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Consciousness and Self-Awareness — Part II: Consciousness$_4$, Consciousness$_5$, and Consciousness$_6$

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Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether and how self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that *The Oxford English Dictionary* identifies in its entry for the word *consciousness*. In this second part, I inquire into how self-awareness enters (a) consciousness$_4$, or the immediate ("inner") awareness that we have of our mental-occurrence instances, (b) consciousness$_5$, or the constitution of the totality of mental-occurrence instances which is the person's conscious being, and (c) consciousness$_6$, or the highly adaptive general mode of the mind's functioning that we instantiate for most of the time that we are awake. Consciousness$_4$ is a kind of occurrent self-awareness because, in being conscious$_4$, it is part of oneself that one has occurrent awareness of; although one need not also, at those times, be aware of oneself as such. Consciousness$_5$ consists of those of one's mental-occurrence instances that one is now conscious$_4$ as one's own or one can remember being conscious$_4$ of and appropriating to oneself. Whether consciousness$_6$ must involve self-awareness is difficult to answer because the common concept of consciousness$_6$ does not imply an answer, and we have no clear view of what consciousness$_6$ uniquely consists in; that is, no account of consciousness$_6$ as yet successfully distinguishes it from all of the mind's other general operating modes.

I introduced Part I (Natsoulas, 1997) with special reference to James's (1890/1950) claim that one can be occurrently aware of an item (O) without having, on that particular occasion, any awareness of oneself or of any component of one's stream of consciousness, including any component constituting one's occurrent awareness of O. The opposing view is that features or concomitants of occurrent awareness always include awareness of its own

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occurrence and of belonging to its owner; an occurrent awareness of O must discriminate between itself and O or must be discriminated from O. James considered this view extreme because it construes every basic durational component of the stream of consciousness as involving, or involved in, a reflective or introspective process, even where O has existence only outside the stream.[1] However, I suggested, the question needs addressing whether a degree of truth is, after all, contained in *some* thesis to the effect that consciousness involves self-awareness; perhaps every instance of consciousness has *something self-referential about it* without its being itself, necessarily, an object of awareness. This reference would be to oneself rather than to one's mental-occurrence instance. For example, perhaps all one's occurrent awarenesses take their respective O as either being or not being part of oneself, just as every occurrent awareness distinguishes its O from other items.

The present topic is the relation between consciousness and self-awareness. *Specifically, does consciousness require, either as a concomitant or as an intrinsic feature, awareness of its owner as such, or awareness of its own occurrence at least, or any other form of occurrent self-awareness?* Does consciousness depend on self-awareness? Here is one right answer to this question: the relations between consciousness and self-awareness will vary depending on the concept of consciousness exercised in posing the question; different concepts of consciousness have different referents, which involve self-awareness in different ways. Such variation was evident in Part I, where I inquired into how occurrent self-awareness is involved, if at all, in consciousness$_1$, consciousness$_2$, and consciousness$_3$, the referents of the first three concepts of consciousness *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989; "OED") identifies under *consciousness* (Natsoulas, 1983). For each of these three kinds of consciousness, I arrived at a different answer concerning the involvement of occurrent self-awareness in consciousness.

Three other consciousness concepts included in the same OED entry provide the successive foci of Part II. Before addressing whether and how occurrent self-awareness is involved in consciousness$_4$, consciousness$_5$, and consciousness$_6$, I briefly summarize my conclusions on the first three concepts.

1. Unlike the other five kinds of consciousness, *consciousness$_1$* does not take place merely within an individual's mind or is simply instantiated by an individual's behavior. Rather, consciousness$_1$ is interpersonal. Consciousness$_1$

[1]James had to reject the thesis that there is awareness of every mental-occurrence instance, because James held that such awareness can take place only by means of a mental-occurrence instance that is distinct from its object. An undesirable implication of the thesis that James rejected is that this separate awareness would be itself perforce the object of a further mental-occurrence instance, and so on.

is a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance of something (O). I limit my description to two people (A and B) in such a relation together. In each such case, the six following statements obtain. Note that nowhere in the following listing do I imply A and B must be in the same place or in mutual communication to be instantiating a consciousness$_1$ relation together. Nor do I imply that A's and B's respective awarenesses, which concretely make up the particular consciousness$_1$ relation, must take place simultaneously.

(a) A and B both know a certain fact or set of facts about O, which can be anything or anyone.

(b) A(B) knows that B(A) knows that fact or those facts about O.

(c) A(B) knows that B(A) knows that A(B) knows that fact or those facts about O.

(d) From time to time, A and B both have occurrent awareness of that fact or those facts about O, which can be a matter merely of having thoughts about those facts.

(e) From time to time, A(B) undergoes occurrent awareness to the effect that B(A) occurrently apprehends on occasion the states of affairs identified in the first three items above. These occurrent awarenesses, or apprehensions, may be just passing thoughts regarding those matters.

(f) Only A is involved or only a few additional people can be involved in this particular consciousness$_1$ relation with B. Otherwise, the relation is not exclusive enough to qualify as an instantiation of consciousness$_1$.

