

Consciousness and Conscience

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The “intrapersonal together sense” is one of several meanings of the English words *conscious* and *consciousness*. C.S. Lewis identified the intrapersonal together sense as analogous to the “interpersonal sense” of these same words: a sense that goes back, too, to ancient times, millennia before the two words entered the English language. Whereas the interpersonal sense of consciousness picks out a certain kind of relation that exists, has existed, or will exist between two or a few people, the intrapersonal together sense refers to a process instantiated wholly by a single person yet analogous to that particular interpersonal relation. In addition to the interpersonal sense and the intrapersonal together sense, this article distinguishes the related concept of “consciousness in the guilty sense”: which has reference to a subcategory of consciousness in the intrapersonal together sense. A person conscious in the guilty sense has come to judge that he or she has committed or is committing now a legal or moral transgression — this kind of consciousness turning into an application of “conscience” insofar as the judgment passed involves moral self-condemnation and produces feelings of guilt. All of the above are mutually similar kinds of consciousness and they are cases of “awareness-with.” However, although simple awareness-with is one of their crucial ingredients, they are each more complex than the kind of awareness-with that consists of no more than undergoing inner, direct awareness of one’s states of consciousness.

A Duality of Perspective

Psychologists and others will sometimes call attention to the role the prefix *con-* plays in the word *consciousness*. For example, in Chapter X of *The Principles of Psychology*, a chapter devoted to the consciousness of self, James (1890/1950) distinguished between (a) the stream of consciousness, which he had examined to great effect in Chapter IX, and (b) a certain radical alternative to the stream of consciousness that James found attractive. After

all that James had astutely proposed on an introspective basis concerning the stream of consciousness, he constructed this theoretical alternative himself and spoke of it as “a stream of sciousness” (p. 304).

By removing *con-* to coin the word *sciousness*, James intended to indicate that the stream of mental life in fact lacks a certain particular feature. In James’s time, as in our own, it was commonly held that this “con” feature always characterizes the stream of consciousness. Moreover, belief in this feature anteceded by centuries James’s fresh doubts regarding it. Locke (1706/1975) was referring to the “con” feature of mental life when he stated, “Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind” (p. 115). At that point, Locke was engaged in addressing the claim that we know from our own case, firsthand, that the mind is always active. Locke argued that, if our mind does sometimes come to a stop in its functioning, we cannot tell that it does so, because, whenever it does stop, we are not conscious of anything at all.

As previously discussed (Natsoulas, 1996c, 1996d), James (1890/1950) set aside his sciousness hypothesis without developing it. It was just too controversial for his purposes; hardly anyone would agree with him. Nevertheless, James had evidently been tempted to replace his now famous stream of consciousness with a stream of sciousness, despite how different his account of the mental would have to be. How strongly he was so tempted can be gathered from the next to final section, which he titled “States of Consciousness Themselves Are Not Verifiable Facts,” in the short version of *The Principles* (James, 1892/1984, p. 400) that he published two years later.

Instead and throughout, James (1890/1950) conformed to the fundamental postulate of psychology that he specified in the following paragraph of Chapter VII:

*Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined — it means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover. Every one agrees that we there discover states of consciousness. So far as I know, the existence of such states has never been doubted by any critic, however skeptical in other respects he may have been. That we have cogitations of some sort is the *inconcussum* in a world most of whose other facts have at some time tottered in the breath of philosophic doubt. All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves thinking, and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activity or passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal. I regard this belief as the most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology, and shall discard all curious inquiries about its certainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this book. (p. 185)*

The stream of consciousness “think[s] its own existence along with whatever else it thinks” (James, 1890/1950, p. 304, quoting James Ferrier). The successive pulses of mentality or basic durational components of the stream of consciousness — which James called “thoughts,” “feelings,” or “states of

consciousness" (Natsoulas, 1998b) — are "directly verifiable existents which no school has hitherto doubted them to be" (James, 1892/1984, p. 191).

Thus, the stream of consciousness often has acquaintance with some of its own components and does not need to be positing the very existence of the mental. That is, the stream consists in major part of states of consciousness that are firsthand apprehensions of other states of consciousness in the same stream. And it is in this particular capacity and actuality that a stream of sciousness would be different from a stream of consciousness. Otherwise, I take it, James considered the two kinds of streams to be the same, to consist of the same kinds of pulses of mentality brought into existence in the same way.

A stream of sciousness would be a stream of consciousness none of whose components had itself or any other component of the stream as its immediate object. Thus, if people possessed a stream of sciousness in place of a stream of consciousness, they would be totally alienated from their own mind. Not in the sense of their "watching" their mental life flow uncontrollably by, or finding it foreign, not to be their own mental life (Reed, 1974, p. 120). But in the sense of their having no direct access at all to any component of their mental life. Each person would be as alienated from his or her own mental life as people are in fact from each other's.

Although a stream of sciousness would not be a stream of consciousness as this is commonly understood, a stream of sciousness — because its components, too, would be thoughts, wishes, perceptions, and so on — would qualify as an unconscious mental stream. This stream would proceed completely unbeknownst to itself except by inference. Interestingly, James (1890/1950) argued at length in effect against the existence of such a thing as a stream of sciousness when he explicitly argued against the existence of unconscious mental states (pp. 164–175). If it is true that such states are impossible, then, of course, a stream of them would be no less impossible. Moreover, James insisted that, whenever an individual has, abnormally, two simultaneous streams of mental life, both of these are streams of consciousness, however "stupid and contracted" one of the two may be (p. 227; Natsoulas, 1994–1995, 1995–1996).

Nevertheless, James found the sciousness hypothesis attractive; the stream of consciousness may actually be, rather, a stream of sciousness in every case. His explicit ground for believing in this possibility was the following: "Whenever I try to become sensible of my thinking activity as such [i.e., of any part of his mental life], what I catch is some bodily fact, an impression coming from my brow, or head, or throat, or nose" (James, 1890/1950, p. 400).

James's discussion of the sciousness alternative to the stream of consciousness was brief and uncritical. He did not ask the obvious question: How, when he engaged in introspection, did he know (a) that he was trying to become sensible of his mental stream and (b) that, when he so tried, he

“caught” this or that bodily occurrence instead? Contrary to his sciousness hypothesis, James in fact did have acquaintance with his mental activity, even as he claimed that he could not grasp any of it.

Within any stream of sciousness, there would not be present any “inner awareness” (Natsoulas, 1996a) or, as James (1890/1950) designated the latter, “that direct inner perception of spiritual activity, which we naturally believe ourselves to have” (p. 304). Insofar as an occurrent awareness took place of anything belonging to a stream of sciousness, this awareness would be the outcome of a process of postulation or inference.

