

The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XII. Inner Awareness Conceived of as a Modal Character of Conscious Experiences

Thomas Natsoulas

University of California, Davis

An intrinsic theory of inner awareness contends such awareness is inherent in and essential to every mental-occurrence instance that is rightly described to be an object of inner awareness. More specifically how does the direct apprehension take place that one frequently undergoes of mental-occurrence instances as they go on? In publications of the 1980s intrinsic theorist David Woodruff Smith proposes that what makes a conscious experience conscious is part of the modality of presentation in the experience of its primary object. Inner awareness is a kind of “modifying” or “qualifying” of that presentation. It is a way the experience (or mental act) is “executed” rather than a secondary awareness with its own content that is included in and directed upon the experience. A recent chapter of Woodruff Smith’s returns to his previous phenomenological analysis of inner awareness in order to deepen and widen it and to revise it in some ways. Among the alterations in his conception is that an inner awareness is no longer necessary for an experience or mental act to be classified as conscious. This change is not a matter of phenomenology but of ontology because the reasoning in its favor is not based on inner awareness. The chapter very largely addresses nevertheless inner awareness and takes as before a phenomenological approach to it. Woodruff Smith uses Franz Brentano’s account of inner awareness for guidance in articulating his own account and he also absorbs thereto a significant part of Edmund Husserl’s understanding of inner awareness in terms of temporal awareness. Emerging aspects of Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological account include among them (a) that having inner awareness is one of the features of the presentation of the primary object in a conscious experience but it is not itself presented, (b) that tertiary awareness is involved in conscious experience since inner awareness is one of its phenomenological features, (c) that an experience of which we have inner awareness need not be qualitative but, in order for it to be a conscious experience, it cannot but be qualitative, because the “tertiary awareness” which all our conscious experiences involve requires qualitiveness, and (d) that inner awareness is supervenient on temporal awareness just as the primary awareness in a conscious experience supervenes on the qualitative content of the experience.

The term *inner awareness* — as employed in this article and all through a series of which this is the twelfth installment (e.g., Natsoulas, 1996a, 1996b, 2001, 2004a, 2004b) — has reference to the direct apprehension one may undergo of mental-occurrence instances as they go on within one. The term *intrinsic theory* refers here to the kind of theory of consciousness that conceives of inner awareness to be an intrinsic feature belonging either to every mental-occurrence instance of ours or to only the members of a certain proper subset of them (cf. Brentano, 1911/1973; van Geert, 1985; Woodruff Smith, 1989). How more specifically does such awareness “from the inside” take place?

Contrary to intrinsic theory the locus of any inner awareness is not infrequently conceived of to be *other than* in the mental-occurrence instance itself that is its object. For example, it is maintained to take the form instead of a mental-occurrence instance that is an apprehension of another mental-occurrence instance which transpires closely before it (e.g., Dretske, 1991; James, 1890/1950; Rosenthal, 1986; Weiskrantz, 1997). In order for a theory to qualify as an intrinsic theory of inner awareness it must contend that *inner awareness is inherent in and is essential to every mental-occurrence instance that is rightly described to be an object of inner awareness*. Such a mental-occurrence instance would owe to its nature that it is awareness of itself, along with other objects of awareness that it may also have.

That it is intrinsically awareness of itself means the mental-occurrence instance is an occurrent awareness of its own occurrence *unaided by any appendage to it that, it may be claimed, performs the job instead*. For example, a theory would not qualify as being an intrinsic theory of inner awareness if it proposed inner awareness to be a matter of one’s acquiring *automatically and silently* — that is, without any occurrent awareness at the time of so doing — a latent knowledge of that mental-occurrence instance, which enables subsequent experiential remembrance of it to take place (cf. O’Shaughnessy, 2000).

Some Intrinsic Theorists of Inner Awareness

Some intrinsic theorists — such as Sigmund Freud (1895/1966) and David Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) — share the view that (a) *not every* mental-occurrence instance has itself among its objects and (b) such a mental-occurrence instance is *not any less what it is* for its not being itself among its objects.

For example, in accordance with my own intrinsic-theoretical view a state of consciousness that transpires unbeknownst should not be considered to be anything other than *a basic durational component of its respective stream*, no less so than a state of consciousness that is an object of inner awareness (Natsoulas, 2001). Thus, I regard our streams of consciousness to be comprised otherwise than William James does. In my view each such stream is made up of two relevant kinds of states of consciousness. The structure of one

kind of such state includes the inner-awareness feature whereas the structures of all the remaining states of consciousness belonging to the same stream do not instantiate that feature.¹ And I further propose, at those times when one is actually engaging in the mental activity of introspection, there consequently occurs an increase in the relative frequency in one's stream of the kind of state of consciousness that has itself among its objects, the kind that is both an inner awareness and an object of that inner awareness (Natsoulas, 1991).

Sigmund Freud

The great champion of the unconscious is a clear example as well of an intrinsic theorist of consciousness. This is not commonly known. Nor are many people cognizant that consciousness is a central scientific problem for Freud to which he wishes he could contribute more than he in fact is able.

