

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: X. A Phenomenologist's Account of Inner Awareness

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This article is in large part an exposition and interpretation of the Woodruff Smith intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness. And, it is propaedeutic to considering, subsequently in the present series, the first of six theses regarding inner awareness that Kriegel defended in a recently published issue of this journal. Included here, as well, is some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness. Kriegel defended his first thesis with special critical reference to phenomenologist Woodruff Smith's theory, and maintained that, on the contrary, a conscious mental-occurrence instance presents itself, too: albeit secondarily, in the sense of its receiving less attention than does its primary object (e.g., the sun). Woodruff Smith conceived of inner awareness — the apprehension that one immediately has, as they take place, of many of one's mental-occurrence instances — to be part of the modality of presentation of a mental-occurrence instance's primary object. That is, the inner awareness intrinsic to a conscious mental-occurrence instance "modifies" (or "qualifies") the (sole) presentation in that mental-occurrence instance. I would like to put it for Woodruff Smith that inner awareness is the reflexive way in which a conscious mental-occurrence instance is an awareness of its primary object — as the latter's being, *inter alia*, an object of this conscious mental-occurrence instance. However, his conception includes that every conscious mental-occurrence instance possesses a "phenomenal quality" — which amounts to the instance's appearing in the mind — and inner awareness is awareness of this appearance. This seems to mean a conscious mental-occurrence instance, too, is presented therein, contrary to both (a) that the presentation in any mental-occurrence instance is just of its primary object and (b) that the inner-awareness feature "modifies" the only presentation there is within a conscious mental-occurrence instance.

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"Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness" is the title of a very pertinent article published recently in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*. Uriah Kriegel (2003) defended six theses about the content of "inner aware-

ness,” and addressed the sort of conception of inner awareness — which I have been calling “intrinsic theory” — that is the main topic of the present series of articles (Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). I plan to consider soon in this series the first of Kriegel’s six theses regarding the inner awareness that, according to intrinsic theory, is built into conscious mental-occurrence instances. I shall do so as he did, that is, with special reference to the intrinsic account of inner awareness that David Woodruff Smith (1986) proffered and Kriegel described as “non-traditional.” However, in the present article, I can include only the first two parts of my planned discussion, namely, (a) some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness, and (b) some preliminary exposition and interpretation of Woodruff Smith’s account.

Some Theories of Inner Awareness

Two Definitions

The phenomenologist Woodruff Smith (1986) sought to give an account of inner awareness not in the way that Kriegel’s (2003) understanding of the phenomenon does, that is, not in terms of the intentional directedness of a mental-occurrence instance on an additional, separate content. Indeed, in a major section of Kriegel’s article with the title “In Defense of the Traditional View,” he argued against Woodruff Smith that, in a conscious mental-occurrence instance, this instance is itself presented: albeit “secondarily,” in the sense of its receiving less attention than its primary object (e.g., the sun) does.

Whoever advocates any variety of the intrinsic theory of inner awareness contends that inner awareness is intrinsically a property of each conscious mental-occurrence instance (e.g., Alston, 1991; Brentano, 1911/1973; Gurwitsch, 1985; Kriegel, 2003; Natsoulas, 1996a; Woodruff Smith, 1986). Various intrinsic theories of inner awareness exist but all of them hold that no more than a conscious mental-occurrence instance needs transpire for there to be inner awareness of it. Thus, even a theory such as Kriegel’s does not assign that further, separate content, which he proposed is necessary to explain inner awareness, to a distinct mental-occurrence instance, an “appendage” to the mental-occurrence instance that is the object of inner awareness. If Kriegel’s theory did so assign, it would not qualify as an intrinsic theory of inner awareness.

In the present context, the technical term *inner awareness* has reference to the apprehension that all of us immediately have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances as they transpire (cf. Brentano, 1911/1973; Kriegel, 2003; Woodruff Smith, 1986). Let me spell out this definition somewhat further:

We are *not* said to have “inner awareness” of anything that occurs or exists within us *except* certain parts of our mental life. Moreover, to qualify as inner awareness, this awareness must be *immediate*: it cannot be a consequence of drawing an inference on the basis of separately apprehending something else, other than the mental-occurrence instance which one has inner awareness of. I emphasize that this is owing to the *concept* of inner awareness at work. Of course, one has awareness of matters existing or taking place within one and that themselves are not parts of one’s mental life (e.g., the behavior of one’s heart). However, *by definition*, such awareness does not fall under the present concept.

Double Awareness

Intrinsic theory maintains that, in addition to whatever else a conscious mental-occurrence instance may be, it is also an inner awareness of itself; therefore, it has been said, and sometimes critically, that such a mental-occurrence instance is a “double awareness.” But, it would be error to understand the latter, if uttered by a true intrinsic theorist, as meaning that a conscious mental-occurrence instance is made up of two subsidiary mental-occurrence instances: that is, either (a) two experiences that are causally related to each other, one of them causing the other one to take place, or (b) two experiences that take place simultaneously in parallel. Although Kriegel (2003) believed that a conscious mental-occurrence instance is intentionally directed upon two separate contents — that it “involves a two-fold intentional content” (p. 172) — it was not his intention to propose thereby that a conscious mental-occurrence instance is constituted of more than a single experience.

Kriegel (2003) was surely correct when he declared, “If we are realists about mental states, there is all the empirical difference in the world between the case in which the subject has *two* mental-occurrence instances and a case in which only one mental-occurrence instance is taking place” (p. 171). At that point, however, Kriegel was speaking of “appendage theory,” which is a different kind of conception of inner awareness from the intrinsic kind. According to appendage theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious if it takes place along with a distinct mental-occurrence instance that is an awareness of it, thus making it conscious. But, appendage theory aside, there is an empirical difference, too, between a mental-occurrence instance that consists of two distinct awarenesses and a mental-occurrence instance’s being a unitary awareness directed upon both of two distinct objects.

Thus, it is somewhat misleading to speak, as I do elsewhere, of the inner awareness and the outer awareness that are involved in a conscious mental-occurrence instance (cf. Kriegel, 2003, p. 172), unless one intends to forsake a single-awareness understanding of the conscious mental-occurrence instances. This was not the intention of the most prominent of all of the psy-

chologists of consciousness to date. As I have written concerning William James's (1890/1950) frequently complex individual states of consciousness,

Because I am speaking of James's position in *The Principles*, my several references to the awarenesses that *make up* a state of consciousness should not be taken literally. Typically, a state of consciousness has many objects, but this does not mean that a number of simultaneous awarenesses ever occur therein. Even when James [1895/1978] came to acknowledge that states of consciousness often have a complex structure, he continued to insist that each such state is unitary, a single awareness. (Natsoulas, 2000, pp. 152–153)

An intrinsic theorist needs to explain, of course, how a mental-occurrence instance can be, at the same time, an awareness of itself and, for example, a visual-perceptual experience of the sun. The theorist must meet such objections as the following: that it is not possible for one literally to see any of one's visual experiences. This objection could be spelled out as follows:

In having visual-perceptual experience of the sun, one will often be aware therein of more than just the sun. But, whatever else one is as well aware of never comprises the perceptual experience itself. All one has awareness of is what is visually presented in the experience. And the experience itself is, obviously, not visually presented therein.