Which assumes, of course, that postulation or inference can go on in the absence of all inner awareness. Among the pulses of mentality to which one was necessarily “blind,” one would have no inner awareness of the components of one’s stream that were involved in one’s postulating or inferring. Again I ask: How would one then know that one was taking notice of *X* (e.g., a certain piece of behavior), thus enabling one to draw an inference from *X*’s occurrence or existence to something about one’s stream of sciousness, or about anything else?

In sum, James was implying that the word *consciousness* contains the prefix *con* because the phenomenon of consciousness involves awareness, in a first-hand sense, directed on the phenomenon itself, along with whatever else consciousness may be awareness of. It is a part of the meaning of the word *consciousness* that, together with outer awareness, hypothetical awareness, and awareness as though of something real, there also takes place inner awareness. Consciousness is not only, in every case, an “awareness-of” (see James, 1890/1950, Chapter IX), but also it is, frequently and always potentially, an “awareness-with.” That is, a state of consciousness — which is always an awareness of something whether fictional or real — is open to being the object of inner awareness and, often, inner awareness of a state of consciousness does occur.

Thus, we may say, all of consciousness involves a duality of perspective, a partly outward and partly inward orientation. The inward has as its objects none other than those very occurrences that constitute having an orientation at all. Consciousness is very much an outwardly directed function that also manages — as it has sometimes been expressed — to turn around upon itself. James (1890/1950) spoke of inner awareness as “a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious operation” (p. 296).

One can be aware of one’s own mental life from either direction; one can hypothesize concerning it, as one does concerning the mental life of other people, or one can apprehend components of one’s mental life directly. However, this latter direct apprehension should not be understood as a kind of interoception, as a form of perception directed on something that is going on within one’s body. Inner awareness is more intimate because it is not

mediated by a sense organ or sense receptors — although perceptual states of consciousness are often objects of inner awareness, no less often than states of consciousness that have nothing perceptual about them.

The notion of consciousness as turning around upon itself is likely misleading because it implies that an outwardly directed function comes to focus elsewhere, inwardly. The outward and the inward may well not be the same function. That it is not the same function is proposed, in effect, by certain theorists, those who treat of inner awareness as equivalent to a state of consciousness's intrinsic awareness of itself (e.g., Woodruff Smith, 1989; Natsoulas, 1996a).

Two Branches of Meaning

Lewis (1960) discussed the words *conscious* and *consciousness* (as well as *conscience*) from a historical and literary perspective and emphasized the development of two branches of meaning. Accordingly, there is a "together" branch and a "weakened" branch corresponding to how *conscious* and *consciousness* have been used over many years — since these words were first introduced into the English language in the seventeenth century.

Lewis also considered expressions of the same meanings in ancient Greece and Rome. The Latin verb *conscire* was the original source of *conscious* and *consciousness*. As Lewis explained, *conscio* was used to mean either "I know together with, I share with (someone) the knowledge that" or merely, with a vaguely intensive force, "I know" or "I know well." Consistently with the first of these two senses, one could be *consciuis* or *conscia* in relation to someone else, or to oneself. That is, one could also be conscious together with oneself alone. Among its other complexities, the together variety of consciousness included a kind of awareness-with.

Because a weakened branch of meaning for *conscious* and *consciousness* exists, the *con-* can be misleading — unless one knows the prefix is sometimes inoperative. Indeed, in this case, *conscious* and *consciousness* are used to refer to what might be described as the occurrence of an "unaccompanied" consciousness of something. Some instances of what is called "consciousness" do and other instances do not involve a certain particular duality of awareness that goes toward defining the together sense.¹

¹There are other kinds of dual awareness; these should be distinguished from the kind being referred to in the text. Among the other kinds is that which occurs when one looks at a picture and has both awareness of the picture surface and awareness of the items the picture depicts. Gibson (1979/1986) considered the first of these awarenesses a perceptual awareness, and the second he called a "nonperceptual awareness" that the visual system produces as well. However, the latter awareness should not be confused with inner awareness, which has as its object, by definition, a state of consciousness.

When James wrote of *scsciousness*, he had in mind a certain kind of unaccompanied consciousness. And he allowed for the occurrence of components of the stream of consciousness that happened not to be objects of inner awareness, although they could have been; as the stream of consciousness flows, the pulses of mentality successively constituting the stream are not all of them accompanied by inner awareness (see Natsoulas, 1998a). Whether as part of the stream of consciousness or making up an entire stream of *scsciousness*, this simpler kind of consciousness would be an awareness-of that is not also an awareness-with.²

From their first introduction into English, *conscious* and *consciousness* have been used for making reference to a different, accompanied kind of consciousness; that is, these words can have, instead, a “together sense.” The latter was Lewis’s (1960) name for this meaning of the two words, which he seemed to detect in Locke (1706/1975; see just below) and other authors. The referents of *conscious* and *consciousness* when used in this together sense deserve more attention as such than they have so far received from the new psychologists of consciousness. As will emerge in the present article, the difference between the together sense (“consciousness_t”) and the weakened sense (“consciousness_w”) is not reducible to James’s *consciousness-scsciousness* distinction.

After discussing the meanings of the word *conscience*, Lewis (1960) returned to commenting on the weakened branch of *conscious*, giving examples of this use in literature. He spoke of the together sense and the weakened sense as constituting — when they are “full-blown” — two extremes with fine gradations in between them, at which various specific instances of using the word may fall. About one such use, Lewis (1960) stated,

When Locke says “to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it seems . . . impossible” the [weakened] sense (“aware”) is almost full-blown. Almost, but perhaps not quite. Locke may be saying something more than that an un-felt misery is not a misery. What that something more could be is apparent from [Samuel] Clarke’s definition, “Consciousness in the most strict and exact sense of the word signifies . . . the Reflex act by which I know that I know and that my thoughts . . . are my own and not another’s.” . . . There would still be a slight together sense — myself *consciring* my thoughts as mine . . . I think Locke is using it, if not in the passage I have quoted yet in the very next paragraph, when he says the soul “must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions.” (pp. 211–212)

²However, I should also mention a theoretical viewpoint according to which no “unaccompanied” instance of awareness ever occurs: for discussion of Mead’s (1934) conception of consciousness as awareness, additional references to his work, and relevant page references, see Natsoulas (1985). For a contrast with Sellars’s (e.g., 1968–1969, 1981) view of awareness and some criticism of Mead’s view, see Natsoulas (1991b).

"To be happy or miserable without being conscious of it seems . . . impossible" could have been a use of *conscious* purely in the weakened sense. It would have been such a use if Locke had meant simply that if one is miserable or happy, one must feel miserable or happy. Which is to say that being miserable or happy necessarily makes a difference in an individual's mental life, and this difference is referred to in speaking of the individual as feeling miserable or feeling happy.