It is widely known of course that Freud argues strongly and repeatedly in support of the thesis that some of our mental-occurrence instances — including ones that are taking place within you and me at this very moment — *are not* objects of inner awareness. They are occurring right now outside of our consciousness whether or not we are currently engaged in introspection. Our being unaware of them is *not* a matter of our failing to turn our attention to them. Rather, *no way exists whereby we can have inner awareness of any of Freud's "unconscious psychical processes"* (Natsoulas, 1984, 1985).

Though unconscious psychical processes always transpire in that sense unbeknownst they do have content nevertheless and may be about something existing now, something that has existed previously, or something that may yet come into existence. In these and other respects all of our unconscious psychical processes are posited to resemble conscious psychical processes. But it is *only by inferential means* that we ever have awareness of any of their occurrences or features as such.

It is in the nature of such mental-occurrence instances that they are inapprehensible by inner awareness, *as it is in the nature of every one of our conscious psychical processes to be an object of inner awareness*. These two non-overlapping categories of mental-occurrence instance are non-objects and objects respectively of inner awareness. This is proposed to be invariably the case; it does not depend on their circumstances of occurrence. The conscious psychical processes occur only within the sub-system "perception-consciousness" of the psychical apparatus, a sub-system that is so constituted that every psychical process that occurs there is an object of intrinsic inner awareness.

¹See further on in the text for some description of James's (1890/1950) "appendage" account of inner awareness according to which no state of consciousness is an inner awareness of itself (cf. Natsoulas, 1995–1996, 1996–1997).

Franz Brentano

Any psychical process that occurs elsewhere in the psychical apparatus is without exception never an object of inner awareness, according to Freud. Yet Freud's teacher Franz Brentano (1911/1973) maintains in contrast to him that every mental-occurrence instance is directed on itself. In the latter sense it is an "internal perception" as well as being in many cases a perception of something else via a sensory system.

The following passage of Brentano's is frequently quoted. It identifies the mental with the conscious, and the conscious with mental acts each of which has itself as an object:

Every mental act is conscious; it includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every mental act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example, the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. (Brentano, 1911/1973, pp. 153–154)

This is not to say a mental act, being conscious, is made up of two subsidiary acts, that Brentano is denying the mental act's ultimate unity. One page later he expresses as follows the latter, crucial point. "The consciousness of the primary object and the consciousness of the secondary object are not each a distinct phenomenon but two aspects of one and the same unitary phenomenon [i.e., one and the same unitary act]" (p. 155; editor's footnote inserted). Thus, a mental act that has two or more objects is not considered to be less unified or less unitary than if it possessed just one object, notwithstanding that one of its objects is the very mental act itself.

David Woodruff Smith's Account in the 1980s

A prior article in the present series on the positive case in favor of intrinsic theory (Natsoulas, 2004a) partly addresses *what kind of property of a mental-occurrence instance inner awareness is* (cf. Natsoulas, 2004b). It considers an intrinsic conception of inner awareness put forward by Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) in publications of the 1980s. He holds inner awareness to be one of the characters instantiated by the "modality of presentation" in a mental-occurrence instance. A mental-occurrence instance is an object of inner awareness only if this occurrence possesses as an intrinsic feature a modality of presentation that includes inner awareness.

So an inner awareness would not be as James (1890/1950) argues. It is a matter for James of a state of consciousness's having another such state that belongs to the selfsame stream among its objects of awareness. It is impossible for any state of consciousness to be among the items it directly apprehends. In

defense of the latter proposition James contends, "If to *have* feelings or thoughts in their immediacy were enough [to be aware of them firsthand], babies in the cradle would be psychologists, and infallible ones" (p. 189; original emphasis).

James is thus an "appendage theorist" of inner awareness. *Appendage* is a word employed at one point by Freud (1895/1966) to distinguish his intrinsic conception of the conscious psychical processes from other theories. According to James a state of consciousness is one that transpires *perforce* unbeknownst if it is not followed in its stream by a state of consciousness directed upon it. Inner awareness of the former state takes the form of a subsequent state which may be itself an object of inner awareness depending on whether in turn it is followed in the stream by a state of consciousness directed upon it. However, this does not set a regress going in my view because a state of consciousness need not be an object of inner awareness. Nor must a state of consciousness that is an inner awareness have to be itself in turn such an object.

For Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) in contrast inner awareness is part of the modality of presentation of a mental-occurrence instance's primary object. Thus, inner awareness would seem to amount to *a certain special way whereby the primary object of a mental-occurrence instance is therein presented*. In this respect Woodruff Smith stands in contrast to Brentano too, who holds that a mental act, being conscious, *presents itself to itself* in addition to presenting its primary object. Its primary object (e.g., a certain lake one sees is frozen or, alternatively, judges to be frozen) is other than the mental act itself.