Thus, a particular consciousness$_1$ relation in which you happen to participate may or may not have a reflexive object; that is, you yourself need not be the O in such a case, nor need O be one or more of the people with whom you are instantiating the relation. However, *any instance of consciousness$_1$ perforce includes, on the part of each individual who is involved in it, two kinds of self-awareness: namely both inner awareness and awareness of oneself as being an object of the other's (or others') awareness.* Whenever a consciousness$_1$ relation is actualized between A and B, A(B) has occurrent awareness of B(A) as having occurrent awareness of some of the same facts about O that A(B) has occurrent awareness of.

2. *Consciousness$_2$* is a process in which one newly learns or reminds oneself, on a firsthand evidentiary basis, about the kind of person one is in certain sorts of respects. *Assuming remembering (of the evidence to be mentioned) is involved, consciousness$_2$ requires self-awareness in the following six forms:*

(a) witnessing or having witnessed potential evidence about oneself, namely, one's own behavior as such, or a segment of one's stream of consciousness as such;

(b) having inner awareness of this witnessing, at the time when the witnessing occurred;

(c) having further inner awareness and self-awareness at the point of remembering witnessing the evidence;
(d) having occurrent awareness now of one or more intellectual, moral, or religious aspects of one's character or personality;[2] and
(e) bringing the self-witnessed evidence to bear in making judgments regarding that aspect or those aspects of oneself.

3. *Consciousness*$_3$ is having occurrent awareness of anything at all (O), including entities, events, and states of affairs that do not exist, have not existed, and will not exist. O may be oneself or any bodily or mental part of oneself; a particular instance of consciousness$_3$ may be an occurrent self-awareness, even an inner awareness — consciousness$_4$ is a kind of consciousness$_3$. *Consciousness*$_3$ *need not involve in particular cases any self-awareness at all, of any kind, and it may occur completely unbeknownst to anyone, including its owner.* Even Sigmund Freud's repressed wishes are instances of consciousness$_3$. The latter statement does not contradict such states' being "unconscious" in Freud's special sense (Natsoulas, 1985). Whatever else a wish, whether conscious or unconscious, may be intrinsically, it is an occurrent awareness of the state of affairs that is wished for therein.

Consciousness$_4$, or Having Immediate Awareness of One's Mental-Occurrence Instances

Although an instance of consciousness$_3$ need not involve any kind of self-awareness at all, any occurrent self-awareness is an instance of consciousness$_3$. Consciousness$_3$ can be of anything at all, including of course oneself, one's mental-occurrence instances, one's behavior, and parts of one's body. Therefore, *consciousness*$_4$ is a kind of consciousness$_3$.[3] It is a kind of occurrent awareness; as is, as well, any other kind of occurrent self-awareness. What, more specifically, is consciousness$_4$?

> Any occurrent awareness of one or more of one's mental-occurrence instances is, by definition, a case of consciousness$_4$ (or "inner awareness") *provided that* the occurrent awareness is "immediate": that is, (a) not an instance of remembering and (b) not mediated by an awareness of something else.

Here is an example of a kind of mediation that would disqualify an occurrent awareness of a mental-occurrence instance from being a case of consciousness$_4$: one judges oneself to have had certain experiences of O on the basis of

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[2]See Natsoulas (1991) for some comments regarding the definitional restriction of consciousness$_2$ to only certain of the individual's characteristics.

[3]A superordinate–subordinate relation is not instantiated by any other pair drawn from the six kinds of consciousness that are discussed in the present article.

the fact (or apparent fact) that one possesses certain items of knowledge about O. Occurrent judgments all qualify as instances of consciousness$_3$; and the specific judgments in this example are awarenesses of mental-occurrence instances. Yet, these judgments do not qualify as instances of consciousness$_4$ for two reasons: (a) they are outcomes of inferential processes, and (b) they are not about the latter processes, neither mediatedly nor, as they would have to be in order to qualify, unmediatedly.

Doubts about Consciousness$_4$

Again, all instances of consciousness$_4$ are cases of occurrent self-awareness, since the Os of consciousness$_4$ are, in every instance, a certain kind of part of oneself, namely, a mental-occurrence instance. Thus, the answer to the present article's main question, when posed with reference to consciousness$_4$, would seem to be unproblematic:

> Consciousness$_4$ necessarily involves self-awareness because any instance of consciousness$_4$ is itself a kind of awareness of self.

However, some psychologists will not find this straightforward answer satisfactory. They will have reservations or critical doubts regarding *what it is that one has immediate occurrent awareness of whenever one is considered to be instantiating consciousness$_4$*. They will hold, in opposition, that these Os are never mental-occurrence instances; and consciousness$_4$ is, therefore, not what it is purported to be. I present next three different ways in which this objection may be brought, together with my reactions to each of them. All three of the following debunking proposals are to the effect that consciousness$_4$ is *illusory* if consciousness$_4$ is understood as I have defined it in the introductory paragraph of this main section.