That is, someone might hold, as Locke did not, that to feel miserable or happy may consist merely of being aware differently of matters in general; that is, a certain kind of unpleasant feeling or feeling-tone would belong to all of this awareness. Thus, the weakened sense of the word *conscious* would be full-blown. It would not be, as Lewis stated with reference to Locke's use of the clause, *almost* full-blown, possessing only a *slight* together sense.

When Locke (1706/1975) so wrote, he was engaged in denying that thinking (i.e., mental life) proceeds during sleep without one's having inner awareness of it. Such a thesis would imply, Locke argued, that one might be happy or miserable without being conscious of it. The latter is, Locke held, "utterly inconsistent and impossible" (p. 110).

And in his just preceding paragraph, Locke stated his main point as explicitly as may be desired: "[One] cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it" (Locke, 1706/1975, p. 109). To be sensible of thinking is to be aware of it — although, Locke allowed, awareness of the mind's operations and passions may sometimes occur confusedly and indistinctly, and in this way in some people all of the time.

For a different theorist, merely to be feeling miserable is a different occurrence from feeling miserable *and* being conscious of it. The latter conjunction would be something more. It would be to have inner awareness of how one is feeling, as might not occur. According to Locke, in contrast, to feel miserable is to be conscious of it, just as the soul must have inner awareness of its own perceptions. Neither feeling miserable nor perception takes place without there being inner awareness of it. This was proposed to be a necessary connection.

No doubt, Lewis too was working directly from the passage in Locke and, therefore, must have taken Locke's context into account when Lewis made the above statements. What was it in that context that suggested to Lewis that Locke could be using *conscious* in its weakened sense? Perhaps it was this: Lewis surely understood Locke to be referring to inner awareness with the word *conscious*. However, Locke used the phrase *conscious of it* repeatedly in the paragraph without giving any indication that, in one's being conscious of them, the objects of this consciousness, which were states of consciousness of one's own, were being appropriated to oneself. Nor was any other awareness that accompanies the inner awareness implied. However, the second

quotation from Locke does include the notion of appropriation, and Lewis more confidently believed that the second quotation did possess a slight together sense.

In the first quotation, Locke could have meant that the inner awareness involved is an unaccompanied awareness. This would not be to deny that inner awareness of a state of consciousness is an accompaniment of it, thus making for dual awareness. However, the inner awareness would not in turn be accompanied in the sense that its object is accompanied. An inner awareness of a state of consciousness may be, as it were, a bare inner awareness.³

This would mean that having inner awareness of a state of consciousness is not *ipso facto* an instance of consciousness in the together sense. Even if inner awareness is necessary for any case of consciousness_t, inner awareness may not be sufficient — as it might be expected to be if, wrongly, one has James's consciousness–consciousness distinction in mind at this point. The difference between consciousness_w and consciousness_t is not just a matter of whether inner awareness is involved.

The latter statement may amount to what Lewis was suggesting. More (to be specified) must take place; otherwise, having inner awareness is a case of consciousness_w. Qua consciousness, inner awareness differs from, for example, perceptual awareness only in that it has a state of consciousness as its object. When we are conscious of a tree in the garden, we may be merely straightforwardly aware of the tree (Natsoulas, 1998d). So too, when we are conscious of a state of consciousness, we may be merely straightforwardly aware of this state (Natsoulas, 1998c).

However, we can also be conscious of a state of consciousness (among much else) in the together sense of *being conscious*. This is a point I shall develop, along with what it is to be conscious in this other way. In the case of the above examples of use from Locke, why does Lewis say that the together sense is present but “slight” and the weakened sense is “almost full-blown?” Does this statement imply that there is more to the together sense of *conscious* and *consciousness* than, in Lewis's phrase, “myself conspiring my thoughts [i.e., my states of consciousness] as mine?” What is the full-blown together sense? Which aspect or aspects of the together sense remain in Locke's two quoted uses of *conscious*?

³There would consequently be a contradiction in Locke's view — because inner awareness, too, is an operation of the mind and all operations of the mind are objects of inner awareness in all of their instances. However, such a contradiction is inevitable for any view of the mental that requires inner awareness of every mental-occurrence instance, because an infinite regress of inner awarenesses is thereby implied.

Consciring with Oneself

Identifying an early meaning of the words *conscious* and *consciousness*, Dewey (1906) called his readers' attention to "the 'con-' factor" involved in the sense. The two words were used at one time to make reference to a certain interpersonal fact. Two or more people were said to be "conscious of it one to another" if they shared knowledge about something with each other. Thus, the prefix *con-* could serve the same function in *conscious* and *consciousness* as it had in the original Latin word from which they derived.

In a previous article (Natsoulas, 1991a), I discussed at length the above, interpersonal meaning of *conscious* and *consciousness*. To signal the corresponding use, I attached to these two words the numeral one as subscript. But there is no need for me to summarize here my previous discussion of consciousness₁. Let me just mention a presently relevant feature that is perforce instantiated by all instances of consciousness in the interpersonal sense.

I argued in my previous article that the knowledge involved in consciousness₁, rather than its being just a passive state of knowledge, must be, at least from time to time, activated and phenomenological. That is, in each one of the individuals who stand in a consciousness₁ relation with each other, the specific joint knowledge shared must inform his or her active thought. What their mutual consciousness₁ relation is all about and the fact of their sharing with each other knowledge of it must be manifested in each of them, in the occurrent awareness belonging to each individual.

My reason for mentioning the old meaning of *conscious* and *consciousness* is this: I believe it will aid comprehension of what consciousness_t amounts to if one keeps in mind the sort of phenomenon that the words *conscious* and *consciousness* were initially used to pick out. When we present-day psychologists do consider all the forms that consciousness takes, keeping in mind the interpersonal phenomenon that once was consciousness will help to restrain our natural tendencies to reduce and to simplify the subject matter.

For example, the identification of consciousness_t simply with having inner awareness of states of consciousness should be resisted. And if, as seems to be true (see later), inner awareness is necessarily a part of consciousness_t, we should pursue the question of how it is such a part. We should spell out the rich inner context that exists in such a case. The interpersonal kind of consciousness will have, I believe, something to teach us with respect to what goes on intrapersonally.

Let me return to Lewis's phrase "myself consciring my thoughts as mine" and to Clarke's definition: "Consciousness in the most strict and exact Sense of the Word, signifies . . . the Reflex Act by which I know that I think and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not Anothers." Lewis (1960, p. 212) made use of the former phrase to represent the slight together sense

that, he believed, Clarke expressed in the latter sentence. This leads me to raise two questions: (a) What is it, according to Lewis's concept, for me to conspire my thoughts as mine? (b) How is my conspiring my thoughts as mine less than, if indeed it is less than, my being conscious of them in the full intrapersonal together sense?