Woodruff Smith characterizes the presentation of the primary object as "modified" ("qualified") by the inner-awareness feature that is intrinsic to the mental act. In effect we are being offered an alternative conception of James's states of consciousness or his basic durational components of the stream of consciousness. Woodruff Smith bestows particular attention upon those of James's states that are objects of inner awareness, and he seeks to explain these states' being such in terms of their intrinsic structure.

Two fundamental dimensions of the overall structure belonging to a state of consciousness — or "experience," Woodruff Smith's term — are the experience's mode and the experience's modality of presentation. Its mode consists of *whatever is presented in the experience as it is presented*. Judging a certain lake to be frozen and seeing that the lake is frozen, both of these involve the same *mode* of presentation. That is, both experiences present the lake and the lake's being in a frozen condition, but they mutually contrast with respect to the *modality* of presentation they respectively involve.

They are distinct species of experience; they instantiate a species character different from each other's. One of them presents a certain lake *judicatively*. The other experience *visual-perceptually* presents that lake. In a certain other respect the modality of presentation could be anyway the same for both of

them. Both experiences would then be objects of inner awareness. Both would have a *reflexive character* in the latter sense. Each would have itself as a secondary object in addition to having the lake for its primary object.

It is important to note that the latter thesis does not have the meaning that the experience itself is presented therein in the sense that the lake is presented. Woodruff Smith (1986, 1989) emphasizes that neither a judicative nor a visual experience presents itself (cf. Kriegel, 2003; Natsoulas, 2004b).² Inner awareness consists rather of a kind of “modifying” or “qualifying” the presentation of the primary object.

The following paragraph is quoted from a past article in the present series. It states a certain understanding of Woodruff Smith’s latter thesis, it raises certain questions, and it helps to introduce the main topic of the present article.

The problem with which Woodruff Smith did struggle is how a unitary awareness can be an awareness of, say, Lake Fuschl and, at the same time, an awareness of itself. The solution that he proffered was that an experience, although it does not present itself, can be an awareness of itself by “modifying” the presentation of which it consists. I have been construing this “modification” of a presentation as a matter of the experience’s taking the object that it presents in a certain way: as the object of this experience. Does this interpretation hold up when tested against Woodruff Smith’s (1989) fuller exposition of his account? How should inner awareness qua “modifier” be understood? It is one thing to say that the reflexive character of an experience is responsible for that experience’s having itself as a secondary, non-presentational object, and another thing to say how this is accomplished by “modifying” the presentation of its primary object in the experience. (Natsoulas, 2004a, p. 116)

A Return to Consciousness

The purpose of the present article is to improve upon our understanding of Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of consciousness. I am concerned with how he is lately treating of the feature of a mental-occurrence instance that I identify as inner awareness in the introduction to this article. I examine closely here one chapter of Woodruff Smith’s volume *Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology* published in 2004 by Cambridge University Press.³

That forty-five-page chapter is entitled “Return to Consciousness” and comprises the book along with another new essay and some already published articles. In the chapter of special interest our author “pursue[s] and partly

²At a few more points in the text I refer to what intrinsic inner awareness is awareness of as the experience or mental act’s “secondary” object. However, the qualification I just presented in the text applies whenever it is Woodruff Smith’s account of inner awareness that is under discussion.

³All bare page references appearing in the present article hence forth are to Woodruff Smith (2004).

revise[s his] own earlier analysis of inner awareness as a 'modal' character of mental acts" (p. 76), and he states that the "central motif" of everything contained in the chapter is the problem of inner awareness.

One Important Revision

According to Woodruff Smith's previous analysis an "integral part" of each of our conscious mental acts is inner awareness each of them of itself. The new chapter's title could be "Return to Inner Awareness" though it is not. One determinant of the actual title may be the classical view according to which *what makes any mental-occurrence instance conscious is its being an object of inner awareness*. Another determinant may be a certain revision in Woodruff Smith's view of human consciousness.

This revision manifests itself in such statements as this one: "We must not press every consciousness into the mold of 'inner consciousness,' as important as it is in certain higher activities of consciousness. For we also experience very basic modes of consciousness that lack 'self-consciousness'" (p. 109). It would seem there exist mental acts or experiences that he would now count as instances of consciousness notwithstanding their not being self-awarenesses. That is, in this kind of experience the character of reflexivity (inner awareness) is not a part of the modality of presentation yet the experience is considered to be conscious.

This is clearly a major departure from the classical view. Thus, Woodruff Smith would be returning to consciousness rather than simply to inner awareness, because consciousness now for him does not require inner awareness.

Whereas Freud contrary to Brentano introduces unconscious mental-occurrence instances into his system Woodruff Smith takes a further step away from the conception Brentano develops, a step which can be expressed in Jamesian terms. Not all the states comprising our *stream of consciousness* are objects of inner awareness. A difference from James is that many of our states of consciousness have in Woodruff Smith's view inner awareness built right into them individually whereas for James the latter description does not apply to any of them.

Crucial to our understanding of consciousness is the development of an adequate conception of inner awareness though Woodruff Smith rightly recognizes that not all creatures described for good reason as conscious possess the human sort of inner awareness and that some of our mental-occurrence instances are not erroneously described as partaking in consciousness simply because we have no inner awareness of them. In many articles I distinguish two meanings of *consciousness* among others.

