

Consciousness and Self-Awareness — Part I: Consciousness₁, Consciousness₂, and Consciousness₃

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Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that *The Oxford English Dictionary* identifies under the word *consciousness*. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness₁; a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness₂; a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness₃; being occurrently aware of anything at all, including nonexistent particulars. An instance of consciousness₁ may or may not have a reflexive object, but it will perforce include both inner awareness and awareness of oneself as an object of the other's awareness. Consciousness₂ requires self-awareness in the forms of (a) witnessing or having witnessed potential evidence about oneself, (b) inner awareness of this witnessing when it occurred, (c) inner awareness and self-awareness as involved in (if necessary) remembering having witnessed that evidence, (d) occurrent awareness of features of one's character or personality, and (e) bringing self-witnessed evidence to bear in judging of the latter. In contrast, consciousness₃, which in a particular instance may be an occurrent self-awareness, need not involve any self-awareness at all.

I may have either acquaintance with, or knowledge about, an object O without thinking about myself at all. It suffices for this that I think O, and that it exists. If, in addition to thinking O, I also think that I exist and that I know O, well and good; I then know one more thing, a fact about O, of which I previously was unmindful. That, however, does not prevent me from having already known it a good deal. O *per se*, or O *plus P*, are as good objects of knowledge as O *plus me* is.

I am quoting here from William James's *The Principles of Psychology* (1890/1950, p. 274), from the fourth section of his well-known "Chapter IX. The Stream of Thought" (titled "The Stream of Consciousness" in James's [1892/1984] abridgement). The above statement has special relevance to the

present topic: which is *whether and how self-awareness is involved in each of six basic kinds of consciousness* (Natsoulas. 1983). James's chapter is comprised of a series of discussions concerning, respectively, five important characteristics of the stream of consciousness and of its basic durational components. James also refers to *ongoing thought* as equivalent to the stream of consciousness, although the stream contains many different kinds of mental-occurrence instance: including perceptions, bodily awarenesses, emotions, desires, and volitions. At the point where James makes his claim regarding consciousness and self-awareness, he is describing his fourth characteristic of how consciousness is constituted and proceeds, in a section with the expository title: "*Human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself; that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the function of knowing*" (p. 271). This fourth property of consciousness amounts to the crucial fact that every basic durational component of the stream is *an awareness*, no matter what else it may also be. For example, a desire too is an awareness, an awareness of whatever state of affairs or happening it is that one desires. All basic durational components of the stream are, individually, instances of someone's being occurrently aware of something, except when a component is only *as though* of something: in those cases in which the "object" of the awareness does not exist, has not existed, and will not exist. An awareness is, however, *no less* an awareness for having only an apparent object.¹

The function of knowing, which is, according to James, "the most mysterious thing in the world," can also *turn right around* on the stream of consciousness itself. In other words, one also (frequently) has "acquaintance-with" or "knowledge-about" objects that are components of one's stream of consciousness. The stream may include awarenesses that are immediate apprehensions of other components of the stream *in their presence*, that is, upon their occurrence or shortly thereafter; and, of course, the stream of consciousness may include thoughts having for their objects other components of the same stream *at a temporal remove from them*. The absolute distinction — which James emphasized — between an occurrent awareness and its object, whatever the latter may be, finds no exception in those cases where the object of awareness is a proximate component of the same stream: "No subjective

¹It is that which James called the "topic" of an awareness that may not have existed, may not exist, and may not come to exist. The "topic" is, in that case, what the awareness would be of or about. In contrast, what James called the "object" of an occurrent awareness exists in every case. James defined the "object" as other authors would define the cognitive content of a mental-occurrence instance. He stated that the "object" is "all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the manner, and however symbolic the manner of the thinking may be" (James, 1890/1950, p. 276). However, in the present text, I hew to the nowadays more familiar pair "object" and "content," rather than to James's "topic" and "object."

state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else" (James, 1890/1950, p. 190). Thus, with respect to inner awareness, or how we have immediate awareness of our own mental-occurrence instances, James was an "appendage" theorist (as, e.g., Rosenthal [1993] is), and not an "intrinsic" theorist (as, e.g., Woodruff Smith [1989] is).

Consciousness without Self-Awareness?

In his discussion of the fourth important characteristic of consciousness, James insisted: *one can be occurrently aware of an object O without being aware as well of oneself or of any component of one's stream of consciousness, including the particular occurrent awareness itself whereby one is aware of O*. Thus, according to James, consciousness can take place without self-awareness's being a part or an accompaniment of it. Even in the adult human being, whose habitual state of mind is "a state of reflective cognition," this kind of state is not "primitive"; rather, straightforward awareness of something else "must come first" according to James. The opposing general thesis, which James attacked, is a thesis that a number of theorists have argued in one form or another. James (1890/1950) quotes several of them, including H. L. Mansel as follows:

Whatever variety of materials may exist within reach of my mind, I can become conscious of them only by recognizing them as mine . . . Relation to the conscious self is thus the permanent and universal feature which every state of consciousness as such must exhibit. (p. 274)

James accuses such authors of committing a version of what he calls "the psychologist's fallacy." That is, they foist something that they themselves know about an instance of occurrent awareness upon that instance itself — it too must know what they know about it. The theorists hold that among the features or concomitants of every occurrent awareness is an awareness of its occurrence and of its belonging to its owner. These theorists distinguish, rightly on James's view, between a mental-occurrence instance and its object O; however, they assume, as well, that the mental-occurrence instance, in order for it to be an occurrent awareness of O, *must discriminate between itself and O*. In this, they go too far: every occurrent awareness would then be a *reflective process*, even when O is external to the stream. A kind of self-awareness would be a necessary ingredient, an intrinsic feature, of every state of consciousness, of every basic durational component of James's stream.