1. A theorist may argue contra consciousness$_4$ along these lines:

> Rather than one's being aware of a mental-occurrence instance when one is said to be conscious$_4$, what one is actually immediately aware of is *a piece of one's behavior; or, at most, an incipient behavior.* An incipient behavior is an inner stage — which may or may not be followed by the next stage — in the process by which an overt or covert behavior comes to be produced. Therefore, consciousness$_4$ does not exist. Awareness of one's own behavior is not produced by a special introspective process. Own-behavior awareness takes place all the time, in the ordinary course of guiding and controlling one's behavior in relation to the surrounding environment.[4]

[4]I do not argue in the text as I have argued elsewhere (from a Gibsonian perspective [Gibson, 1979/1986, chapter 13]):

> Your controlling your active locomotor behavior on a visual basis necessarily involves your [being conscious$_4$] of how, as you move, a part of the environment is transforming or changing in how you are visually experiencing it, that is, in how that part of the environment is visual-qualitatively appearing to you. (Natsoulas, 1993b, p. 317)

Although this alternative proposal means that consciousness$_4$ is not what we commonly believe it to be, consciousnness$_4$ would still qualify as a kind of occurrent self-awareness under this proposal. In fact, the reference to our apprehending incipient behavior comes close to, if it is not equivalent to, the notion that we have immediate access to certain of our own mental-occurrence instances. That is, incipient behaviors may actually be the equivalents of our being inclined to, or having a present tendency to, produce particular actions.

Moreover, this first debunking proposal needs to be reconciled with the phenomenological facts, that is, with what it seems to one that one has awareness of on particular occasions when one takes oneself to be instantiating consciousness$_4$. The thesis that we frequently take behavior for something else, which is not behavioral, needs to be made persuasive. That we suffer a systematic illusion of this kind requires an explanation. If indeed it is (overt, covert, or incipient) behavior that we are conscious$_4$ of, why do we not already know this? Why do the Os of consciousness$_4$ seem to us to be so different from behaviors? A theorist's thesis loses credibility when he or she dismisses contradictory evidence merely with the claim that observing this evidence is subject to an illusion. I have no desire to ignore certain illustrious episodes in the history of science. We should be proud of and take courage from scientists' having succeeded in demonstrating that something which people widely believed to be the case was in fact not the case. However, a scientific thesis is not true just because it contradicts prior belief. Any proposal to the effect that it is behavior that we really have awareness of when we are commonly held to be instantiating consciousness$_4$ should be accompanied with close attention to the hard cases — in which it seems to us, very surely, that we are aware of something not at all like any kind of action or responding. The burden of proof should fall on the theorist who proffers a debunking proposal, rather than on those who do not find the proposal obviously true.

Consider in this connection Wilfrid Sellars's discussion of visual perceptual awareness, specifically, his experiencing a pink ice cube (his favorite example). Sellars's (1978) following description is based on his having consciousness$_4$ of instances of it. The two statements which I quote express how that experience seems to him firsthand, as well as how experience of the same kind seem to many other sophisticated observers:

> We not only see *that* the ice cube is pink, and see it *as* pink, we see *the very pinkness* of the object; also its very shape — though from a certain point of view. (p. 177)

> *Something, somehow* a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely *believed in*. (p. 178)

Sellars (1968, 1980) has explicitly held:

> Consciousness$_4$ is a matter of learned conceptual responding to one's mental-occurrence instances; one becomes aware firsthand of one's mental-occurrence instances by responding to them in the form of taking a certain kind of initial position in a language game.

Yet, in the above quoted statements and other similar statements, Sellars (1978) implies that, after all, we do have a kind of access to our mental life that brings us into *contact or encounter with our visual sensations that is more intimate than any mere conceptual response, utterance or thought, however well-informed, can be*. That is, when visual perceptual experiences (of environmental entities) that contain these sensations are objects of consciousness$_4$, the experiences are revealed to us as being nonconceptual at least in part. That is, their having a nonconceptual aspect is not just a matter of how we think of them. We apprehend our perceptual awarenesses of environmental entities and events as *experientially presenting* those entities and events to us; rather than merely as *representing* them, as our linguistic behaviors and thoughts do. From the first-person perspective of consciousness$_4$, the experiential presence of the environment and body is clearly not reducible to responding to them. Is their clearly evident presence no more than an illusion? Are we behaving with respect to the environment and body, without having any experience of them? This is one of those hard cases that I mentioned; it needs close attention and persuasive comment from any theorist for whom the first debunking proposal carries weight.

2. Similarly to the first proposal and, again, without denying that consciousness$_4$ is a kind of self-awareness, a theorist might hold:

> Assuming an instance of inner awareness does not fail of reference, what we must be conscious$_4$ of in that case is never a mental-occurrence instance. Rather, the Os of consciousness$_4$ are always neurophysiological occurrences, which lack all mental properties (e.g., intentionality, qualities). *For no such properties exist.*

Such a view would have to give its own sense to the notion of our having inner awareness, since this view does not deny, as well, the existence of inner awareness. If, purportedly, what we have inner awareness of is physiological in the above pure sense, this leaves to be explained the occurrent self-awareness that inner awareness is. Presumably, a theorist who claims the above would contend that consciousness$_4$, too, is a neurophysiological process without any mental properties. However, such a claim would lead me to ask: How can a neurophysiological occurrence embody a reference to another neurophysiological occurrence if the former neurophysiological occurrence does not possess the property of intentionality? Occasionally, I hear a psychologist

say that the concept of intentionality will eventually be replaced in scientific thought by means of strictly causal concepts. I reply to this prediction as follows:

> If, someday, the property of intentionality comes to be entirely erased from the face of the earth, nothing will then *seem* in any way to any creature that may still be left alive on our planet. Instantiations of the first-person or subjective perspective will all have disappeared. In other words, we cannot eliminate intentionality simply by replacing the concepts with which we work. To say the least, our instantiating the property of intentionality is essential to our being able to exercise concepts and to do scientific work.