- (a) There is consciousness in one sense when we merely are aware occurrently of something that lies beyond our stream of consciousness or

even when we are thus aware as though of such a something. The latter cases are those in which what we seem to have an occurrent awareness of does not now exist, never existed and cannot exist.

- (b) Consciousness in a second sense possesses an actual referent whenever we have immediate occurrent awareness of being occurrently aware or as though aware of something.

How the Chapter Is Introduced

From the perspective of the present series of articles the analysis of inner awareness under development in Woodruff Smith's chapter demands sedulous discussion. The chapter is somewhat richer an exposition of his analysis than prior writings. The analysis is now under notable revision. And his account possesses detail and uniqueness missing in other present-day attempts to explain inner awareness. Here is a little of how he introduces his chapter.

Some years ago (in *The Circle of Acquaintance* [1989] and, tersely, in "The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness" [1986]), I proposed a model of the phenomenological structure that makes a mental act or state *conscious*: what I called an *inner awareness* of the act taken as a *modal* structure distinguished from any higher-order reflection or judgment or recollection or perception of the original act And now I return to the story of consciousness, seeking to refine a neoclassical analysis of consciousness. Here I hope to deepen and widen — and in some ways, revise — my earlier modal analysis of inner awareness by contrasting it with alternative views drawn from both phenomenology and cognitive science In this way I hope to bring out the uniquely *modal* form of inner awareness in consciousness. (p. 77)

Woodruff Smith starts historically by providing brief information about Brentano's (1911/1973) approach and that of four other classical philosophers (Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Husserl). He adjudges Brentano to be the one of these five authors who proffers the sharpest and most detailed statement of the problem of inner awareness.

Later in the chapter he comes back to Brentano's conception and employs it in a section titled "Inner Consciousness" to guide him in articulating his own account. He also returns in the latter half of his chapter to Edmund Husserl and absorbs a significant part of Husserl's account of inner awareness into his own (see the final main section of the present article).

To begin with, Woodruff Smith identifies the problem in terms of what the "form" of inner awareness is and what inner awareness "consists" of. Thus, it does not consist of any "higher-order reflection or judgment or recollection or perception of the original act" (p. 77). He explains too that his effort so far regarding inner awareness is "purely phenomenological."

The Problem Is a Suitable "Articulation" of Inner Awareness

When he introduces Brentano's conception Woodruff Smith suggests the problem is one of "articulation." "Brentano struggled valiantly to articulate this secondary inner consciousness as a dependent, inseparable part of the given act, and not a separate higher-order act directed toward the act Here we have the modern problem of consciousness, which hovers with us today: how to articulate such an inner awareness" (pp. 78–79). How should we articulate the integral part of a mental act that is the act's awareness of itself?

It must be differently articulated than if it were a matter as in James (1890/1950) of a mental state directed on another mental state. If the latter is true a mental state of which there is inner awareness is a primary object of another mental state in the same stream to which they both belong. Thus, it would not be its own secondary object as is proposed by Brentano and, differently, by Woodruff Smith. The object of an inner awareness is a mental state. A mental state must have a different phenomenological structure if it has itself as an object.

The problem of inner awareness is to give to that structure satisfactory expression in words. This is evidently how Woodruff Smith views the problem. He not only calls it a phenomenological problem but also expresses regret that "careful phenomenological analysis" is scarce in the work of those philosophers of mind who consider themselves to be cognitive scientists and who address problems of consciousness. There is needed an analysis of the "form" inner awareness takes and *the discipline of phenomenology is uniquely prepared to perform the needed "formal analysis" of inner awareness*. Phenomenologists as such take a first-person approach to consciousness. They study consciousness as experienced or, as some of them would say, "as it presents itself to itself." *It is only from this perspective that the "form" of inner awareness reveals itself*.

Woodruff Smith's mentions of articulation as needed in treating of inner awareness suggest something similar. Inner awareness is a feature of mental-occurrence instances that, along with other features of theirs, is given to the first-person perspective. An adequate conception of inner awareness depends on its being suitably articulated.

Judging from the examples provided of such articulation it seems very much like expressing the cognitive content of a conscious mental-occurrence instance or issuing a report of it. Here is a typical example. "Phenomenally [i.e., qualitatively] in this very experience I see this frog" (p. 84).

However, it would seem the same emphasis on the crucial importance of articulation would not be placed with respect to the neural processes that so many cognitive scientists believe to be identical to mental-occurrence instances. They would contend that analysis or articulation of the form of these neural processes cannot suffice. The offerings of phenomenology would at best be held to be necessary but far less than sufficient even for the sort of inner knowledge that is sought by phenomenology.

Subsequent to an adequate articulation of the stream of consciousness and its basic durational components there would still be doubts as to the form of those components not answerable through further inner awareness of them. What may be a similar view is expressed by Woodruff Smith himself when he acknowledges that the further development of the modal model he is presenting requires that he embark on an *ontological* "exploration" of the modal and intentional characters of experiences (see later).