Notwithstanding James's argumentational eloquence (e.g., "This is a perfectly wanton assumption, and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing it true"), James could have been wrong on this point. Perhaps those who held that consciousness necessarily involves self-awareness were

on to something; there may be something self-referential about every instance of consciousness. Compare with John R. Searle (1983) on the causal self-referentiality of every instance of perceptual awareness. However, one need not adopt the view that all one's instances of consciousness are self-referential in the extreme form that Searle did. Searle held that, whenever we perceive anything (O), we have, in perceiving O, awareness of O as causing our perceptual experience of O. Instead, one might simply hold that any occurrent awareness of O that one has must take O either to be or not to be part of oneself, either as something with which one identifies or something with which one does not identify. There would always be, at every point in one's stream of consciousness, an awareness of oneself in at least this positive or negative respect. Although, in contrast to Searle on perception, an occurrent awareness would not necessarily be a reflective process, in the sense of turning around upon itself and apprehending itself, occurrent awareness would always *apprehend its objects with respect to their proper inclusion in, as it were, either the "me" or the "not-me."*²

In making his case for consciousness sans self-awareness, James proffered three concrete examples as providing evidence for his thesis. These examples were drawn from the reports of people, including James himself, concerning their experiences upon having inhaled an anesthetic or while they were reviving from a faint. Regarding James's three examples, I have argued as follows in a recent paper (Natsoulas, 1996–1997):

1. Such reports depend on one's *remembering* a particular past experience. Otherwise, one would not be in a position sincerely to report the experience as having occurred, except by hearsay or by inference, both of which are ruled out in the case of the present examples.
2. Remembering a past experience depends on *having been aware of the experience* at the time of its occurrence. Otherwise, one will not have acquired any beliefs concerning that particular experience (except by hearsay or inference).
3. Also, at the time, one must have been *aware of the experience as one's own*. Otherwise, one would not know later whether one was remembering the experience or merely imagining it, assuming that one later had, for example, visual imagery of the very same event which one had earlier experienced firsthand.

My conclusion was that James's examples of consciousness without self-awareness could not have been as he described them, because they were

²As discussed elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b), James (1890/1950, pp. 304–305) seriously contemplated what I have called the "Sciousness Hypothesis": that the stream of mental life does not include immediate awareness of any of the components of the stream itself. Always outwardly directed, the stream distinguishes among its external objects those that belong to "me" and those that belong to "not-me." Of course, one can and does think about one's mental life; but, according to the Sciousness Hypothesis, to do so, one must infer about it just as one does with respect to the mental lives of other people.

experiences that were later reported on the basis of remembering them (Natsoulas, 1996–1997).

But what if a psychologist manages to elicit from subjects self-reports at the time when such experiences are occurring, so that the subjects do not have to remember the experiences in order to report them? Would the subjects' introspective reports support the independence of consciousness from self-awareness? The following is my brief answer:

To report any experience of one's own on the spot, one must be occurrently aware of that experience. Moreover, one's awareness of the experience must be conscious rather than nonconscious. Consider this analogous case: whether you could report the presence of a large dark cloud straight ahead near the horizon if you were entirely unaware of perceiving the cloud, although you did perceive it. I suggest that it would be for you, from your first-person perspective, as though you did not perceive the cloud. Note also that reports are a special kind of behavior: they are *communicative actions about something in particular*. In the case of reporting one's experience to an experimenter, one would be seeking, because of the experimenter's instructions, to inform him or her regarding the particular experience that one is *aware of oneself as now having*.

With this answer, however, I have not ruled out the possibility that such experiences, and even the conscious awareness of them, can take place in the absence, at the time, of all self-awareness except for inner awareness — which may well be considered a kind of self-awareness because it is an occurrent part of oneself that one has inner awareness of. Rather, what I have done above is to cast doubt on whether *positive* reports concerning experiences can provide evidence for consciousness sans self-awareness. *Negative* reports are a different matter: as, for example, when brain-damaged or hypnotized people report not having a certain particular experience although their behavior strongly suggests that they are having that experience.

Present Topic and Approach

My present topic is the relation between consciousness and self-awareness. Specifically, *does consciousness require, as a concomitant or intrinsic feature, awareness of its owner as such, awareness of its own occurrence at least, or any other form of occurrent self-awareness?* The ultimate answer to this question will perforce be multifaceted. In answering it, a number of senses of *consciousness* will have to be considered. Needless to say, *self-awareness*, too, is not a univocal term. How one should answer a scientific question depends on what it is that the question has reference to. It is not unusual, however, for a psychologist to raise a question and proceed to give an answer to a different, more manageable question. As Pylyshyn (1990) stated: "Philosophers and psychologists . . . are prepared to give a theory of consciousness but what they give is a theory of something else. And the relationship between consciousness

and that other thing is never made explicit" (p. 201). I have elsewhere commented on this regrettable methodological deficiency, as it occurs among psychologists (Natsoulas, 1983). I have described it as a case of "difficult to avoid referential displacements" from what is initially of interest to what can be readily studied by means of procedures acceptable to the discipline (cf. Koch, 1975, 1980; Wittgenstein, 1947/1980). Because my purpose here is to make some headway in the understanding of consciousness and, in particular, how consciousness may depend on self-awareness, I need to avoid the kind of referential displacement that I have mentioned. For this reason, I shall again rely for guidance on the six main concepts of consciousness that *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989; henceforth the "OED") identifies in its entry under that word (cf. Natsoulas, 1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). As will be seen, the entailed relations between consciousness and self-awareness vary depending on which ordinary sense of *consciousness* (and *self-awareness*) is at work in the particular context. To demonstrate this fact with special reference to the six OED concepts of consciousness is one of the purposes of the present article. I focus first, and in turn, on the referents of the first three of these concepts; and in the second, separately published part of the present article, I focus in turn on the referents of the remaining three OED concepts.