As Edmund Husserl (1933–1937/1970) states:

> Science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure, both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life, pregiven as existing for all in common. Furthermore, [science] is an accomplishment which, in being practiced and carried forward, continues to presuppose this surrounding world as it is given in its particularity to the scientist. For example, for the physicist it is the world in which he sees his measuring instruments, hears time-beats, estimates visible magnitudes, etc. — the world in which, furthermore, he knows himself to be included with all his activity and all his theoretical ideas. (p. 121)

3. Or a theorist might argue:

> Whenever it seems to us as though we are having inner awareness of a part of our mental life, we are, rather, taking direct notice of the parts of the world or body that we are here and now perceiving, remembering, imagining, hallucinating, desiring, rejecting, or the like. Thus, it is by first being immediately aware of the objects of such mental activities that we can judge ourselves to be undergoing certain mental-occurrence instances. Therefore, consciousness$_4$ is not a kind of self-awareness except (a) when it happens to be ourselves or a part of our body that we are perceiving, remembering, or the like, as required, or (b) if a theorist wants to include as components of consciousness$_4$ certain inferential processes which draw upon what is unmediatedly apprehended. On the basis of immediate awareness of something else, these inferential processes serve to provide us with thoughts regarding our mental life.

Near the beginning of this main section, I brought out that such inferential outcomes are not what we mean by consciousness$_4$. However, it could be argued in response:

> The immediacy which is required for consciousness$_4$ to be instantiated would be satisfied by the theoretical inclusion, in the total process, of the noninferential awarenesses on which the inferences are based. That is, there would be an immediacy of awareness in every case, although there would be no immediate awareness of any mental-occurrence instances. Self-awareness would take place late in the consciousness$_4$ process that begins, say, with one's seeing the sun and ends with the judgment that one just had or is now having visual experience of the sun.

However, such an account of consciousness$_4$ fails to recognize *the necessary involvement of self-awareness — in the form of inner awareness of a mental-*

occurrence instance — at an early point in the proposed consciousness$_4$ process, as well as near the point of outcome. In other words, the process proposed to theoretically replace inner awareness must, after all, include inner awareness in order to do the work that it is proposed to do. Let me explain with the use of the following example:

> Again, suppose that a perceiver (P) is seeing the sun, in the usual sense: that is, (a) P is engaged in the activity of visual perceiving; (b) P's visual activity produces and includes, at its core, a stream of visual perceptual experience; and (c) the sun is the object of P's experience, together with parts of the sky, some clouds, and some terrestrial objects, in relation to which P is experiencing the sun.

Merely perceiving the sun in a straightforward manner would not suffice to get the inferential process going that consciousness$_4$ is supposed to be. That is, P frequently perceives something or other in his or her environment without P's having any awareness of perceiving it. In addition, let us suppose, therefore, that P is enlisted to report concerning his or her mental life as it proceeds. In order for P to infer anything about his or her experiences on the basis of (as the inferential hypothesis requires) his or her seeing the sun, P must be aware not only of the sun: *simply from the cognitive content of P's awareness of the sun and its relations to the sky, clouds, and mountains, no conclusion follows concerning P's having visual experience of the sun. For the Os of this experience do not include P or any part of P.* When a psychologist claims that a subject can infer about his or her experiences from something in the environment that these experiences give the subject awareness of, the psychologist has failed to notice that what the subject's particular experiences are about may have nothing at all to do with the experiences themselves. How do you infer anything about your experience of the sun from the mere fact, which you perceive to be the case, that the sun is at a certain position in the sky? The following must be one of the psychologist's unwitting premises in proposing the occurrence of such inferences:

> The visual perceptual awareness of the sun has a self-intimating phenomenological structure. That is, when P has awareness of the sun, P is aware therein, in the very having of this awareness, not only of the sun, but also of his or her being aware of the sun.

Thus, the psychologist would implicitly be adopting a certain conception of consciousness$_4$, the kind of conception regarding which Gilbert Ryle (1949) was famously critical. In this connection, the reader may well find it useful to consult certain of the phenomenologist David Woodruff Smith's (1986, 1988, 1989) publications. One will find there detailed presentations of and arguments in favor of Woodruff Smith's own self-intimational account of consciousness$_4$ — although he does not claim that every mental-occurrence

instance possesses a self-intimating phenomenological structure, as Franz Brentano (1911/1974) does. Woodruff Smith's account has been strongly influenced by the phenomenological psychology of Husserl.

Does Consciousness$_4$ Involve Self-Awareness? A Second Answer

I have already given one answer to the question of what the relation between consciousness$_4$ and self-awareness is:

> Consciousness$_4$ is the immediate awareness that we have of (some of) our mental occurrence instances. Since these are our mental occurrence instances, consciousness$_4$ is therefore a kind of occurrent self-awareness.