The Character of Consciousness Involves Tertiary Awareness

Woodruff Smith introduces the intrinsic feature of inner awareness with reference to cases — blindsighted people — in which there is good grounds to think someone does see something in particular but does not have inner awareness of so doing. Absent in such cases is the character that Woodruff Smith calls "the character of consciousness" (soon to be specified). He also calls it "the character *consciously*."

Consciousness_c and Blindsight

Reference in the present article to this character of consciousness is abbreviated "character_c." This is useful not simply because it is shorter but because character_c is a *feature belonging to individual mental-occurrence instances* and not to something else called "consciousness." All the mental-occurrence instances that make up seeing in blindsight are said to lack character_c and so such seeing is not conscious. Instances of seeing which do possess character_c involve inner awareness.

Also, very brief statements in the final two sections of Woodruff Smith's chapter give an idea of his understanding of blindsight. He starts to discuss there the "ontology" of consciousness, which he describes as taking him beyond phenomenology and as potentially adding warrant to the phenomenological analysis of inner awareness that he is proffering. Under *ontology* Woodruff Smith lists different forms that consciousness takes including forms entirely lacking in inner awareness.

He suggests that we have a kind of conscious vision that involves no awareness of seeing, but he makes explicit his belief that blindsight is *not any kind*

of *conscious vision*. Rather, it is proposed to be “unconscious vision. Blindsight is perception without consciousness, wholly unconscious vision” (p. 115). Evidently blindsight is deficient in more than just inner awareness. It is deficient in something more that, if it were at all present, would make of blindsight a kind of conscious vision notwithstanding the claimed absence of inner awareness.

Woodruff Smith declares that since those mental states that are involved directly in blindsight are not themselves conscious they do not instantiate *any sensory quality*. The seeing occurring therein is not visual-qualitative nor is it any other sort of qualitative. In articulating the cognitive content of an instance of blindsight Woodruff Smith would not employ the phrase *in this experience* nor the adverb *phenomenally* which is for him synonymous with *qualitatively*.

However, he does not indicate how he is able to rule out that the mental-occurrence instances comprising blindsight do not instantiate the character *consciously*. Indeed Woodruff Smith goes so far as to ascribe cognitive content to them along the lines of “unconsciously I see this frog” (p. 81). Using my own terms, here is how I would state the issue:

The latter expression of cognitive content implies blindsight is not unconscious vision. Rather, it is conscious vision deficient in inner awareness. At the least in blindsight awarenesses of something in the environment do occur. So too even the unconscious psychical processes of Freud’s — although they are proposed not to be perceptual nor ever qualitative — are each a case of consciousness. That is, each unconscious psychical process is an awareness either of or as though of something beyond itself.

In the last two paragraphs of the present main section I add further comment about blindsight.

What Qualifies Character_c as Phenomenological?

The classical tradition treats of inner awareness as cognitive and as having mental-occurrence instances for immediate objects. They thereby qualify as conscious. Such is the account Woodruff Smith is returning to in his chapter in order further to develop it. Not every case of seeing occurs “consciously” (i.e., instantiates character_c). Some instances transpire “unconsciously.” Character_c, the character *consciously*, is “phenomenological.” Presumably the character *unconsciously*, if it makes sense to express it in the phenomenological kind of way indicated above, is not in itself phenomenological. How could it be?⁴

⁴Arguing that unconscious experiences transpire that instantiate Woodruff Smith’s character of inner awareness would probably imply that these are not actually unconscious experiences. See further on in the text for some related discussion about “tertiary awareness.” Also of relevance is discussion later in the text concerning the role of the qualitative character of experiences vis-à-vis inner awareness of them.

However, a natural question to raise is about the character *consciously*. What qualifies it as phenomenological as opposed to its being rather a non-phenomenological feature of any mental-occurrence instances instantiating it? Does it qualify as such from Woodruff Smith's perspective because character_c is a part of the "form" of a mental-occurrence instance and so is revealed to us from the first-person perspective?

The character of consciousness [i.e., character_c] is a *phenomenological form* of a mental act: something we each *experience* in our own first-person conscious experiences — and to which we give voice in first-person phenomenological descriptions like "Consciously I see this frog." In fact, it is only by experiencing conscious sight myself that I can project [character_c] into your vision, namely, by empathy. And I so gather that you and others also experience [character_c] in conscious vision. (pp. 81–82)

Not only does character_c characterize some of our experiences. When we have an experience that instantiates character_c we evidently *experience* the latter therein. That is, whenever we have a conscious experience we *experience* character_c along with whatever else we apprehend of that experience.⁵

Again, Woodruff Smith's above proposal would seem to be the following. *Character_c is not simply a feature of our experiences; the inner awareness essential to every conscious experience of ours includes having awareness of character_c.* Is this proposal not the reason why Woodruff Smith emphasizes that character_c is "a phenomenological form" of a mental act? An introspective report of *consciously* seeing a certain particular frog is a report of one's being aware not merely of *this frog* and of now having *experiences of this frog*. The report also indicates having awareness of *the character_c belonging to those visual experiences*.

