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The Case for Intrinsic Theory: V. Some Arguments from James's *Varieties*

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This and the planned next article of the present series mine the wealth of reports and astute discussions of states of consciousness contained in William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Thus, I bring out further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness$_4$, or inner awareness, that, as it happens, James explicitly opposed in *The Principles of Psychology*. The alternative, appendage kind of account that James advanced there for consciousness$_4$ stands in marked contrast to intrinsic theory: by requiring that having inner awareness of any mental-occurrence instance must take the form of a separate mental-occurrence instance directed on the first. Intrinsic theory holds instead that every conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instance possesses a phenomenological structure that includes reference to that very instance itself.

Two Main Terms of Discussion: What Consciousness$_4$ and Intrinsic Theory Are

Shortly before I began writing the first article in this series, I gave the name "intrinsic theory" to the kind of account of consciousness$_4$ that is of special interest here (Natsoulas, 1993a).[1] The term *intrinsic theory* is not a

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[1]This is the fifth one of a series of articles being published in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*. The main purpose of the series is presentation of a comprehensive exposition and close examination of the positive case in favor of the "intrinsic" kind of account for "consciousness$_4$" (Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b, 1998c). I prepared the first installment in the academic year 1994–1995. But my project remains still very much underway, with additional installments in one or another phase of composition or planning.

familiar term to psychologists. It will likely produce some initial confusion especially with respect to certain unrelated theoretical ideas pertaining to motivation. It should be kept in mind throughout that the kind of intrinsic theory that this series of articles is all about pertains exclusively to "consciousness$_4$" (Natsoulas, 1994). Intrinsic theory maintains that "consciousness$_4$" is a literal part of a mental-occurrence instance. It is an internal, intrinsic feature of the structure of every "conscious$_4$" mental-occurrence instance. Intrinsic theory in the present sense does not imply, for example, any particular motivational hypothesis.

I do not treat consciousness$_4$ simply as a subfield of psychological investigation, such as cognition, memory, personality, and motivation clearly are. I construe consciousness$_4$ as a certain kind of phenomenon or mental process. More specifically, consciousness$_4$ is the special kind of occurrence to which *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1989, the "OED") refers in its definition of the fourth meaning of the word *consciousness*. The OED's fourth definition reads in full: "the state or faculty of being conscious, as a condition or concomitant of all thought, feeling and volition; 'the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts and affections' (Hamilton)."

I consistently deploy the term *consciousness$_4$* along with the technical term *inner awareness* to refer to

(a) the occurrent, firsthand, immediate, mental apprehensions themselves that one has of some of one's own mental-occurrence instances, just as these instances are taking place;

and to

(b) the relational property that some mental-occurrence instances possess wherein there takes place an immediate occurrent awareness of them.

Thus, contrary to the OED's above quoted definition, I hold that only *some* of our mental-occurrence instances are suitably described as "conscious$_4$." Any mental-occurrence instance properly describable as "nonconscious$_4$," and there are many, does not instantiate the property of consciousness$_4$. That is, a nonconscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instance takes place without any inner awareness of it. As I am using the term, one may also say, that an individual has, or fails to have, consciousness$_4$ of a certain mental-occurrence instance or group of them.

In an article prior to the present series, I used *self-intimational*[2] to designate the intrinsic accounts of consciousness$_4$ and I contrasted these with both the "appendage accounts" and the "mental-eye accounts" of the same phe-

[2]My choice of *self-intimational* was a mistake for the reason that Ryle (1949) had used the term pejoratively against intrinsic theory in his famous critique (cf. Armstrong, 1968; Dulany 1991).

nomenon (Natsoulas, 1993d). Both of the latter accounts hold instead the following thesis to be true: being conscious$_4$ of a mental-occurrence instance requires that there take place, along with that instance, something further that constitutes one's having inner awareness of that mental-occurrence instance (see, e.g., James's, 1890/1950, description of the functions of the "self of all the other selves").

The intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness$_4$ does not originate in my writings (see, e.g., Brentano, 1911/1973). For many years, theoretical accounts of the intrinsic kind, although not under that name, have received discussion, comment, and criticism in the psychological and philosophical literature (e.g., Armstrong, 1968; Dulany, 1991; Grossmann, 1984; Husserl, 1913/1983; James, 1890/1950; Rosenthal, 1986; Ryle, 1949; Woodruff Smith, 1989). However, I can be counted among the authors who have espoused an intrinsic account. The first article of the present series (Natsoulas, 1996a) contains reference to my relevant past work, and I continue, here and elsewhere, so to espouse and to develop my own variety of intrinsic theory.

I have done so again recently with special reference to Gibson's (1979/1986) ecological approach to the introspective activity that he called "viewing" (Natsoulas, 1999b). A visual perceiver engages in the activity of viewing — which I have been calling "reflective seeing" — by means of the visual perceptual system itself. Thus, to have visual perceptual experiences that are conscious$_4$ does not require, as several psychological authors have suggested, that a distinct consciousness system be brought to bear on one's visual perceptual experiences.

It is my view — as well as the view of some[3] other intrinsic theorists of consciousness$_4$ (e.g., Freud, 1915/1957; Woodruff Smith, 1989) — that every mental occurrence that transpires within us, whatever other description may also be suitably applied to it, falls into one or the other of the following two large categories:

(a) the nonconscious$_4$ mental occurrences: or mental occurrences none of whose instances is an object of inner awareness; thus, when any instance in this category of mental occurrence takes place, it takes place along with, at most, an awareness from a distance (i.e., inferred, associated) to the effect that it has occurred and, much more frequently, without any awareness of the instance at all of any kind; or

[3]Not all such theorists. For example, the intrinsic theorist Brentano (1911/1973) holds that, although the idea of nonconscious$_4$ mental occurrences is not self-contradictory (cf. Gurwitsch, 1950/1985; Natsoulas, 1996b), no mental-occurrence instance ever in fact takes place that is not conscious$_4$, that is not an object of inner awareness. Of course, Brentano's position also implies that no mental occurrences are sometimes conscious$_4$ and sometimes not conscious$_4$.

(b) the conscious$_4$ mental occurrences: or mental occurrences that are conscious$_4$ in every one of their actual instances; that is, they are not instantiated except as objects of inner awareness, which does not mean, of course, that they cannot be awarenesses of something else.

However, I am not quite denying the existence of mental occurrences that partake of consciousness$_4$ in only some of the instances of their occurrence. I do not mean to reject the existence of particular mental occurrences that can properly be described as sometimes occurring with inner awareness of them and sometimes occurring without their being objects of inner awareness. It does not contradict my version of intrinsic theory to say that, at different times, the "same" mental occurrence may occur either consciously$_4$ or non-consciously$_4$. But, as I shall shortly explain, I must interpret such variable mental occurrences in a special way that makes them consistent with the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness$_4$ that I have been describing and shall further describe in the next paragraph. The key relevant notion is that any actual "mental occurrence" is a type that has many possible token instances, and that such a type can be broadly enough conceived to allow for both conscious$_4$ and nonconscious$_4$ instances of it.