James's (1890/1950) understanding of consciousness is a significant influence on the discussions of the referents of six concepts of consciousness that make up the two parts of the present article. James operated from within a certain conceptual framework and orientation, which "concretely" construed all mental events, states, and processes. That is, they would all be components of the stream of consciousness, which is open throughout to inner awareness of its basic durational components and of the somewhat larger segments of the stream, consisting of several basic durational components, which constitute a "specious present moment" (James, 1890/1950, Chapter XV; Natsoulas, 1992–1993). Of course, self-awareness, if one thinks of it along the concrete Jamesian lines, is itself a kind of consciousness. Whatever its objects may be, self-awareness itself is either (a) a basic durational component of the stream of consciousness or a feature of such a component, or (b) a consecutive set of basic durational components of the stream of consciousness, or a feature of all of these. Contrary to James in *The Principles*, however, let me add: self-awareness may also occur *externally* to the stream; that is, self-awareness may take the form of a *nonconscious* mental occurrence, which *cannot* be an object of inner awareness; even the person whose mental occurrence it is must *infer* its occurrence. Thus, self-awareness does not require inner awareness, any more than perceptual awareness does. Nor is the following the case, which I shall argue *against* in Part II of this article: involved in every instance of inner awareness is a self-awareness that is more than an immediate apprehension of a mental-occurrence instance.

Consciousness₁: An Interpersonal Cognitive Relation

The first concept of consciousness that, in its entry for *consciousness*, the OED brings to our attention corresponds to a now obsolete use of this word for the purpose of referring to a certain cognitive relation between people. In previous articles (e.g., Natsoulas, 1983, 1991a), I have called this relation "consciousness₁" and shall do so again here. The concept of consciousness₁ is a very different meaning of the word from the other five OED concepts, which all familiarly refer to something that takes place within a single person. Contrary to James's (1890/1950, p. 304) implication, the prefix *con* in *consciousness* did not originally have the function of securing reference to a stream of consciousness's apprehending itself along with whatever else it apprehends. Rather, at first, *con*-sciousness was, consistently with the word's Latin derivation, a kind of being aware together between two or more people (Dewey, 1906; Lewis, 1967; Natsoulas, 1991a). Although any consciousness₁ relation is indeed psychological, and its occurrent constituents take place in certain streams of consciousness, a consciousness₁ relation is at the same time interpersonal. There is not one each, but *only a single consciousness₁ which is, as it were, shared by two or more people who instantiate consciousness₁ with respect to each other.*

Every case of the consciousness₁ relation necessarily includes the features I shall enumerate in the next subsection. For the sake of simplicity, I shall describe these features only for the case of two people's being conscious₁ together and with no one else. My treating of consciousness₁ as I do, that is, *on a par with* the other OED kinds of consciousness, is motivated by a desire not to miss out on a possibly useful approach to consciousness, merely because the respective concept of consciousness is no longer a lively option. Needless to say, psychologists are not prophets, any more than physicists or other scientists are. Notwithstanding their possessing a high level of methodological sophistication, psychologists do not already know how best to advance their knowledge of those psychological phenomena about which they have only a vague understanding at the present time. No doubt, psychologists and allied scientists are destined to experience at least as many surprises with regard to the nature of consciousness as physicists have encountered in their pursuit of the ultimate constitution of matter.

Features of Consciousness₁

1. *A and B both know a certain fact or set of facts about O. O can be anything or anyone, including A, B, or A and B. An interesting kind of example is one in which A and B have cooperated together in the commission of a crime. Consequently, A and B know this fact, or set of facts, about themselves — plus more, as follows, in being conscious₁ together.*

2. Also, *A(B) knows that B(A) knows the fact or facts about O mentioned in the first sentence of 1.* Thus, they do not simply know the same facts about O. The relevant facts about O are "known-with" by A and by B in relation to each other. And this involves still more than the reciprocal knowledge which I have just mentioned.

3. It also involves: *A(B) knows that B(A) knows that A(B) knows the fact or facts about O mentioned in the first sentence of 1. above.* Thus, with respect to their possessing the knowledge that is specified in 1. and 2., A is an object of B's knowledge, and B is an object of A's knowledge.

4. The first three enumerated features of consciousness₁ are properly stated in terms of the particular knowledge which A and B must possess to be in a consciousness₁ relation with each other. However, possessing this knowledge is not enough: *from time to time, A and B must also have occurrent awarenesses of the relevant facts that they know and have been mentioned above.* In other words, a consciousness₁ relation between A and B would not be considered as persisting if the pattern of knowledge constituting this relation no longer came to A's and B's mind. It is natural to ask: For how long might this knowledge remain passive, purely dispositional, and still A and B would be counted as being in the consciousness₁ relation with each other? My answer perforce is this:

However you may choose to apply the concept of consciousness₁, the facts pertaining to the particular case, which is a candidate for possible continued inclusion under the heading of consciousness₁, will remain the same. Whether you describe the case as an instance of consciousness₁ will depend, I suppose, on whether you have reason to expect that, one of these days, the cognitive relation will again be activated in the form of the necessary set of occurrent awarenesses.

5. *A(B) must undergo occurrent awareness that B(A) is occurrently apprehending the facts mentioned in the first three items above.*³ There is no implication, however, that A and B must undergo simultaneously with each other any of the requisite occurrent awarenesses that constitute a consciousness₁ relation between them. For example, it may happen, quite fortuitously, that A and B undergo the requisite awarenesses always on different days.

6. Also, a consciousness₁ relation must be relatively exclusive. *Not many more than a few people may be involved in an instance of this relation, or else there is not much point in speaking of the participants as being conscious₁ together.* Compare consciousness₁ with being in on a secret; and its no longer qualifying

³Thus, consciousness₁ can be considered a relation between streams of consciousness, provided it is true, as argued in the text, that the awareness that consciousness₁ requires cannot occur nonconsciously, in the sense of occurring without inner awareness of it. See the very end of the main section on the consciousness₁ relation in the text.

as a secret as the number of people grows who know the relevant facts. Lewis (1967) informs us that a common use of the Latin *conscio* and *conscientia* was for the purpose of referring to two people's having joint and mutual secret knowledge of a transgressive piece of conduct on the part of one or both of them.