Someone may want to offer an exception: to the effect that one might see one's experience by use of certain instruments. The idea of observation by instrument has been with us for a long time in the philosophy of science. It may be claimed possible to observe a visual experience of one's own by looking at a monitor that is connected to a certain special piece of apparatus that is suitably connected to one's brain. Thus, it would be suggested (a) that one could thereby have a visual experience of a direct effect of that experience that is specific to it, and (b) that this visual-perceptual experience would amount to one's seeing one's experience. However, obviously, there would still remain the question as to how, otherwise, a visual-perceptual experience could be an awareness of itself.

Unconscious Mental-Occurrence Instances

The intrinsic theorist Franz Brentano (1911/1973) would substitute the word *all* for the word *some* in the above clause that states everyone has immediate apprehension of some of his or her own mental-occurrence instances as they transpire; he claimed every mental-occurrence instance to be such intrinsically as to be an object of inner awareness. In contrast, most intrinsic theorists of inner awareness do recognize that mental-occurrence instances that are not conscious transpire as well. Brentano allowed that the concept of an unconscious mental-occurrence instance is not self-contradictory; no

doubt, that part of Brentano's thought was not lost on his student Sigmund Freud. But, other intrinsic theorists, including Freud, have not agreed with Brentano's view that the concept of an unconscious mental-occurrence instance does not in fact have any referents that are real.

Before going on, I must mention that there have been psychologists (e.g., Hebb, 1981, 1982; Hebb and Donderi, 1987) who, notwithstanding the following facts, rejected inner awareness as being non-existent yet they warmly welcomed into their science unconscious mental-occurrence instances:

1. The attribution of unconscious mental-occurrence instances to a person or animal requires that a scientist make certain *sensory observations* of the person or animal.
2. To perform these sensory observations, a scientist must undergo *perceptual experiences* of the behavior or reactions of the individual to whom the unconscious mental-occurrences are to be inferentially attributed.
3. The perceptual experiences that are an essential part of making these sensory observations *must be* objects of inner awareness; otherwise, for the scientist, from his or her first-person perspective, it is *as though that which would have been observed did not occur*; the scientist will, consequently, not be in a position to make use of the required observations to infer the unconscious mental happenings that occurred in the person or animal (cf. Natsoulas, 1977, 1983).

The first century of psychology as a scientific discipline saw the occurrence of a major reaction of long duration against consciousness and those colleagues who would investigate the topic, and some of the forms taken by this reaction were, to say the least, surprising.

Effects of this reaction are still noticeable in present-day psychology. And signs of it can be found even in James's *Principles* (1890/1950). Though James clearly was an appendage theorist of inner awareness (Natsoulas, 1995–1996, 1996–1997), he also expressed a preference for a path different from the one that he actually traveled. His masterpiece contains many descriptions from the first-person perspective of states of consciousness. Although these descriptions required his having inner awareness, James overtly wished he could have developed an account of mental life as consisting of a stream of "sciousness." As was true of his renowned stream of consciousness, which he was willing to abandon, the replacement stream of sciousness would consist of mental-occurrence instances, one after another often in tight succession, but the occurrence of all of the basic durational components of the stream of sciousness would have to be inferred upon the basis of observations of non-mental occurrences. None of them would be an object of inner awareness, as the basic durational components of the stream of consciousness were held to be (James, 1890/ 1950, pp. 304–305).

Returning to my main thread, I call attention to the fact that Woodruff Smith is among those intrinsic theorists who, in contrast to Brentano, have acknowledged the existence of unconscious mental-occurrence instances, and the following is a typical statement of his on the present topic: "Consciousness is thus a certain property that a mental state may have; it consists in the subject's being aware of the mental state while it transpires" (Woodruff Smith, 1988, p. 28). Note what is signified by the words *may have* in the latter sentence: as Sigmund Freud (see Natsoulas, 1984, 1985) insisted, not all of our mental-occurrence instances are objects of inner awareness; instead, some of them take place, as it were, in the dark; thus, if they are to be known of, even the person whose mental-occurrence instances they are has to draw inferences as to their occurrence, based on something that is directly apprehended.

It is sometimes objected that an intrinsic theory of inner awareness, because it puts forward that inner awareness is an intrinsic property of mental-occurrence instances, rules out all of the unconscious mental-occurrence instances. For example, Brian O'Shaughnessy (2000) argued that an infinite regress would be started if inner awareness were admitted theoretically. Whether it is admitted in the form of an intrinsic feature or in the form of a mental-occurrence appendage to the respective mental-occurrence instance, inner awareness would in effect be held to "dog" each mental-occurrence instance that transpires. However, an intrinsic theorist could counter that the conscious mental-occurrence instances are different in nature, in their internal structure, from the unconscious mental-occurrence instances. That a conscious mental-occurrence instance is by its nature an object of inner awareness is not incompatible with some mental-occurrence instances' transpiring unapprehended. Recall Freud's insistence that, whether dynamically (i.e., owing to repression) or descriptively unconscious, an unconscious mental-occurrence instance is incapable of transforming into a conscious mental-occurrence instance (see Natsoulas, 1985). This follows from his hypothesis that the conscious and the unconscious mental-occurrence instances possess different intrinsic natures; they are different kinds of process in the brain.

These matters may appear simpler than they really are. This becomes evident frequently as the present series of articles proceeds. Already, the above quote from Woodruff Smith demands, in order for it not to be misleading, some mention of another of his views: suppose that a mental-occurrence instance is, as every intrinsic theory proposes, an object of inner awareness owing to its intrinsic constitution. In Woodruff Smith's view, that this mental-occurrence instance thereby qualifies as being conscious does not follow. It may be lacking a certain something else that he regarded as necessary for it so to qualify. Either it possesses "a phenomenal quality" or it is an unconscious mental-occurrence instance, notwithstanding its being an object of inner awareness.

