of an unconscious idea with an idea already belonging to

¹A narrational form of analysis wherein the analysand speaks only in the third person pronoun.

the preconscious in all its intensity, will be transferred to the analysand in the guise of the third person rather than to a meaningless other.

Whereas traditional analysis would aim to provoke the analysand toward regressivity and "artificial neurosis" (Freud, 1916/1963, p. 444), through frustrating the demand of the analysand for responsiveness, the aim of third person analysis is to dispossess the analysand of the "artifice," and of the narcissistic image through which the ego formulated, and to lead the analysand ahead to pursue and claim his/her maturational present. Even Freud (1916/1963, p. 439) has described transference as a diversionary tactic which draws the analysand away from his/her own conflicts by taking the analyst into account. Third person analysis will not replicate any more of these externalized identifications. What is important is identification with the self and the self alone. Given the breathing space that the third person pronoun gives to the first person pronoun, the ego becomes nothing more than the analysand's work of imagination so that the analysand may re-establish recognition of what was created by the analysand and for the analysand. There will be no more false connections. It is this unconditional pronoun renunciation of third person analysis which will allow the function of what I call the symbolic excorporation needed to separate out the self from the self so that what was unfamiliar will become familiarized, and what was accepted as familiar will be scrutinized.

Whereas transference is usually represented as an affect (Lacan, 1973/1981, p. 123), it is here referred to as a defensive resistance against the cure. We cannot speak, as Freud (1916/1963, p. 443) has done, of the transference as changing into a resistance, when it is itself a resistance. Thus, viewed as a product of the analytic situation, this transference is certainly not a mode of apperception, but rather a model of misapprehension. What must be stressed is that the transference admits to an ambivalence of affect, an entity in opposition to itself (Freud, 1916/1963, p. 443) and announces a relationship of confusion with the analyst. In third person analysis, however, the only relationship of confusion to be canvassed is that of the self with the self. This affords an opportunity to eliminate the obscuration process of the ego. Thus, the ego, as perceiver, is now responsible for its mode of apperception. Where Lacan (1973/1981, p. 131) has stated "the unconscious is the discourse of the other," I should like to interpret the "other" as that which is being spoken about by the narrating self. Whereas transference with the analyst will promote a stilted, unreal discourse, transference with the subject will open the door to the unconscious and thus to interpretation. Even Lacan admits to the quiescence or inaccessibility of the unconscious during the transference. Lacan has written that during the transference the analyst as representative of reality leaves the analysand

with only one subject, if you will pardon the expression, to get his teeth onto, and that's the analyst. (1966/1977, p. 245)

However, during third person analysis there will be no teeth marks on the skin of any analyst.

One of the effects of speech in the third person is that the narrator always realizes in greater detail the self that is being narrationally pursued in the third person pronoun. Detachment from the "I" is the basis of the analytic experience of third person analysis in that the subject "he"/"she" is now objectified. This is why the narrator, upon objectifying the self, may begin to realize the functional importance of a self distanced from itself so that attentional value will be placed on whatever is related about the self in the third person. For the analyst will no longer have to cite the illusory character of the analysand's actions toward the analyst. The narrator, for the first time, will be made to recognize how the narrator is self-viewed with all the personal implications. The narrator confirms the narrator without the usual ambivalence. In other words, there is no usual occurrence of transference during the session. The narrator is too busy speaking of another (the object) to another (the subject) so that, in effect, the one he/she is relating to on an interpersonal level is the narrator in the guise of the articulated third person other. Similarly, thoughts of identification, which get their desire from idealization never occur within the mind of the narrating analysand, nor any projection outward. Here, what will be projected outward is indeed the self. Thus, with this new process of analysis, we may find the manifestation or phenomenon of what I call *self-transference*.

It should be the aim of analysis to get the analysand not to connect the past with the present but rather to connect and separate what is being felt in the present with the past. According to Fenichel (1945/1972, p. 561), transference improvements are neither trustworthy nor durable, mainly because the displacement and repetition of pathogenic childhood conflicts are not enough to dissolve once and for all that on which they were formed. Such that external experience is not of the same quality as internal experience the validity of what was remembered may only be session dependent.

During a transference, due to an impaired temporality, the original repressed drives are only realized in derivative form and so it must be that the discharge attained is necessarily derivative, and therefore insufficient, for "it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1957/1973, p. 458). In a metonymic situation, the analysand, being unveiled in unclear emotional reactions to unrealistic modes of object-relationship, is unable to look at these reactions clearly because there is not the necessary distance which would permit the analysand to do so.

In the Freudian text (1916/1963, p. 444), transference, which was originally considered the greatest threat to treatment, was then viewed its most effi-

cient tool, but only when “the treatment has obtained mastery over the patient.” But, it may be precisely this negative manifestation, this feeling of being mastered, that reinforces the feeling of helplessness and/or dependency which may be what brought the analysand into the therapeutic situation in the first place. Such dependency on the analyst would inhibit the analysand from seeking any external criticism or postulating any internal criticism as well. Ferenczi has written in his diary

One can keep a patient like this for years without making any significant progress, always hoping that something is being “worked through.” (Ferenczi, 1932/1988, p. 96)

But, for Freud (1916/1963, p. 445), this dependency trend is seen as a necessary step toward the cure. He suggests that once the analysand feels “mastered,” it is not the intellectual insight, which according to Freud can never be strong or free enough for such achievement, but solely the relation to the doctor that aids in the treatment. In this aspect, hypnosis has been likened to the transference process in that improved individuals who were hypnotized only remained improved in direct proportion to their closeness to the doctor, thus establishing a dependency pattern underlying the improvement. In other words, being “mastered” would play into the type of regression longing for that phase of passive–receptive development. So, clearly, here, the dependency and not the transference is the condition of the improvement. This dependent condition is dangerous to the treatment possibilities because the empowerment of the analyst can only be at the expense of the analysand’s weakening, or perceived weakening. This element of suggestibility is eliminated in third person analysis in that the analysand, in becoming the heroic entity of the narrative, has only the analyst to look up to.

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