

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XIII. The Role of the Qualitative in a Modal Account of Inner Awareness

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Theorists of consciousness differ in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a qualitative character, and in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a reflexive character. This article mainly discusses one such theory, wherein it is proposed that both the qualitative character and the reflexive character (a) are intrinsic to each state of consciousness that possesses them and (b) are modal characters of each state of consciousness that possesses them. What is centrally of concern here is that special part of the theory in question that treats of the reflexive character of our states of consciousness and, more specifically, the role that is assigned therein to their qualitative character

A good place to begin is by reference to the just prior article in the present series of articles (Natsoulas, 2006). Published in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, these articles of mine examine *a certain kind of conception of inner awareness* from several perspectives. I employ throughout the term *inner awareness* to speak of *direct occurrent awareness, or apprehension, of one's experiences as they are proceeding within one*. The noun *experience* has the same referents as does *state of consciousness* in William James's (1890/1950) masterwork *The Principles of Psychology*. I give some preference to the latter term here because of how useful I find to be James's conception of the feeling dimension of our states of consciousness.

David Woodruff Smith's (2004) phenomenological account of inner awareness fits well under the heading *intrinsic theory*. The purpose of my immediately preceding article is improvement of our understanding of his "modal model." My focus there is on the following thesis of Woodruff Smith's: *Inner*

awareness of an experience is owed to a certain modal character belonging to the presentation therein of the experience's primary object or objects. Examples of such objects are those many environmental scenes whereof our activity of visual perceiving yields outer awareness. The concept of a *modal character* is crucial. As my discussion develops in the present article, I continue to explicate the meaning of that concept in Woodruff Smith's theory.

Two of the modal characters that, according to him, characterize our experiences, or states of consciousness, are already mentioned above. The two of them are

- (a) our experiences' *qualitative character*, which is, from James's perspective, equivalent to the dimension of *feeling* that James maintains is instantiated in the instance of every one of our states of consciousness, and
- (b) our experiences' *reflexive character*, which is responsible, according to intrinsic theorist Woodruff Smith, for an experience's having in many cases *itself too* among the items it is an awareness of.

I come back to Woodruff Smith's intrinsic account of inner awareness here, with my purpose being to unravel the role that he assigns to the qualitative character of our states of consciousness. The abstract of my prior article mentions as follows one part of the role that he would seem to be assigning to that character.

Emerging aspects of Woodruff Smith's phenomenological account include among them . . . that an experience of which we have inner awareness need not be qualitative but, in order for it to be a conscious experience, it cannot but be qualitative, because the "tertiary awareness" which all our conscious experiences involve requires qualitateness . . . (Natsoulas, 2006, p. 183; italics added)

This may be adjudged to be my own interpretation. Would Woodruff Smith himself subscribe to it? I return here to my interpretation and seek to enhance its cogency.

Much of the present article consists of an analysis that requires some preliminary elucidations. Let me first introduce my topic by listing several theses that together capture, I believe, all of that which my prior article *explicitly* states regarding the role of the qualitative character in Woodruff Smith's (2004) phenomenological account of inner awareness. I rely again on his essay "A Return to Consciousness," wherein the latest version of his theory receives expression. The sections that ensue spell out the theses listed, in the context of an effort to improve on how Woodruff Smith is treating of qualitateness in relation to the modal character of reflexivity, and otherwise.

The Qualitative Character in Woodruff Smith's Account of Inner Awareness

1. An experience's qualitative character is, importantly, a *modal* character. In part, this is to say that

- (a) it is an *intrinsic* feature of the respective experience,
- (b) it is a part of *the way* in which the experience is "executed," and
- (c) it is a feature that affects ("modifies," "qualifies") how the experience's primary object or objects are therein presented.

2. The qualitative character of experiences corresponds to the feeling aspect that is ascribed by James to each of our states of consciousness. These states are the basic durational components that make up, one at a time, our stream of consciousness.

3. However, in Woodruff Smith's view, *not all* of our experiences are qualitative. Not all of them have a qualitative character. Thus, the modality of the visual-perceptual experiences that are involved, for example, in blindsight does not include a qualitative character. Sigmund Freud, who too is an intrinsic theorist of consciousness, similarly maintains that not all our psychical processes are qualitative. *Only our* conscious *psychical processes are qualitative*. And they are so in every instance of their occurrence. *Invariably* non-qualitative, in contrast, are all of the many psychical processes that take place outside the subsystem "perception-consciousness" of Freud's psychical apparatus.

4. In the total absence of qualitateness, the modality of an experience may include, anyway, a *reflexive character*. The experience may be an awareness *of itself*, in addition to whatever else it may be (e.g., a perceptual awareness, a thought, or a wish). I mention again soon, and later on I comment to the effect, that the complete absence of qualitateness *limits* inner awareness in a certain way. But, qualitative absence does not rule out all inner awareness.

5. Being *modal* characters or dimensions of the way the respective experience is "executed," neither the reflexive nor the qualitative character entails the existence of a content beyond the one and only in which the primary object of the experience is presented. Both modal characters add to or help to determine *the single content instantiated by the experience*. This is so (a) with respect to the reflexive character whether or not the experience is qualitative, and (b) with respect to the qualitative character whether or not the experience is an object of inner awareness.

6. The two characters are proposed to be parts of every *conscious* experience's modality of presentation of its primary objects, and they are described

as “interwoven” in the inner awareness of that experience. But Woodruff Smith also states that neither modal character “articulates” the other character. This would seem to mean that there can be inner awareness sans qualitiveness and vice versa.

7. If a particular experience is non-qualitative and yet an inner awareness of itself, Woodruff Smith’s *phenomenological* account does not consider the experience to be a conscious one. But, his *ontology* of consciousness, which he begins to spell out in the final two sections of his essay, accepts that we undergo conscious experiences whereof we have no inner awareness except, at the most and as it were, in the form of *retentions* of those experiences by subsequent experiences that take place in the same stream.

8. The qualitative character of an experience is said to “modify” the “form” of the experience in its entirety. And, of course, this includes the experience’s reflexive character if it has one. Its reflexive character is no less intrinsic to the experience than is its qualitative character.

9. In the same exact context, the reflexive character of a conscious experience is said to fall within the “scope” of its qualitative character. “In that way,” one’s *inner awareness* of having the experience is a *conscious* awareness. The inner awareness is itself “felt” or experienced. It gets apprehended whereas, if the experience is wholly lacking in qualitiveness, one is aware of having the experience but not consciously so aware. The latter case is analogous to being unconsciously, yet no less visual-perceptually, aware of a tree in the garden.

10. As mentioned, an experience *presents* its primary object (e.g., an environmental scene). The qualitiveness of the experience enables the occurrence of such presentations, in addition to making inner awareness conscious. But this should not be understood as a matter of two distinct presentations or contents per conscious experience. No conscious or unconscious experience has more than a single unitary content. In the case of all our conscious experiences, the single content has reference to all three of the following,

- (a) to the primary object of the experience,
- (b) to the experience in which it is presented, and
- (c) to the inner awareness involved.

Does it not also refer to the specific qualitiveness involved?

Further Introduction of the Qualitative Character

As is mentioned above, I state in my prior article (Natsoulas, 2006), albeit without substantial development, that Woodruff Smith’s *qualitative character*

corresponds to the feeling aspect that James (1890/1950) attributes to every basic durational component of his stream of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1998). Every one of our states of consciousness that occurs is proposed by James to be, at the same time, both a “thought” and a “feeling.” Our consciousness is thoroughly cognitive yet also *a stream of feeling*. And the proposal that our every state of consciousness has a feeling aspect does not on its own imply that we have inner awareness of every such state of ours that occurs.

The qualitative character that Woodruff Smith (2004) ascribes to every conscious experience, he explicitly identifies with

what philosophers call the “raw feel” of an experience, its subjective quality, “what it is like” to have the experience, the way it is experienced or lived through. Here lie the sensory qualia of a perceptual experience. However, emotions also have their own peculiar qualia or subjective character: note the difference between feeling joyful and feeling sad. But qualia do not end with sensation and emotion. Conscious thinking “feels” a certain way. And so does conscious intention or volition. So every conscious mental act or state, we should recognize, has its *phenomenal* [or qualitative] character. (Of course, this use of “feels” is not tied to emotional feeling.) (pp. 99–100)

Nor is Woodruff Smith’s use of phrases such as *the subjective quality of an experience* tied to its owner’s having inner awareness of the experience.