An intrinsic theory of consciousness$_4$ is a theory that proposes that one's inner awareness of any mental-occurrence instance is a part or aspect of, is intrinsic to, that mental-occurrence instance. That very instance itself is, among other things that it may be, one's inner awareness of itself. The inner awareness of any conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instance is not a distinct mental-occurrence instance that is directed on it from outside it.[4] Either a mental-occurrence instance is conscious$_4$ or it is not conscious$_4$; either it is an awareness of itself, along with whatever else it may be an awareness of, or it is not an object of inner awareness. Intrinsic theory considers any associated or inferential awareness that has a mental-occurrence instance as its object not to be an immediate awareness of the instance, for such (indirect) awareness is mediated and carried by a separate mental-occurrence instance.

Such indirect awareness may be, for example, a case of having a thought regarding a certain mental-occurrence instance of one's own. One may come to think, on some basis, of this mental-occurrence instance soon after it has occurred or at a much later time. This thinking-of can take place even when the mental-occurrence instance of which one thinks cannot possibly be an object of inner awareness. Consider, for example, a Freudian repressed wish (see Natsoulas, 1985), or an appraisal of one or another state of affairs that takes place, according to cognitive psychology, in the course of and as part of a kind of processing that is described as proceeding unconsciously. In both

[4]As Rosenthal (1986, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) argues. See Natsoulas (1989, 1992a, 1993c, 1993d) for criticism pertaining to Rosenthal's view.

these cases, there could not be, according to the respective theory, a consciousness$_4$ of the posited mental-ocurrence instances.

Which is not to claim that no conscious$_4$ counterparts of these instances might also come to occur. Thus, later in the course of psychotherapy, once repression of the unconscious wish is overcome, a conscious$_4$ wish similar to it may freely take place. So too, a similar though conscious$_4$ appraisal can take place in the course of information processing that is said not to be unconscious.

The mental occurrences belonging to other people are, in relation to oneself, like mental occurrences that are nonconscious$_4$. Thus, it is possible to have accurate thoughts about other people's mental-occurrence instances, even as these instances are occurring, but one does not have thereby, or in any other way, consciousness$_4$ of those mental occurrences.[5] Should an electronic device someday be invented whereby a thought occurring in another person produces in oneself the same thought as the other person is having, it would be only one's own (same) thought, not the thought of the other person, that could be an object of one's inner awareness.

Simply having the same thought as another person has, however such thought duplication might be achieved, is not the equivalent to being aware of the other person's thought: not even if the two thoughts, occurring in two different streams of consciousness, are both conscious$_4$, that is, each of them includes inner awareness of itself. No doubt, we would speak in such a case of one person's reading another person's mind. However, another person's mental-occurrence instances cannot be apprehended except through one's having awareness of something else. In the present futuristic example, that other way would consist of having inner awareness of certain of one's own mental-occurrence instances, namely, those among these instances that, by means of a special device, are produced directly by the other person's thoughts.

I can now return to those "variable" mental occurrences, as I called them. That is, for certain purposes, we seem to find it useful to describe some mental occurrences as sometimes being conscious$_4$, and as also taking place, at other

[5]This is a good place to make mention of other senses of *consciousness* than the sense assigned to *consciousness*$_4$. There are several such ordinary senses (Dewey, 1906; Husserl, 1900/1970; Natsoulas, 1983), as well as many technical ones put forward by philosophers, biologists, psychologists, physicists, computer scientists, and others. In the sentence to which this footnote is attached, I mention having awareness of the thoughts of other people; and I mention soon in the text one's having one or another kind of perceptual experience of a part of the environment. I am speaking in these cases of what I call "consciousness$_3$" corresponding to the OED's third definition of *consciousness* (see Natsoulas, 1992b, 1995). One may be occurrently aware of, be "conscious$_3$" of, something (e.g., have thoughts about it, perceptual experiences of it) without being conscious$_4$ of this particular instance of consciousness$_3$.

times, without their being objects of inner awareness. For example, visual perceptual experience of a certain particular tree in a certain particular garden sometimes will take place without any inner awareness of the experience and this experience may be otherwise the same as when it occurs consciously$_4$. In this sense, the same mental occurrence can transpire consciously$_4$ on one occasion and nonconsciously$_4$ on a different occasion, and these occasions will often follow closely upon each other. Within even brief periods, much alternation likely occurs between conscious$_4$ and nonconscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instances.

For example, while we are trying to solve a problem mentally, our inner awareness of what is taking place in the stream of consciousness is frequently interrupted as we focus our attention on particular objective matters pertaining to the problem. Another example: as we watch a movie, many of our visual perceptual awarenesses are exclusively of what is taking place in the scene, yet we are also aware throughout, for the most part, of being engaged in watching a movie. That is, we are aware of the pictured scenes consciously$_4$ and nonconsciously$_4$ and often so aware, back and forth, in highly frequent alternation.

According to intrinsic theory of consciousness$_4$, an auditory experience of an isolated brief musical tone of a particular frequency and intensity is a type of mental occurrence that includes both conscious$_4$ instances and nonconscious$_4$ instances. But from the same intrinsic perspective, one may also speak in the same case, alternatively, of two mental occurrences whose respective instances are all of them conscious$_4$ and all of them nonconscious$_4$. For, according to intrinsic theory, two qualitatively different mental occurrences take place; one of the two intrinsically possesses a reflexive aspect, partially directed round upon itself, whereas the other mental occurrence possesses no such aspect, that is, is totally directed outwards from itself. It is, of course, their similarity in other respects that allows us to speak of them as both being the same mental occurrence.

In the Background of the Present Discussion: James's Appendage Interpretation of Consciousness$_4$

Following an early comment in Freud's *Project* (1895/1964, p. 311), I have been calling a kind of theory that is competitive with intrinsic theory "appendage" theory of consciousness$_4$ (e.g., Natsoulas, 1992a, 1993d). In a series of articles (e.g., Natsoulas, 1985, 1993b), I have argued that Freud, like his teacher Brentano (1911/1973), worked throughout with an intrinsic theory; his property of consciousness was posited to be intrinsic to every

mental-occurrence instance that takes place in his anatomically conceived "perception–consciousness system" of the psychical apparatus. In contrast, James's (1890/1950) well-known account of consciousness$_4$ in *The Principles of Psychology* qualifies as being of the appendage variety. I shall explain how James's account so qualifies right after a brief description of it.