What Is Tertiary Consciousness?

The latter is as it were a further "level" of awareness that mental-occurrence instances may individually include. This "level" — to which an entire article of mine (Natsoulas, 1998c) is devoted — can be usefully designated "tertiary consciousness" or "tertiary awareness." Thus (a) a perceptual awareness of a frog would be a case of *primary* consciousness (primary awareness) as would be too awareness of a frog during sleep, daydreaming or thinking. (b) In instances of seeing the frog (or dreaming or thinking of it) one may have inner awareness too. This would be a case of undergoing secondary consciousness (or secondary awareness). It is called "secondary" because its object is a primary

⁵But not if the revision that I mention earlier in the text is maintained. There would be conscious experiences (e.g., conscious vision) that do not instantiate character_c or at least they do not have the full character_c. See further on in the text about the two dimensions of that character. The one called "reflexivity" is responsible for inner awareness. In its absence the second dimension is not necessarily missing as well according to Woodruff Smith.

awareness one is having. (c) The just mentioned inner awareness itself would be another object of immediate apprehension. In which case one would be having as well a *tertiary* consciousness (tertiary awareness).

Woodruff Smith would seem to be proposing tertiary awareness is a part of all our conscious experiences. His character_c of a mental-occurrence instance includes both secondary and tertiary awareness. Both would be involved in each one of our conscious experiences. Our conscious visual experiences are distinguished not just by our having inner awareness of them. Soon Woodruff Smith is making more explicit what the character_c belonging to every conscious experience consists of (see further on). But part of this character would seem to be that it is itself too apprehended.

This is what the indented quote from his chapter in the preceding subsection would seem to be saying. It seems to say character_c is voiced by a phenomenological report such as the one that Woodruff Smith uses as an example, and character_c can be so voiced because that integral part of an experience which is an inner awareness of the experience is a matter of the experience's having character_c. Here is how Brentano too puts forward the latter thesis:

In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. (1911/1973, p. 127)

That mental phenomenon is an apprehension of a certain sound, and it is an apprehension too of itself. It is an apprehension of itself as the apprehension it is of the sound and of itself. So we apprehend our inner awareness of a mental phenomenon just by the mental phenomenon's taking place within us.

On the Significance of Tertiary Consciousness

To grasp the significance of tertiary consciousness consider the experience Woodruff Smith articulates using the sentence "Unconsciously I see this frog." This sentence is not one that would serve as an actual firsthand report. Surely the speaker has no inner awareness of the unconscious experiences to which the sentence has reference. The speaker is surely inferring their occurrence.

Now it may well be thought our conscious experiences are different from our unconscious experiences in that all the conscious ones are objects of inner awareness whereas all unconscious experiences are not such objects. But another possibility requires some mention. The next two paragraphs are a way in which this additional possibility is expressible.

1. The two kinds of experience, the conscious and the unconscious, may be more alike than is stated. That is, there may be cases where they mutually dif-

fer only at the tertiary level. Woodruff Smith allows experiences that transpire unbeknownst. Is then unbeknownst inner awareness not to be allowed? Consider that blindsight might involve both having a visual experience and having inner awareness of that experience. The visual experiences that are involved in blindsight may be instantiations of less than the full character_c. The reflexivity that is part of that character (see next section) may occur in truncated form wherein the inner awareness that is involved does not have itself as part of its object. Accordingly, Brentano argues that, whereas inner awareness is indeed a feature of every one of our experiences, it also may be variable between experiences. Specifically, our mental activities are not in all cases “explicitly perceived in all of their parts” (1911/1973, p. 277). Inner awareness does not necessarily distinguish all of an experience’s parts. Analogously, the parts of a physical object may be perceived without all of them being distinguished from each other.

2. A failure to apprehend the inner awareness intrinsic to particular experiences, Brentano adds, causes some psychologists to dispute that inner awareness is “evident and even to question the correctness of saying that inner [awareness] is universally valid” (p. 277). With reference to blindsight and more broadly I would add the following to Brentano’s statement. Whenever one has entirely unbeknownst inner awareness of experiences one is *not* in a position to act by taking these into account though one has inner awareness of them. To be able to act on the basis of an experience’s occurrence (i.e., based on a primary awareness) one must have conscious awareness of its occurrence (i.e., secondary *and* tertiary awareness). Merely having unconscious awareness of an experience’s occurrence (i.e., secondary awareness) cannot suffice (Natsoulas, 1998c).

Specifying the Modality of a Mental Act

Staying with the same perceptual example Woodruff Smith defines character_c (calling it also “the character *consciously*”) as follows. It is an intrinsic feature of every conscious perceptual act and “part of [its] *modality* of presentation or intentionality: the *way* the perceptual act is executed with its mode of presentation and so its intentional relation to its object” (p. 84).