After he briefly addresses the ontology of consciousness, Woodruff Smith (2004) provides, in conclusion, a list of “Forms of Consciousness in Review.” It consists of seven such forms, plus one form of unconsciousness. None of these forms involves conscious experience without inner awareness, while two of them are cases of conscious experience without inner awareness. The example that he offers of unconscious experience is blindsight. According to his view, blindsight does involve visual-perceptual awareness, but neither inner awareness nor qualitativeness. Thus he is denying only the existence of *conscious* experiences that do not have a qualitative character.

Why would someone hold that qualitative character is essential to consciousness? Might this be because, at some level, qualitative character is conceived of as being analogous to the light that makes it possible for us to see (cf. Woodruff Smith, 1989, pp. 97–98)? Freud conceives of all of his conscious psychical processes as being qualitative. In a series of article concerning “Freud and Consciousness,” here is how I state Freud’s conception of consciousness as necessarily involving the qualitative character.

For Freud, neither consciousness nor qualities is possible without the other. The idea of an unconscious experience (e.g., an unconscious feeling) is contradictory if it means that there can be qualities without consciousness, as though they could occur, somehow,

without a subjective side — purely objectively — without being conscious in Freud's basic sense, and still be qualities. Qualities constitute the contents of consciousness. (Natsoulas, 1984, pp. 219–220; cf. Freud, 1895/1966, p. 308; 1900/1953, p. 574; 1915/1957, p. 202)

Inner Awareness “Falls Within the Scope of” the Qualitative Character
(Woodruff Smith)

But *how* are consciousness and qualitative character tied together, if they are actually so tied, and not merely tied in certain conceptions of consciousness? For example, are they connected at a fundamental level, and does their connection have to do with the nature of the *awareness* that is essential to all our experiences, whether they are conscious or not? Does feeling in James's broad sense *make possible* awareness of matters that lie beyond the stream, as well as inner awareness? Compare the indented quotation above from Woodruff Smith (2004, pp. 99–100).

Let me at this point just call attention to a possibly helpful statement in the Woodruff Smith essay. The statement pertains to whether a conscious experience's qualitative character renders the inner awareness itself conscious that is directed on the experience from within it. When I live through a conscious experience, I undergo therein just a single unitary awareness that apprehends

- (a) the experience's primary object, which often lies externally to the experiential stream,
- (b) the experience itself, which is a secondary or non-presented object of the experience, and
- (c) the inner awareness itself that is directed upon that experience, given that it is a conscious experience.

Not only is my experience as a whole conscious but so, too, is the inner awareness that is intrinsic to and reflexively directed upon it.

Here is part of Woodruff Smith's possibly helpful statement. “The inner awareness of the act [i. e., the experience] is itself conscious [i. e., an object of that inner awareness] and experienced or ‘felt’ in living through the act” (2004, p. 100). This statement suggests that *the experience feels itself feeling its objects, which include the experience itself*. Woodruff Smith does not quite say this, but he would seem to be preparing us for that interpretation when he says in the remainder of his statement that the inner awareness that we have of our conscious experiences is also “modified by” and “falls within the scope of” their qualitative character.

Shortly before this statement, Woodruff Smith mentions some metaphors that seem to him to be on the right track although in need of articulation by a model for inner awareness. He puts one such metaphor to use in the following sentence. “The act feels itself in feeling its object” (p. 98). The following is even closer to my italicized interpretation in the just preceding paragraph.

“We experience consciousness embracing inner awareness within it” (p. 97). This says that, in having awareness of an experience (i.e., a state of consciousness) from the inside, we feel the experience to be one with our feeling of it. Thus, we feel our feeling of it in feeling the experience. However, is this really on the right track as regards to what it is for *inner awareness to fall within the scope of the qualitative character*, as Woodruff Smith claims it does? I come back to this question later in the present article.

More Than Inner Awareness Falls Within the Scope of the Feeling Aspect (James)

James (1890/1950) explains inner awareness *not* in terms of a state of consciousness's having itself among its objects. Rather, inner awareness of a state of consciousness always has the form of a *subsequent* state of consciousness that takes place in the selfsame stream. But, relevantly to the present article, James addresses the qualitative character of all our states of consciousness and their cognitive character and the relation between these characters. It would seem the more basic of the two characters is the qualitative. Accordingly, one may put it for James that, irrespective of how many objects it has in any instance, the unitary awareness that a state of consciousness is *falls within the scope of its qualitative character*. This is what Woodruff Smith proposes about inner awareness.

“The Apprehending Function Is Performed by the Feeling Aspect” is the title of the final main section of an article of mine about the dimension of feeling that James ascribes to all our states of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1998). That article, as do others (Natsoulas, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005), has the main title of “On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness.” But, the word *intrinsic* is not used there as it is here, to identify a certain sort of conception of inner awareness. Rather, my topic there is what our states of consciousness intrinsically are.

Both James and Woodruff Smith hold that some of them are inner awarenesses. But this may be left aside since it is James's view that no state of consciousness of ours can directly apprehend itself. For now, we may leave aside inner awareness in order to consider a certain other portion of James's account of the intrinsic nature of our states of consciousness. Near the beginning of this section, I quote Woodruff Smith's (2004) specification of the qualitative character. Let me do the same for James's feeling aspect.

Note first that, in James's view, any real or apparent item whereof a state of consciousness is or would be an awareness is *never an object of pure thought*. Rather, it is always felt, always an object of a feeling. It is something of which one is at least seemingly qualitatively aware. Those momentary pulses that our occurrent states of consciousness are and that make up our streams of consciousness are “consubstantial in their inward nature, as modes of feeling”

(James, 1890/1950, p. 479). None of our states of consciousness can be excluded from characterization as a feeling. Not because, as James claims and as may well be true, one has some awareness of one's body in the case of one's every state of consciousness. It is because, basically, the nature of each one of our states of consciousness is that of feeling. It needs to be emphasized that the latter statement applies even to those states of consciousness of ours that possess objects of the greatest possible abstraction.

In an article to which I refer above in this subsection, I identify James's feeling aspect to begin with as follows.

The cognitive aspect of any state of consciousness has reference to the state's serving as a vehicle of cognition, that is, its being a cognitive apprehension (cf. Dulany, 1984); whereas the same state's feeling aspect is the experiential, qualitative way in which or form by which this state of consciousness "feels" the items that it apprehends (or seems to apprehend, in cases where the items have no [past, present, or possible future] existence). (Natsoulas, 1998, p. 132)

According to James, the items that a state of consciousness feels and thus apprehends never include the state itself. But it may be felt by another state of consciousness in the selfsame stream. Although a state of consciousness does not apprehend itself in any respect, James proposes that it may be an inner awareness of a prior state and of its qualitative character. This character is, in his view, the inward nature of a state of consciousness. Admittedly, James does speak of a state of consciousness's feeling aspect as its being one way in which the state may be *taken*, namely, "as being subjective" (James, 1890/1950, p. 478). But he calls *feeling* the state's "structural aspect" and distinguishes it from the state's "functional" aspect or the state's apprehending what may be "a bit of truth as its content" (p. 478). He is thus claiming that a state of consciousness is, in itself, intrinsically (inwardly) a feeling.

James also expresses his conception of states of consciousness qua feelings in terms of these states' being "peculiarly tinged." But this tingeing is said to be the flowing stream's "sensitive body," and it intrinsically belongs, in its variations, to each pulse of mentality that successively constitutes the stream for an instant. James contrasts, in this context, the cognitive perspective on the stream of consciousness from the subjective perspective on it, and declares that from the latter point of view the stream is, in all of its parts, a stream of feeling. However, James *does not* mean that *really* the stream possesses a different nature and, therefore, it only *seems* to inner awareness to consist of a succession of feelings.

In my article that I mentioned near the beginning of this subsection (Natsoulas, 1998), I address the question of how James uses the term *subjective* with respect to the dimension of feeling. I am led by how Alfred North Whitehead (1929/1969, p. 28) spells out his concept of "prehesion" to con-

sider if James's feeling aspect is not, in Whitehead's term, the "subjective form" of the states of consciousness. This form is how or the way *a state of consciousness* apprehends its objects, for it is James's strongly held view that there exists no apprehending subject *other than one's states of consciousness themselves*. Also, I arrive there (Natsoulas, 1998) at an interpretation of James's theory to the effect that its feeling dimension is not so much how a state of consciousness feels to inner awareness as its being itself the transitory subject, *that which in passing feels other things*. Indeed, I go so far as to suggest a Jamesian feeling is not subjective in itself, in the ordinary sense of its being an appearance of something else. Thus, the feeling aspect is the qualitative character belonging intrinsically to real occurrences, our states of consciousness, which are no less concrete than anything else that we may encounter.