A certain thesis is thus implied that may be unacceptable or hard fully to grasp. Woodruff Smith clearly asserted that the subject does not have inner awareness of any unconscious mental-occurrence instance that takes place in him or her. However, he also countenanced that reflexive apperception could be an intrinsic property, as well, of unconscious mental-occurrence instances. Thus, the conscious and the unconscious mental-occurrence instances might not differ in respect to their instantiating inner awareness. Woodruff Smith (1986) wrote,

It is even possible that our own brains work in this way, so that every human mental state includes a self-monitoring structure. In an unconscious self-monitoring state, though, there would be no phenomenal appearance of mental structure; such a mental state would have no phenomenal character, and no phenomenality. (p. 153)

See later on in the present article about (a) the “phenomenal character” that Woodruff Smith proposed characterizes only the conscious mental-occurrence instances and (b) the relation that he proposed between their phenomenal character and their “reflexive character.” Every mental-occurrence instance that is conscious instantiates both of these characters, according to Woodruff Smith’s variety of intrinsic theory; and it is conscious in that it does so.

Kriegel’s First Thesis

The following is the first of the six theses that Kriegel (2003) defended regarding the content of inner awareness: “This inner awareness is indeed an aspect of the content of conscious states, not an aspect of their psychological attitude or mode” (p. 193). A conscious mental-occurrence instance is an inner awareness of itself in addition to whatever else that it may be (e.g., a visual-perceptual awareness). Kriegel expressed that all of the conscious mental-occurrence instances have this attribute by describing them as being intentionally directed inward as well as outward. Also, he presented a drawing which he proposed to represent the intentional structure, according to intrinsic theory, of the consciousness that any conscious mental-occurrence instantiates. The drawing shows two arrows emanating from a conscious mental-occurrence instance in different directions. One arrow then turns around and points back to the mental-occurrence instance itself. The other continues its outward course and reaches something external to the mental-occurrence instance. The intentionality of the conscious mental-occurrence instances was considered to be bi-directional.

Kriegel’s main point could also have been expressed by saying that each conscious mental-occurrence instance possesses a reflexive character, along with its other characters as the mental-occurrence instance that it is.

Reflexive character was Woodruff Smith's (1986) term employed in his account of "the structure of that secondary awareness, the consciousness-of-itself that is constitutive of consciousness" (p. 149). One communicative aspect of his exposition was use of first-person, single-sentence descriptions of the phenomenological content of mental-occurrence instances. For example, this statement: "Phenomenally in this very experience I see this small, green, smooth-skinned frog on this lily pad," would express all of the aspects of the content of a certain mental-occurrence instance that Woodruff Smith used in making his case. A part of the content that is so expressed is owed to the inner-awareness feature. This feature is evidently not the equivalent of the content of the mental-occurrence instance or of any part of the content. The mental-occurrence instance is a seeing as well as an inner awareness; and so, its visual character would, analogously, be responsible for an aspect of the total content but would not be equivalent to that aspect.

Kriegel, too, sought to specify the precise content of the inner awareness of which all of the conscious mental-occurrence instances are constituted. And it was under the section title "Inner Awareness: Content or Attitude?" and with special critical reference to the conception of inner awareness proposed by Woodruff Smith that Kriegel upheld his first thesis about the content of inner awareness. He understood Woodruff Smith to have, unlike himself, rejected that the inner awareness is an aspect of the content of a conscious mental-occurrence instance and to have held that it is an aspect of a different, integral part of a conscious mental-occurrence instance.

Inner Awareness Conceived of as a Feature of the Modality of Presentation in an Experience

Woodruff Smith (1986) maintained that, among every conscious experience's "constituent and constitutive features" is inner awareness of itself. The term *experience* served him as *mental-occurrence instance* serves me. I shall use these two terms interchangeably in my discussion of his theory. Also entering the picture in this section shall be Edmund Husserl's term *mental act* (Woodruff Smith and McIntyre, 1982). I shall treat it as also referring to the set of occurrences to which the above two terms refer. According to Woodruff Smith, the inner-awareness feature of a conscious experience has a "structure;" he will be seeking to render this structure explicit in his article; previous authors who addressed this topic, including Brentano and Husserl, had fallen short of providing "a clear and proper account" of the structure of inner awareness.

In having inner awareness, one is "*ipso facto*" aware of oneself as the experience's subject. This statement of Woodruff Smith's is, I believe, equivalent to his saying that, in one's having a conscious experience, one is aware of it as

one's own. Whether this self-reference is necessary is an issue I plan to return to; perhaps, an experience is able to apprehend itself sans taking itself to belong to oneself (or anyone; cf. Woodruff Smith, 1989, pp. 93–94); thus, without their being any less conscious, some conscious mental-occurrence instances would not instantiate an “egocentric character” (another of Woodruff Smith's technical terms). He proposed the egocentric character of a conscious experience is part of the “modality of presentation” in the experience. Whatever a conscious experience presents, it presents as being the object of this, one's experience.

For his example of a conscious experience, Woodruff Smith (1986) used a visual-perceptual experience of his own in which he sees this small green frog sitting on this lily pad. Referring to this experience, he spoke of “seeing” this frog, while my preference is to speak of his conscious mental-occurrence instance as a visual-perceptual awareness (or experience) of this frog. I tend to reserve the term *seeing* for an activity of the visual system I call “visual perceiving.” *Seeing* and *visual perceiving* would be synonymous and refer to the same activity of that system. As such an activity is proceeding, a stream of experience (awareness) flows, as it were, through the activity. These activities — others of them are visualizing and visual dreaming — are made up of more than just the stream of visual experience that is a product and constituent of theirs. Some pertinent discussion and bibliographic references are available in a section, titled “An Activity/Awareness Distinction,” of a recent article of mine (Natsoulas, 2003c; cf. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre, 1982, p. 4).

Rejection of a Secondary Presentation

Woodruff Smith introduced the above example directly after he argued that inner awareness should not be considered to be “a second presentation of the primary presentation, but a feature of the original presentation itself” (p. 150). The following numbered comments, which make use of Woodruff Smith's example of a visual-perceptual experience, express my understanding of his latter statement:

1. His statement alludes to a certain view of Brentano's (1911/1973): to the effect that every mental-occurrence instance includes in its structure two presentations: a primary presentation of its primary object (e.g., the small green frog on the lily pad) and a secondary presentation of its secondary object (i.e., always the experience itself). Woodruff Smith was rejecting Brentano's inclusion of a second presentation in the experience. However, Woodruff Smith was, of course, not denying the main thesis of intrinsic theory: that a conscious experience is also, somehow, an awareness of itself; rather, he considered it an error to think of inner awareness as a presentation in the sense that a visual experience is rightly called a visual presentation.

2. He did speak of the inner-awareness feature of a conscious mental-occurrence instance as a "secondary awareness." This could be wrongly taken to mean that Woodruff Smith maintained that a conscious mental-occurrence instance consists of not one but two distinct awarenesses. To express his account of inner awareness, it would be suitable, as will be seen, to characterize inner awareness as secondary. But, for him, an inner awareness clearly is not a second awareness, one that accompanies the primary awareness of frog on pad. His holding as much would mean that he was an appendage theorist of inner awareness, not the intrinsic theorist that he actually was.