In contrast to intrinsic theory, James (1890/1950) argues that no state of consciousness, that is, no basic durational component of his famous stream of consciousness, can have itself for its object, even as one among its often many objects. Notwithstanding the complexity of all that a single state of consciousness may take in, self-intimation is impossible in principle (cf. Armstrong, 1968; Natsoulas, 1989; Ryle, 1949). James (1890/1950) insisted as follows:

> Cognition [is] reference to an object other than the mental state itself [that is the cognition]. (p. 186)
>
> Comte is quite right in laying stress on the fact that a feeling [i.e., a state of consciousness], to be named, judged, or perceived, must be already past. No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else . . . . Cases in which we appear . . . to be experiencing and observing the same inner fact at a single stroke . . . are illusory. (p. 190)
>
> Mind knowing and thing known . . . are irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way *is* the other, neither *makes* the other. (p. 218)
>
> Whatever qualities a man's feelings may possess, or whatever content his thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which seems to *go out* to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to *come in* to be received by it. (p. 297)
>
> The present moment of consciousness is thus, as Mr. Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series. It may feel its own immediate existence — we have all along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact — but nothing can be known *about* it till it be dead and gone. (p. 341)
>
> To get the awareness [of a feeling] we must openly beg it by postulating a new feeling which has it. (p. 359)

Because James (1890/1950) holds that every mental-occurrence instance that actually takes place is a state of consciousness, that it is a durational component of one or another stream of consciousness, it follows for James that any mental-occurrence instance may be an object of inner awareness: in the form, of course (given his appendage theory), of a distinct mental-occurrence instance. It is an essential part of what it is for a mental-occurrence instance to be a component of a stream of consciousness that when it occurs, it is conscious$_4$ or could have been conscious$_4$ if it happened in fact not to be so. In James's view, no state of consciousness (and, therefore, no mental-occurrence

instance) is closed in principle to inner awareness — except under some abnormal conditions of brain function such as occur with the inhalation of certain drugs or in connection with fainting (James, 1890/1950, p. 273).[6]

The total brain process brings one state of consciousness after another into existence, and thus creates over time one's entire mental life. Of course, this means that the total brain process produces, often in perfect succession, each conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instance and the respective distinct state of consciousness that includes inner awareness of that instance. All the mental products of the total brain process are typically, according to James, very complex states of consciousness. And the total brain process is itself well enough "informed" regarding each mental-occurrence instance to be capable of producing an awareness of it directly upon having produced the mental-occurrence instance. Yet this brain process is incapable of creating a single state of consciousness that includes an inner awareness of itself or of any of its own parts or aspects. It is as though the total brain process has to wait upon feedback from a mental-occurrence instance it has just produced in order for the brain process to produce an inner awareness of that mental-occurrence instance.

According to James, a mental-occurrence instance may hinder or further the course of the ongoing total brain process; that is, it may amplify or weaken the process as it is proceeding. But, since the mental-occurence instance is exactly as it is because of the total brain process that produced it, there being no other proximal cause of the mental-occurrence instance, feedback from a mental-occurrence instance would seem to be unnecessary in order for an accurate inner awareness of the mental-occurrence instance to be produced as well. I have elsewhere discussed James's appendage account of inner awareness somewhat critically, and I need not repeat my previous discussion here (Natsoulas, 1995–1996, 1996–1997). Also available in print is a critical article of mine concerning apppendage theory more generally (Natsoulas, 1993d; see also Natsoulas, 1992a).

James's conception of consciousness$_4$ is not of the intrinsic variety because his conception distinguishes inner awareness from its mental object in the form of two different mental states, two different states of consciousness, or basic durational components of the stream. James's account qualifies as an appendage theory as opposed to a "mental-eye theory," although the latter

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[6]The same qualification is needed in light of a Jamesian interpretation that I recently devised for a certain neuropsychological phenomenon, namely, "blindsight" (Cowey, 1994; Gazzaniga, Fendrich, and Wessinger, 1994; Natsoulas, 1982, 1997, 1999a; Weiskrantz, 1986, 1993, 1995, 1997). I used this phenomenon to suggest that James's (1890/1950) account of the stream of consciousness can allow for occurrent mental features that cannot be conscious$_4$ because of certain brain lesions (Natsoulas, 1998a).

kind of theory, too, postulates the production of a further mental state that is the inner awareness (see Natsoulas, 1993d). That is, James's account does not introduce a perception-like mechanism that produces the inner awareness. The brain process that brings a state of consciousness that is an inner awareness into existence is the same total brain process at a later point. The brain process that produces in one's stream of consciousness a certain intense desire, for example, is also the brain process that results, very soon after, in one's having inner awareness of that desire. In the case of appendage theory (as well as mental-eye theory), a mental-occurrence instance is no different if it is followed by inner awareness of it than if it is not. The consciousness$_4$ that is instantiated by a mental-occurrence instance is owed to an external relation between the mental-occurrence instance that is the object and a distinct mental-occurrence instance. However, no mental-occurrence instance produces another mental-occurrence instance; the brain process is the only recipient of whatever effects a mental-occurrence instance may directly have.

However, the present article tries to keep James's (1890/1950) account of inner awareness as much as possible in the background. The present series of articles has for its purpose exposition of the positive case for intrinsic theory. Although I am naturally drawn from time to time into making objections to alternative kinds of accounts of consciousness$_4$, I do not want to develop such objections here (cf. Natsoulas, 1996a). As I stated elsewhere: "To show a theory to be deficient does not improve, ipso facto, a competing theory's adequacy to the phenomena" (Natsoulas, 1993d, p. 144).

Religious Experiences: How James Defined Them and Their Present Relevance

In this article and the next one that I am planning for the present series, I shall use James as a kind of witness of the stream of consciousness, for the following two reasons:

1. As is well known, James had a strong and active interest in experience itself. He is widely considered to have been a master of phenomenological inquiry, even by professionals who make such inquiry their life's work. James (1902/1982) collected a great many cases of religious experience, and closely examined them in a highly empirical manner. He wanted to find out about them, to discover what they were like, rather than to prove that he was right, that he already knew what is the case regarding religious experience. Although he did not balk at theory, James seems to have been even more empirical in his approach than most present-day psychologists. In all of his psychological efforts, he repeatedly returned to the mental phenomena themselves and was skeptical about psychological thought that strayed far

from the firsthand evidence. Similarly, his goal in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, as he stated in a letter, was to champion as "the real backbone of the world's religious life" the actual firsthand, original religious experiences — as opposed to the speculations about the divine that are associated with the experiences, let alone dogma, ritual, and institution, and the feelings that these in turn manage to produce (Marty, 1982, p. xix). No further explanation seems necessary for giving substantial psychological attention to religious experience. As James (1902/1982) rightly stated: "To the psychologist the religious propensities of man must be at least as interesting as any other of the facts pertaining to his mental constitution" (p. 2).

2. Psychologists must take measures to protect psychological science from partisanship and the distortions that it produces. The relevant opposite term to *objectivity* is not *subjectivity* but *bias*. James was an extraordinary "witness" of human experience and his judgments regarding experience are especially valuable in the present context. James was not biased in favor of intrinsic theory. His strong preference for an appendage theory of inner awareness presumably had, for the present purpose, the desirable effect of predisposing him not to favor for inclusion in his discussion of religious experience firsthand reports consistent with intrinsic theory.