Our figurative modes of expression in discussing the feeling aspect (e.g., James's description of it as a kind of tingeing of the stream) should not distract us from its ontology, which is that of a kind of activity or process whereof our states of consciousness literally consist. It is no less than their intrinsic constitution that James (1884) is referring to when he writes as follows.

The feltness which is [a state of consciousness's] essence is its own immanent and intrinsic feltness at the moment of [its] being experienced [i.e., lived through], and has nothing to do with how future [states of consciousness] may feel about it. Such *sentire* in future [states of consciousness] is not what is meant by its *esse*. (p. 1)

This statement is part of the case that James makes against conceptions such as Franz Brentano's (1911/1973), which treat of inner awareness as an aspect of the state of consciousness that is its object. Nevertheless, James's statement still acknowledges, unambiguously, that the states at issue have a mode of being that is distinct from their being felt by other states. They are what they are however they are taken and whether or not they are taken in any way or taken at all. All of them *are* states of consciousness with a qualitative character *in the same sense* as a bolt of lightning is *what it is* whether it is in the presence or absence of anyone who is there to observe it.

*The Cognitive Aspect of a State of Consciousness
Falls Within the Scope of Its Feeling Aspect (James)*

The cognitive aspect of each of James's states of consciousness would seem to fall within the scope of their feeling aspect. It so falls in a sense going beyond his thesis that having awareness or seeming awareness of anything always possesses a feeling aspect. In Natsoulas (1998), I argue that it would be a mistake to construe that "tingeing" of a state of consciousness which its feeling aspect is as its being analogous to the tint of a piece of glass through which one looks. "A better comparison would be the modalities of perceptual expe-

rience, or how the objects of perceiving are apprehended qualitatively" (pp. 144–145). The sorts of perceiving in which we are commonly engaged differ from each other in how we experience their environmental or somatic objects. The experiential products of our various kinds of perceiving have characteristically different qualitative contents. The same applies to our states of consciousness that are produced by processes of non-perceptual kind. They, too, are distinctively qualitative in the broad sense of James's ubiquitous feeling aspect.

James's feeling aspect would seem to be cognitive, to be *feelings of* in the intentional usage. The unitary awareness that our every state of consciousness is said to be is a qualitative awareness in every case. This implies that the distinction that is readily made between a state's feeling aspect and a state's cognitive aspect is more of an abstraction than it initially seems. Its two aspects may not be independent, and may not even be distinct.

This is well suggested by a defense that James mounts against "intellectualist" theorists and in favor of feelings. Those theorists maintain that, in order for relations to be apprehended, states of consciousness must instantiate a certain non-qualitative aspect. Their claim is that apprehending a relation involves, perforce, a sort of pure thought about the relation.

In effect, James (1890/1950, p. 245) distinguishes between

- (a) a relation between things, as an *object* of a state of consciousness, and
- (b) the particular *way* in which a state of consciousness apprehends its relational object, what Whitehead calls the state's "subjective form."

James argues that every apprehended relation is "matched" in the stream of consciousness by "an inward coloring of its own." And, in many cases, we are unable to specify apprehended relations better linguistically than our states of consciousness discriminate them in feeling them. We would find ourselves doing better than we do by linguistic means, if our apprehensions of relations were matters, actually, of our having non-qualitative, purely conceptual thoughts about them.

Additional support for my interpretation that James proposes that the cognitive function of a state of consciousness is performed by the state's feeling dimension is available in his treatment of how a state of consciousness apprehends a number of objects simultaneously. It apprehends them not by its being a cluster of feelings that are directed, individually, on each of its objects. Rather, the state is merely a single feeling that has for its object a cluster of items, but not by the exercise of a set of concepts in parallel. The whole cluster is the state's object and a subjective unity with parts, as James (1890/1950) insists as follows.

There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of mind. (p. 278)

The Form of a State of Consciousness

In a subsequent article to Natsoulas (1998), I further spell out how James's account combines feeling and cognition in the single integral that is a state of consciousness (Natsoulas, 2000–2001). In the process, I apply there a concept of James's having reference to what he calls the "form" of a state of consciousness:

The form of consciousness is how — the way, the manner, in which — a particular state of consciousness apprehends that which it apprehends The most rudimentary sensation [, for example,] has two sides: not only "a transcendent side (which is a reference to something as known through the sensation)," but also "an 'immanent' side (which constitutes the fact that it is actually a sensation)" [James, 1879–1880/1988, p. 171]. James calls the latter of these two sides the "form" that this simple cognitive occurrence [i.e., the sensation] possesses. He calls the other side the sensation's "content" or "matter." (Natsoulas, 2000–2001, p. 285)

Not even the simplest state of consciousness that we can ever have is lacking the property of intentionality. In that sense, it cannot be a pure sensation; it cannot fail to have a cognitive aspect. And it is also the case that every state of consciousness must intrinsically possess a concrete form. This form, being qualitative, enables the state to apprehend or seemingly to apprehend its objects or would-be objects. There exists no pure thought, nor any abstract state of consciousness. For that form of feeling, or feeling dimension, which our states of consciousness possess, is essential to their intentionality. It is essential to their having a content, which may or may not successfully refer.

I am not generalizing to all our states of consciousness in a way that James would not. For James, a state of consciousness has the form of feeling whether or not the state is a sensation or qualifies as a feeling in the ordinary sense. Consider any state of consciousness that you believe might serve as a counter-example to the view presented here. James (1890/1950) would answer that this state is no less than any other state of consciousness

a perfectly determinant, singular, and transitory thing . . . a perishing segment of thought's stream, consubstantial with other facts of sensibility" (p. 474; "consubstantial in their inward nature, as modes of feeling" [p. 479]; "continuous and consubstantial with the subjective tissue out of which sensations and other substantive states are made" [p. 245].)

In my article (Natsoulas, 2000–2001), I further spell out my understanding of James as to the feeling aspect of the states of consciousness. I include, among other things, a list of seven explicit or nearly explicit arguments of James's contra the intellectualist view, which rejects feeling as our way of apprehending relations. I do not review those arguments here. Instead, let me refer the reader to them with an assurance that they can be shown to be consistent with what I am stating about James's feeling dimension.

Return to Woodruff Smith's Treatment of the Qualitative Character

Before I return to Woodruff Smith's treatment of the qualitative character of experiences, let me mention that, according to James's theory, we frequently have inner awareness of the *form* of a state of consciousness. This form is always that of feeling; and inner awareness is, therefore, an apprehension of the "stuff" whereof a state of consciousness consists. By *stuff*, James means the concrete mental activity that a state of consciousness literally is.

A diametrically different conception from James's, with respect to the feeling aspect, would treat of that aspect as secondary to the cognitive. Whatever sort of awareness our experiences instantiate would be owed to other than their feeling aspect. Any feeling aspect whereof we have inner awareness would be conceived of as being merely among the experiences' outer objects and not to be an aspect of the experience itself. The feeling aspect would be assigned to the body, for example. According to such a view, we have perceptual awareness of some of the processes that go on in our body, and it is an illusion when we take them to belong rather to our experiences of them (cf. James, 1890/1950, pp. 302–305).

Woodruff Smith's understanding of our experiences' qualitative character is clearly not close to the extreme view that would externalize qualitative content, claiming it to belong rather to the environment or to the body. In question is how close his conception is to James's that maintains the form of our states of consciousness to be the form of feeling. There are other questions about the qualitative character that need to be addressed in greater depth than before, but these involve the reflexive character and are treated of very differently by James, who holds inner awareness to take place between states of consciousness, never to occur reflexively. James is much concerned with the nature of the states of consciousness but he is not an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness. James does not reduce inner awareness to awareness of something that lies beyond the stream but he sees it to be an outwardly directed awareness from one state of consciousness to another state in the selfsame stream.

The Qualitative Character as Part of the Modal Character "Consciously" (or Character)

In his chapter that is of special interest here, Woodruff Smith (2004) includes a main section with the title "Inner Awareness as a Modal Character." But his volume does not contain a section on "Qualitativeness as a Modal Character." Regarding his conception of the qualitative character, some inference is needed from time to time, but enough material is explicitly presented to give confidence that one is on the right track.