3. The primary object of the visual-perceptual experience that Woodruff Smith used for his example is the particular small green frog on the lily pad. The secondary object of this identical experience is the experience itself. The terms *primary object* and *secondary object* would seem to be quite consistent with Woodruff Smith's view, since he considered the experience to be an awareness both of the frog and of itself. Therefore, the experience has itself as object as well as its having the frog on the pad as object. As will be seen, there is a compatible sense in which the experience would be the experience's "secondary" object.

4. The experience is not a visual experience of itself, only of this green frog on this lily pad. The experience itself is not apprehended through the primary presentation that constitutes it. It is not itself visually presented; it is not among the items presented in the experience, as the frog and the pad are presented. Rather, Woodruff Smith said, inner awareness is one of the "features" of the primary presentation. Immediately after these five comments, I shall be seeking to explain its being such a feature. It is by inner awareness's being such a feature that the experience has itself, too, as object. Though the experience presents visually and consciously, it presents nothing more than a counterpart unconscious experience would: namely, this small green frog on this lily pad, and that is all.

5. But an experience is not only of that which is presented in it. No secondary presentation is needed for an experience to be its own secondary object. An aspect of the phenomenological content of the visual perceptual experience of this small green frog on this lily pad has reference to the experience itself even though, as Woodruff Smith insisted, the experience does not present itself in any way. It will be seen later that the latter statement is not true of all experiences, there are self-presenting experiences, but it does not follow that their being self-presenting makes them conscious.

In sum, the feature of inner awareness is *not* a matter of an experience's being accompanied by another experience, an appendage to the former that apprehends it from without. *Nor* is inner awareness a matter of the experience's comprising two distinct awarenesses, thus its containing what appendage theory claims accompanies it. And it is *not* a matter of the experience's being

a double presentation, in the sense of its including a secondary presentation along with a primary presentation: these two presenting, between them, all of what the experience is an awareness of, including itself.

A Reflexive Modality of Presentation

Woodruff Smith (1986) started to formulate an immediately relevant distinction as follows: "In the case of my seeing a frog, the *mode* of presentation in the experience is that of 'this frog,' or 'this small green frog on this lily pad,' whereas the *modality* of presentation is that of vision, i.e. 'see' (as opposed to that of audition or desire, i.e. 'hear' or 'want')" [p. 150]. I focus first on the second term of this distinction, because inner awareness was held to be a part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience.

Woodruff Smith mentioned in a footnote a monograph of his and Ronald McIntyre's (1982), about Edmund Husserl's conception of intentionality, that discusses the above distinction in his terms. They used Husserl's *thetic character* to make reference to what amounts to the modality of presentation in a mental act. Its thetic character was explained to correspond to the species of a mental act. Among the species or kinds of mental acts are such as judging, perceiving, hoping, and imagining; their different thetic characters distinguish them from each other as such.

The thetic character of a mental act was also described as "the generic 'way'" in which the subject has awareness therein. A mental act also instantiates other "act characters," besides the generic thetic character that determines its kind or species. For example, another act character is the degree of attention that a mental act involves. This, too, is part of the total way of givenness of the respective perceived object. Another part, another act character, is the way this attention is distributed among the features of the object. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) listed several of the act characters that Husserl had proposed. In the list, two were identified as follows: "and apparently also the subject's awareness of himself as subject of the act . . . and of the act's position in internal time, its temporal position in the stream of consciousness" (Woodruff Smith, 1982, p. 132). Let me not pursue Husserl's account of the act characters now but come back to it later in this series. But, I should point out that those two act characters that I last mentioned would seem to imply that Husserl too held, as Woodruff Smith did, that inner awareness is a part of the thetic character of a mental act, which is the total way of givenness of the primary object of that act and is distinct from whatever the act may be said to present.

When Woodruff Smith put forward that inner awareness is a feature of the presentation in a conscious mental-occurrence instance, what did he have in mind? To what did he mean to refer in speaking of the modality of presenta-

tion in a mental-occurrence instance? What is it for inner awareness to be part of this modality? Compare the inner-awareness portion of the modality of presentation in a conscious mental-occurrence instance with another part of that modality. This latter part may be such as that of vision, that of audition, or that of desire. In the seeing-this-frog example, the modality of presentation is that of vision, although it would be error to say that the modality is merely that of vision, the modality consisting of more than just its visual dimension. Compare the latter qualification with Husserl's act characters, which he conceived of as being in addition to the genericthetic character of a mental act.

As I have previously stated, the visual-perceptual experience is both an inner awareness and a visual presentation. (a) The visual experience presents the particular frog on the particular lily pad. The experience is of the kind in which there is awareness of some part of the environment in a qualitative manner that is distinctively visual. Whatever may be present in such awareness, it is presented in the visual modality. (b) The reflexive character of the experience, not unlike its visual character, is also part of the modality of presentation in the experience. It would seem to be correct to state that the modality of presentation is "that of reflexivity," as well as being that of vision. For Woodruff Smith, *inner awareness* refers not just to a mental-occurrence instance's having a certain kind of content, but also to the fact that the mental-occurrence instance is of a kind that presents in a certain way, in addition to the visual way in the instance of his example. Namely, it presents its primary object in the reflexive way, as well.

The latter is my interpretation of Woodruff Smith's account and may not correspond to his own understanding. I am not certain that (a) the notion of there being a reflexive way in which one is aware of the primary object of a conscious experience, combines well with (b) his notion, which I shall describe later in the present article, that a conscious experience is an object of inner awareness because it has a phenomenal character that "lights up" the whole experience. In effect, I am trying out the reflexive-way interpretation, because it would seem to help Woodruff Smith's account along and may be consistent with it. I shall continue to use this interpretation for the rest of this article, and bring my doubts up again when I get to the final part, which has to do with the relation between the phenomenal character and the reflexive character of a conscious experience.

In Woodruff Smith's visual-perceptual experience, this small frog sitting upon this lily pad is presented both visually and reflexively. What the perceptual experience presents is apprehended therein not simply as a particular environmental thing but as being that experience's object. This is what it must mean to say that inner awareness is a feature of the presentation in an experience. Whereas the visual character of the experience makes of it a

visual presentation, the experience's reflexive character makes of it, also, a reflexive presentation.