However, this would not be a proper answer if a different concept of self-awareness, having reference instead to oneself as such, were being exercised in the question. Instead, the question might be: *Does every case of consciousness$_4$ involve an ascription to oneself of the mental-occurrence instance that is its object?* Among the illustrative quotations that the OED includes in its fourth entry under the word *consciousness* is this one:

> Consciousness, in the most strict and exact Sense of the Word signifies . . . the Reflex Act by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not Anothers.

Similarly, Woodruff Smith much more recently writes,

> Inner awareness of one's passing experience is *ipso facto* awareness of oneself as subject of that experience. Contra Hume and Sartre, I am not merely aware of a passing experience, this visual appearing of that dove, without reference to any subject. Rather, as I see that dove, I am immediately aware of *my* seeing that dove: I am aware that "I see that dove." My awareness of the experience does not leave it open whose experience this is; it is mine. If you will, the intentional character of the experience is "directional," aiming as if *from* a subject *toward* an object. And my inner awareness of the experience reveals that directional structure, from "'me" or "I" toward "this dove." In this way the inner awareness that defines consciousness includes a basic form of self-awareness, an *inner awareness of oneself*. (1989, p. 88)

However, a few pages later Woodruff Smith in effect describes his above statement as only pertaining to the normal case; some mental-occurrence instances may not possess a normal phenomenological structure. They may lack that directedness *from a subject* mentioned above. As examples of possible mental-occurrence instances lacking this "'I' structure," Woodruff Smith gives certain experiences that take place during some types of deliberate meditation in which an effort is made to eliminate all awareness of oneself. Presumably, such a mental-occurrence instance, too, need not be, but can be

an object of consciousness$_4$. If one has inner awareness of the mental-occurrence instance, this awareness is not an instance of self-awareness except that it makes one aware of an occurrent part of oneself, without one's having any cognizance of this fact.

We may speak, as Woodruff Smith might well speak, of some mental-occurrence instances as being "impersonally conscious$_4$." They are "conscious$_4$" because they are Os of inner awareness, and they are "impersonally" conscious$_4$ because the inner awareness that one has of them does not ascribe them to oneself or to anyone else.[5] The inner awareness that one has of them is a self-awareness only in the sense that the O of the awareness is an actual part of oneself. Whereas I have no reason to deny that such impersonal instances of consciousness$_4$ take place, Rosenthal (e.g., 1990, p. 37) has expressed the view that our inner awareness — which, he holds, always takes the form of a separate mental-occurrence instance from the mental-occurrence instance that is its object — cannot be directed on a specific mental-occurrence instance, cannot pick out the particular instance that it is about and thus qualifies as conscious$_4$, unless the inner awareness affirms that the mental-occurrence instance is one's own. In the present context, my interest in impersonal consciousness$_4$ does not lie with how each inner awareness "finds its target" (see Natsoulas [1993c]; also, Francescotti [1995], Rosenthal, [1993], and Natsoulas [1993a]), but with how impersonally conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instances are learned of and remembered by the individual whose mental-occurrence instances they are. Let me briefly say, however, that the problem of how inner awareness can be of a particular mental-occurrence instance is especially troublesome if one adopts the view (along with Rosenthal, James, David M. Armstrong [1968], and others) that no mental-occurrence instance can have itself among its objects. The specific reference of inner awareness would seem to be less problematical if the phenomenological structure of a mental-occurrence instance is such that it gives awareness of itself along with whatever else may be its object or objects (Natsoulas, 1996).

Be that as it may, it is useful to distinguish between three categories of mental-occurrence instances which, presumably, all of us undergo: some of our mental-occurrence instances occur without our having inner awareness of them, some occur with personal inner awareness of them, and some occur with only impersonal inner awareness of them. I consider these three cases in turn, with respect to the remembering of each kind of mental-occurrence

[5] I do not discuss the case here, as I have elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1979, 1991–1992a, 1991–1992b), of personal inner awareness in which the mental-occurrence instances are taken to belong not to oneself, but to someone else, an agent who has invaded one's mind (Federn, 1952; Jaspers, 1963; Landis, 1964; Reed, 1972; Woodruff Smith, 1989).

instance that there may be. Throughout, I ignore all indirect ways of knowing about one's mental-occurrence instances, such as by inferring them from one's behavior or reactions, or by judging from other parts of one's mental life that they have taken place, or by means of instruments directed upon one's body or brain.

1. In the absence of inner awareness of one of my mental-occurrence instances, I would have acquired no knowledge of it at the time — notwithstanding its being itself an awareness of something and that, in having it, I apprehended something else which was the case possibly about myself. Nevertheless, later on, effects of this mental-occurrence instance may manifest themselves in my behavior or my mental life, but *I will not remember having that mental-occurrence instance, because I had no awareness of it in the first place*. Analogously:

> I do not acquire knowledge or beliefs about a tree in a garden when, looking out into the garden, I fail to have visual perceptual awareness of the tree. And so, I do not remember even the tree's being there, although photic stimulation reflected directly by the tree's surface did enter my eyes and did have certain effects on me.