Consider first what Woodruff Smith states about a character of experiences that he speaks of as the “character ‘consciously.’” In my prior article in this series, I call it “character_c.” Character_c is treated of as consisting of two modal characters. Both of these are intrinsic to any experience that instantiates them and, so, neither of them is a matter of the experience’s relation to something else. The following is what Woodruff Smith says that character_c is and is not. Does what he says about character_c apply to both of the characters that comprise it? Which of the statements in the following passage apply to the respective experience’s qualitative character and which apply only to its reflexive character?

[Character_c] is not part of the mental act’s [i.e., the experience’s] intentional relation to an object or its character of object presentation. That is, it is not part of the *mode of presentation* of the object, embodying the content through which the act is directed toward its object, [for example] the content “this frog” or perhaps “this poisonous red tree frog.” Rather, [character_c] is part of the *modality* of presentation or intentionality: the way the perceptual act is executed with its mode of presentation and so its intentional relation to its object . . . [Character_c is the] part of the act’s modality [that modifies] the act’s perceptual character so as to make it conscious. (2004, p. 84)

It will not serve to substitute qualitative character for character_c in the above passage, but it does distinguish in effect the qualitative character from James’s cognitive aspect. The perceptual example is an awareness of a particular frog and its properties and these objects of awareness are said to be presented in the experience. At the end of the quote, the experience’s cognitive aspect is referred to as its “perceptual character.” The qualitative character’s relation to the perceptual character would clearly seem to be external, in the sense that the qualitative character is held not to be part of the perceptual character of the experience.

However, it is not clear that the qualitative character or just the reflexive character modifies the perceptual character of the experience from without. In Woodruff Smith’s next paragraph we learn that *the qualitative character modifies the reflexive character*. The perceptual character of the experience could be modified by its qualitative character at least in that way.

According to the above quoted passage, character_c modifies the perceptual character and thus makes of the perceptual experience a conscious experience. It does so without becoming part of the perceptual character. Two questions arise. How does character_c bring about the modification of the experience, and are the qualitative and the reflexive characters together responsible for it? We are at once informed that these two modal characters of an experience together “define” the experience’s character_c “which modify[es] the whole mental act” (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 84). However, the roles of the two modal characters are not contrasted at this point, except by saying that the qualitative character is a modifier of the reflexive character.

There are variations among our experiences in character. For example, these variations are responsible for differences between perceptual experiences in "vividness" and "salience." There is mention as well of passing feelings of annoyance as their possibly being even less vivid and salient. And there may occur in us some feelings that are "only vaguely conscious," and other feelings that are not at all conscious.

Woodruff Smith is presumably conceiving of non-conscious feelings as experiences that have a qualitative character and do not have a reflexive character. Insofar as this is a view of them that he would maintain, there is a contrast to Freud. Freud holds instead that qualitateness and inner awareness are properties of each and every conscious psychical process and, therefore, there just are no unconscious feelings (Natsoulas, 1984, 1985). Except for those that Woodruff Smith calls "vaguely conscious," the other experiences that he mentions at this point would vary in how richly qualitative they are. I take *vaguely conscious* to indicate that, also, experiences are proposed to occur that are deficient in inner awareness although they do instantiate it somewhat.

A further question arises. How might the qualitative character of an experience be conceived of to modify its perceptual character from without in a sense whereby the qualitative is not part of the perceptual? After all, does not an environmental scene that one perceives possess qualitative presence in the experiences that comprise one's perceiving it? Is not the qualitateness of those experiences part of how the scene is presented? Is not their content cognitive *and* qualitative, as James would have it? When we are perceptually experiencing an environmental scene, do we not take notice often of the specific qualitative way in which the scene is therein presented to us?

Distinguishing the Modal Account of Inner Awareness from Brentano's Account

Woodruff Smith (2004) calls Brentano's (1911/1973) intrinsic theory of inner awareness "the sharpest and most detailed statement of the problem of consciousness as inner awareness" that is to be found in "classical philosophy and psychology" (p. 78). He also states that the problem of inner awareness "comes to maturity" with Brentano's effort, whereof the key lesson is that

by parsing consciousness into several features of intentional structure . . . inner [awareness] may be built into the structure of consciousness itself, as [Brentano] says, "without any further complications or multiplication of entities." (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 89)

But I do not attempt to examine Brentano's account here for how it deals with James's feeling dimension of all our states of consciousness or Woodruff Smith's modal qualitative character of all our conscious experiences. However,

how Woodruff Smith separates himself from Brentano is relevant to the present discussion, insofar as the role that is played by the qualitative character is thereby revealed. Acceptable to Woodruff Smith is Brentano's thesis that the explanation of inner awareness does not need reference to more than the structure of an experience. Brentano holds that an experience (i.e., a single mental act) involves two sorts of directedness. An experience is directed to its primary object in one way and to itself in a different way. In addition to its being, for example, a visual-perceptual experience, it is a *judgment* that is directed upon itself, as being a visual-perceptual experience and, as well, as being such a judgment. Inner awareness apprehends the experience as an object not of a distinct judgment but of a judgment that is an integral part of the experience itself.

It is, according to Brentano, the inclusion of that judgment in the structure of each experience of ours that makes the experience conscious. Objecting, Woodruff Smith (2004) denies that one's inner awareness of one's experience, which renders one's experience conscious, has the form of a judgment. Why, rather than a judgment, is not the modal character *consciously* the basic form of consciousness? Woodruff Smith is referring to character_c, which is made up of both the modal qualitative character and modal reflexive character.

I am reminded at this point of James's (1890/1950) defense of *feelings apprehend relations* against the intellectualists' insistence that, to be apprehended, all relations need "something that lies on an entirely different plane, by an *actus purus* of Thought, Intellect, or Reason, all written with capitals and considered to mean something unutterably superior to any fact of sensibility" (p. 245). Brentano is cast in the role of the intellectualist owing to his adding a judgment to every experience, in order for it to be a conscious experience as all of them are, in his view.

Woodruff Smith embraces the intuition of an inner awareness that is bound into, for example, our visual-perceptual awareness of a tree in the garden. But he holds it to be an error to conceive of what is perforce bound into any conscious state of consciousness, and performs the function of inner awareness, as having judgmental form. The next step could be to make something useful of the theoretical claims

- (a) that both inner awareness and qualitiveness are parts of the modal character *consciously* (or character_c) of a conscious experience, or state of consciousness, and
- (b) that character_c is bound into the single unitary awareness that a conscious experience, or state of consciousness, is proposed to be, no less so than one that is not conscious.

Woodruff Smith sees the problem as lying in the form that a self-reflective experience takes with special reference to the form of its reflexive character.

It would seem that James might be more helpful than Brentano is, notwithstanding the fact that it is Brentano and not James, who is the intrinsic theorist of inner awareness.

How Might the Qualitative Character Be Enlisted in the Effort?

It is interesting to find Woodruff Smith proffering qualitative metaphors in preparing us for his exposition of an articulated model of inner awareness. I comment next on his metaphors, and I adapt them because I am interested in making more evident the role of the qualitative character in a modal theory of inner awareness.

1. Consider having occurrent awareness of something in particular that lies externally to that awareness. We are thus aware perceptually more than most of the time; and, of course, there are many other kinds of examples of outer-directed awareness, such as having awareness in thought of something or other that exists beyond one's stream of consciousness, or having awareness of something or other as part of being involved in a night or day dream. Woodruff Smith says that it is useful to think of such examples, whatever their kind, as instances of one's "*seeing-through*" the awareness. Speaking metaphorically, one sees right through the awareness, without a detour, to its primary object or objects.

Woodruff Smith suggests the relation between awareness and its primary objects is analogous to the relation of translucent materials to visual perceiving. Seeing is commonly conceived of as someone's engaging in the activity of visual perceiving. One or another part of the environment radiates or reflects light into one's eyes and this light may pass through a piece of glass in getting there. It may pass through in a way that has effects on the visual system much as though the glass were not there. Because they are "transparent" to properties of their primary object or objects, awarenesses may be considered analogous to such translucent material. Psychologists speak of the veridicality that an awareness often instantiates.