For want of a distinctive word in English, Lewis (1960) coined the word *conspiring* for the relation existing between people that I, following the order of *The Oxford English Dictionary's* (1989; henceforth, the OED's) entries for *consciousness*, later called "consciousness₁" (Natsoulas, 1991a). Then, consistently with ancient usages — some of which recognized the reality of something like conspiring with oneself alone — Lewis (1960) extended the notion of conspiring into the intrapersonal arena:

Man might be defined as a reflexive animal. A person cannot help thinking and speaking of himself as, and even feeling himself to be (for certain purposes), two people, one of whom can act upon and observe the other. Thus he pities, loves, admires, hates, despises, rebukes, comforts, examines, masters or is mastered by, "himself". Above all he can be to himself in the relation that I have called conspiring. He is privy to his own acts, is his own *consciūs* or accomplice. And of course this shadowy inner accomplice has all the same properties as an external one; he too is a witness against you, a potential blackmailer, one who inflicts shame and fear. (p. 187)

Notice that that there is no mention of one's own states of consciousness among the possible items with respect to which one might conspire with oneself. Does the absence of states of consciousness in this role show us why Lewis characterized the having of inner awareness as no more than in slight degree qualifying as a case of consciousness₁? Whether together with other people or on one's own, is it only deeds that can properly be said to be conspired about?

Some of what Lewis stated about the relation of conspiring with oneself would seem to be applicable to one's relation to one's states of consciousness. One is certainly privy to one's own mental life — to that part of one's mental life of which one can have inner awareness. One is normally, if not always, in a position to take notice of what is occurring in one's own stream of consciousness. And one can serve as witness concerning those contents. Their being contents of one's own stream of consciousness, testifying about them may bring on shame or fear in oneself — as when (a) one confesses to others that one has a desire of which they strongly disapprove or (b) one informs others of one's desire to put a certain plan into operation, a plan that, in fact, will injure them in some fashion.

Also, one can often intervene in one's mental life, causing it to proceed in one direction rather than in another. This can be accomplished in many ways, for example, by engaging in certain mental actions or by searching out environmental items that affect one in predictable ways (e.g., natural set-

tings, people, foods, music, books, and art objects). Thus, one has some responsibility as regards the states of consciousness that comprise one's mental life.

At a different point in Lewis's (1960, p. 211) essay, there is the implicit suggestion that states of consciousness may be among the objects of conscurring. There, Lewis stated both (a) that the idea of conscurring was obviously at work in Berkeley's assertion "God is conscious to our innermost thoughts" and (b) that whenever *consciousness* or *conscious* was accompanied by *to*, as in the quote from Berkeley, the intended referent was a case of conscurring. However, there is some reason to wonder concerning the validity of both of Lewis's statements.

God may be privy to one's innermost thoughts, but with whom would God, then, be conscurring concerning those thoughts? Not necessarily with oneself, for Berkeley's statement could be made about the innermost thoughts of individuals who do not believe in God's existence and with whom, therefore, God could not be conscurring. To spy on someone without his or her awareness of it is not a case of conscurring with that individual, notwithstanding the result of joint knowledge between the target and the spy regarding matters that the target would keep secret.

That the weakened sense of *conscious* may be at work in the above quotation from Berkeley finds support in the OED's entry for "*conscious to (a thing)*." This entry should be distinguished from the OED's entry for "*conscious to oneself (of anything, that, etc.)*." The latter entry (see next section) does seem to conform with Lewis's discussion of consciousness.

Here is the definitional part of the OED's entry for *conscious to (a thing)*: "sharing in the knowledge of, having cognizance of, being a witness to; mentally alive or awake to; in a bad sense privy to." The OED's examples illustrating this use involve, as objects of this kind of consciousness, items of a sort that one might simply be mentally alive or awake to, that is, simply be in on, occurrently, the fact of the item's existence or occurrence. These examples include the following four items as objects of consciousness: (a) someone else's patience and wisdom, (b) anything that is done at a certain place, (c) the demerits of a certain work, and (d) a certain transaction. Consistently with the definition itself, one may be conscious to any one of these things in not even a slight together sense. I do not say that none of them can be the kind of object Lewis described as something conspired about: only that none of them needs to be.

These illustrative quotations from the OED do not decide the question whether one can conspire one's own thoughts with oneself, that is, whether this is consistent with Lewis's notion. However, given that some of one's states of consciousness are of a sort that one would want to keep secret the fact of their occurrence to one, and that Lewis allowed that God might con-

scire with one concerning one's innermost thoughts, it seems reasonable to conclude that what applies to one's deeds in this connection applies also to one's states of consciousness.

In that case, to have consciousness_t of one's states of consciousness is clearly more than to conscire one's states of consciousness as one's own — just as consciring one's deeds as one's own is less than, although a part of, being conscious_t of them. In consciousness_t, one goes beyond the mere appropriation to oneself of either one's deeds or one's states of consciousness. The next question to be addressed is the character of the intrapersonal psychological phenomenon that the together sense of consciousness picks out.

Being Conscious in the Intrapersonal Together Sense

What is the intrapersonal together sense of *conscious* and *consciousness*? Three of the OED's subentries under *conscious* and *consciousness* contain the definitions and illustrative quotations that directly inform us regarding what consciousness_t is. The three are the subentries for (a) *conscious to oneself* (of anything, *that*, etc.), (b) *conscious* without the *to* but made exactly the same use of as *conscious to oneself*, and (c) *consciousness* when used just as the early *consciousness to oneself* was used. Although the three words and phrases have been current for a long time for expressing the intrapersonal together sense, the OED identifies none of these uses as obsolete — as it does the use of *conscious* and *consciousness* to convey the interpersonal together sense (Natsoulas, 1991a).

Here is the complete set of examples of usage that the OED presents for the intrapersonal together sense. All of the following quotations, except one, refer to what I have previously called, after the order of subentries in the OED, instances of “consciousness₂” (Natsoulas, 1991b), rather than instances of “consciousness_t,” as I call them in the present article.

Being so conscious vnto myself of my great weaknesse; wherin a Man is Conscious to himselfe, that he is most Defectiue; if they say, That a Man is always conscious to himself of thinking; their own Medicines, which they must needs be conscious to themselves, were good for nothing; if I were not conscious to myself of having done every thing in my power, to warn the nation; a pardon, Sir! Till I am conscious of an offense, I will not wrong my innocence to beg one; Satan . . . with Monarchal pride Conscious of highest worth, unmov'd thus spake; I am easily conscious that I have omitted many things; we are secretly conscious of defects and vices which we hope to conceal from the publick eye; a proof how conscious they were of their own unfitnesse; he must have been conscious that, though he thought adultery sinful, he was an adulterer; the consciousness of mine own wants; had not the consciousness of their own ignorance . . . kept them from so idle an attempt; an honest mind is not in the power of a dishonest: to break its peace there must be some guilt or consciousness; there is . . . a palpable consciousness of guilt; Bentley . . . was supported by the consciousness of an immeasurable superiority; happy in the consciousness of a well-spent life.