Self-Awareness and Consciousness₁

Based on etymology and examples of use, I have elsewhere sought to make the concept of consciousness₁ explicit, as well as the other five OED concepts (Natsoulas, 1983, 1991a). Except for the purpose of identifying a particular concept of consciousness as in the preceding subsection, I do not enter into conceptual matters here, nor in the second, separate part of this article. Instead, I concern myself next with the kinds of self-awareness that are evidently involved in any consciousness₁ relation as I have already picked this kind of relation out with the help of the OED. In subsequent sections of the first part of this article, I do the same with respect to the referents of the concept of consciousness₂ and the concept of consciousness₃. In the second part, which is published separately and carries the title "Consciousness and Self-Awareness — Part II: Consciousness₄, Consciousness₅, and Consciousness₆," I address the self-awareness, if any, that is necessarily involved in the referents of the remaining three OED basic concepts that are listed in the OED's entry under *consciousness*.

Reflexive objects. I have spoken of what the object is, or what the objects are, of consciousness₁, or of what a particular consciousness₁ relation is primarily about. This object of the relation, or these objects of the relation, should not be confused with the individuals who are in the consciousness₁ relation with each other, that is, *the subjects* of this joint and mutual cognitive relation which is consciousness₁. However, these individuals can also be the objects of the very consciousness₁ relation in which they are the subjects, that same instance of a cognitive relation in which they are the ones who are conscious₁ together with each other. It is in this sense that the object of a consciousness₁ relation may be a reflexive object: A consciousness₁ relation between A and B may be about A, B, A and B, or a combination of either one or both of A and B and other people, animals, and/or things. However, I mention again: the object (O) of a consciousness₁ relation can be anything at all, and therefore O is often a nonreflexive object of the respective relation. In fact, a particular consciousness₁ relation may be about (better to say: seemingly about) *nonexistent* processes, entities, or states of affairs. Given the case in which O happens to be something or other that is nonexistent, the above description of the features of consciousness₁ would have to be revised from its present reference to a *knowledge of facts* about O to the possession of *mere beliefs* about O.

Each time a particular consciousness₁ relation between A and B is actualized (see the fourth and fifth features of the concept listed above), as opposed to the relation's remaining potential in the form of A's and B's possessing the requisite knowledge (see the first three features), A and B would perforce have occurrent awareness of those facts about themselves on which the relation is founded, assuming a consciousness₁ relation with the reflexive object A and B. This is one way that occurrent self-awareness can be involved in an instance of consciousness₁. Of course, self-awareness is not instantiated in this same way (although in other ways; see below) when neither A or B is an object of the consciousness₁ relation between A and B.

Where A(B) is, or A and B are, the objects of a consciousness₁ relation between A and B, the corresponding occurrent self-awareness would be either an awareness of something that A(B) or A and B were doing or undergoing at the time of the awareness's occurrence, or something that one or both of them had done or undergone at an earlier time. But how this awareness came to occur *would not matter*. It could be a case of remembering, of reading a diary entry, of being told or reminded by someone, of listening to or watching a tape, or of having ordinary perceptual or bodily awareness. Or it might be a case of *inner awareness*: A's(B's) immediate awareness of what is taking place in A's(B's) own stream of consciousness. That is, there can be a consciousness₁ relation between A and B with respect to the fact of A's (or B's) undergoing a certain feeling or thought, perception or emotion, desire or expectation, and so on. B(A) could not, of course, have inner awareness of A's(B's) mental life, but B(A) may be able to tell regarding some of what is taking place in A's(B's) stream from A's(B's) appearance and behavior.

As I stated, it would not matter how A and B achieved occurrent awareness of the facts about O on which a consciousness₁ relation between them was founded. Consider this example: A is a psychoanalyst, and B is a patient of A's and, therefore, B is the O of a number of consciousness₁ relations between A and B. In an instance of consciousness₁ relation between A and B, the relevant facts about B might concern one of B's repressed unconscious wishes. The knowledge that A and B share concerning the presence in B of this wish would be necessarily indirect, a matter of knowing other things about B more directly and drawing inferences, with the help of psychoanalytic theory, from these other things to the present state of B's psychical apparatus, the unconscious part. Even when, as a result of a long course of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, B's unconscious wish has become repressed no longer, B's knowledge of the wish's continued presence in him or her, and of its having affective, cognitive, and behavioral effects, would be drawn largely from B's inner awareness of an equivalent conscious wish that the unconscious wish, which is no longer "dynamically" unconscious, does now produce.

Object of the other's awareness. As mentioned, a consciousness₁ relation between A and B need not have either A or B as its object. For example, in a bar late one night, A and B, who are both brokers on Wall Street, overhear voices coming from the booth next to theirs discussing a plan to corner the market in a certain rare and highly useful commodity. A is occurrently aware not only of B's hearing the plan, but also of B's being aware of A's hearing the plan. (The same applies to B with respect to A.) How does A tell that B has this awareness of A? Assuming both A and B interestedly refrain from commenting while listening, A infers B's awareness of A's hearing the voice from the fact that B looks at A in a certain way as they are listening to the voices. That is, B appears to A not simply to be listening, but to be listening together with A, that is, in full awareness that A too is listening to the voices while A is aware of B's listening to the voices. Thus, A has a second kind of self-awareness, in addition to being aware of the fact that he or she and B are listening to the highly intriguing statements emanating from the next booth. In addition, A is aware of himself or herself as an object of B's present occurrent awareness, just as A is aware of the overheard discussion as being an object of B's occurrent awareness. So too, a child becomes occurrently self-aware (not for the first time) when her mother tells a story about her within range of the child's hearing; but not merely because the story evokes thoughts in the child about herself; also, self-awareness occurs in the child's very recognition of the fact that it is she herself about whom her mother is speaking.