These awarenesses are what Woodruff Smith is calling "experiences" and James calls "states of consciousness." For James, none of them has an intrinsic reflexive character. For Woodruff Smith, some of them do. Included under the "transparency" of a state of consciousness is that it does not have a reflexive character. Analogously, glass through which one sees may not be totally transparent; one may see the glass itself as well. A reflexive state of consciousness in Woodruff Smith's sense is one that possesses a reflexive character that, so to speak, draws "attention" to the state of consciousness itself, which would otherwise be fully transparent. Undergoing a reflexive state of consciousness, one has some awareness of that by which awareness of the state's primary object or objects occurs. An intrinsic theory of inner awareness such as

Woodruff Smith's holds that every reflexive state of consciousness of ours involves no more than just one awareness in its structure. This single awareness accomplishes, as it were, the apprehension of the state's primary object or objects, but also an apprehension of the state itself.

Reasoning regarding inner awareness that puts the metaphor of "seeing-through" to use might include another modal character that belongs to the same state. It could be argued that a state of consciousness must possess a qualitative character; otherwise, its primary object or objects could not be presented therein. Presentations require qualitiveness. Recall James's claim that all states of consciousness are, in a broad sense, feelings, and their having this dimension of feeling makes it possible for them to be cognitive.

Reflexively and *non-reflexively* are two different ways in which a state of consciousness is "executed." If a state of consciousness transpires non-reflexively, one sees through the awareness to what the state qualitatively presents; the state's primary objects are apprehended but the means whereby they are apprehended are not apprehended as well. It is different when a state transpires reflexively rather than non-reflexively; in such instances, the qualitative character of the state falls within the scope of its reflexive character; and, so, one apprehends the qualitative presence of the state's primary objects. But the implication is not that the primary objects fail to be apprehended; as occurs in the counterpart non-reflexive case, they get apprehended but now with reference to their being qualitatively presented in the state.

2. Here is how Woodruff Smith (2004) introduces another metaphor for inner awareness that he believes is on the right track.

As an alternative metaphor, instead of saying consciousness is "seeing" its object "through" itself, we might say consciousness is "hearing" its object "in" itself: *in a medium* that includes act and object in one movement. Hearing places me within the object of consciousness and within the experience, as the sound surrounds me, envelops me, flows through me — I am not looking at it from a distance. (p. 98)

As I suggest in the last part of my just preceding comments, the single movement of grasping both the state of consciousness itself and its primary objects is owed to its qualitative character. It is this character of the state that is responsible for its presenting its primary objects.

Woodruff Smith's statement concerning consciousness's "hearing" itself in the very activity of hearing its object is quite brief. Presumably, he has in mind that reflexive states of consciousness apprehend their primary objects as though these are themselves part of the state itself. With the phrase "one movement," Woodruff Smith is describing metaphorically any of a reflexive state's "executions." Each of them is modally reflexive. The state consists of no more than one unitary awareness, which has a qualitative content that refers to the primary objects of the state in relation to the state.

The specific metaphor at work in the background of Woodruff Smith's thinking at this point would seem to be the metaphor of his listening to some music in a non-distracted way. I suggest that, during an episode of the latter kind, Woodruff Smith's stream consists of both reflexive and non-reflexive states of consciousness. By this, I mean states that respectively do and do not have a reflexive character. Those that lack a reflexive character are no less qualitative than those that have it. The music to which Woodruff Smith listens is qualitatively present in all the reflexive and non-reflexive states that take place in him as parts and products of his activity of listening. But if his stream includes only the non-reflexive sort of state of consciousness, I suggest that he is aware of the music then only from a distance at most.

He would then be *only* a primary object of the respective states and, I believe, in the reflexive case, he must be more than that. Woodruff Smith's phenomenological report in this case is merely the second sentence in the above quotation, but the sentence seems to indicate that he undergoes self-awareness as part of the modality of the music's presentation. It would seem to be impossible for non-reflexive states to be cases of his apprehending the music to *surround* him or to *envelop* him or to *flow through* him. Nor would those non-reflexive states that are products and parts of his listening activity place him, as he says they do, *in* the sounds that he hears or *in* his experience of them. The relations that he lists between himself and the music that is being performed are not in themselves observable. So psychologists would rightly say. Therefore, the awarenesses that he has of those relations are perforce a matter of his having inner awareness.

The qualitative presence of the music in the succession of states of consciousness is such that his inner awareness of that presence has the sort of content to which he is giving expression in his report. He perceives the music and himself in spatial relation to each other. They together make up, along with the room and other things in the room, a certain dynamic environmental scene. As the music and room are, so he, too, is a primary object of his states of consciousness. However, the objective scene does not include the music and himself in the relations that he is aware of and reports. He tells us about how the music's qualitative presence combines with his own qualitative presence in the identical states. "Hearing places me within the object of consciousness and within the experience, as the sound surrounds me, envelops me, flows through me — I am not looking at it from a distance." For this to happen, as no doubt it does, there must occur within his states not only self-perceivings from the outside, but also inner awareness of the qualitative presentations of oneself that are a part and product of those self-perceivings.

3. Another metaphor that Woodruff Smith applies is consistent with what I am suggesting. He deploys the metaphor briefly in a preliminary set of comments to four main sections that are devoted to an articulate account of his

revised modal model of inner awareness. Without further comment, he states the following. "Nodding toward physics, consciousness occurs in a 'field' that ties act and object together so that the act feels itself in feeling its object" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 98). In a counterpart non-reflexive state with the identical primary object, no "field" exists that is said to tie a state's primary object to the state. In both cases, of course, awareness occurs of that object; it is qualitatively presented therein.

According to the modal model under discussion, it is not a second awareness that renders a state of consciousness reflexive. In contrast, James and others introduce a second act to perform the inner-awareness function. But, even in James's theory, there is just one awareness per state of consciousness. So, too, in the above quoted sentence, Woodruff Smith makes no reference to any act other than the awareness whose primary object is that to which the sentence refers. The "field" of which Woodruff Smith also speaks in that sentence, he does not conceive of as being a second act. The tying together (primary object with act) that occurs only in reflexive states is *executed otherwise* than by a further state of consciousness.

That the metaphorical field is present only in the reflexive case implies a difference between the counterpart reflexive and non-reflexive states in *how they apprehend their primary object*. It is not the qualitiveness of the single awareness that is involved in each of the two states that is what distinguishes them; both instantiate exactly the same qualitiveness. Thus, something else must serve to explain inner awareness, namely, something about *the way* in which a reflexive state is *aware* of its primary object. The following sentence, though it is obviously not specific enough, would seem to be on the right track. *A reflexive state of consciousness apprehends its primary object not simply qualitatively but also reflexively.*

That single awareness of its primary objects whereof a reflexive state consists, possesses both a qualitative and a reflexive character. But, what is it more specifically for an awareness that is of an item external to the state of consciousness to be reflexive? How is one *reflexively aware of the tree in the garden* for example? One is aware of such an item qualitatively because the respective states are intrinsically qualitative. James would want to say that the latter is their subjective form. Is there a way to say the same concerning the reflexive states with regard to their having, each of them, awareness of itself?

The strong temptation is to explain the difference between the counterpart reflexive and non-reflexive states of consciousness as coming down to a difference in the concepts exercised in their respective "executions." Thus, the environmental scene whereof I am having visual-perceptual awareness now may be taken by my states of consciousness as being a portion of the environment around me or, alternatively, as being the current object of these states of consciousness that are parts and products of my current activity of looking at

it. In this example, the reflexive states of consciousness would be those that apprehend the environmental scene in the latter way; and that way would be considered the reflexive way.

Is this what Woodruff Smith means when he thinks of states of consciousness as taking place in a “field” that ties together act and object? Is his field a field of thought or is it a field of feeling? The rest of Woodruff Smith’s sentence concerning the metaphorical field says that the result of its operation is “that the act feels itself in feeling its object.” Using Woodruff Smith’s metaphor, it is natural to ask *in what different way* do the two counterpart states *feel* their primary object, which they have in common? The reflexive state *ties itself and its object together* and the non-reflexive state does not. The reflexive state is said *to feel itself in feeling its object* while the non-reflective state feels its object but does not feel itself. How does the reflexive state feel itself *in feeling its object*?

The key must be the primary object’s qualitative presence. The sole awareness constitutive of a reflexive state of consciousness differs from its non-reflexive counterpart in the following way. *The reflexive awareness is of the qualitative presence of its primary object.* In being aware of its primary object’s qualitative presentation, the reflexive state therein has awareness of itself. The reflexive state does not simply feel its primary object. Which is what the non-reflexive state does. Rather, the reflexive state *feels itself feeling its object.*

Imagine that one is an introspective virtuoso who is able to switch set or attitude very quickly back and forth so that while one is visually perceiving a certain environmental scene non-reflexive states of consciousness with the scene as their primary object are replaced in one’s stream by a counterpart reflexive state and vice versa. There would take place a repeatedly reversed switch in one’s awareness back and forth between

- (a) one’s feeling (in James’s broad sense of feeling) the *environmental scene* that is qualitatively presented in one’s state of consciousness, and
- (b) one’s feeling (in James’s same broad sense) the *qualitative presentation* of that scene in one’s state of consciousness.