Except for the third of these sentences or phrases, each of them, whether in the first-person or in the third-person, has reference to one or more instances of consciousness in the intrapersonal together sense. In each instance, someone, if not the author of the statement himself or herself, is said to be or to have been conscious of something in that special sense. The third quotation comes from Locke (1706/1975) and refers simply to inner awareness, as I discussed in an earlier section of the present article. The remaining quotations state the occurrence of a more complex psychological process than the simple undergoing of an immediate apprehension — a perception, as Locke would consider it — that has for its object a state of consciousness.

However, involved in the more complex process is someone's personally witnessing or having witnessed something of himself or herself. And the individual brings what he or she has witnessed or is witnessing to bear, as such, on a judgment concerning himself or herself. Therefore, inner awareness must be part of what is taking place in each one of these cases.

The psychological process that is consciousness, requires it. Suppose, for example, that (a) I have performed or am just now performing a certain action toward another person or animal, (b) I am now remembering or taking notice of doing so, and (c) I am bringing what I remember or am now taking notice of to bear on whether I am cruel or have behaved or am behaving cruelly. In order for me to be conscious to myself of being cruel or behaving cruelly on an occasion past or present, I must consult my stream of consciousness.

I must have inner awareness of what is taking place in my stream of consciousness in the way of relevant remembering or noticing. If, for example, I were to notice a piece of my behavior and did not have inner awareness of noticing the behavior, the behavior could not serve as evidence concerning the kind of person that I am or, for that matter, as evidence of anything else. I must have awareness of witnessing or of having witnessed whatever may serve as evidence or else it is as though I am not witnessing it or have not witnessed it (Natsoulas, 1998c).

In all cases of consciousness, one brings what one witnesses to bear on a matter regarding oneself that other people too can similarly judge about oneself if they have witnessed some relevant evidence. Thus, although different standards can be applied and different opinions can be arrived at, it is an "objective," not a "subjective," matter whether one has led a well-spent life; whether one possesses a certain weakness, defect, or vice; whether one is immeasurably superior, of the highest worth, innocent, guilty, unfit, or ignorant; whether one is purveying medicines that one knows are useless; whether one has committed an offense, an omission, or an adultery; or whether one has done everything in one's power to warn the nation. What I

mean by saying all these are "objective" matters is merely that one's conclusions about oneself can be challenged by others based on their own observations. The above facts are not matters with respect to which one stands in an epistemically privileged position — except for being constantly present and in a position to witness evidence about oneself should it develop or if one deliberately brings some evidence into existence as such.

Thus, when the OED defines (a) *conscious to oneself* as "having the witness of one's own judgement or feelings, having the witness within oneself, knowing within oneself, inwardly sensible or aware" and (b) *consciousness* as "internal knowledge or conviction; knowledge as to which one has the testimony within oneself, esp. of one's own innocence, guilt, deficiencies, etc.," the OED would seem to be drawing both a parallel and a contrast to there being an external witness of one's behavior and to the interpersonal sense of consciousness.

Just as another person can have firsthand knowledge concerning oneself and bring it to bear in forming conclusions regarding the kind of person that one is, so too, one can be to oneself in this regard as another can be to oneself. It is, of course, this "objective" relation to oneself involved in consciousness_t that makes of it the distinct kind of consciousness that it is. As we have seen, Lewis (1960) described the relation in terms of his notion of *consciring*.

Consciousness in the intrapersonal together sense is analogous to consciousness in the interpersonal sense; one is to oneself as though one were another, witnessing one's actions and, based on what one has witnessed, making judgments about oneself of the kind that another person also could make. There is involved in consciousness_t a duality of awareness: an awareness-with, that goes well beyond the awareness-with that James's stream of consciousness includes and his stream of consciousness lacks. It is as though each of us possesses two mental lives, and one of these can draw upon the other in order to come to judgments regarding the kind of person that we are. There is the mental life from which our actions emanate and there seems to be a second such life observing this process and drawing conclusions about the individual whose mental life it is.

The form of the witnessing, however, is unique. One does not know of one's actions merely by perceiving them, as one perceives the situations in which they occur. One has occurrent awareness of one's actions partly by taking notice of those states of consciousness involved in the actions' very occurrence. Thus, one can know some of what has mentally determined one's choice to perform an action that one performs. And one can thereby — before one is able to perceive it — have awareness of an action that one is about to or has begun to perform.

Similarly, one's knowledge of one's past actions involves a unique perspective. There is a special way in which one was a witness to them in the first

place, and this can affect the inner manifestations of one's present knowledge of them. Thus, one remembers not simply the fact that one performed a certain action, as one might remember the actions of a historical figure. But also, one was there and may remember the event itself of one's doing the action.

We witness from a unique perspective ("from the inside") our own states of consciousness, as well as the actions in which we engage. And our states of consciousness, too, can be revealing for us as regards the kind of person that we are. The together sense of consciousness might be extended, therefore, to apply, as well, to how we are aware of our states of consciousness, at the time of their occurrence or in retrospect. Thus, for example, one might be conscious to oneself of spending much time in reverie. That is, one might catch oneself repeatedly undergoing the latter kind of state of consciousness, remember later a number of these instances, and conclude that one has a propensity for reverie. Or, for another example, someone could be described as follows: "Bentley developed a consciousness of his deepest interests by setting himself to take notice of which ones of the utterances that others addressed to him caused him, quite spontaneously, to listen more attentively."

However, this would be an extension of the basic sense that is described in this section, because our states of consciousness can be noninferential objects of awareness only for ourselves. Thus, they differ from those evidences involved in the instances of consciousness_t listed by the OED.

Being Conscious in the Guilty Sense

There is a relation between the concept of consciousness_t and the concept of conscience. As much is suggested by some of the OED's illustrative quotations that exercise the together sense of *conscious*, *conscious to oneself*, and *consciousness*. It is clear from these quotations (see preceding section) that the objects of consciousness_t — what it is that one can properly be said to be conscious of to oneself — strongly tend to possess an ethical relevance. I have argued elsewhere that all of the OED's above examples, except the one from Locke in the list, have an ethical significance if one interprets the ethical more broadly than we do at the present time: to include intellectual powers and achievements.⁴

Still more explicitly, a close relation between conscience and consciousness_t is suggested in the OED's subentry for *conscious* devoted to the intrapersonal together sense of the word. The subentry includes a second and equal

⁴In a recent chapter (Natsoulas, 1998a), I gave grounds for holding that what all the objects of consciousness_t have in common, except for one, is their relevance to what James (1890/1950) referred to as "the spiritual self considered abstractly." I shall not make use of James's concept of the spiritual self in the present article; however, my chapter can be rightly viewed as completely relevant to the present topic.

part that defines *conscious* in a further sense. The compilers of the OED evidently considered this further sense, which I have not mentioned before in this article, to be very close to the together sense. For reasons that will be obvious, I shall speak of this further sense as consciousness in the guilty sense or as consciousness_g. As late as in 1827, *conscious* was used in print to express the guilty sense, but the OED labels this use as now obsolete.