Varieties is made up of a brief preface, a postscript of seven pages and, between them, the twenty Gifford Lectures of 1901 and 1902, which James delivered in Edinburgh. In his second lecture, titled "Circumscription of the Topic," James identifies what he will mean by the religious experiences mentioned in the title of his book. He will restrict his topic to those particular states of consciousness in which individual people apprehend themselves to stand in a relation — not a chosen relation so much as one impelled though not unwelcome — to whatever it may be that they, as individuals, apprehend to be "the divine." Such states of consciousness are, evidently, instances of self-awareness. More specifically, they are awarenesses of one's currently taking up a certain personal attitude to God or to what may amount to no more than "the essentially spiritual structure of the universe" or anything else that is "godlike," even the remarkable presence to us of the world itself as a whole here and now. James thereupon narrows his definition of religious experiences by requiring them to be experiences of the above description and, in addition, solemn and grave. Also, he expands his definition by allowing states of consciousness to vary in the degree to which they are religious experiences, allthough he proposes to deal in his lectures only with states of consciousness that are extreme and unmistakably religious.

The relevance of the second lecture to the present topic can be located specifically in the reflexive character of the religious states of consciousness, according to James's definition of the latter. Note that such states were not distinguished by him simply as solemn and grave and as having for their

object one or the other of some imagined or real aspect of the divine. Religious states of consciousness are not simply a kind of suitably emotional apprehension that is directed to matters (real or imagined) which lie externally to the stream of consciousness, that is, to a part of the world, to the world as a whole, or to something that lies beyond the world as a whole. States of consciousness that would fit the latter description, just as it stands, might not be religious states of consciousness or they would be, at most, truncated counterparts of such states. They could be missing the reference to self that, according to James, is involved in every religious experience: specifically, the apprehension of a relation or apparent relation between oneself and the divine.

Whereas James explores in the second lecture what should be included in the category of the divine for the purpose of his definition of religious experience, he seems not to have considered this lecture the time for him to enter into the other term in the relation involved, namely, oneself or what one is from one's own perspective. However, he did relevantly discuss this question in *The Principles*, stating there that "the spiritual self" is "that which we most verily seem to be" (James, 1890/1950, p. 296); and this self, when it is taken most concretely, is none other than our stream of consciousness (see close of next main section).

Religious experience involves not only a suitable reference to oneself in relation to the divine, but also a reference to one's stream of consciousness, specifically, to an apprehension of one's religious experience as a crucial part of one's relation to the divine. Therefore, we should expect to find, in James's many examples of reports of religious experience, consistent reference not only to one's relation to the divine, but also to how one takes oneself to be experiencing the divine in having the experiences that James defined as religious. It is further in question, of course, (a) whether such inner taking of religious experience is intrinsic — in the sense meant by intrinsic theory — to the respective states of consciousness and (b) whether how these states are described on a firsthand basis yields reason to hold in favor of intrinsic theory.

James's Skepticism Regarding Inner Awareness: Considered in the Light of James's Later Rejection of "Medical Materialism"

The Discreditation of Religious Experiences

The first lecture in *Varieties* is titled "Religion and Neurology" and contains discussion of the "medical materialism" that would reduce the significance of religious experience to the effects on mental processes of brain or bodily function. While comparing his view of religion with this medical

materialism, James (1902/1982) expresses a certain conviction consistent with his famous account of the stream of consciousness in *The Principles*. A decade after the latter, he continues to agree with the "general postulate of psychology" that states every state of consciousness has "some organic process as its condition . . . every one of them without exception flows from the state of their possessor's body at the time" (p. 14).

James then points out that religious experiences are not unique in this regard. For example, the thoughts and feelings comprising the activities of science itself, much admired by medical materialism, are no less organically conditioned than religious experiences are. Therefore, the significance of neither category of experience, religious or scientific, is decidable simply based on the dependence of the states of consciousness involved on bodily conditions.

In this context, James (1902/1982) also comments briefly on a certain phenomenological fact that would seem to have a most direct relevance to arguments in favor of the adoption of an intrinsic theory of consciousness$_4$:

> We are surely all familiar in a general way with this method of discrediting states of minds for which we have an antipathy. We all use it to some degree in criticising persons whose states of mind we regard as overstrained. But when other people criticise our own more exalted soul-flights by calling them "nothing but" expressions of our organic predispositions, we feel outraged and hurt, for we know that, whatever be our organism's peculiarities, our mental states have their substantive value as revelations of the living truth; and we wish that all this medical materialism could be made to hold its tongue. (pp. 11–13)

Objecting to medical materialism as above, one rightly distinguishes between (a) the causal contexts of our states of consciousness, their natural existential conditions, and the most proximal factors responsible for their occurrence and (b) the contents of our states of consciousness and what these states may be about beyond themselves.

On the assumption consistent with James's (1890/1950) mental/physical dualism that mental states are not brain processes, the following general fact can be safely asserted. Although it is the total brain process that brings into being, pulse by sucessive pulse of mentality, our stream of consciousness, it is also true that very few of our states of consciousness — perhaps none at all in some people — make reference to brain process. It is entirely possible to carry on a normal life without awareness of any brain processes at all as such.[7] Indeed, there is much else, in addition to bodily states, processes, and

[7]The "as such" here is necessary given my identification of mental events with brain process. A normal life cannot be led, in my view, absent all awareness of one's mental life. I doubt that one could survive in the absence of such awareness, except through extaordinary care provided by others who are not lacking in such awareness.

events, that our states of consciousness give us awareness of. For psychologists to develop adequate theories about our knowledge of the world, they cannot identify what is known with what makes it possible for us to know it. For example, although we have visual perceptual awareness of the environment around us because parts of the environment project structured light to our points of observation, it is the environment itself that we apprehend, not the transparent light that fills the medium between us and the unoccluded environmental surfaces that face us (cf. Gibson, 1979/1986). There are, of course, exceptions to any rule that would say what we know is always distinct from what makes it possible for us to know it. For example, the sun is seen because of the light that it produces, and other things are seen because, usually, they have specifically structured the reflected light entering our eyes. Yet, it is also true that many visual-system processes, in whose absence we could not see, are not open to awareness except by scientific inference that is based on matters that can be observed. This is true, of course, of much the greater part of what we know about the universe.

The Discreditation of Consciousness$_4$

The quotation above was a portion of James's call in *Varieties* to the effect that religious experiences should be taken seriously: not just as phenomena to be explained scientifically, but with respect to the kinds of things they "assert" to be the case, what is "known" by virtue of them. However, in *The Principles*, James (1890/1950, pp. 296–305) expressed doubt analogous to medical materialism concerning the intentional significance of certain of his most theoretically important states of consciousness: namely, those common states, widely dispersed throughout the stream, that James called collectively the "self of all the other selves" (p. 297).