According to all varieties of intrinsic theory, the conscious mental-occurrence instance that Woodruff Smith identified as his seeing this frog, is also an inner awareness. He put it that this experience of his, being conscious, has a reflexive character. In undergoing this experience, he is aware of this frog consciously, as well as visual-perceptually, both ways at once. This theory would seem to imply that, on some occasions, he may be visual-perceptually aware of this frog unconsciously. But, the latter word would not pick out, as *consciously* does, part of the modality of presentation, except negatively. That is, *unconsciously* as used here indicates the lack of part of the modality of presentation that is instantiated in the conscious counterpart of an unconscious instance of being visual-perceptually aware of this frog on this lily pad. On those unconscious occasions, the basic awareness is no less visual-perceptual than on the conscious occasions, but no apprehension of the awareness itself is then involved. According to the interpretation I have proffered above, the lack of such an apprehension would mean that, in the unconscious case, the frog would be apprehended differently. Which is to say, the frog would not be apprehended to be an object of the experience in which it is apprehended (nor, of course, as object of any other experience).

Woodruff Smith (1986) considered the modality of presentation characterizing a conscious mental-occurrence instance as being, in effect, wider than in an unconscious mental-occurrence instance. Referring to his conscious experience of seeing this frog, he argued, "We must widen the modality of presentation to include not only 'see' but also 'I [see]' and indeed 'in this very experience [I see]'" (p. 150; original brackets). In other words, one must include, in describing the modality of presentation in this experience, three act characters that it instantiates: a visual-perceptual character, an egocentric character, and a reflexive character.

Thus, the proposal would seem to be that Woodruff Smith is aware of the frog in all of the following ways simultaneously: (a) as a particular environmental object with certain properties, this small green frog sitting on this lily pad, (b) as an object of this visual-perceptual experience, and (c) as an object that he himself is now experiencing. But, I do not mean that his conscious experience consists of his having three awarenesses of its primary object. Nor do I mean that the experience is constituted of three awarenesses of different objects: the frog, the experience, and himself. Woodruff Smith (1986) wrote,

The experience is not, strictly speaking, presented; indeed, the experience itself is not in any way presented in the experience — what is presented is "this frog." (My perception would be *presented* in, say, my judging that "I see this frog;" it would there be presented as the state of affairs that "I see this frog." And an experience of judging that "this judgment is self-presenting" would present itself, viz. as "this judgment.") Hence,

inner awareness does not consist in a second presentation, a presentation of the experience itself, accompanying or following the primary presentation in the experience (here, the presentation of "this frog"). (p. 150)

A conscious visual-perceptual awareness of X does not include in itself another awareness that has the visual-perceptual awareness of X as object. This is why Kriegel (2003) depicts Woodruff Smith's conception of inner awareness by means of a single, straight arrow. The arrow emanates from a perceptual awareness, labeled "self-conscious perception," and directly reaches a cube in the environment, which represents the perceptual awareness's primary object. No separate, inner awareness is depicted that also arises from the perceptual awareness and then turns round on the perceptual awareness itself.

Two Conscious Judicative Experiences

Compare Woodruff Smith's perceptual example with the two experiences of judging that he mentioned parenthetically in the above quotation.

1. *Judging that I see this frog.* The primary object of this experience of judging is: oneself having a certain particular visual-perceptual experience of this frog. For appendage theory, this judgment would be the only kind of inner awareness that one can have of this visual-perceptual experience, since appendage theory denies any inner awareness that is intrinsic to an experience. For an intrinsic theory of inner awareness, such as Woodruff Smith's, the judgment that I see this frog is merely a thought that accompanies visual-perceptual experience that is already conscious owing to its intrinsic character. To reject the occurrence of such judgments would be to deny our thinking about our experiences as they occur, a phenomenon all of us are familiar with, for example, from having thoughts about a sunset while watching it take place. Thoughts accompanying unconscious visual-perceptual experiences of the setting sun would have none of those particular experiences as objects.

According to Woodruff Smith's intrinsic account of inner awareness, judging that I see this frog is not any part of any visual-perceptual experience. And the judicative awareness does not contain the visual-perceptual experience of this frog. In this case, the one experience is about the occurrence of the other, distinct experience. Nor does the judicative awareness contain any other awareness. It is an awareness of itself, but not by containing a distinct reflexive awareness. It is a unitary awareness, of both itself and its object. Its object is one's having this visual-perceptual experience of this frog, just as a conscious visual-perceptual experience of this frog is awareness both of its object, this frog, and of itself, this visual perceptual experience.

Woodruff Smith would say that this unitary awareness possesses both of two structures: a presentational structure and a reflexive structure. The natural question to raise here concerns the relation that was proposed to exist

between these structures that are instantiated at the same time by a single awareness. Woodruff Smith asserted that an experience's reflexive structure qualifies its presentational structure. This assertion entails that whatever is presented in an experience that is conscious would be differently presented than it would in an otherwise-the-same unconscious experience. That is, an unconscious experience could present the same state of affairs identically as does the conscious experience except that the presentation would not be reflexively qualified in the unconscious case. Even a self-presenting experience — notwithstanding its having itself as its primary object and, so, presenting itself — would be unconscious if it did not have a reflexive structure. This last point will be explained very soon.

Since Woodruff Smith claimed a conscious experience's reflexivity is a feature qualifying the sole presentation in the experience, perhaps it would have been better if he had described the relation of interest in terms not of the experience's having two structures, but just one reflexive presentational structure. The latter would have been better insofar as Woodruff Smith conveyed that an experience with a reflexive presentational structure contains just one presentation and that only the experience's primary object is presented therein. My interpretation of Woodruff Smith has been that a conscious experience's structure is reflexive in that its primary object is presented in the experience as object of the experience. This interpretation must be tested in a discussion, soon to follow in this article, of another work of Woodruff Smith's (1989) addressing these same matters.

With the relation of presentational structure to reflexive structure in mind, Woodruff Smith (1986) stated (a) inner awareness is "an integral part" of a conscious experience, not a secondary presentation therein, and (b) inner awareness is "a modifying feature of the primary presentation" in a conscious experience. Having a reflexive structure is not to be interpreted as the possession of a second presentational structure. A second presentational structure would mean the respective conscious experience consists of two distinct parts that exist in the experience side-by-side and, perhaps, constitute respectively the core of the experience and, around this core, a penumbra or fringe of mentality (cf. James, 1899, pp. 17–18).

Often, James (1890/1950) has been understood to have proposed a core-surround kind of understanding of his individual states of consciousness, the basic durational components of his stream of consciousness. But, I have elsewhere argued: whereas James used a spatial metaphor to describe the structure of individual states of consciousness, he explicitly conceived of each of them as a single integral awareness, albeit having in many instances several objects (Natsoulas, 2000). A core-surround conception would propose, instead, a structure that consists of one focal awareness and one or more distinct marginal awarenesses that occur at the same time as the focal aware-

ness, and each one of these constituent awarenesses would have a presentational structure of its own.