Inner awareness. Another kind of self-awareness is also instantiated in the example of the two eavesdropping brokers. This kind of self-awareness is involved, I suggest, in every instance of any consciousness₁ relation. Again, A is aware, as B is, of A's and B's listening to the conversation in the next booth. To bring out a further kind of self-awareness that is involved in the consciousness₁ relation between A and B, I must ask: How does A know that he or she (A) is listening to the voices? To some readers, this will seem a strange question to raise, pertaining as it does not to the problem of other minds, but so to speak to the problem of one's own mind. Some readers may well answer the question without hesitation: "A knows by listening." This answer would seem to imply something along the following lines:

Although listening is an outwardly directed perceptual activity, it may also be a reflective process at the same time. In the very perceptual activity of listening to something, one may have awareness of this activity in which one is now engaged. Or, however else such awareness does occur, one may well have awareness of listening just as this perceptual activity is taking place.

To this, I would add the following: an essential ingredient of listening that makes listening recognizable to one when one is successfully engaged in this

perceptual activity, is one's having inner awareness of the auditory experiences that one is undergoing as a crucial product and part of the activity of listening. In contrast, one may be *listening for* something and not yet hearing it, because what one is listening for is not sounding or is sounding too weakly to be heard from where one stands. It is by inner awareness that you know what you are *listening to*. If one can listen without having inner awareness of the auditory experiences one is therein undergoing, one would be in the dark, absent inner awareness, as to what it is that one is listening to, as well as unaware of the listening itself except perhaps as something that one is anticipating doing. Similarly, one knows that one is *listening for* something not simply because one intends to listen for it, but also because one has inner awareness of oneself as now having certain auditory experiences, inner awareness of oneself as hearing certain sounds which do not as yet include the sounds for which one is listening.

I have claimed that every instance of consciousness₁ includes the inner-awareness kind of self-awareness. Inclusion of inner awareness in consciousness₁ is entailed by the essential fact that a consciousness₁ relation, each time that it is actualized, involves occurrent awareness of the other individual who is in the consciousness₁ relation with one as having awareness of some of the same facts about O that one has awareness of oneself. Such thoughts as the following would fill the bill: "What I(A) am now having awareness of, those special facts about O, B too is aware of. And B is aware of my being aware of them and B's being aware of them." As mentioned in the preceding subsection, B need not have the referred to awarenesses simultaneously with A. After committing a crime together, for example, A and B may take up residence in widely separated locations and never communicate with each other again. But B, too, must have the requisite occurrent awarenesses from time to time if we are not to consider the particular consciousness₁ relation between A and B to have lapsed.

Inner awareness is involved (on both sides) every time an interpersonal pattern of occurrent awarenesses is instantiated that constitutes a consciousness₁ relation. A(B) does not simply have occurrent awareness of (a) the relevant facts about O, (b) B(A) as having occurrent awareness of those facts, and (c) B(A) as having occurrent awareness of A's(B's) having occurrent awareness of those facts. A(B) also has inner awareness of (d) his or her own occurrent awarenesses mentioned in the preceding sentence. That is to say, *consciousness₁ never takes place nonconsciously*: in the sense that those mental-occurrence instances of A's(B's) that, on his or her part, constitute the relation take place with only B's(A's) having awareness of them. Along with being occurrently aware of what is relevantly taking place in the other's stream of consciousness, A(B) takes notice as well of A's(B's) own relevant occurrent awarenesses, and of them as forming matching pairs with B's(A's)

corresponding ones. For example: "B must be thinking, as I am, of what we did together and that I, as B himself does, have it very much on my mind, including my thinking about B's thinking about it, as in fact I am."

Consciousness₂, or Conceiving of Oneself on a Firsthand Basis

In a previous article (Natsoulas, 1991b), I specified as follows the kind of happening that we are seeking to refer to when we exercise the second concept of consciousness that is listed in the OED's entry under *consciousness*:

By means of the process of consciousness₂, I newly learn or remind myself, on a firsthand basis (not from hearsay), about the kind of person I am in one or another respect (to be further specified below); I newly learn or remind myself of this, from having witnessed relevant actions I performed or experiences I had, and by now bringing this [personal] evidence [about myself] to bear on how I conceive of myself, in terms of a trait or ability I therefore consider myself to possess, on perhaps other grounds as well. (p. 344)

Clearly, self-awareness is crucially involved in every instance of consciousness₂ — or else a candidate instance could not qualify as an instance of consciousness₂. Next, I shall enumerate and describe the several ways in which self-awareness is instantiated in consciousness₂. As will be seen later in this part of the present article, a sharp contrast exists between consciousness₂ and consciousness₃ with respect to self-awareness. It is a matter of *controversy* whether any self-awareness at all is necessary for consciousness₃. In contrast, any successful application of the word *consciousness* that serves to express the second OED meaning entails an *essential* reference to self-awareness.

Self-Awareness and Consciousness₂

1. Consciousness₂ requires being or having been *one's own witness*; or "having the testimony within oneself," which is how the OED puts this point in its definition of the concept of consciousness₂. To be conscious₂ at the present moment, it is necessary — although, obviously, it is not by any means sufficient — that one now be witnessing or that one previously have witnessed something of a certain kind about oneself (call it "O"). Note that O *cannot* be just anything at all, as it can be in someone's being conscious₁ or conscious₃. The self-witnessing on which consciousness₂ depends has as its O either one's own behavior or a segment of one's stream of consciousness. Hearsay obviously cannot serve as a basis for consciousness₂; as when, for example, one learns from one's parents, lacking all memory of it that one can consult, about one's behavior early in life. Any instance of consciousness₂ involves one or both of these kinds of immediate self-awareness — that is, (a) own behavior awareness firsthand and (b) inner awareness — among

other kinds of self-awareness. Note that consciousness₂ does not simply amount to such self-witnessing, whether past or present, however we might choose further to specify the self-witnessing involved. Whether or not remembering past experiences or behaviors is part of an instance of one's being conscious₂, the latter must include a process of one's coming to a conclusion on the basis of self-witnessed evidence (see item 5. below). In fact, psychologists would do well to distinguish with care between consciousness₂ per se and the self-witnessing that such consciousness requires and on which consciousness₂ is based. One's instantiating consciousness₂ cannot be the equivalent of one's merely remembering the occurrence of one or more occasions of such self-witnessing.