These states were said to perform, among other functions, the crucial function of going out to meet the specific contents and qualities of other states of consciousness in the same stream, welcoming or rejecting these other states, giving or withholding assent to what these states assert or intimate (p. 297).[8] That is, each of the states of consciousness that comprises the self of selves is a state of consciousness that — consistently with James's appendage account of consciousness$_4$ — is, among other things, an inner awareness of another state of consciousness.[9]

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[8]See a recent article of mine concerning the functions performed, according to James, by the self of selves (Natsoulas, 1998–1999).

[9]Including other states of consciousness that are also elements of the self of selves. The self of selves, or "central nucleus of the Self," is "something of which we also have direct sensible acquaintance, and which is as fully present at any moment of consciousness in which it is

On the basis of introspecting in turn such higher-order states of his own, James (1890/1950) proposed that, so far as he could tell, they may well be devoid of any "spiritual activity." The self of all the other selves may be, instead, no more than a "collection of activities physiologically in no essential way different from the overt acts themselves" (p. 302). Evidently, in order to make this behavioral notion more acceptable to his readers, James added the suggestion that, except for their "furthering or inhibiting the presence of various things, and actions before consciousness," the states that constitute the nuclear part of the Self are in themselves unimpressive to inner awareness and may attract little attention that would reveal their true nature as bodily reactions (p. 302).

Moreover, either because the states comprising the self of selves are in themselves mere bodily reactions (occurring largely in the head and throat) or because they are, at most, feelings (perceptions) of these particular reactions discovered by James, it follows that the self of selves does not apprehend anything mental. And so, notwithstanding all that James had taught on an introspective basis regarding the stream of consciousness, a remarkable, radical hypothesis became highly tempting to him:

It may well be true that, after all, the stream of consciousness — on which James had just completed a long and brilliant chapter — is actually no more than a stream of "sciousness" (p. 304). That is, all of the mental pulses that comprise the stream of consciousness may be awarenesses, often possessing complex contents, that are neverthelss directed intentionally in an entirely outward direction from the stream.[10] In other words, it may be the case that we actually never have, none of us ever has, inner awareness of any of our mental states. Whatever we may know about our own mental life, we know because it is inferrable on the basis of our taking notice of objective matters.

However, James (1890/1950) did not thereupon develop his further thoughts regarding consciousness any differently than prior to introducing this strange hypothesis. He did not act on the assumption of its truth, although it is clear that he was strongly so inclined. Instead, James "left

present, as in a whole lifetime of such moments" (James, 1890/1950, p. 299). Also, instances of inner awareness were not restricted to having just one state of consciousness for their object. See Natsoulas (1992–1993) on James's concept of the specious present, which has reference to the apprehension of a sequence of states of consciousness as all taking place in the present moment (although no less as occurring successively).

[10]Cf. Gibson's (1979/1986) understanding of introspecting visual experience as actually a matter of differently looking at the environment and self in relation to it: "I notice the surfaces that face me, and what I face, and thus where I am. The attitude might be called introspective or subjective, but is actually a reciprocal two-way attiitude, not a looking inward" (p. 286). For discussion of Gibson's late conception and a proposed revisionary ecological proposal of my own, see Natsoulas (1999b).

open" the momentous question of whether thought can be its own immediate object, and he proceeded as though an affirmative answer to this question is true — evidently because he expected that, otherwise, nearly everybody would disagree with him. He stated, "I will continue to assume (as I have assumed all along, especially in the last chapter [Chapter IX. The Stream of Thought]) a direct awareness of the process of our thinking as such, simply insisting on the fact that it is an even more inward and subtle phenomenon than most of us suppose" (p. 305).

A Positive Argument for Intrinsic Theory Deriving from James's Introspective Failure

James's observations at this point in *The Principles* can provide the basis of an argument in favor of an intrinsic account of consciousness$_4$: especially when combined with (a) his defense of religious experience against medical materialism and (b) a certain understanding that also can be found in *Varieties* of an abstract sort of awareness. Let me explain by taking up in turn the relation between each of the above two items to James's discussion that led him to the sciousness hypothesis in *The Principles*. I take up the first of these immediately, and the second in a later subsection titled "Abstract Inner Awareness."

A misleading expectation. An effort to introspect the self of all other selves — which, in the first place, James believed to consist of distinct, active states of consciousness directed upon other states of consciousness — led him to notice only the phenomenological presence of certain bodily concomitants of those states. James (1890/1950) then proceeded to identify these concomitants with the states comprising the self of selves or, at most, he came to consider the concomitants to be the sole intentional objects of the states. That is, he found he could not locate introspectively any mental or spiritual activity belonging to the self of selves, despite the fact that these states were felt to "preside" over the other states comprising the stream, accepting and rejecting them and so on.

James's introspective discovery — or, in my view, error — to the effect that there was nothing else phenomenologically there besides the bodily concomitants, led James into deep skepticism with regard to inner awareness itself, to his doubting the very existence of our firsthand contact with our own experiences. One should pause to contemplate this remarkable outcome. This was one and the same William James who helped to found the science of psychology and who emphasized, in both his words and actions, that the natural science of psychology had no choice but to rely on introspective observation "first and foremost and always" (James, 1890/1950, p. 185). However, I do not attempt to answer directly here why James came to be in such a state of his mind regarding the mind.

On the basis of his introspective effort, James (1890/1950) might have worked out a more reasonable conclusion, thus avoiding the psychological counterpart of medical materialism into which he allowed himself to fall. The above quotation (James, 1890/1950, p. 305) provides a hint as to what his conclusion could have been. He states there, in effect, that inner awareness is in fact a more inward and subtle phenomenon than James had been proposing in *The Principles*. James had already made it quite clear in that book that he favored an appendage account of consciousness$_4$. Inner awareness was supposed to consist of a state of consciousness directed on another state of consciousness: thus, in such cases of awareness, the knowing and the known were no less distinct than in all other cases of knowing about something.

If inner awareness is more inward and more subtle than according to his appendage account, how, specifically, is inner awareness different than James had previously supposed? At the least, we are given to understand that inner awareness is more difficult to detect than he had supposed. After relevant careful introspection by a master of the craft, the nature and character of inner awareness remain uncertain. How can this indeterminacy itself be explained? What is the nature of inner awareness that it should be so difficult to distnguish firsthand? Should its very existence be questioned on this basis? With his sciousness hypothesis did James go too far — which would make it impossible for him to treat of the stream of consciousness as before?

An intrinsic theorist would welcome the alternative conclusion toward which James appears to have moved in his statement. Such a theorist would put the matter in the following way:

> It is a mistake to try to locate inner awareness in distinct states of consciousness that are difficult if not impossible introspectively to detect (cf. Natsoulas, 1992a). Attempting to apprehend one's inner awareness, on the assumption that it consists of mental reactions having other mental reactions for their immediate objects, one merely finds instead various bodily reactions that do not have mental objects. However, this is not for the reason that we lack the power of inner awareness, as James was strongly tempted to conclude (cf. James, 1892/1984, p. 400). Rather, it is because not only in appearance but in fact inner awareness is a more inward or subtle phenomenon than most of us suppose. Finding only bodily reactions upon introspecting the self of selves is what one would expect if consciousness$_4$ is intrinsic to the mental-occurrence instances that are the objects of the self of selves. For, contrary to James's less inward and subtle appendage account, the inner awarenesses that we have of our conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instances are not separate mental reactions.