Woodruff Smith did not accept the thesis of there being a second presentation in a conscious experience. So too, James's conception of a state of consciousness as integral does not allow for multiple presentations in a single state. Perhaps, the reason James was an appendage theorist of inner awareness was that he was not able to find a way to conceive of having inner awareness of a state of consciousness without invoking a second presentation. Therefore, he assigned the inner awareness to an appendage, that is, a distinct state of consciousness, which, too, involves just one presentation. This state of consciousness that is an inner awareness presents the state which is its object along with, usually, several other items. In contrast, Woodruff Smith believed that he had found a way to explain inner awareness without resorting to an internal or external appendage to the conscious experience. An experience's reflexive structure would "modify" the one and only presentation in the experience. He saw reflexivity as a feature of this presentation, as a way in which the experience presents its primary object.

2. *Judging that this judgment is self-presenting.* The second experience that was mentioned parenthetically — "an experience of judging that 'this judgment is self-presenting'" (Woodruff Smith, 1986, p. 150) — is what I earlier called in this article a self-presenting mental-occurrence instance. Woodruff Smith stated that this judicative experience presents itself as this judgment, analogously to his visual-perceptual experience's presenting this frog. However, the judicative experience, in this case, has itself as its primary object; it is an experience of itself, whereas the perceptual experience of this small green frog on this lily pad is its own secondary object, not an experience of itself.

Notwithstanding this judicative experience's being an experience of itself, it may not also be conscious; such self-directed experiences can conceivably occur unconsciously. Thinking of an experience is not what makes it conscious, not even when the experience one thinks of is that in which it is thought. Although the judicative experience that Woodruff Smith expressed as "this judgment is self-presenting" was a conscious experience, it was conscious not owing to the fact that it had itself as primary object. Rather, what made it a conscious mental-occurrence instance was the same as what makes conscious, when it is conscious, a visual perceptual experience of this frog, namely, inner awareness.¹ In the case of every conscious mental-occurrence instance, Woodruff Smith maintained inner awareness to be one part of the modality of presentation in the experience. The modality of presentation in an experience of judging that this judgment is self-presenting may not

¹However, in Woodruff Smith's view, it is not its reflexive character, all by itself, that makes it conscious; see later in the text.

include inner awareness. If inner awareness is absent, the experience is not conscious, whatever its object may be, even if the experience has itself as object.

What more exactly is it for the reflexive character of a conscious mental-occurrence instance to be, as stated, part of the modality of presentation therein? To gather more in this regard, I turn next to Woodruff Smith's book *The Circle of Acquaintance* (1989). He again asked, "What is that inner awareness which defines consciousness?" (p. 83). And, in the course of his discussion, he expressed, among much else, a point regarding his account that I stated in my paragraph before this one. That is, a self-presenting judgment of the kind mentioned above would not necessarily be a conscious experience since consciousness requires inner awareness and inner awareness is not a matter of judging that one has the experience. Woodruff Smith stated,

To summarize: Consciousness, we said, involves an immediate inner awareness of one's passing experience. But this inner awareness does not consist in the ability to judge that one is having the experience. Nor is it a concurrent actual judgment or introspection that one is having the experience. Nor is it a successive recollection that one just had the experience. Indeed, it is not a species of presentation at all. And it is not a second mental act, whether accompanying or following the given experience. Nor is it a kind of inattentive awareness of the experience. Somehow, inner awareness, as distinguished from introspection, is built right into the experience itself. (pp. 87–88)

Woodruff Smith could have appended the following additional negative thesis consistent with his view: inner awareness is built into every conscious experience, but this inner awareness is not a judgment that one is having the experience. No conscious mental-occurrence instance consists of a dual awareness: an awareness of X and a judgment about this awareness, each of these having its own distinct content. The inner awareness is otherwise included.

Mode and Modality of Presentation

In his book, Woodruff Smith (1989) distinguished, at greater length than in his 1986 article, between the mode and the modality of presentation in an experience. He described these as being two fundamental components of the overall structure of the experience. Unfortunately, the terms *mode* and *modality* are very similar and careful attention is necessary to which of them is in use at any moment. This is important since they refer to distinct dimensions of an experience. I shall therefore italicize *mode* and *modality* for a while, hoping this will help bring the right referent to the reader's mind each time.

The *mode* of presentation was defined as: "the way something is presented — as we have said, 'what' is presented 'as' it is presented" (Woodruff Smith, 1989,

p. 17). Two experiences, whose phenomenological contents were expressed respectively with the sentences "I judge that Lake Fuschl is frozen" and "I see that Lake Fuschl is frozen," served as examples for the purpose of bringing out what the *mode* of presentation is in an experience. These experiences instantiate the same exact *mode* of presentation, expressed as "that Lake Fuschl is frozen." In both of them, "what" is presented "as" it is presented is the same. Woodruff Smith spelled out this point a little with the following words: "In the two experiences the same object or state of affairs is presented in the same way (or 'under the same description')" [p. 16].

Two experiences involving the same *mode* of presentation may involve a different *modality* of presentation from each other. This is the case for the two specific experiences just mentioned. One of the two, being a judgment, judicatively presents Lake Fuschl as now frozen, whereas the other, being a visual-perceptual experience, visually presents Lake Fuschl as now frozen. Being different species of experiences, their common primary object, Lake Fuschl, is presented in them differently. Woodruff Smith (1989) spoke in this connection of different species of presentation; there are, among other kinds, a judicative kind of presentation and a visual kind of presentation. The *modality* of the presentation in an experience consists in part of the species of presentation (e.g., judicative, perceptual, or imaginal), which is determined by the species of the experience. Other parts of the *modality* of presentation include the reflexivity of presentation, which we have already seen in Woodruff Smith's (1986) article and must consider here further.

The *mode* of presentation in an experience does not reflect whether the experience has inner awareness built into it. Woodruff Smith (1989) stated, "The structure of inner awareness is not a part of the *mode* of presentation in an experience" (p. 98). Presumably, this means a *modality* of presentation in an experience that includes inner awareness does not affect what is presented as it is presented in the experience. For one thing, this *modality* of presentation does not change what is presented, so that the experience itself, too, is presented.

Nevertheless, Woodruff Smith stated that the *modality* "modifies" the *mode*. He had in mind a part of the phenomenological content of an experience that the *modality* of presentation in the experience contributes. The content expressed as "that Lake Fuschl is frozen" is not the entirety of the respective conscious experience's phenomenological content. The reflexive character of the experience contributes an indexical content with reference to the experience itself. Woodruff Smith emphasized, as I have in describing his account, that the addition of this indexical content does not mean the experience is presented to itself. As we have seen, a judicative experience can be self-presenting, but its reflexive character is not responsible for its being self-presenting.