Thus, until fairly recently, *conscious* served to distinguish as well a certain subcategory of the kind of psychological process that is consciousness_t. The latter is the gist of my interpretation of why the guilty sense was juxtaposed with the together sense within a single OED subentry. Any instance of consciousness in the guilty sense qualifies also as an instance of consciousness in the together sense. Of course, certain features distinguish the sort of psychological process to which the concept of consciousness_g had reference from the many other cases of consciousness_t.

According to the OED's explicit definition of *conscious* in the guilty sense: (a) to say that someone is conscious of something, can properly mean that the person has "guilty knowledge" of that matter, and (b) to say that he or she is conscious, can be to say that the person is "inwardly sensible of wrong-doing, guilty." The OED provides the first five of the following list of eight illustrative quotations for *conscious* in the guilty sense. Along with the five, I have listed three of the OED's examples of usage for the concept of consciousness_t that clearly seem to me also to qualify as instances of consciousness_g.

1. Pergamius accuses many thousands as conscious of the same arts.
2. She being conscious, did of her own accord . . . make confession of her wickedness.
3. *Conscious*, inwardly guilty, privy to ones self of any fault or errour.
4. The conscious Ravagers return.
5. What time, with sweet forgiving cheer, He called his conscious bretheren near.
6. A pardon, Sir! Till I am conscious of an offense, I will not wrong my innocence to beg one.
7. He must have been conscious that, though he thought adultery sinful, he was an adulterer.
8. An honest mind is not in the power of a dishonest: to break its peace there must be some guilt or consciousness.

The individuals referred to above had all participated in one or another activity with the consequence that each of them was conscious to himself or herself of being responsible, alone or with others, for a particular moral or

legal transgression. In effect, the above quotations describe these people as having being engaged in an internal process that included the following three aspects:

- (a) remembering what they had done or refrained from doing,
- (b) having inner awareness of witnessing these particular actions or inactions, and
- (c) bringing what they had witnessed to bear on a judgment concerning themselves, specifically, judging themselves to have committed a transgression.

My preceding paragraph ignores that, in the sixth example listed above, the individual being portrayed is denying that he is conscious_g. However, whether he is denying or stating a truth, the concept that he is exercising is the concept of being conscious in the guilty sense. For ease of exposition, I assume he was lying, had transgressed in the way he was accused of transgressing, and was conscious to himself of having done so.

Being conscious_g, the people mentioned in the above examples were not merely factually guilty, that is, guilty of having in fact committed a specific transgression. They were, in addition, inwardly guilty, inwardly sensible of their own wrongdoing. I want to suggest that the inwardness being adverted to here does not amount to having certain inner feelings. Rather, to be inwardly sensible in that way is a matter of being conscious_t where that of which one is conscious_t is the fact of one's transgressing or having transgressed.

It is possible, of course, that one might be responsible for a transgression and lack guilty knowledge of it. That is, one might not be conscious to oneself of being at fault. Even supposing that one remembered doing the action, one might still lack a consciousness_t of it and, therefore, not be conscious in the guilty sense. It is a further matter whether the individual brings what he or she remembers doing to bear on a judgment concerning the kind of person that he or she is. And even when he or she does do so, the individual may judge himself or herself to be innocent of wrongdoing. Thus, the individual would be conscious_t but not conscious_g in such a case.

The woman in the second quotation above is probably being described there not only as possessing guilty knowledge, or as being conscious_t of her own factual guilt, but also as judging her action to have been wrong and as having feelings of guilt about what she did. Her confession may well have been motivated by a desire to be forgiven or punished for her transgression.

Notice that the judgment that one is responsible for a moral or legal transgression is not the same as the judgment of having done something wrong. The first may occur independently of the second. This distinction is reflected in Lewis's (1960) insistence that, although what one may be conscious_t of may be a transgression, the together sense of consciousness does not involve one's passing judgment against oneself.

Although the latter point is likely a valid one, Lewis's way of asserting it leads directly to a question that it is useful to consider here. Concerning our being conscious to ourselves about something, Lewis (1960) stated,

It bears witness to the fact, say, that we committed a murder. It does not tell us that murder is wrong; we are supposed to know that in some other way. In this respect it is exactly like an external witness who gives evidence about a matter of fact; the criminality or innocence of the fact has been fixed by the legislator and will be declared by the judge. Hence according to the usages we have considered it would make no sense to say "My *conscientia* [i.e., consciousness] tells me this is wrong"; it tells me simply that I have done this. (p. 190)

In being conscious_c, we are somewhat like an external witness; I agree with Lewis on this point (see earlier). I would add the following to his statement. An external witness, being like ourselves, may do relevantly more than merely to remember and to report on our actions. Like us, he or she may judge our action to be a moral or legal transgression. From what he or she has witnessed, an external witness, like "the internal witness," may draw conclusions regarding the kind of person that we are — in this case, that we are one or another kind of transgressor.

However, the issue here concerns what the psychological processes of consciousness_c and consciousness_g involve. As has been seen with special reference to the OED's relevant entries, neither of these two kinds of consciousness consists merely of the processes of witnessing and remembering. But both fall short in respect to the passing of judgment. Although, as we have seen, both do involve judgment, they do not involve the passing of judgment against oneself. This point needs to be further addressed.

The woman who confessed probably did pass judgment against herself. She probably did consider what she had done to have been wicked. But, although her being conscious_g of what she had done led her to pass such judgment, consciousness_g does not require the latter. That is, the woman could have been conscious in the guilty sense, thus recognizing that she was guilty in fact, without her judgment's being of the kind that would produce feelings of guilt in her. Indeed, "She being conscious, did of her own accord . . . make confession of her wickedness" could be an accurate description even if (a) she was the kind of person who did not feel guilty or (b) she believed what she had done was not wrong.

The Judgments of Conscience

The word *conscience* entered the English language either before or during the thirteenth century, that is, much earlier by centuries than the word *consciousness* did. However, monolingual speakers of English were not lacking a

concept of consciousness until the word came along so that they could express the concept. For one thing, uses of *conscience* to refer to phenomena of consciousness already existed. For example, in Middle English, *gret conscience* meant full awareness, and *putten upon one's conscience* meant to call something to mind.

Similarly to *consciousness*, *conscience* derived from the Latin *conscire*, and from *conscientia*. The OED's entry for *conscience* provides the following description of the latter Latin word:

privity of knowledge (with another), knowledge within oneself, consciousness, conscience, f. *conscient-* [present participle] of *conscire*, f. *con-* together + *scire* to know; thus *conscire alii* to know along with another, to be privy with another to a matter, thence, *conscire sibi* to know with oneself only, to know within one's own mind.