Note the following transitional sentence that takes Woodruff Smith (2004) directly to spelling out his phenomenological conception of inner awareness. “What we need . . . is an articulate model that places inner awareness *within* the consciousness of the object, without making it a separately focused higher-order cognition of that consciousness” (p. 98). There must be adopted something like what the present section proposes if Woodruff Smith’s modal model is to stay modal and thus not become transformed into a conception wherein reflexive states of consciousness are held to be comprised individually of more than a single unitary awareness.

The Qualitative-Reflexive Apprehension of a State of Consciousness's Primary Object or Objects

However, Woodruff Smith maintains that character_c must be "articulated as . . . distinct in form from the intentional character of presenting (say) 'this frog'" (2004, p. 98). Recall

- (a) that the character_c of any state of consciousness includes both its modal character of reflexivity and its modal character of qualitiveness, and
- (b) that, on my suggestion, a state of consciousness, owing to its qualitative character, *presents qualitatively its one or more primary objects*.

Woodruff Smith contends that those two modal characters belonging to a state of consciousness's presentation must not be conflated with the state's "object-directedness" nor with that of any other such state. Keeping the modal characters distinct from the presentation's intentional character has the advantage according to Woodruff Smith of avoiding a path that leads to a *conception of inner awareness as a higher-order inner cognition that accompanies the presentation in the respective state*. "The of-ness of the act lies elsewhere" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 99).

But, if the two modal characters actually are as Woodruff Smith states them to be, how can he claim that the of-ness of a state lies elsewhere? He states them to be characters that belong to the presentation in the state of consciousness. Indeed, he proposes that its qualitative character determines the form that is taken by the entire state of consciousness. And so, as I see it, the two modal characters lie right there where the intentional character lies of the presentation in the state. Where else than in the presentation that they "qualify" or "modify" could they lie, given Woodruff Smith's modal model here under discussion? As is true for a state's object-directedness, the modal characters are features of the presentation. Indeed, together with its object-directedness, they are what determine the unified and only content that the state possesses.

We are told that, "on the model at hand," reflexivity and qualitiveness are "interwoven in consciousness, in inner awareness" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 99). This is a characterization of character_c, of course, and it comes along with such insistences as

- (a) that character_c is not a part of the state of consciousness's directedness toward its objects,
- (b) that character_c does not furnish the state with additional objects beyond this frog, or this environmental scene, or whatever may be the objects of the counterpart non-reflexive state of consciousness,
- (c) that nothing distinct from the state delivers direct judgments about the state whereof the state itself does not know, any more than its counterpart non-reflective state knows about itself, and

- (d) that no part of a state of consciousness delivers judgments about the state, except if it so happens that the state is, very unusually, a thought or judgment about itself, the state thus being its own primary object.

A state of consciousness's qualitative character is claimed to "modify" the form of the whole state. Again, it is useful to compare kinds of states; compare a state of consciousness that has a qualitative character with one that, contrary to James, does not possess such a character. From Woodruff Smith's viewpoint, the existence of states of consciousness is perhaps not ruled out that are just like qualitative states except for an absence of qualitiveness. We have his statement that, at least, seems to say that such states may occur. "A mental act could intimate itself reflexively without yet being phenomenal" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 100).

Two terms in the latter sentence, *mental act* and *phenomenal*, are not those that I use in this discussion to make the same references. However, their respective equivalency to the terms *state of consciousness* and *qualitative* is quite clear. Indeed, the passage from Woodruff Smith that I reproduce near the beginning of my section "A Further Introduction to the Qualitative Character" defines *phenomenality* no differently than *qualitative character* is defined.

His statement regarding a state of consciousness's having a reflexive character without being at all qualitative is followed at once by mention of these two modal characters as "interwoven in consciousness, in inner awareness." I assume that there does not lurk in the latter cryptic notion any rejection of reflexivity without qualitiveness. However, a reflexivity that is interwoven with qualitiveness might not be the same reflexivity that a non-qualitative yet reflexive state would be instantiating. On the conception that Woodruff Smith is developing, does qualitiveness make a difference to inner awareness?

In the latter connection, from his viewpoint, does a distinction need to be drawn that is like the one that he stresses between a state of consciousness's object-directedness and its character_c? Is a distinction needed between the inner directedness and the qualitative character of a state? Or is it held that inner awareness is intimately tied up with qualitiveness in some way? How does inner awareness take place, as it is claimed, "within the scope" of a state's qualitiveness?

If a particular state of consciousness is a non-qualitative reflexive state, how is its feature of inner awareness different from the inner awareness of a counterpart qualitative reflexive state of consciousness? The qualitative character of the latter state is claimed to "modify" its reflexive character. This "modification" is presumably such that the counterpart non-qualitative state *does not instantiate the same reflexive character as the qualitative state does*. How are they not like each other in reflexive character? Given that the conception of inner awareness under discussion is a modal model, we must look for this difference

to exist in the modality of presentation of the state's primary object or objects. How are they differently presented in a state that is reflexive and qualitative, as compared to a state that is reflexive and non-qualitative?

Even before I can be in a position to consider Woodruff Smith's answer, I must raise another question. *Is the very notion inconsistent of a non-qualitative state of consciousness's presenting its objects?* If such a state cannot do so, then perhaps we must follow James when he insists that all of our states of consciousness are qualitative in every instance of their occurrence. Then, the statement that the qualitative character "modifies" or "qualifies" the reflexive character would be merely a reference to the form that inner awareness takes owing to the state's qualitateness and it would not imply that such a state could be non-qualitative. The "modification" would be a matter of the role that is played by qualitateness in reflexive states, and its role in non-reflexive states would be compared. The qualitative character of any state of consciousness modifies the presentation in the state of its primary object or objects. How does the qualitative character of a reflexive state of consciousness also modify its reflexive character?

Woodruff Smith (2004) gives us an idea of what it means to say the reflexive character of a state of consciousness is modified by its qualitative character. Here is all of what he tells us. "In that way the inner awareness of the [state of consciousness] is itself conscious and experienced or 'felt' in living through the [state]" (p. 100). I gather that *inner awareness is a conscious feature of a reflexive state of consciousness*; it cannot be an unconscious feature of the state. And this, one might call it, "higher-order" reflexive necessity is owed directly to a reflexive state's having a qualitative character. Note that there are involved here three features, at least, of each such state.

1. No less than is a non-reflexive state of consciousness, a reflexive state of consciousness is *an awareness or apprehension of its primary object or objects*. Its intrinsic reflexivity in no way diminishes its outer object-directedness. Speaking metaphorically, I can say that a reflexive state *is not turned inward*. It presents nothing that its counterpart non-reflexive state does not present. And being intrinsically and modally qualitative, the reflexive states *qualitatively apprehend their primary object or objects*, no less than do their counterpart non-reflexive states of consciousness.

2. A second feature of the reflexive states of consciousness is, of course, that each such state is *an inner awareness of itself*. It is in this sense that it has a reflexive character. If, instead, it is the theory of inner awareness that James argues for in *The Principles* that is true, then there exists no reflexive character in Woodruff Smith's sense and, so, no reflexive states of consciousness. If Woodruff Smith is right in taking the intrinsic-modal track, then a great many of our states that in fact make up James's famous stream are intrinsically and modally reflexive. And so, I would put it as follows for a modal model

of inner awareness. Any reflexive state's primary object or objects are therein reflexively apprehended in a sense related to the state's qualitatively apprehending its primary object or objects. This notion of a reflexive apprehension comes out of my effort to give sense to the reflexive character's "modifying" the presentation of the primary object or objects in a reflexive state of consciousness. What is it, for example, for me reflexively to apprehend a tree in the garden when I am having visual-perceptual awarenesses of that tree as a result of looking out at the garden through my window? According to my understanding of Woodruff Smith, when my visual-perceptual awareness of the tree occurs reflexively, this awareness is in itself different than when such awareness takes place non-reflexively.