Woodruff Smith stated that a conscious mental-occurrence instance's *modal(ity)* structure contributes the following to that conscious mental-occurrence instance's content: (a) a reflexive content expressible with the phrase *in this very experience*, (b) a species content expressible with the word *see, judge, hope*, or the like, and (c) an egocentric content expressible with *I*. Thus, a conscious mental-occurrence instance that is a case of my being visual-perceptually aware of this wriggling snake can be expressed with the sentence *In this very experience I see this wriggling snake*. Included in this content is reference to this mental-occurrence instance's primary object, this wriggling snake, as well as reference to its secondary object, this very experience.

Still, the above sentence does not express the full content of a conscious mental-occurrence instance; I omit temporarily a necessary further character of every conscious mental-occurrence instance and its contribution to the phenomenological content. I want to mention now the notion that the *modal(ity)* structure does not function to yield presentations of any items it makes one aware of. The conscious visual-perceptual awareness of this wriggling snake only has the snake as its object; one sees neither oneself nor the experience in one's having this experience. Again, the *modal(ity)* structure has the role of modifier or qualifier. Applying the notion that each of the three characters of the experience mentioned above is a determinant of how what is experienced is experienced, one might say:

- (a) The reflexive character of the experience determines the subject's taking the primary object of the experience to be the object of this very experience. (b) The species character of the experience determines how the primary object of the experience is experienced. (c) The egocentric character of the experience determines who it is who seems to the subject to be experiencing the primary object of the experience in that way.

Some Steps toward Understanding Inner Awareness as "Modifier"

1. *Problem.* Unitary awareness — not sequences or combinations of same — is what I am in this article concerned with, particularly those instances that involve inner awareness in their own structure. And, I have interpreted Woodruff Smith's theory of inner awareness as conceiving of all of our experiences, the conscious as well as the unconscious, as unitary awarenesses. That all of them are awarenesses is consistent with Brentano's (1911/1973) claim that each possesses the feature of intentionality or aboutness. All of our experiences are about something or, possessing the property of intentionality, they are such as would be about something if that which they seem to be about did exist.

But, Woodruff Smith claimed that non-intentional conscious experiences exist and he gave feeling dizzy as example. The claim that, in feeling dizzy,

one perceptually apprehends neither environment nor body is doubtful; see Woodruff Smith's (1989, p. 96) unconvincing discussion. Furthermore, that any conscious experiences lack intentionality is clearly not compatible with his theory of inner awareness. According to the theory, a conscious experience of feeling dizzy must be an instance of being aware of something; it would perforce have itself as object or would not be a conscious mental-occurrence instance.

The problem with which Woodruff Smith did struggle is how a unitary awareness can be an awareness of, say, Lake Fuschl and, at the same time, an awareness of itself. The solution that he proffered was that an experience, although it does not present itself, can be an awareness of itself by "modifying" the presentation of which it consists. I have been construing this "modification" of a presentation as a matter of the experience's taking the object that it presents in a certain way: as the object of this experience. Does this interpretation hold up when tested against Woodruff Smith's (1989) fuller exposition of his account? How should inner awareness qua "modifier" be understood? It is one thing to say that the reflexive character of an experience is responsible for that experience's having itself as a secondary, non-presentational object, and another thing to say how this is accomplished by "modifying" the presentation of its primary object in the experience.

2. *Phenomenal quality.* After stating what inner awareness is not, Woodruff Smith (1989) concluded, "Somehow, inner awareness . . . is built right into the experience. The structure of that inner awareness will be the subject of part 4 [in Chapter II: Consciousness and Self-Awareness]" (p. 88). Let me turn now, with the interest that I have described, to that part 4, where Woodruff Smith was seeking "to develop a precise analysis of the phenomenological structure that defines consciousness, including inner awareness of one's experience and of oneself and, beyond that, the subjective character, or phenomenal quality, of the given experience" (p. 95). Part 4 includes a section, "Consciousness and Inner Awareness," in which inner awareness is addressed starting with a reference to "phenomenal quality" as follows: "Not only is the experience 'appearing' in the mind, phenomenally, but the subject is somehow *aware of its appearance*" (p. 98). Simply in the having of a conscious experience, the experience appears to the mind phenomenally, and its appearing, in this way, is equivalent to the experience's "phenomenal quality," a feature that no unconscious experience instantiates, Woodruff Smith stated.

This statement regarding unconscious experiences could be understood as contradicting the interpretation I have given in the present article. Thus, depending on what the term *phenomenal quality* means here, it may follow, contrary to my interpretation, that it is impossible to have, for example, an unconscious visual perceptual experience of this frog sitting on this pad. Indeed, I would have thought that, on Woodruff Smith's theory, an experi-

ence can “appear” without there being any inner awareness of the experience, that is, without the subject’s having “awareness of its appearing.” Woodruff Smith seemed to me to treat of the qualitative character of experiences as independent of their reflexive character; thus, there could be unconscious experiences no less qualitative than any conscious experience, yet not instantiating a reflexive character. However, Woodruff Smith (1989) wrote of the qualitative character as follows:

Every conscious mental state has a certain subjective character, which we may call its *phenomenal quality*. Thus, every sensation, perception, desire, or thought, insofar as it is conscious, has a certain quality of “what it is like,” or what it “feels” like, to have that type of experience. And that subjective character is part of what makes the experience *conscious*. An unconscious mental state, by contrast, has no phenomenal quality — there is no such thing as what it feels like to have a thought or desire unconsciously or to receive sensory information unconsciously or subliminally. (p. 95)

His reference to what it is like or feels like to have an experience suggests that his concept of the phenomenal quality of an experience includes both how the experience appears and awareness of how it appears.

3. *Sensuousness*. If, however, the latter two features are mutually separable, there could be four basic kinds of experience: (a) conscious experiences, each of these being both a qualitative awareness of its primary object and an inner awareness of itself; (b) unconscious experiences₁, each of these being both non-qualitative and non-reflexive; (c) unconscious experiences₂, each of these being qualitative but not reflexive; and (d) unconscious experiences₃, each of these being non-qualitative but reflexive. In one of my early subsections, “Unconscious Mental-Occurrence Instances,” I quoted from Woodruff Smith (1986, p. 153) concerning the possible existence of unconscious experiences₃, where he was speculating that every unconscious mental-occurrence instance might be reflexive and non-qualitative. But, as I also brought out, he stated clearly that an unconscious mental-occurrence instance is one of which the subject does not have any direct cognitive inner awareness (cf. Woodruff Smith, 1989, p. 81). This rules out inner awareness in the absence of qualitateness, and I must inquire into why.