This etymology is no doubt familiar after the discussion of consciousness_c in previous sections of the present article. Indeed, the reader may correctly expect the claim to be made here that the process comprising an operation of conscience partly consists of consciousness_c.

In an extended discussion of conscience, Potts (1980) properly gave some emphasis to what is, as I have suggested, a frequent component of instances of consciousness_c. He stated that remembering doing particular things is

part of what is involved in examining one's conscience: you go over the events of a previous period in order to call to mind what you did or failed to do, and often remember thereby a number of things which you had temporarily forgotten. The exercise is necessary because, if they are things of which we are ashamed, it is highly convenient to forget them. (p. 3)

In this way, one brings oneself into a position from which (a) one might testify — on the basis of firsthand knowledge, recognized as such — concerning certain past actions or inactions of one's own and (b) one can bring this personal evidence, that is, of the occurrence of these actions or inactions, to bear in making a judgment concerning the kind of person that one is. However, this process, as so far described, would not necessarily be an exercise of conscience. Nor would conscience be necessarily indicated if one made an inner judgment to the effect that one had transgressed or was transgressing a legal standard or even a moral standard.

The earliest illustrative quotation for *conscience* in the OED is dated 1225. The phrase is in Middle English, and has been translated as follows: "within ourselves our own conscience, that is, our mind reproaching itself with the fire of remorse for sin" (Engelberg, 1972, p. 10). But, also, *conscience* was used to pick out other kinds of events, states, and processes, occurrences to which *consciousness*, a new word, came later to advert. According to the OED, *conscience* took the place of *inwit*, which literally meant "inner knowledge" and

performed functions that later would be performed by *consciousness* and *conscience*. Thus, in the above translation, *inwit* was the original for the translator's choice of *mind*.

Before the arrival of *consciousness* and for a long time afterwards, *conscience* could mean either (a) "the mind or heart as the seat of thought, feeling, and, desire; attitude of mind, feelings" or (b) "the faculty of knowing what is right, esp. with reference to Christian ethics; the moral sense, one's conscience; awareness of right and wrong; consciousness of having done something good or bad" (*Middle English Dictionary*).

Lewis (1960) described *consciousness* as being at first a useless synonym for *conscience*. Later, the two words divided between them the original functions of *conscience*. Some time ago *consciousness* took over a function of *conscience*, whereas such a division of linguistic labor has yet to transpire in the French language. In English, *conscience* no longer means "inward knowledge, consciousness; inmost thought, mind," as it did until well into the eighteenth century and still does in French.

The English (and the French) word continues to possess a meaning that it has had all along: "consciousness of right and wrong; moral sense" (OED). Thus *conscience* is defined in terms of *consciousness*. Which implies that there cannot be an operation of *conscience* without the involvement of *consciousness* (see next section). That is, *conscience* pertains to something that goes on in the stream of *consciousness*. Certain components or sections of the stream are, at the least, required phenomenological manifestations of the operations of *conscience*.

The latter requirement is made quite explicit when the OED spells out the current meaning of the word *conscience*. Thus, we are informed that the phenomenon of *conscience* amounts to

the internal acknowledgment or recognition of the moral quality of one's motives and actions; the sense of right and wrong as regards things for which one is responsible; the faculty or principle which pronounces upon the quality of one's actions or motives, approving the right and condemning the wrong.

That is, when, as we say, one exercises or examines one's *conscience*, there takes place within one certain states of *consciousness*. These are instances of the passing of judgment on particular actions, including one's failures to act, or on certain states of *consciousness* or sections of one's stream. In accordance with standards that one accepts, one judges one or more of one's actions or parts of one's mental life to be morally right or morally wrong.

Note that one is not said to be exercising one's *conscience* when the judgments that one makes about one's behavior or mental life are based on standards with which one unambivalently disagrees or on standards to which one is indifferent. Even when such fully rejected standards have an importance to

others, even when others would want to punish one's transgression, one's judgment that one has transgressed would not fit the meaning consciousness of right and wrong, notwithstanding any fear evoked by one's consciousness_t of transgressing or having transgressed.

A psychological process that is an exercise of conscience typically involves consciousness in the together sense in combination with the consciousness of having done wrong or having done right. One passes judgment on oneself to one effect or the other. Conscience requires either consciousness in the guilty sense or consciousness in a closely analogous innocent sense in which one passes a moral judgment in one's favor. However, to comprehend more fully the concept of conscience, it must be considered what these special passings of judgment on oneself involve that mere consciousness_t and consciousness_g do not involve.

Analogously to the notion of an "inner witness" who is operative in the together sense of consciousness, Lewis (1960) described the concept of conscience as based on the notion of an "inner lawgiver." Thus, in an exercise of conscience, the individual becomes apprised or is reminded (either one of these "from the inside") regarding what he or she should have or should not have done or, in anticipation, what he or she should or should not do. That is, one therein functions in such a way as to pass down judgments from on high upon oneself. One does so from a position of authority constituted by one's convictions as to the kind of person one should be.

These convictions typically result from one's participation in a process of socialization or, less frequently, they may be acquired independently through observation, conversation, reading, and thought. Conscience may achieve a level that Mead (1922/1964) described when he stated that the "generalized other" within us may pass beyond the provincial bounds of the specific group to which we belong and come to speak with the "*vox populi, vox dei*, the 'voice of men and of angels'" (p. 245).

As Lewis brings out, in the exercise of conscience, there are involved, as there are not in mere consciousness in the together sense, "commands and permissions" that depend on being aware of one's past, present, or future actions, inactions, and states of consciousness and making judgments concerning what these mean or will mean, if they occur, about oneself. In being conscious_t, one may judge oneself to have committed a crime, but consciousness_t does not extend to include judging oneself to have done wrong. Consciousness_t alone does not pass judgment to the effect that one has broken one of its commandments. In order for an occurrent process of self-knowledge to do so, it must become more than mere consciousness_g.

Lewis also calls attention to the "diversity of consciences," meaning by this the differences that exist between individuals with respect to what they will judge to be morally right or morally wrong among their past, present, and

future behaviors and states of consciousness. That is, their different convictions provide them with different standards against which morally to judge the same actions, inactions, and states of consciousness. Their respective inner lawgiver applies, as it were, different laws to them. Some people, for example, are in possession of a relatively "tender" conscience, that is, one that forbids them what other people's conscience allows.