3. In Woodruff Smith's account, the inner awareness that we have of our reflexive states, by simply their occurrence, is also a conscious awareness; it is an awareness of itself as well. Earlier in his chapter, he argues against those theorists who propose, for example, that inner awareness of a state of consciousness is a matter of another state's having the former as an object. They assume that a state that itself is not conscious can in this way render conscious another state. Woodruff Smith (2004) objects to this rhetorically, "How can an unconscious intentionality directed toward a second intentionality make the second one conscious?" (p. 95). He answers by suggesting that the awareness making a state of consciousness conscious ought somehow to be integrated into that state. By the awareness's being a part of the state that it makes conscious, the awareness itself is somehow made conscious. By being intrinsic to the state which it makes conscious by being an inner awareness of it, the awareness is itself somehow rendered an object of inner awareness.

In my comment above in this section on the enumerated *first* feature of a reflexive state of consciousness, I bring in the qualitative character as a factor in how a state, whether it be reflexive or non-reflexive, apprehends its primary object or objects. My suggestion is that a state apprehends its primary object or objects in a qualitative manner. Woodruff Smith suggests much the same about the *third* feature of the reflexive states listed above. He states that (a) these states' qualitative character "modifies" their reflexive character. Compare this with my claim that the qualitative character of every state "modifies" its primary object-directedness, and James's thesis that a state is, in every instance, a feeling of whatever it apprehends. Woodruff Smith also states that (b) owing to the state's falling in its entirety under the scope of its qualitative character, the inner awareness that is intrinsic to the state is *qualitative and thus conscious*; it is "experienced and 'felt' in living through the act [i.e., the reflexive state]."

There would seem to be an allusion here to one of those metaphors that Woodruff Smith says are on the right track with respect to a suitable account for inner awareness. "The act feels itself in feeling its object." Thus, in *quali-*

tatively apprehending its primary object or objects, a state is also apprehending itself qualitatively apprehending its primary object or objects. However, the latter is not all of what he proposes concerning inner awareness. Apprehending itself qualitatively apprehending its primary object or objects, the state of consciousness therein distinguishes itself from its primary object or objects. The state distinguishes itself as, so to speak, *the apprehender*, the subject, or that which apprehends. That the state is the apprehender is consistent with James's (1890/1950) rejection of an ego that exists externally to the stream of consciousness and is able from there to apprehend the states of which the stream is comprised. Referring to those states, James argues that *the individual thought is the only thinker there is*.

In the context of Woodruff Smith's conception, we may put it that a state's self-apprehension does not occur in the dark; one might say that its primary object or objects are not anonymously presented and apprehended. Their presentation is reflexively apprehended therein; which is to say that a reflexive state apprehends the qualitative presentation whereof it consists to be what it is. In addition to being the outer awareness of its primary object or objects that a reflexive state is, it is an inner awareness of the presentation therein of its primary object or objects as a dimension of the very state apprehending it.

I must again note one of Woodruff Smith's major insistences, since it pertains as well to the reflexivity of inner awareness. *Its being in itself conscious or apprehended does not mean that inner awareness has the form, after all, of a judgment*. Before moving on to a revision that absorbs some of Edmund Husserl's account of temporal awareness, Woodruff Smith (2004) characterizes as follows his progress to this point in the essay.

In short, we have here an analysis of phenomenological form that resonates with Brentano's [intrinsic] view of inner [awareness] but avoids the problematic features of higher-order monitoring, including Brentano's own version of an internal higher-order judgment. (p. 101)

The key, as he sees it, is his construal of reflexivity. He understands it, as he does qualitiveness, to be a modal character of the unitary presentation in a reflexive state of consciousness. And so, inner awareness amounts to how, the way that, a reflexive state apprehends its primary object or objects.

A Further Character of Reflexive States of Consciousness

Woodruff Smith's partial absorption of Husserl's account of "temporal awareness" casts more light on the role that the qualitative plays in his own modal model of our inner awareness. Here is how he encapsulates Husserl's non-modal theory of inner awareness. "Our 'inner consciousness' of our passing experience — what I am calling inner awareness — *automatically falls out*

of the structure of our consciousness of time: our temporally flowing consciousness of temporally flowing events both external and internal to our consciousness" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 101; italics added). Thus, inner awareness is a matter of a state of consciousness's including, as parts of it, "retentions" and "protentions," which are retentive and anticipative awarenesses of (a) past and future primary objects of the ongoing stream and (b) past and expected states whose objects those primary objects were or will be. No state of consciousness is an awareness of itself; inner awareness arises out of those retentions and protentions; and it is, rather, awareness of *the ongoing stream of consciousness*, as I soon explain.

Woodruff Smith does not reject Husserl's introduction of retentions and protentions as being parts of the individual states of consciousness, but he wants to introduce them into his own theory in a way compatible with his modal model of inner awareness. He proposes that inner awareness "supervenes" on the temporal awareness that consists of a pattern of retentions and protentions across states of consciousness. This means that the contributions of retentions and protentions to the content of a state of consciousness are distinct from the contributions that the modal character of reflexivity provides. A state of consciousness's "temporal character" and reflexive character are therefore said to have "different phenomenological tasks," as, analogously, qualitiveness and object-directedness have in non-reflexive states. Woodruff Smith speaks, too, of "form" belonging to a state that is owed to the protentions and retentions constituting the state, and he distinguishes that form from the form that the state owes to its intrinsic inner awareness.

But, the supervenience relation between the reflexive and temporal characters is one in which the reflexive character's contributing to the state's content and thus making a conscious state of it depends upon that state's having a phenomenological temporal character as defined in the present section above. "Without the integral temporal awareness of the ongoing experience, I could not (as Husserl says) 'sense' the ongoing experience, albeit simply as 'this very experience'" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 105). Greatly of interest from the present article's viewpoint is Woodruff Smith's effort to explain and support the latter contention by reference to the qualitative character.

Consider Woodruff Smith's (2004) example of his now being engaged in looking at this frog. Of course, this visual-perceptual activity of his is having effects on the contents of his stream of consciousness. Each of those states of consciousness includes one of various *visual presentations* that are characterized by him as "frog-like pattern[s] of colors and shapes and textures" (p. 104).

Although each of Woodruff Smith's states of consciousness that occur when he is looking at this frog has such a visual presentation as part of its unitary content, this presentation is said not to be the content's "salient" part. The salient content belonging to the states that constitute the present section of

Woodruff Smith's stream of consciousness *has reference to the states' primary object or objects* (e.g., this frog or this frog and some of its properties). Indeed, he speaks of this frog as *that which is presented* by the "frog-like patterns" characterizing the visual presentations that are included in the states of consciousness that are essential to his now seeing this frog.

Note that the primary object or objects of a state of consciousness are not identified with the presentations of them in the state of consciousness. Yet, it would seem to be correct to say that the primary object or objects *have qualitative presence therein*. It is *how* a state of consciousness is an instance of awareness of its primary object or objects. If this state is a reflexive state, it is as well an inner awareness of itself. But, this further object of awareness is not presented too in the state. The state itself does not have qualitative presence in the state and, therefore, is differently an awareness of itself.

In his having visual-perceptual awareness that is produced by his visual-perceptual activity of looking at the frog, contents take place at two "levels," according to Woodruff Smith; and higher-level content is stated to supervene on lower-level content. Though Woodruff Smith does not use the word *level* in the present connection, his section "Inner Awareness Supervening on Temporal Awareness" shows that a metaphor of higher versus lower content is much at work in his thought.

It is at work on two fronts, which Woodruff Smith considers to be analogous to each other. The following quotation indicates that there is a certain pattern of thought that is being applied to states of consciousness that are instances of visual-perceptual awareness of this frog and to states involving, each of them, inner awareness of the state itself.

[The] flow of sensory experience (including kinesthesia and bodily control) is a deep and basic current in our stream of consciousness, above which flow our various other intentional activities. And that basic sensory flow, let us grant, has a structure very much like that Husserl analyzed as temporal awareness. Supervening on that temporal awareness, however, is a distinct *formal* feature of consciousness, which is inner awareness proper. (Woodruff Smith, 2004, pp. 105–106)

If, as I argue, the modal model allows just a single unitary awareness (and content) per state of consciousness, then *above* and *below* are likely to mislead the reader and may lead the modal theorist himself or herself in the wrong direction. He or she may come to conceive of some of our states of consciousness as being, individually, dual awarenesses, or more. In my opinion, a modal theorist of inner awareness should devote his or her effort, instead, to showing just how a state is a unitary awareness notwithstanding the different kinds of items whereof the state is proposed to be simultaneously an awareness.