But first, let me focus briefly upon the unconscious experiences₂, which I earlier described as compatible with Woodruff Smith’s theory: for example, a visual-perceptual experience of this frog on this pad that is not also an inner awareness of itself. Such unconscious experiences, too, would be ruled out, if they were understood as proposedly possessing phenomenal quality where this includes awareness of the experience’s qualitateness. However, a distinction that Woodruff Smith (1989) drew may provide a means for admitting unconscious experiences₂. The distinction is between phenomenal quality, which every conscious experience possesses, and the feature of sensuousness that he also recognized:

There are conscious mental states or processes with no . . . sensuous quality, like conceiving (but not *seeing*) red, or thinking that $2 + 2 = 4$. One might say that even these experiences have a "feel" to them, the character of "what it is like" to have them, but that "feel" is not the sensuous quality of perception. Thus, a proper analysis of consciousness must distinguish it from both intentionality and sensuousness. (p. 82)

Perhaps the distinction between unconscious experiences₁ and unconscious experiences₂ can be conceived of in terms of the absence versus presence of sensuousness rather than qualitateness, where the latter is to be understood, in contrast, as always being apprehended, never a feature of an unconscious experience.

4. *Does inner awareness require phenomenal quality?* Woodruff Smith held that every one of our conscious experiences possesses phenomenal quality (as distinct from sensuousness) and is an inner awareness of itself. And, the property of phenomenal quality would seem to require inner awareness, since phenomenal quality includes being aware of the experience's appearance. Can we also add, consistently with the theory under scrutiny, that inner awareness does not occur except in the form of the conscious experiences because these have phenomenal quality? Are the unconscious experiences₂ ruled out because of their lack of phenomenal quality? Here is how the phenomenal quality of an experience is described:

The phenomenal quality of an experience is a property that involves the overall structure of the experience *qua* conscious. The various features of the experience are *phenomenally* present in the mind, "appearing" in consciousness somewhat as if a light were radiating from them. When the light is on, the mental process is conscious, in all its structure; and when the light is off, the mental process is unconscious. (Woodruff Smith, 1989, pp. 97-98)

Phenomenal "light" is produced in each conscious experience simply by its occurrence. Thereby, its features "appear," and inner awareness is awareness of their "appearance." It would seem that inner awareness requires phenomenal "light" whereby the features of the respective experience are apprehended.

This sounds like a proposal that every conscious experience includes a presentation of that experience. In which case, contradicting others of Woodruff Smith's statements, more than just the experience's primary object is presented in a conscious experience. Thus, the theory would hold as follows:

A conscious experience, however sensuous, is not sensuously presented. It is not itself seen, for example, although the experience can be sensuously visual, or the like. However, each time any experience occurs, it is therein presented "phenomenally." And a presentation of this kind is analogous to a sensuous presentation.

Of course, Woodruff Smith may well find unacceptable the notion of such a second presentation, which would present the primary presentation together

with the various parts of the modality of presentation in the experience, but the above is what his discussion suggests.

Woodruff Smith described the phenomenal quality of a conscious experience as he did its reflexive, egocentric, and species characters. The experience's phenomenal character, as well, was proposed to be part of the modality of presentation in the experience, and this character was proposed to "modify" the other characters that make up the total modality of presentation and the primary presentation in the experience. Woodruff Smith (1989) stated that this is the "place" of phenomenal quality in the overall structure of an experience, admitting at the same time that his theoretical placement of phenomenal quality does not say what phenomenal quality is. However, he was not prepared to say more concerning phenomenal quality except that we have knowledge of it by acquaintance and that "one day there will be theories of the neural structures that confer qualia on various experiences" (p. 97).

Why did Woodruff Smith come to this understanding of phenomenal quality? It may well be a contradiction of his theses (a) that there is just a single presentation per experience and (b) that the secondary object of a conscious experience, which is itself, is not presented in the experience. Obviously, he wished to include qualia in his account, but he could have done so via the species-character part of the modality of presentation in the experience. For example, a visual experience involves visual qualia, and that is how it "modifies" or "qualifies" the primary presentation in the experience. He could have argued, as he did with respect to the presence of qualia in every one of the conscious experiences, that varying with the species character of the experience, there are not only sensuous qualia but also cogitative qualia, and so on (p. 96). Thus, different qualia for different species of experience.

Perhaps he considered that he needed to "place" phenomenal quality as a distinct part of the modality of presentation in a conscious experience so that he could propose that an experience's phenomenal quality modifies one or more of the other parts of the modality of presentation in the experience. Note again the phrases that he used upon turning from phenomenal quality to inner awareness: "Not only is the experience 'appearing' in the mind, phenomenally, but the subject is somehow *aware* of its appearance" (p. 98). But, shortly after this statement, in the same section, Woodruff Smith insisted an experience, although it be conscious, is in no way presented therein. Evidently, he did not mean that there is inner awareness of the experience because it is presented, just as there is awareness of the small green frog because it is presented.

Instead, Woodruff Smith spoke of "the fusion of phenomenal and reflexive characters" as being "somewhat analogous to the fusion of sensuous and intentional characters in perception" (p. 101), and he spelled this analogy out somewhat by calling attention to the similarity between (a) being aware

in a visual-perceptual experience of this “sensuously presented” wriggling snake and (b) being aware in the same visual-perceptual experience of this “phenomenally occurring” experience. Thus, he avoided including the word *presented* in the latter phrase, notwithstanding that the analogy between (a) and (b) would seem to invite its use.

Since awareness of this wriggling snake requires, it would seem, that the snake be presented in the respective experience, perhaps the same could be said with respect to the relation between the reflexive character and the phenomenal character. Woodruff Smith claimed that the various features of an experience “appear” only if the phenomenal “light” comes on. Which implies that inner awareness somehow depends on the primary presentation’s “lighting up” beyond what its species character provides in the way of qualia: for example, visual sensuousness. But, why does inner awareness, which is a modifier of the primary presentation in an experience, a determinant of how the primary object of the experience is taken, require additional qualia to do its job?

Here is where Woodruff Smith (1989) brought in that an unconscious mental state might be an object of intrinsic reflexive apperception. He did not refer to it as an unconscious experience probably because he believed that to do so would connote consciousness. What makes a mental state unconscious is that it lacks phenomenal quality, not that it lacks all qualia. The example he used was an unconscious fear of this wriggling snake. Probably, Woodruff Smith would not deny that the species character of this unconscious mental state makes it a qualitative awareness of the snake, although he might resist the word *awareness* because of its connotation. In this context, he also preferred to speak of reflexive apperception rather than inner awareness, but there is no real suggestion that he was speaking of something else. Although inner awareness and phenomenal quality were said to be seemingly fused in everyday human consciousness, Woodruff Smith did not take the opportunity to explain this fusion further, what the relation is between the two fused characters.

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