2. In the self-witnessing of evidence on which one's consciousness₂ can be based, not only is it an occurrent part of oneself that one is aware of firsthand; also, one is aware of this occurrent part of oneself *as being part of oneself*. In this sense, the awareness involved in the self-witnessing of evidence for use in being conscious₂ must be "personal" rather than "impersonal." As James (1890/1950) would say, in the act of one's witnessing them, the items that one witnesses are "appropriated to oneself." Therefore, for example, seeing — by means of an arrangement of mirrors, or by means of video equipment — someone doing something (e.g., standing on the sidewalk and looking intently straight ahead) without recognizing that individual as oneself would be an instance of self-awareness (see item 1. above), but it would not be self-awareness of the kind that I mean here. A similar difference can be brought out with respect to inner awareness: probably, it is possible for you to be immediately aware of one of your experiences without your appropriating the experience to yourself. As I have already noted in this article, with reference to James's (1890/1950) examples of consciousness in the absence of self-awareness, people do report having such experiences. I expressed doubt, however, that experiences that are self-reported can ever be experiences of which the individual was aware when they occurred without his or her having awareness of them as his or hers. Although I hold that all experiences that one reports are or were appropriated to oneself at the time of their occurrence,⁴ I have no reason to reject the thesis that, among the inner awarenesses that take place in one, there are some which are "impersonal"; that is, these are inner awarenesses that do not ascribe their object to oneself (or to anyone else).

⁴People sometimes report on a firsthand basis experiences that they have had or that they are now having but from which they feel themselves to be "alienated." That is, their experiences seem to them not actually to be theirs. The experiences may even seem to belong to another agent who has managed somehow to invade their mind (Natsoulas, 1979; Reed, 1972). Evidently, these people are not aware of these particular experiences simply or impersonally, that is, without either appropriating them or disappropriating them. I can readily counte-

3. One's being conscious₂ more frequently takes place after the fact than at the time when one is witnessing the evidence on which that instance of consciousness₂ is based. In most instances of one's being conscious₂, one is remembering what it was that one witnessed about oneself (and that is relevant to judging what kind of person one is; see item 5. below). All cases of remembering proper essentially include occurrent awareness now of a past occurrence or state of affairs.⁵ The remembering proper that is involved in consciousness₂ is an occurrent awareness now of something that one did or underwent oneself. As part of consciousness₂, there usually takes place a kind of self-awareness that is a "retrowareness" (Natsoulas, 1986) of oneself in one or more respects.

4. However, for an occurrent awareness to qualify as an instance of remembering proper, the occurrent awareness must be a retrowareness of a special kind. It does not suffice that the object of the particular retrowareness is something of which one was originally aware firsthand. *One must now be aware of oneself as apprehending now something that one had earlier apprehended.* Thus, inner awareness is involved in the act of remembering, but also there is involved a kind of retrowareness that resembles inner awareness: namely, a present retrowareness of one's past apprehending of something in particular.⁶ In those cases of consciousness₂ in which one must remember witnessing the relevant evidence, consciousness₂ requires having inner awareness of present components of one's stream of consciousness that are retrowarenesses of both the evidence and some of the mental acts that took place as part of one's witnessing that evidence.

nance the possibility of impersonal experiences, experiences of which one has immediate awareness without ascription. However, I believe that cases in which someone ascribes his or her experiences to someone else are more complex than they first appear. Requiring close examination is the hypothesis (a) that these people do have awareness of their other-ascribed experiences as being their own, and (b) that self-ascription of the experiences takes place in the very process of their disappropriating these experiences. I postpone to a future article consideration of alienated experiences from the perspective that I have just indicated.

⁵If one remembers to do something, or remembers that one will or should do something (e.g., to keep a certain appointment on the next day), is one therein remembering a future event rather than something in the past? Such cases would seem to amount to following a plan that one has previously adopted, or one's acting on a past resolution to do something in particular. Any remembering proper that may be involved in such cases would be an instance of remembering a past experience or overt behavior wherein one resolved or promised to later carry out the particular action on a particular occasion or to put a certain plan into effect as circumstances might require.

⁶I am reminded of John Locke's (1706/1984) notion of a consciousness, or inner awareness, that gets extended backward in time. Thus, one has occurrent awareness now of past mental-occurrence instances of which one had been immediately aware at the time. One has awareness of them now that is like the awareness of them that one had at the time.

5. Remembering is not enough; one is not conscious₂ simply because one remembers witnessing something about oneself, however important this latter feature of oneself happens to be. What one remembers does not become evidence until it serves as such, until one puts what one remembers to use as evidence. To instantiate consciousness₂, one must put what one remembers or is witnessing now about oneself *to use as evidence regarding the kind of person that one is*. In addition to now being aware of the particular past occurrences as being occurrent parts of oneself, one must have (a) thoughts concerning one or more abstract characteristics *pertaining to the intellectual, moral, or religious dimensions of one's character or personality* (see Natsoulas, 1991b) and (b) judgments concerning how the evidence that one remembers bears on one's possessing or not possessing these abstract characteristics.

6. Of course, such thoughts about oneself and the appropriate conclusions reached from them can also take place quickly, even as one is now engaged in witnessing behaviors and mental-occurrence instances of one's own that are relevant to the kind of person that one is. These objects of awareness can serve as evidence not only later but at the time of their occurrence. In either case, whether one is conscious₂ now or later, one has, in being conscious₂,

- (a) self-awareness in the form of one's having awareness now of present or past self-witnessed evidence about oneself as a person,
- (b) self-awareness in the form of one's having inner awareness of the present self-apprehendings that I just mentioned,
- (c) self-awareness in the form of one's having thoughts about one's relevant personal (intellectual, moral, or religious) trait or traits, and
- (d) self-awareness in the form of one's evaluating the relevance of the self-witnessed evidence about oneself with respect to how it bears on the kind of person one appears to oneself to be.