The Consciousness of Conscience

I have suggested that one's internal recognition or acknowledgement of the morality of one's particular actions or states of consciousness, the sensing of their rightness or wrongness, and the approving or condemning of them accordingly, are conscious processes. Or at least they are processes that include at their core, as a crucial part and product of them, the flow of pertinent states of consciousness in James's (1890/1950) sense of the latter. That is to say, the processes of conscience stand in relation to the corresponding states of consciousness as the processes of perceiving stand in relation to the flow of perceptual experience that is a respective part and product of these processes. Absent perceptual experience, there is no perceiving. And so, too, certain states of consciousness are an essential component of the operations of conscience.

To the above, I would want to add that, whenever one's judgments of conscience are of the kind in which one condemns oneself, the judgments are productive of feelings of guilt. The concept of conscience would seem to require that feelings of guilt be an accompaniment of any actual inner self-condemnation. The occurrence of such feelings indicates that self-condemnation has taken place.

The absence of guilt feelings indicates that no more than consciousness in the guilty sense (consciousness_g) transpired. However, Jung (1958/1970) argued otherwise:

Conscience may appear as an act of conscious reflection which anticipates, accompanies, or follows certain psychic events, or as a mere emotional concomitant of them, in which case its moral character is not immediately evident. Thus, an apparently groundless anxiety state may follow a certain action, without the subject being conscious of the least connection between them In this instance the classical characteristic of conscience, the *conscientia peccati* ("consciousness of sin"), is missing The moral evaluation of an action, which expresses itself in the specific feeling-tone of the accompanying ideas, is not always dependent on consciousness but may function without it. (pp. 182-183).

An interpretation of such cases as Jung had in view could be to deny that any moral evaluation of the action occurs therein, to deny that an act of conscience should be inferred. Instead, the individual would be said to

respond with anxiety because the deed is somehow associatively linked to this emotional reaction. That is, there is something about the deed that, owing to past learning, operates as a warning of danger. However, no awareness of the deed occurs under the latter heading, and therefore no link is drawn between the deed and the anxiety that it produces. Indeed, the anxiety may be reasonably (albeit falsely) explained in some other way (e.g., in relation to a forthcoming event) that does not have anything to do with the deed.

However, Jung had patients in psychoanalysis who exhibited the effect that he described in the above quoted sentences. He found that these patients (e.g., their dreams) gave him reason to infer that (a) the emotion that they experienced was not guilt and (b) what was responsible for their emotion was "an unconscious act which accomplished itself as though it were conscious and intentional — as though, in other words, it were an act of conscience" (Jung, 1958/1970, p. 183). In other words, the patients were conscious of their deed in the guilty sense, they judged themselves to have transgressed morally, but this took place entirely outside their stream of consciousness.

Jung's suggestion was that there is a further consciousness that is distinct from the ego's consciousness. Because of the apparent complexity of what takes place within the individual in such cases and because of its similarity to an operation of conscience understood in the first place as a conscious phenomenon, Jung was led to propose the existence of a second knower, that is, a part of the individual that also is able to have experiences like those that take place in the stream of consciousness.

With reference to a particular therapeutic case that he was discussing, Jung (1958/1970, pp. 183–184) stated in effect that there takes place a second consciousness leading to an act of conscience of which the first consciousness has no awareness. Jung called the second knower an "unconscious personality" that functions somewhat similarly to the "conscious subject." In Jung's example, the unconscious personality has awareness of the person's recent receipt of a certain business offer, judges this offer to be illegal, is aware of the person's strong financial desires, and pronounces a suitable judgment on the desire and any participation by the person in the deal.

However, notwithstanding the posited unconscious act of conscience, there were no guilt feelings consequently produced in the patient: "The specific feeling-tone of a bad conscience [was] missing too" (p. 182). Instead, some emotion was manifested in the process of reporting a dream involving the individual's literally having dirty hands. The emotion was described by Jung as a feeling of "uncertainty." This feeling, Jung seems to say, was not actually produced by the unconscious judgment, but occurred as a result of the past usefulness of his dream contents in the course of his psychoanalysis.

The dream of dirty hands produced a feeling in the patient that something important was perhaps being represented, and so the patient mentioned the dream to Jung as possibly problematical. Jung does not inform us whether any anxiety state connected to the business deal occurred in the patient.

An absence of guilt feelings would mean, according to my interpretation of conscience, that the patient had not actually condemned his participation in the deal. Evidently, the unconscious personality only became conscious_g of the deed. It recognized that a participation in the business transaction would constitute a moral transgression by the individual. If the unconscious personality had condemned the deed, the person would have experienced guilt feelings, although he would not have identified them as such.

This understanding of what occurred is consistent with Jung's (1958/1970) claim that the unconscious "pronounces moral judgments with the same objectivity with which it produces immoral fantasies" (p. 187). To pronounce a moral judgment objectively (in Jung's sense) on a piece of one's behavior or on a section of one's stream of consciousness seems to amount to being conscious of it in the guilty sense (i.e., conscious_g). And, therefore, it falls short of the self-condemnation that characterizes an actual negative judgment of conscience.

The introduction of a second personality in order to encompass what takes place in these patients is a radical addition to theory. It is an acknowledgment that the exercise of conscience is a conscious process and a proposal that there may exist an unconscious consciousness, that is, a stream of consciousness that has inner awareness of its components, but of which the individual has no inner awareness because the states of consciousness constituting it are not part of his or her stream of consciousness. Perhaps an explanation can be developed that does not double the number of conscious selves per individual.

An interpretation for Jung's cases — even for those cases in which emotion is produced, purportedly by an unconscious judgment of conscience — could conceive of conscience both as "consciousness of right and wrong" in the OED's sense and as proceeding consciously in the sense of a single phenomenology, restricted to one stream of consciousness. Insofar as the individual cannot report himself or herself as judging what he or she has done as morally transgressive, either (a) no such inner judgment in fact occurred or (b) the state of consciousness that included the judgment was not an object of witting inner awareness.

In order for the judgment to be made, an inner awareness of it had to occur, because there was involved a bringing of evidence to bear on the judgment. The individual must remember the deed and be aware of making a judgment in light of what he or she remembers. However, inner awareness of the judgment could occur without the inner awareness's being itself in turn

an object of inner awareness. This is what I meant just now by an object of "witting" inner awareness. If the inner awareness of the judgment was not such an object, then the individual could not report the occurrence of the judgment — any more than one can report the presence of a face at the window if one is visually aware of the face but one's visual awareness of it takes place without inner awareness of having the visual awareness (cf. Natsoulas, 1998c).

The state of consciousness of which the judgment of conscience was a part would be a state among the other states of consciousness constituting the stream of consciousness. Not all such states are objects of inner awareness. Some of them occur to us with and some without our taking any notice of them. And, according to my above interpretation, we take notice of some of the former with and some of them without having, also, any awareness of doing so. When such cases are of the kind cited from Jung, the judgment of conscience may evoke feelings of guilt without the individual's being able to connect the feelings with the occurrence of any self-condemnation — because, for the individual, it is as though he or she made no judgment of conscience.

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