Consider again the qualitativensness that our states of consciousness instantiate. Their modal qualitative character does not depreciate their respective

contents' having reference, for example, to this frog. Qualitative content is not a manifestation of a secondary object-directedness; it is not as if the qualities of a state compete with this frog for attention and cause a split therein. A state's qualitative content is not located at a different level from the one whereat the object-directedness of that state operates. After all, is not Woodruff Smith describing *integral* (undivided) individual states as qualitatively presenting this frog to him whenever he is engaged in visually perceiving it?

Woodruff Smith emphasizes that to specify a state of consciousness's primary object is not to specify directly the features of the qualitative presentation of that object in the state. "The content 'this red tree frog' does not decompose semantically into a content specifying the pattern of colors, shapes, and so on" (Woodruff Smith, 2004, p. 104). The latter is a fact concerning meanings but it is proposed to bear also on Woodruff Smith's thesis that his visual-perceptual awareness of this frog *supervenes* on his respective state's qualitative character.

There is a sense in which a notion of supervenience is applicable but not a sense that assumes two separate contents. Without so assuming, it could be accepted that the object-directedness of a state of consciousness depends on its qualitative character. Recall James's claim: all our states of consciousness are of an intrinsic qualitative nature; all are feelings of. All of them are feelings in a broad sense that would seem to be in accord with Woodruff Smith's (2004, p. 100) thesis that, at the least, all of our conscious states have an intrinsic modal qualitative character. Compare too my remarks early in this article about Freud on consciousness.

The Temporal Character and Inner Awareness

Perhaps Woodruff Smith brings the notion of supervenience into the picture for a reason that has nothing to do with the place of qualitiveness within the structure of a state of consciousness. Perhaps he thinks that he needs the notion in order to absorb Husserl's retentions and protentions into his own theory without reducing, as Husserl in effect does, inner awareness to an inter-state relation. Indeed, in this context, Woodruff Smith applies a notion of levels to the relation between the flow of sensory experience and "our various other intentional activities." He describes these as flowing "above" our sensory experience (2004, p. 105).

His extended effort in the defense of a modal account of inner awareness appears to lead him in the direction of positing more than one stream of mentality that simultaneously runs through us, although the two levels that he mentions are assigned to a single stream of consciousness. Thus, our inner awareness would be a higher-order occurrence than those retentions and protentions on which it is now said to supervene. The contribution of a state's

reflexive character to its content is declared to be “distinct” from the contents belonging to the retentions and protentions, which are also parts of the particular state.

Distinct here means *two*, but not *two parts of a single content*. This further duality of content is analogous to Woodruff Smith’s separation of the qualitative content of a state of consciousness that is involved in his perceptual example from that state’s objective content, notwithstanding that one’s visual-perceptual awareness of this frog does not amount to a separate intentional reference from the object’s qualitative presentation in the state. It is curious that Woodruff Smith resorts to supervenience. Why not choose instead to extend his modal model? Should he not be proposing, in the same spirit as before, that some of our states of consciousness have a “temporal character”? Could not Woodruff Smith include retentions and protentions as further contributions to a state’s unitary content that, too, are owed to how a state is “executed”?

He could conceive of a state’s temporal character analogously to the qualitative character of his states that are visual-perceptual awarenesses of this frog. He could contend that the temporal character of a reflexive state is what renders the state “temporal” in the sense of its being an inner awareness of the state *in its relation to past and future states in the same stream*. Thus, a state of consciousness that is an instance of visual-perceptual awareness would have no more than a single content, and this content could instantiate four modal characters. The state’s content could be not only both referential and qualitative, but also both reflexive and temporal. In the Woodruff Smith modal-theoretical approach, no more than a single level of awareness would be posited. For there is no higher level of awareness in that state that supervenes on a lower level of awareness. Such a theoretical move could be consistently modal.

Nevertheless, a state’s intrinsic inner awareness could still possess a kind of dependency upon the state’s temporal character. Let me explain. Woodruff Smith is evidently in partial agreement with Husserl. *Inner awareness requires temporal awareness in the form of separate retentions and protentions*. I again reproduce Woodruff Smith’s (2004) statement in which this dependency claim is expressed. “Without the integral temporal awareness of the ongoing experience, I could not (as Husserl says) ‘sense’ the ongoing experience, albeit simply as ‘this very experience’” (p. 105).

Those retentions and protentions are clearly held to be about “the ongoing experience.” But to what does the latter term have reference? Early in this article I state that in the present context *an experience* as Woodruff Smith employs it and the term *a state of consciousness* as James uses it are equivalent to each other. I am employing them interchangeably throughout — except at this point, owing to how Woodruff Smith’s uses *experience* in communicating Husserl’s conception of inner awareness.

Accordingly, the referent of *ongoing experience* in the sentence that I quote just above is, I believe, none but Woodruff Smith's stream or, better, *the present section*, as James says, of his stream of consciousness. That ongoing experience is Woodruff Smith's stream as it is proceeding now. As does his entire stream, his ongoing experience partly consists of states of the kind under discussion here, with regard to the intrinsic inner awareness that they involve. No single state of consciousness is an ongoing experience since it is a *pulse of mentality*, in James's phrase. And so, unlike the stream of consciousness to which a state of consciousness belongs, the state *does not go on*. Such a state, in its entirety, is momentarily there and gone.

Woodruff Smith's suggestion at this point should be this. Every one of those of our states of consciousness that have both a reflexive character and a temporal character is an inner awareness of itself in relation to other states that belong to the selfsame stream and take place in the state's temporal vicinity. The content of such a state makes reference to *the state's primary object* and to *the state itself* and to *the ongoing experience of which the state is a part*.

Not all of one's states of consciousness that constitute an ongoing experience of seeing this frog are likely to be reflexive. Consider such a non-reflexive state that nevertheless is a temporal state of consciousness in the sense explained in the preceding section. It lacks Woodruff Smith's reflexive character though it includes retentions and protentions of other states of consciousness in the same stream. What difference does the absence make of inner awareness from the state? My answer follows and is, as it were, an exercise in the modal model that I discuss in this and the preceding article of the present series. Further efforts are needed to work out the implications of the model more fully.

1. A state of consciousness's object-directedness does not depend on its being reflexive. Any such state that occurs is either about something or as though about something, the latter in those cases in which its object-directedness, its intentionality, fails to have an object that exists now or in the past or that comes into existence in the future. In the example, the state's content would successfully refer to this frog and properties of it.

2. A temporal non-reflexive state does not apprehend anything of itself, and this includes the state's content. The state's primary object or objects, whereof the state is an apprehension, should not be identified with the state's content, of which it is not at all an awareness. In the example, it is not by the state's apprehending its content that it apprehends this frog and features of this frog. Given the state's having the content that it has, it is an awareness of its primary object or objects but not an awareness of its own existence or features of itself.

3. Among this frog's objective properties is that I am perceiving it. This is not a property that I must somehow apprehend for it to be true that I am per-

ceiving this frog. An objection might be that my visual perceiving is an activity in which I engage, and I cannot be so engaged if I have no awareness of being so. But the state under discussion possesses a temporal character and, so, its structure includes retentions and protentions. And there are states that are reflexive constituting the ongoing experience of which the temporal non-reflexive state of interest is a part. Thus, I am aware of being engaged in visually perceiving this frog and its properties, and this is the case even owing to my non-reflexive state of interest, since it is temporal.

4. It may be argued that a temporal non-reflexive state is a conscious state. After all, such a state is an awareness of the ongoing experience of which the state is a durational part. However, from the perceiver's perspective, it would not be as though that non-reflexive state occurs. My point is one that I often make regarding, for example, states of consciousness of mine that are non-reflexive visual-perceptual awarenesses of a tree in the garden. Unless I have inner awareness of the states that those awarenesses are, it is for me just like I do not have them. The states transpire in complete darkness, as it were, and I am totally blind to their occurrence. I am now saying that the same applies to a state of consciousness that is an awareness of the stream to which it belongs and that is not an awareness of itself. Surely, it is a non-conscious state. Apprehending the stream it belongs to, a temporal state does not apprehend itself, for it is devoid of the reflexive character. Too, one's ongoing experience, or present section of one's stream, does not qualify as conscious, no matter how many of its component states do so qualify. The reflexive character is an intrinsic modal character that belongs to some individual states of consciousness and not to anything else.

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