2. If, instead, I do have personal inner awareness of a mental-occurrence instance, I may acquire knowledge or belief concerning the mental-occurrence instance's having occurred to me and, later, I may remember having had that mental-occurrence instance. Of course, having personal inner awareness of a mental-occurrence instance makes possible but does not guarantee the latter result. Here is a particularly relevant case in which there is no remembrance: suppose an inner awareness of a certain mental-occurrence instance takes place in me unbekownst to me; that is, suppose an inner awareness takes place unconsciously in me, without my having any awareness of its occurrence. In that case, too, *it would be as though the mental-occurrence instance that is its object had not taken place*. Analogously:

> It is as though a tree is not there if I have perceptual awareness of the tree but no awareness of being so aware. The tree has effects on me, these include my being perceptually aware of the tree. And this awareness may have further effects on me, including effects on my behavior and mental life. But I would not remember seeing the tree because, at the time of seeing it, I did not have any awareness of seeing it.

If, instead, my personal inner awareness is itself conscious$_4$, then I am aware of myself as having inner awareness of the particular mental-occurrence instance, and so I may later remember my earlier awareness of having that mental-occurrence instance.

3. If I have a merely impersonal inner awareness of a mental-occurrence instance, I may acquire knowledge or belief concerning the mental-occurrence instance's having occurred and, later, I may remember the mental-

occurrence instance. However *I could not remember my having the mental-occurrence instance, since I was not aware of my having it in the first place.* Generally:

> (a) If I become aware of anything ("X"; including a tree or a mental-occurrence instance), but I lack inner awareness of my being so aware, it is for me as though I am not aware of X.
>
> (b) If I become aware of X and of this awareness but do not apprehend its being mine, it would also be for me as though I were not aware of X; that is, it would be as though it were not me who was aware of X.

As in the case of personal inner awareness, impersonal inner awareness of a particular mental-occurrence instance does not guarantee being able to remember it. Suppose again that my inner awareness of the mental-occurrence instance took place unbeknownst to me. It would be for me as though the mental-occurrence instance, too, had not occurred (see the analogical perceptual case that I described in the preceding paragraph). If, instead, my impersonal inner awareness is itself conscious_4, then I am aware of the inner awareness and of what it is an inner awareness of, and *I may later remember the mental-occurrence instance, though not remember my having it.*

Consciousness_5, or the Diachronic Totality of Mental-Occurrence Instances That Makes Up a Person's Conscious Being

The problem of the present section comes down to (a) identifying consciousness_5, that is, the set of mental-occurrence instances that make up the diachronic totality which is a person's conscious being, and (b) proffering an hypothesis regarding how these mental-occurrence instances make up this totality. The involvement of occurrent self-awareness in consciousness_5 will be evident or mentioned at various points.

Suppose that the entirety of a human being's mental life were as I quote below James's (1890/1950) description of certain isolated mental-occurrence instances. These mental-oocurrence instances are among the basic durational components of the normal stream of consciousness, yet they are not Os of inner awareness. Note that, in the following statement (as well as elsewhere), James rejects the existence of self-intimating mental-occurrence instances; in his view, as I have mentioned, consciousness_4 always requires an additional mental-occurrence instance directed on the one that is thereby made conscious_4.

> Any state of mind which is shut up to its own moment and fails to become an object for succeeding states of mind, is as if it belonged to another stream of thought. Or, rather, it belongs only physically, not intellectually, to its own stream, forming a bridge from one segment of it to another, but not being appropriated inwardly by later

> segments or appearing as parts of the empirical self in the manner explained in Chapter X ["The Consciousness of Self"]. All the intellectual value for us of a state of mind depends on our after-memory of it. Only then is it combined in a system and knowingly made to contribute to a result. Only then does it *count* for us. So that *the* EEFECTIVE *consciousness we have of our states is the after-consciousness;* and the more of this there is, the more influence does the original state have, and the more permanent a factor is it of our world. (p. 644)

Some of these isolated mental-occurrence instances might be themselves occurrent self-awarenesses. However, they could not also be Os of any kind of self-awareness according to James, because they are individually isolated and, as is proposed to be the case for all mental-occurrence instances, none of them can be its own O or among its own Os. The alternative hypothesis (e.g., Woodruff Smith, 1989), which I have already mentioned, is that some mental-occurrence instances have an intrinsic phenomenological structure referring to the particular mental-occurrence instance itself. Thus, contrary to James, an isolated mental-occurrence instance could be conscious$_4$, and even could be apprehended as such. Consequently, the mental-occurrence instance might be remembered, which would mean that it is far less isolated than James's above instances. By being remembered, it can enter into an abstract "system" (of mental-occurrence instances) of one's own devising and thereby have greater effects on one's behavior and the rest of one's mental life.

This "system," or totality of rememberable and usable mental-occurrence instances, may be just what it is that the OED is getting at in its fifth definition of the word. At this point, the OED states that one use of *consciousness* is to refer to "the totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which make up a person's conscious being." If consciousness$_5$ is equivalent to the "system" adverted to by James in the above passage, then consciousness$_5$ would perforce be constituted by a process that involves occurrent self-awareness. That is, not only would the totality of mental-occurrence instances that constitute one's consciousness$_5$ be Os of one's acts of remembering, but also one would appropriate these Os to oneself and be in a position to relate them to each other. The preceding sentence needs to be qualified by adding that a mental-occurrence instance of which one has inner awareness also may become part of James's "system" on the spot; that is, it may be put to some use immediately upon its conscious$_4$ occurrence. However, in order for that mental-occurrence instance to continue to be a part of one's consciousness$_5$, with all that this entails, it would have to be remembered and appropriated to oneself later on as well.