A further argument. Against James's skepticism regarding the existence of inner awareness, one can rightly raise the following critical question as well:

> If James in fact had no inner awareness of pulses of mentality distinct from his bodily reactions, how would he even have thought of the existence within him of a stream of mere sciousness? How would human beings ever have conceived of their possessing a mental life if, as the sciousness hypothesis holds, not one constituent of the stream of

sciousness is conscious$_4$? Embarking on his first consideration of the self of all the other selves, James (1890/1950) relevantly and cogently wrote:

> This attention to thought as such [i.e., to our states of consciousness], and the identification of ourselves with it rather than with any of the objects which it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious operation, of which we need here only say that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in everyone, at an early age, the distinction between thought as such, and what it is "of" or "about," has become familiar to the mind . . . . Now this subjective life of ours, distinguished as such so clearly from the objects known by its means, may, as aforesaid, be taken by us in a concrete or in an abtract way. (pp. 296–297)

> We may insist on a concrete view, and then the spiritual self in us will be either the entire stream of our personal consciousness, or the present "segment" or "section" of that stream, according as we take a broader or a narrower view — both the stream and the section being concrete existences in time, and each being a unity of its own peculiar kind. (p. 296)

James's Neglect of Abstract Inner Awareness Notwithstanding a Recognition of Amodal Awareness (Perceptual and Hallucinatory)

James's third lecture in *Varieties* is called "The Reality of the Unseen." Among other things, he seeks to explain there our belief in objects that cannot be perceived. James traces this belief to a certain intrinsic feature belonging to our states of consciousness, that is, to a special kind of feeling that our states of consciousness widely instantiate.[11]

As I have argued elsewhere (Natsoulas, 1998a), each state of consciousness, according to James (1890/1950), not only performs a cognitive function — not only is each of our states of consciousness an instance of occurrent thinking, believing, or knowing — but, also, every one of our states of consciousness possesses an intrinsic feeling aspect. Whatever we may cognize is not therein an object of pure thought but an object of sensibility. Each state of consciousness, no matter what it is about or would be about, possesses a "sensitive body." And this feeling aspect of the state is responsible, according to my understanding of the James of *The Principles*, for the ability of a state of consciousness to grasp its objects as falling under certain headings. The feeling aspect of a state of consciousness is what performs the cognitive function that is itself no less an essential aspect of every state of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1998a).

In *Varieties*, James seeks at one point to explain our belief in unperceivable objects in terms of one specific kind of feeling. This special feeling occurs when we have perceptual awareness of something in the environment or of

[11]Which should not be confused with the general feeling aspect that I mention next in the text and which all states of consciousness possess.

oneself, but this same feeling also can be instantiated without reference to an item that we are actually perceiving. James (1902/1982) describes this special feeling as follows:

> It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call *"something there,"* more deep and more general than any of the special and particular "senses" by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. If this were so, we might suppose the senses to waken our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by first exciting this sense of reality; but anything else, any idea, for example, that might similarly excite it, would have that same prerogative of appearing real which objects of sense normally possess. (p. 58)

For example, there occur hallucinations in which what is hallucinated is experienced as objectively present in a particular actual environmental location although awareness of the hallucinatory item itself is "amodal" (Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé, 1964/1991). That is, the hallucinated item is "neither seen, heard, touched, nor cognized in any of the usual 'sensible' ways" (James, 1902/1982, p. 59). By the latter, James means the item possesses phenomenological presence but not in any modality of the senses. An hallucinatory item amodally experienced is no less an object of hallucinatory awareness, but that item contrasts to other hallucinated items in that they appear to us as though we are perceiving them.

However, it should not be inferred that any state of consciousnes that has among its features an amodal awareness of something is purely conceptual and involves no feeling aspect. Indeed, a state of consciousness without a feeling aspect is impossible, according to James. To claim the existence of a state of consciousness that is not a feeling, that does not possess a feeling aspect, is to contradict the essential nature of all states of consciousness according to James (1890/1950). The particular states of consciousness that make up an amodal bout of hallucination all possess a feeling aspect, they are perceptual awarenesses of a part of the environment, and they also involve a feeling of objective presence both with respect to the hallucinatory item and the items of which the hallucinator has modal awareness at the same time, such as his or her body and the part of the environment whereat the hallucinatory item appears to be located.

Note the terms in which James (1902/1982) describes an example: "It seems to have been an abstract conception rather, with the feelings of reality and spatial outwardness directly attached to it — in other words, a fully objectified and exteriorized *idea*" (p. 63). However, from James's (1890/1950) chapter on "Conception" in *The Principles*, it is clear that all states of consciousness, however "abstract" they may be, were held to be concrete durational components, individually, of the stream of consciousness and to possess, in every instance, both qualitative (feeling) content and cognitive

(knowing) content. Thus, a state of consciousness that is an amodal awareness of something is not lacking a feeling aspect, but the item that is the respective object or apparent object of awareness does not have phenomenological presence of the kind in which it qualitatively appears.

A Certain Phenomenological Fact Consistent with Intrinsic Theory

Next, let me bring the amodal kind of hallucinatory or perceptual phenomenon into relation to the main concern of the present article, as a possible basis for an argument in favor of intrinsic theory of inner awareness. In some cases, the occurrence of amodal awareness can be a striking, surprising phenomenon (e.g., James, 1902/1982, p. 59). A subject will report having an amodal awareness of something, or as though of something, together with his or her emotional reaction that this awareness engendered. In such cases, the subject not only apprehends the real or only apparent, amodally present object, but he or she is also conscious_4 of so apprehending. At least part of the emotional reaction comes from his or her being conscious_4 of experiencing in this unexpected amodal way. As one sophisticated perceptual subject stated, "I should never have believed that there could be phenomena in the perceptual domain so divorced from the stimulus conditions" (Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé, 1964/1991, p. 155).

The subject's evident intimate familiarity with how it is, or was, to undergo the particular experience suggests that the experience is an object of inner awareness intrinsically. He or she is not merely in a position simply to note the experience, not merely in a position to say that an amodal experience of a certain kind took place. The subject will dwell on the experience's unusual or unexpected features and judge himself or herself to have more or less succeeded or failed to find the right words to say what the experience was like. Consciousness_4 is not merely to know of the experience's occurrence. Nor, from the subject's perspective, does inner awareness of the experience amount merely to acquiring information concerning the experience. Rather, the subject apprehends the experience as something that he or she is now living through or, when recollecting the experience, one that he or she has lived through.