Two Other Parts of the Modality of Presentation

The modality of a perceptual act has parts or dimensions that are distinct from character_c. A perceptual act possesses as well *an act character* and *an ego-centric character*.

1. In Woodruff Smith’s example the character of seeing is *the act character* that is involved. As inner awareness reveals, the corresponding perceptual act

belongs to a certain visual species of mental acts. In being aware firsthand of the act one has awareness of it as an instance of seeing and also of the particular frog as its being presented in the perceptual act. Thus, one part of the modality of the act, said to be character_c, gives awareness of another part of the act's modality.

2. The act's *egocentric character* is its "being directed from subject toward object" (p. 84). It too is a part of the act's modality and is apprehended by inner awareness. Mental acts that are very different one from another in respect to their primary object may not also differ in the "way" of their "execution." That is, they may not differ in their modality at all. And so all of them may be conscious acts of seeing with the same subject as their conscious source.

The Two Parts of Character_c and Their Mutual Relation

Woodruff Smith also distinguishes two parts of character_c itself. One part of this character is the mental act's phenomenal (or qualitative) character. Its reflexive character is another part of the act's character_c. He describes as follows the relation between those two further parts of the act's modality to each other. "The *form* of inner awareness consists in this reflexive character modified by the phenomenal character" (p. 84; original stress). He also uses the verb *to modify* in referring to the relation between character_c and the mental act as a whole. Character_c consists of two parts one of which is said to modify the other. And character_c is also stated to modify the entire mental act.

Woodruff Smith's use of this verb in the latter instance would seem to mean that, owing to a mental act's instantiation of character_c, the mental act is different than it would be if it did not lack that character. Character_c modifies a mental act from what it would be absent that character. How would it be different? Absent its character_c the mental act would not be conscious in the sense of being an object of inner awareness. And in the absence of character_c it would not be qualitative either since a part of character_c is the mental act's qualitative character.

It is not as clear how the mental act's qualitative character modifies its reflexive character as Woodruff Smith says it does. An answer might be that in having inner awareness of a mental act, one apprehends among other features the qualia or quale belonging to it. Are not qualia given to inner awareness?

After all, a mental act's act character too is an object of inner awareness even though its act character is said to be part of the act's modality or the way the mental act is executed. And so too inner awareness is an object of inner awareness although inner awareness is a part of the modality of the mental act and is that which makes of the mental act an inner awareness of the act itself, including as an object the feature itself of inner awareness that belongs to the act.

Contrast to Appendage Theories of Inner Awareness

Woodruff Smith contrasts his view of inner awareness with views of inner awareness as being a matter of *causal interaction between neural states*. These neural states which interact causally with each other are mental states but they are proposed not to be any less thoroughly neural for that. And some of these mental states are accepted to be conscious. They are apprehended in the form of other such states directed on them. This apprehension of a state is what it is that makes it conscious. The states that perform the function of making other states conscious are themselves no less thoroughly neural for being inner awarenesses.

Woodruff Smith points out that according to some the apprehension under discussion is a kind of observation of the mental state whereas for others it is rather a kind of (higher-order) occurrent thought about the state. Woodruff Smith seems quickly to reject the observational kind of view on the grounds that a mental state is not sense-perceivable. However, he does spell out the higher-order thought kind of view.

Such a view proposes inner awareness is a judgment articulable as follows. "I now judge that I am now in this mental state" (p. 93; original underlinings). Thus, what makes any mental state a conscious state is just the act of judging oneself to be in that mental state. No further judgment is required about this judgment in order for a mental state to be conscious according to the higher-order-thought kind of view of inner awareness.

Woodruff Smith does not appear to want to make an objection. He states, "I believe this is an appropriate response within the higher-order monitoring model" (p. 94). However, I ought to mention that the higher-order monitoring model does not consider tertiary awareness to be a part of what makes a mental state conscious. This contradicts the Brentanian model that is guiding the elucidation of Woodruff Smith's account of inner awareness.

Within the higher-order monitoring model a requirement of tertiary awareness would set a regress of awarenesses going. Might this be a problem for Woodruff Smith's model as well? Recall that in having intrinsic inner awareness of a mental act the inner-awareness feature of the act is itself apprehended. It is apprehended in the form of the act itself, which entails that the higher-order apprehension too is apprehended. I return to this matter soon.

Tertiary Awareness and Appendage Theory

Woodruff Smith criticizes appendage theory of inner awareness on the basis of the evidence that inner awareness provides about inner awareness. We do not find firsthand a separate mental-occurrence instance that accompanies and is a thought about (or otherwise apprehends) each of our conscious

mental-occurrence instances. We should find the latter if appendage theory is valid.

Moreover, Woodruff Smith does not just report negatively on what inner awareness reveals about our inner awareness. He also reports firsthand, "Rather, inner awareness is experienced as an *integral part* of a conscious experience: that is how we *experience* inner awareness" (p. 95; original emphases).