Someone might be tempted to interpret the OED's concept of consciousness$_5$ entirely synchronically: as requiring no more than the making use of, or at least the being in a position to make use (i.e., having inner awareness) of, a mental-occurrence instance at the point of its occurrence. However, this

view would be difficult to sustain given that the very first of the OED's illustrative quotations for the fifth sense of consciousness comes from John Locke (1706/1984) — who thus appears to have been the first person to use the word *consciousness* in the OED's fifth sense (see also Fox [1988]). Judging from Locke's usage (see Natsoulas, 1994), consciousness$_5$ is the totality of mental-occurrence instances that make up a human being's personal continuity over time. This totality is constituted, according to Locke, *by the present extension of consciousness$_4$ to past mental-occurrence instances. And this amounts, it would seem, to one's remembering having inner awareness of each of them, an inner awareness that appropriated them to oneself.* Locke (1706/1984) writes,

> As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now as it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. (p. 449)

Through memory, the power of consciousness$_4$ — whereby, according to Locke, a present mental-occurrence instance is apprehended and appropriated to oneself — is extended to the past. That is, consciousness$_4$ functions with reference to past mental-occurrence instances. These past mental-occurrence instances were Os of consciousness$_4$ when they occurred; and, qualifying currently as parts of consciousness$_5$, they are capable of being Os of present occurrent self-awareness as well. Specifically, they can be remembered and again appropriated to oneself.[6]

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[6]An alternative construal of the totality that is consciousness$_5$ (see Natsoulas, 1994) would identify this totality with certain basic durational components of the stream of consciousness. These components are widely dispersed all along the stream's course, but they perform certain functions in common, which is what qualifies them as components of an individual's consciousness$_5$. James (1890/1950) called this abstract totality of concrete mental-occurrence instances "the self of all the other selves" (p. 337). These mental-occurrence instances do not mutually cohere, forming a larger unit within the stream of consciousness. This self of selves consists, according to James, of those components of a stream of consciousness that are either (a) the inner awarenesses of other components of the stream or (b) the acts of remembering by which past mental-occurrence instances are again apprehended. The Os of the self of selves include other components of the same self of selves as well as components of the stream that do not perform the same functions as does the self of selves. It should be noted that the self of selves is proposed to function not only to appropriate mental-oocurrence instances to oneself, but also to reject them as not belonging to oneself. Also, the components of the self of selves function to reject certain mental-occurrence instances as not being appropriate, and certain mental-occurrence instances as not being veridical.

Consciousness$_6$: The Mind's Normal Mode of Waking Function

The OED's concept of consciousness$_6$ would seem to have reference to a *general operating mode of the mind* — as distinct from the specific mental-occurrence instances which make up the stream of consciousness or are involved in nonconscious mental activity. These "particular consciousnesses or awarenesses" (O'Shaughnessy, 1986) take place while the mind is functioning in the consciousness$_6$ mode or in a different general mode (e.g., dreaming sleep, meditation, great emotional excitement, or trance). Thus, the topic of consciousness does not present only a single problem for scientific psychology to solve, as is sometimes implied ("the problem of consciousness"). Among the problems of consciousness to which psychologists need to apply themselves is *the development of an accurate description of how the mind is distinctively functioning whenever one is in the general state of consciousness$_6$*. With an accurate description of consciousness$_6$, we would be in a position to spell out the role that is played by occurrent self-awareness, necessary or not, in the mind's typical mode of waking function.

Although this mode may well be what we mean when we use *consciousness* in the OED's sixth sense, the dictionary's meaning has broader reference than is useful, I believe, from the perspective of psychology. That is, the OED fails to distinguish among the many different general operating modes of the mind that we may instantiate *when we are awake*. In contrast, I hope that psychologists will become increasingly sensitive to "the problem of consciousness$_6$" and will soon be in a better position, than we are now, to distinguish the different general modes of mental functioning that alternately characterize the state of awakeness to which the OED refers in its sixth definition of *consciousness*. Therefore, in using the term *consciousness$_6$*, I have in mind the advanced conception of consciousness$_6$ at which psychology will eventually arrive, although what this conception will be like is very unclear at present.

In his effort to make progress toward this goal, Brian O'Shaughnessy (1986, p. 49) asserts that consciousness$_6$ (i.e., "consciousness itself," as distinct from "particular consciousnesses or awarenesses") is *a psychological state that puts one in a position to know about the environment and about one's own mind under the widest possible headings*. This state of the mind is not to be confused with James's many states of consciousness which, one after another, make up the stream of consciousness. Metaphorically, I would say:

> As the stream of consciousness flows on, it flows through consciousness$_6$, as well as through other general operating modes of the mind, one such mode or state at a time. I mean that when one is conscious$_6$ — when one is in that, from a biological perspective, extraordinarily adaptive occurrent state of the mind — one is undergoing awarenesses of many entities, events, and properties that belong to the environment or to oneself. Although such particular awarenesses are not unique to consciousness$_6$, their occurrence is an essential feature of the mind's functioning in the conscious$_6$ mode.