It will not seem to the subject that the experience and his or her immediate awareness of it are distinct occurrences. Instead, the experience seems to be apprehended from the inside. That is, it is apprehended as being this experience here, rather than that experience there. James (1890/1950) famously stated that one has "direct feeling" of one's states of consciousness and therein finds them to possess "the quality of warmth and intimacy and immediacy" (p. 239). Among the appendage theorists of inner awareness, Rosenthal (1986) is one who has explicitly recognized that the immediate impression we have of inner awareness is especially consistent with the main thesis of intrinsic theory.

As he recognized, this phenomenological fact counts as evidence against Rosenthal's own kind of theory, unless he can provide an adequate explanation for our inner awareness's seeming to be intrinsic to our conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instances when in fact, according to his view, inner awareness is extrinsic, an appendage to any mental-occurrence instance that is conscious$_4$. Elsewhere, I have critically considered the explanation that Rosenthal has put forth to deal with the "diaphanous" character of inner awareness (Natsoulas, 1992a). Although my discussion of Rosenthal's efforts (in this and other respects) is quite relevant to how best to account for inner awareness, I have chosen to focus in the present series on the positive case for intrinsic theory. I shall not argue here for intrinsic theory by demonstrating weaknesses in the alternative accounts. I have done so in certain of my articles outside this series, to which I have referred above.

Abstract Inner Awareness

In James's (1890/1950) systematic view, all of our states of consciousness are feelings (Natsoulas, 1998a). Yet, in his discussion of "believing in things unseen," James (1902/1982) brings out that, as part of a state of consciousness, we may have awareness of particular items in a way that qualifies the awareness of them as "abstract" in a certain sense. That is, we sometimes have awareness of items (or parts of them) without having "definite sensible images" of them. It is to such awarenesses I am referring when I speak of amodal awareness or apprehension. In having amodal awareness of an item or part of an item, it is apprehended or (when it does not exist) seems to be apprehended as being there anyway. Phenomenologically, the item (or part thereof) is present or apparently present to us in a special way that does not include qualitative content.

Such awareness is not merely of items that do not in fact exist. Michotte, Thinès, and Crabbé (1964/1991), as well as Gibson (1979/1986), have usefully called our attention to how much of our perceptual awareness of the environment includes amodal awareness in which parts of the environment hidden from sight are nevertheless apprehended. For example, we have visual perceptual awareness of many environmental surfaces when only a part of each of them is reflecting light to our present point of observation. These surfaces are perceived to extend beyond where the light that they would project to the observation point is being obstructed, that is, to extend behind the surfaces that are partly occluding them.

James (1902/1982) provides a number of examples of religious states of consciousness that involve the amodal phenomenological presence of their main apparent object. Such states seem to apprehend their main objects not simply as objects of thought but in the form of "quasi-sensible realities

directly apprehended" (p. 64). The individual having such a religious experience has no problem in distinguishing these states of consciousness from states of consciousness in which the same object is merely conceived of, and not directly apprehended.

James summarizes such direct apprehensions by saying that they involve a feeling of reality and are more like sensations than they are like intellectual operations. However, it is important to be sure to notice that those direct apprehensions are introspectively distinguished as well from modal perceptual awarenesses. Let me repeat in this connection a point that I have already made. People employ in their reports fine distinctions pertaining to the form of the awarenesses involved. These reports suggest that consciousness$_4$ of the particular states of consciousness is more inward and subtle than appendage theorists, given their notions of inner awareness from outside an experience, are entitled to expect.

The following is what two people reported — and what James (1902/1982) quoted, albeit at greater length than I do here — regarding their experience of God:

> I think it well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor, nor taste; moreover, that the feeling of his presence was accompanied with no determinate localization . . . . At bottom the expression most apt to render what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; he fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him. (p. 68)

> The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt because it was not seen. I could not any more have doubted that *He* was there than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two. (pp. 66–67)

James (1902/1982) describes these two and further examples of this kind of religious experience by saying that the awarenesses involved are no less convincing to the person having them than any perceptual experience can be, and the awarenesses are much more convincing as a rule than any logically based conclusion is, notwithstanding the fact that the awarenesses involved in the above kind of religious experience are phenomenologically clearly distinguished from both of the latter kinds. Indeed, James adds to this statement his larger view that the cogency of the rational in general depends on whether "our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclusion" (p. 74).

With the reality of amodal phenomenological presence in mind, let us return to James's (1890/1950) introspective basis for skepticism regarding inner awareness. He stated about the states of consciousness that individually comprise the abstract totality that he called "the self of all the other selves":

> This central part of the Self is *felt* . . . it is . . . no *mere ens rationis*, cognized only in an intellectual way . . . . It is something with which we also have direct sensible acquaintance . . . . When, just now, it was called an abstraction, that did not mean that, like some general notion, it could not be presented in a particular experience. It only meant that in the stream of consciousness it never was found all alone. But when it is found, it is *felt;* just as the body is felt, the feeling of which is also an abstraction, because never is the body felt all alone, but always together with other things. *Now can we tell more precisely in what the feeling of the central active self* [i.e., the self of all the other selves] *consists*, — not necessarily what the active self *is*, as a being or principle, but what we *feel* when we become aware of its existence? (pp. 298–299)

James called the self of selves the "active" self because of certain other functions that he assigned to it, other than its components' being the vehicles of consciousness$_4$. However, the sciousness hypothesis — the thesis that we do not possess the power of inner awareness — was what he mainly derived from his inquiry concerning how the self of selves "feels."

James stated that he could not detect any "purely spiritual element at all" that belonged to the states of consciousness making up his self of all selves. Admittedly, part of what he was aware of was "obscure" or "indistinct," but he found the much larger, distinct part to consist only of bodily processes occurring mostly in the head. And, he added, the introspectively "dim" portions of these states of consciousness might prove to be of the same physical kind as the portions that were clear to him. Thus, our awareness of spiritual activity could really be, in its entirety, an awareness of bodily activities that we erroneously take to be something else.

James proceeded in his reasoning as follows on the assumption that the latter is true: the stream of consciousness is not itself ever the object of immediate awareness. Contrary to general opinion, the components of the stream of consciousness are never themselves "felt." Everything of which we have had and can have awareness is "objective." The cognitive function and the feeling aspect of all states of consciousness and all awareness that we are said to undergo are merely posited for explanatory purposes. Awareness is an assumed kind of happening that may or may not exist. If mental-occurrence instances exist, no one has ever in his or her life encountered firsthand — by inner awareness — any one of them.

Published two years later, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, James's well-known abridgment of *The Principles*, surely required for its preparation a further, good amount of thinking about the essence of James's teachings concerning consciousness. Nevertheless, James (1892/1984) there repeated that he was not confident as to the fact "that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the outer objects which it knows" (p. 400). He again gave as grounds for his skepticism that any careful attempt that he makes to apprehend the stream of consciousness results in his being aware of some bodily

fact. The stream of consciousness does not appear to him to be a "sensibly given fact." After all, not even in one's own case are the states of consciousness — which James in *The Principles* had so closely observed and described throughout — "verifiable facts."