Consciousness₃, or Being Occurrently Aware of Anything at All

Suppose that you are occurrently aware of something (O). For the present purpose, it does not matter what O is, whether O exists, has existed, or ever will come into existence. O can be anything at all, in an extremely broad sense of *anything*. And your awareness of O may take place in any way at all, as a consequence of any set of factors, even factors we have not yet dreamed of in our sciences and technologies. A newly discovered means of producing awarenesses would not affect the status as such of these new awarenesses. For the present conceptual purpose, the how of occurrent awareness does not pertain. What matters is simply your undergoing the awareness, the awareness's occurrence in you — whether or not you have any idea concerning how the awareness came to occur in you, whether or not you have inner awareness of it, and whether or not you know by any other means of the awareness's occurrence.

Whenever you are occurrently aware, you therein instantiate a referent of the OED's third concept listed in its entry for *consciousness*. You are therein conscious₃ of something or as though of something. Thus, I am construing the concept of consciousness₃ more liberally than I have done in a previous article (Natsoulas, 1992). There, I conformed more closely than I do here to the OED's third entry under *consciousness*. I am now qualifying my understanding of the OED's concept of consciousness₃, so that applying the concept *does not require* the objects of consciousness₃ to be *facts in every case*. However, even previously (Natsoulas, 1992), I commented that the concept of consciousness₃ seems to have evolved in a way that the compilers of the OED have not yet taken notice of.

However, instead of the consciousness₃ concept's having evolved, it may be more accurate to speak of the addition to the English language of a further use of the words *conscious* and *consciousness*. That is, these words are now used not only to refer to any occurrent awareness of a fact, but also to refer to a kind of occurrent awareness that has particulars for its objects. In fact, even nonexistent particulars may be objects of consciousness₃, as I am more broadly conceiving of it. (For present purposes, let me not introduce an additional subscripted term and a distinct kind of consciousness.) We are not occurrently aware merely of facts or beliefs about a tree, about a river, about a bridge, or about a fire-breathing dragon. Also, we are occurrently aware of these things themselves, of a tree, of a river, of a bridge, and of a fire-breathing dragon.

As I mentioned in the introductory section, all of James's (1890/1950) basic durational components of the stream of consciousness, in James's own view, are, individually, awarenesses. They are states of consciousness and, as such, (a) they give one awareness of something (or seemingly of something) and (b) they are themselves actual or possible objects of inner awareness. Thus, from the Jamesian perspective, there are no sensory states as Sellars (1981) and others have described them. That is, there are no sensations that are experiences and yet possess nothing cognitive about them. At the very beginning of Chapter IX, James (1890/1950) wrote as follows:

We now begin our study of the mind from within. Most books start with sensations, as the simplest mental facts, and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage from the one below it. But this is abandoning the empirical method of investigation. No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness from our natal day is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree. It is astonishing what havoc is wrought in psychology by admitting at the outset apparently innocent suppositions, that nevertheless contain a flaw. (p. 224)

James would say the same thing about any other successful candidate for membership among the basic durational components of the stream of con-

consciousness. It too would be an awareness of something else or it would include awareness of something else as an intrinsic feature of it.

My interpretation of the third OED definition of *consciousness* (see Natsoulas, 1983, 1992) makes no reference to inner awareness, except to say that inner awareness is a kind of occurrent awareness. That is, I allow that consciousness₃ may be instantiated even when the particular occurrent awareness cannot be an object of inner awareness. Paradoxical as it may sound, Freud's unconscious mental-occurrence instances would be therefore, all of them, instances of consciousness₃; notwithstanding that Freud's unconscious mental-occurrence instances are properly understood, I believe, as not being in principle accessible to inner awareness. Rather, whenever unconscious mental-occurrence instances succeed in "becoming-conscious," they evoke a counterpart mental-occurrence instance that is an object of inner awareness.

Does every instance of consciousness₃ require self-awareness in some other form than inner awareness? For that matter, does consciousness₃ require inner awareness, contrary to my claim just above? Might all mental-occurrence instances be conscious; that is, might they all be actual or potential objects of inner awareness, as James and, most recently, Searle (1992) have argued? Does all that is cognitive and occurs in the mind necessarily *come before the mind* in the sense of its being *presented to consciousness*? Does one come before one's mind oneself, each time one is occurrently aware of anything, including those many items of which one is aware without in the slightest way confusing them with oneself?

Although I have insisted on the crucial involvement of self-awareness in every instance of consciousness₁ and every instance of consciousness₂, I shall argue next, in closing Part I of the present article, *against* the necessary presence of any kind of self-awareness as part of one's being conscious₃. I fully agree with what John Dewey (1906) stated regarding our concept of consciousness₃:

"Conscious" means *aware*: "consciousness," the state of being aware. This is a wide colorless use; there is no discrimination nor implication as to contents, as to what there is awareness of, — whether mental or physical, personal or impersonal, etc. (p. 40)

Is Self-Awareness Involved in Consciousness₃?

1. In the introductory section of the present article, I mentioned a certain proposal, which James contradicted, concerning consciousness and self-awareness. According to that proposal, *whatever one has occurrent awareness of must be apprehended either as being a distinct existent from oneself or as being either oneself or a part of oneself*. However, there seem to be cases in which

one's occurrent awareness does neither; it neither appropriates to oneself nor disappropriates from oneself that which it makes one aware of. For example, when one comes back to "consciousness" after an accident that rendered one unconscious (see the section on consciousness₆ in the second, forthcoming part of the present article), one may turn one's gaze to the right and become aware of the arm lying at one's side, but one may not be able to tell to whom the arm belongs until one tries to move the arm. In such a case, one is already aware of the arm *before* one can distinguish it from oneself or apprehend the arm to be part of oneself. In the mental act of being perceptually aware of the arm, one picks the arm out from whatever else one is also seeing. But one must be aware of the arm in order to be in a position to appropriate it or to disappropriate it. Judgments regarding what belongs to the self or to the not-self are unnecessary to giving the items discriminated their phenomenological presence. Analogously, one does not determine whether one is hallucinating a particular something before one is occurrently aware of it. In a sense, being occurrently aware of a hallucinated item sets the problem of reality. So too, placing an item on the variable is-me versus is-not-me need not precede or accompany the apprehending of the item.