Note that the particular awarenesses that occur while one is conscious$_6$ can vary widely without creating scientific doubts regarding whether one is in that general state. A difficult question to answer is *how different such awarenesses might be and still one would qualify as being conscious*$_6$. This question will remain difficult so long as we have not developed an adequate account of consciousness$_6$ that spells out the distinguishing characteristics of this general operating mode of the mind. Along these lines, O'Shaughnessy (1972, 1986) has rightly emphasized that one's senses might be masked, one might not know where one is, and one might not even know who one is (e.g., having returned to consciousness$_6$ after suffering from a blow to one's head); nevertheless, with all that, one could well be in a state of consciousness$_6$. However, O'Shaughnessy (1986) also comments as follows regarding the general psychological mode of functioning that I call "consciousness$_6$":

> In a word, consciousness seems not to exhibit *intentionality*. Consciousness is not a perception of something, not a putative awareness of something, not even a directed phenomenon. The model of the empty canvas seems not at all far from the truth. (p. 52)

The model of the empty canvas is, I suggest, a misleading model for consciousness$_6$, because one cannot be conscious$_6$ in the absence of particular consiousnesses or occurrent awarenesses at the time. Indeed, O'Shaughnessy is clearly not implying that one might successfully "empty one's mind" and still be conscious$_6$! And he would agree that one's mental life that proceeds while one is instantiating consciousness$_6$ does exhibit intentionality. Every particular consciousness or awareness is about something or as though about something; and consciousness$_6$ is one general operating mode of the mind that makes such particular states of consciousness possible. However, the fact that the consciousness$_6$ mode of functioning produces mental-occurrence instances that instantiate the property of intentionality does not, by itself, mean that the consciousness$_6$ mode too exhibits intentionality. After all, many happenings in the environment (e.g., lightning), which project stimulation to our senses, produce perceptual awarenesses in us, yet these environmental happenings do not instantiate intentionality.

In an earlier article, O'Shaughnessy (1972) states that consciousness$_6$ is "not an awareness of any item or totality, even though it is consciousness of the world" (p. 40). Is this a contradiction? How does the operating mode consciousness$_6$, after all, involve reference to the world? Does the conscious$_6$ mind perhaps *presuppose* the world's existence, as a requirement of functioning in that mode? Indeed, for O'Shaughnessy (1972), consciousness$_6$ possesses intentionality because it is, or involves, a certain "epistemological posture." When one is conscious$_6$, one's cognitive apparatus is proceeding in accordance with certain special commitments and rules, which O'Shaughnessy specifies somewhat more than saying that the process is rational and truth-

oriented. Consciousness$_6$ is a very adaptive way for one's cognitive apparatus to be functioning; one may well acquire knowledge thereby about the world and oneself in that world. Also, instantiating consciousness$_6$ requires background knowledge, that is, a knowledge-system that truly represents the world, although it is unique to the individual who possesses it. Without going into specifics about this knowledge-system and the particular consciousnesses or awarenesses that are supposed to require it, let me mention that the epistemological posture proposed by O'Shaughnessy is, as it were, self-conscious; in the consciousness$_6$ mode, one is attentive to the environment and one is *making use of one's consequent awarenesses* to arrive at "the truth of the outer world."

Attractive as O'Shaughnessy's (1972, 1986) account of consciousness$_6$ is, especially in the language that he uses to express it, and although he spells his account out more than I have the space to do so here, we are left by his effort with the question whether O'Shaughnessy has actually succeeded in distinguishing consciousness$_6$ from all the alternate general operating modes of the mind. The natural question to ask is: Cannot the mind function along the same lines, as O'Shaughnessy assigns to consciousness$_6$, in other general states of consciousness?

Joseph Glicksohn (1993), who is well aware of the problem of consciousness$_6$ and of O'Shaughnessy's "solution," runs into an analogous problem in my view. He starts by stating, "The cognitive mode distinguishing the normal waking state from an ACS [an altered state of consciousness] is the mode of meaning employed" (p. 1). Regrettably, however, Glicksohn does not go on to focus on consciousness$_6$ in an attempt to distinguish it from all the other general states of consciousness. He is concerned instead with how to characterize certain altered states of consciousness. In a preliminary way, Glicksohn identifies these altered states as states deviating from consciousness$_6$ in that they include certain subjective experiences that consciousness$_6$ does not include as frequently. Upon entering an altered state, one's mind functions consistently with "a dominant personal mode of meaning." That is, from a preponderence of thought in which its objects are directly characterized and mutually compared, the mind is supposed to shift over to a preponderence of metaphoric–symbolic and exemplifying–illustrative thought. Again, Glicksohn's effort leaves us with crucial questions:

> Is it not true that some kinds of altered states are quite impersonal and strongly focussed on the environment just as one finds it perceptually here and now? Does not consciousness$_6$ often involve a lot of thought of the kind that Glicksohn uses to characterize altered states?

I asked a friend of mine who is a poet to try to think for a while entirely in metaphoric and illustrative terms, as Glicksohn explained these in his article.

Very cooperatively, the poet did so for ten or fifteen minutes, by pondering certain lines of poetry of his own and of other poets. He told me later that he had moved continuously during those minutes from one poem to another, or from one line to another across poems, on the basis of resembling metaphors or images. However, there was no indication, objective or subjective, that my friend had entered an altered state at any point in the course of his acceding to my request.

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