This is a remarkable conclusion to draw from happenings picked out as "welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or against, saying yes or no" (James, 1890/1950, p. 299). Such happenings, under that description, are clearly awarenesses, apprehensions of something. But what James found — by, as he said, "grappling with particulars, coming to the closest possible quarter with the facts" — were all bodily movements of some type.

Surely, James should have realized the fact that these movements that he detected were not themselves awarenesses. They were merely concomitants of the mental activity that he was seeking to characterize. For example, suppose it to be true that negating and consenting are, as James believed, always accompanied by closing or opening the glottis, interceptions of the breath or letting the air pass through the throat and nose. There is obviously nothing belonging to such movements themselves that is an accepting or negating of something. Indeed, one can perform these movements without agreeing or disagreeing with anything.

I have already given one explanation for James's (1890/1950, 1892/1984) conclusion that the movements themselves constituted the self of selves: namely, his appendage theory required that he introspectively find, contrary to the intrinsic kind of theory, something more than the states of consciousness that were the objects of inner awareness. But he found nothing more than bodily reactions and states of consciousness, neither of which was about other states of consciousness. This result together with his appendage theory compelled James to decide merely bodily reactions constitute the self of selves. James was led (a) rightly to conclude that no state of consciousness is an awareness of another state of consciousness except insofar as it is a posited object and (b) wrongly to conclude that we have no inner awareness of any mental-occurrence instance.

A further explanation for why James settled on the accompanying movements as being the self of selves pertains to the fact that he was looking for something to feel. His introspective inquiry was concerned with how the self of selves feels. He believed in the first place that we can have "direct sensible acquaintance" with our inner awarenesses. Thus, James failed even to mention the alternative hypothesis that inner awareness is apprehended amodally, that is, not in the sort of way other items are apprehended owing to the sense-receptor activity that they evoke.

However, in *Varieties*, James did emphasize the occurrence of religious experiences whose objects are "abstract" in the sense that these real or merely apparent objects do not have modal phenomenological presence.

Accordingly, James (1902/1982) spoke of objects "present only to thought" (p. 53). And he did not confuse having awareness of these objects with any of one's reactions to the awareness of them. He stated that "the reactions due to things of thought is notoriously in many cases as strong as that due to sensible presences" (p. 53). These reactions, however strong they may be, are not the thoughts themselves, any more than it is right to identify items themselves that are sensibly present with their modal phenomenological presence, however vivid this presence may be.

James (1902/1982) refers in the religious context to the "instrumentality of pure ideas," meaning the awarenesses that we have of items, concrete or abtract, that do not involve these item's modal phenomenological presence. At one point, James says of such items that they "can hardly be said to be present to our mind at all" (p. 55). The latter statement will recall his purported inability to discover introspectively any inner awareness at all. That is, in the latter effort, he was aware, surely, of being conscious_4 of his states of consciousness, but he was unable sensibly to apprehend any distinct inner awareness of his states of consciousness unless it was really only a concomitant bodily movement.

Whereas in *The Principles*, James held that the cognitive function of a state of consciousness is owed directly to the feeling aspect of the state of consciousness, in *Varieties* he argues that we apprehend all things by means of ideas: "In handling the real world we should be stricken with helplessness in just so far as we might lose these mental objects, these adjectives and adverbs and predicates and heads of classification and conception" (p. 56). This is not the place to reconcile James's two views; I shall do so in an article that is currently in preparation. Here, I want to call to your attention the fact of James's (1902/1982) explicit recognition and arguments for the existence of features of objects of awareness that are apprehensible firsthand as real, as being really there, notwithstanding the fact that they are not modally present in the phenomenological sense. Among such amodal features, I would want to include that particular feature of a conscious_4 mental occurrence-instance that is, according to intrinsic theory, the inner awareness of the mental-occurrence instance itself by itself.

A Concluding Comment: The Importance of Tertiary Consciousness

In the next article of the present series, I plan to return to James's *Varieties*. As I have done in the present installment, I hope to mine that book's rich content of selected religious experience and analyses thereof for further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness_4 that James was explicitly opposed to in *The Principles*. Before I end this article, however, there is one final matter I want to mention, although I have already discussed this matter at some length in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*.

James's above quoted use of the phrase "stricken with helplessness" impels me to close with some very brief comment on the importance of "tertiary consciousness" and to urge readers to consult my previously published discussion of this neglected topic (Natsoulas, 1998b). By tertiary consciousness, I mean no more than one's having inner awareness of one or another of one's conscious$_4$ mental-occurrence instances *as such*. Simply having inner awareness of a mental-occurrence instance would be a case of "secondary consciousness."

Now, if it were true, as James reported, that he could not introspectively determine the fact of his having inner awareness of his states of consciousness, if James was — *as we can be certain he was not* — mind-blind even to only that ("tertiary") extent, then James would have been incapable of, for one thing, solving problems mentally. He would not have been able to do so because his mentally solving problems required that he take mental action and this depended on his being wittingly aware of how his mental effort to solve the problem was proceeding so far, that is, of where he had arrived in the process (cf. Armstrong, 1968). More generally, as I have argued in my recent article on tertiary consciousness, in the absence of tertiary consciousness, one could not base any actions on what is mentally occurring to one now.

Suppose, for example, you had inner awareness of seeing something in particular but this inner awareness of yours was not conscious$_4$. That is, suppose that your inner awareness of the respective visual perceptual experience took place unbeknownst to you. In such a case, it would be as though you did not have the particular inner awareness. It would be, from your own perspective, as though you were unaware of your visual experience. Therefore, you could not choose to take any action on the basis of this visual experience. Here is how I have expressed a further example:

> Suppose you are aware of having a headache but your awareness of that state of affairs is not conscious; that is, you are temporarily lacking somehow in any direct (reflective) awareness [i.e., inner awareness] of your awarenesses. In such an instance, you would not take an aspirin although you are in fact aware of having a headache. Such awarenesses may affect your behavior but, *since you are unaware of them, you cannot act on their basis*, that is you cannot select actions based on what these awarenesses "assert" to be the case. (Natsoulas, 1998b, p. 153)

One would be "stricken with helplessness" in handling the real world if one were mind-blind for any length of time with respect to all of one's inner awareness. Interestingly, James (1902/1982) used the above phrase to emphasize the importance of abstract ideas in ordinary commerce with the world. That is, he was speaking of the importance of having awareness wherein what one is aware of is not modally phenomenologically present. And I now borrow his phrase "stricken with helplessness" to speak of what would happen in the total absence of conscious$_4$ inner awareness. As I hold, in the determination of mentally-based action, tertiary-level inner awareness is essential notwith-

standing the fact that inner awareness, whenever it is itself $conscious_4$, is at most an amodal object of inner awareness (see Natsoulas, 1998b).

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