2. A theorist who adopts an indirect realist position with respect to how we have perceptual awareness of the environment surrounding us will propose that inner awareness is essential to every instance of perceptual awareness — and he or she will probably go on, for the sake of consistency at least, to generalize the point to other kinds of awareness. The theorist will propose as follows:

Inner awareness of one's perceptual states is essential to perceiving the environment. In perceiving the environment, what one has primary awareness of is something that belongs to the stream of consciousness itself, for example, to a collection of sensations or experiences or to a phenomenal world. One cannot be perceptually aware of something external to the stream in any direct way. Such direct awareness would have to do the impossible: it would have to cross a spatial gap. It would have to traverse a piece of physical space, whereas perceptual awarenesses, being of the mind, cannot migrate to a location outside the mind, where their purported objects lie. In the process of indirectly perceiving the physical environment, one's perceptual systems operate in such a way that one *takes* what one has inner awareness of *as though* it was something that exists externally to the mind, *as though* one was, *per impossibile*, perceiving the physical environment itself.

The basic objection to this indirect realist position can be briefly stated: the perceiver is theoretically incapable of becoming aware, perceptually or otherwise, of *anything at all that is external to the mind*, unless the indirect realist arbitrarily allows other kinds of mental-occurrence instances, than the perceptual ones, to be occurrent awarenesses that do succeed, whereas perceptual awarenesses for some reason fail, in breaking out of the circle of subjectivity.

3. It may be argued that:

(a) whatever one has occurrent awareness *as though of* must be a part of oneself, because the objects of occurrent awarenesses-as-though-of do not exist, have not existed, and will not exist externally to ourselves. And (b) if occurrent awarenesses-as-though-of are self-awarenesses, occurrent awarenesses-of that are like occurrent awarenesses-as-though-of (except that the occurrent awarenesses-of do have an external object) must also be, fundamentally, awarenesses of a part of oneself. The difference between the two kinds of occurrent awarenesses is nonpsychological: the internal objects of occurrent awarenesses-of happen to correspond to certain parts of the environment.

However, the idea that when we hallucinate we are having awareness of something internal to us is fraught with theoretical difficulties. For example: *a fire-breathing dragon does not exist anywhere, has never existed, and will never exist.* Of this, does anyone have any doubt? When I hallucinate a fire-breathing dragon, my occurrent awarenesses which are involved in this bout of hallucinating do not have as their actual (as opposed to apparent) object a fire-breathing dragon, because the relation of ofness (aboutness) between an awareness and its object requires the existence of both terms in the relation. Because a fire-breathing dragon can have no existence, any relation in which the dragon may seem to participate also does not exist. Being nonexistent, a fire-breathing dragon cannot instantiate any properties at all, although many of the properties that it seems to possess are properties that are instantiated by other things.

The following response to my objection may be forthcoming:

When we have occurrent awarenesses-as-though-of, we are aware of something else, which actually exists internally to us, an internal state or process. And we take, or our mind takes, that of which we are occurrently aware by inner awareness as though it were, for example, a fire-breathing dragon. Thus, we mis-take something real for something that is unreal. The properties that we mis-take a fire-breathing dragon to instantiate are actually properties belonging to something else, something that is internal to us. Or, alternatively, they are not the properties that we take them to be; for example, nothing internal to us has fiery breath. Rather, we mis-take the actual properties of our internal state for different properties and as belonging to a part of the surrounding environment.

However, this process of mis-taking, contrary to how it may sound as described, is not an activity in which we actually engage. That is, the proposed mis-taking happens to us, rather than being something that we ourselves do. That hallucinatory awarenesses and perceptual awarenesses are necessarily occurrent awarenesses of something that lies internally to the mind should not be intended literally. It is not the case that, if we would only introspect more carefully, less superficially, we would become aware of the actual properties belonging to our mind that our mind mis-takes for properties of something that lies externally to our mind. At best, we would

become aware of basic durational components of our stream of consciousness and of their contents, or how we are aware of what we are aware of in having those components as components of our stream of consciousness. In other words, the stream of consciousness is itself, as we find it, an outcome of the proposed mis-takings that are held to be crucial to the hallucinatory and perceptual awarenesses that we undergo. The mis-takings are hypothetical, and they occur, if they do occur, behind the scenes, not at the level of the occurrent awarenesses that are claimed really to be apprehensions of something other than that which they seem to apprehend. What we perceive, the objects of our ordinary perceptual awarenesses, are whatever we are having occurrent awareness-of in the surrounding environment or of the body. And our occurrent awarenesses-as-thought-of provide no special access to our mental states.

4. James (1890/1950) claimed that all of the basic durational components of the stream of consciousness involve self-awareness in the form of bodily awareness. It is not just that stimulation from the body has a major effect on the total brain process, which, according to James, brings the stream of consciousness into existence, pulse of mentality by pulse of mentality. These pulses of mentality are complex, and they include awareness of the body; they individually include bodily feelings, along with whatever else they are occurrent awarenesses of: "Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which *some* awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know" (James, 1890/1950, p. 241). In response to James's contention, one may demand to know how bodily awareness is brought about by the brain and why this process is as unvarying as James stated that it is. Why cannot the total brain process produce some pulses of consciousness that are free of all reference to the body? Must all stimulation of greater than a certain intensity produce an awareness of its source? I do not take James to be saying that occurrent awareness is impossible without bodily awareness, merely that all occurrent awarenesses do include bodily feelings. The complete elimination of bodily feelings, were it possible, or the partial inhibition of bodily feelings, would not produce temporal gaps in the stream of consciousness. The total brain process would not stop adding pulses of mentality to the stream. The total brain process would continue to produce a stream of consciousness, as it does in cases of blindness or deafness.

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