The latter is stated to be a phenomenological fact. This must mean that our inner awareness apprehends the structure of conscious mental-occurrence instances, and finds them to have itself among the items each makes us aware of. This amounts to arguing that tertiary awareness is an ingredient of conscious experiences. That inner awareness is its own object means the respective experience is an inner awareness of secondary awareness as well as being an inner awareness of the primary awareness that constitutes it.

Woodruff Smith objects to appendage theory in a further way that brings tertiary awareness into the picture. He inquires critically, "How can an unconscious intentionality directed toward a second intentionality make the second one conscious?" (p. 95). He contends a mental state that makes another mental state conscious

ought to be somehow integrated into that consciousness. It ought to be a proper part of the given conscious state and so itself somehow conscious, something experienced in that mental state. Thus, we still have not captured something that Brentano was on to in his own account of "inner consciousness." (p. 96)

But what are the grounds for this "ought"? *We perforce have inner awareness of that inner awareness that we perforce have of a mental state that is conscious.* So it is implied. Hence, absent tertiary awareness, the mental state does not qualify as conscious even though there is inner awareness of it. But why is tertiary awareness required?

In the previous section of this article an answer that I would propose is indicated. From the first-person perspective it is as though a mental-occurrence instance has not occurred if it takes place without inner awareness of it. One cannot choose to behave in such a way as takes one's primary awareness into account if one has no awareness of having this primary awareness. So too the same limitation applies in the case of having inner awareness of the primary awareness if it is not a conscious inner awareness.

At this point Woodruff Smith is arguing contra appendage theory of inner awareness. He is therefore loath to suggest that what such a theory needs is to introduce a third mental state to do the job of making conscious the second mental state, which is proposed to be the inner awareness of the first mental state. Instead, in making his case against, he relies upon how inner awareness finds our conscious experiences to be, and he employs a certain metaphor to convey this firsthand finding.

Woodruff Smith insists that each conscious experience is not accompanied by a judgment about it. We do not find each such experience paired up with such a judgment, neither internally to the experience or distinct from it. And he asks *to be shown* that a judgment needs to be assumed as opposed to what he is proposing instead. He is proposing conscious inner awareness is a part of the way in which conscious mental acts are "executed." Thus, inner awareness is "*bound*" into consciousness of an object. This would seem to mean inner awareness "modifies" the experiences involved such as in seeing this frog consciously.

Metaphors Useful to the Modal Account

In order to convey the relevant deliverances of inner awareness Woodruff Smith applies the metaphor of a mental act *that feels itself, too, in the very act of feeling its object*. There are not two acts. The single act is executed self-consciously. He applies another metaphor to the case of consciously hearing something that takes place in the environment. In having this sort of experience one hears in such a way that one apprehends "in one movement," or within a single "field," both that which one hears and the auditory experience involved in the hearing of it.

The metaphor of a single "medium" or "field" that includes something external to oneself and a portion of oneself recalls James's (1899/1915) description of states of consciousness as "fields." Every one of these Jamesian states is unitary. It does not consist of more than a single awareness however complex the object of this awareness may be, however the number of objects that the single state may have, and however the number of different kinds of experience which the state simultaneously qualifies as being (e.g., perceptual, imaginal, memorial, abstractly cognitive, affective, and conative).

A state of consciousness is an awareness according to James of all of its objects *in a single movement* just as Woodruff Smith's metaphor proposes. However, Woodruff Smith reports that a conscious mental act is an awareness that ties both itself and its object together in a single field whereas James (1890/1950) clearly rejects a state of consciousness's apprehending itself as well. Yet James's states or fields that one at a time constitute the stream of one's consciousness, each of these has *oneself* among its objects.

Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which some awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know. We think; and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat of the thinking *Whatever* the content of the ego may be, it is habitually felt *with* everything else by us humans, and must form the *liaison* between all the things of which we become successively aware. (James, 1890/1950, pp. 241–242; original emphases)

Inner Awareness as a Modal Character

There is more to Woodruff Smith's basic notion of inner awareness, substantially more than that inner awareness is built into any mental-occurrence instance that is its object. The more that there is, is indicated by the metaphors he finds congenial in describing the relation between inner awareness and the experience (or mental act) to which it intrinsically belongs. They point to what the problem of inner awareness needs in order to get itself solved. Namely, it requires "an articulated model that places inner awareness *within* the consciousness of the object" (p. 98; original stress).

A Feature of the Primary Presentation Itself

It is important to notice that the latter statement proposes more than does a statement that merely locates inner awareness in the respective conscious mental-occurrence instance. Compare another phenomenologist who is an intrinsic theorist of inner awareness but locates inner awareness at the mental act's "margin." For Aron Gurwitsch (1950/1985) the content added to a mental act by inner awareness of the act does not have relevance to the content belonging to the "thematic process" lying at the core of the act (i.e., the primary awareness; Natsoulas, 1996b, 1998b).

In contrast Woodruff Smith's example has for its object this frog and possesses no secondary content. The "consciousness" to which his latterly quoted statement refers must therefore be the primary awareness involved in consciously seeing this frog. The most important basis for a construal of Woodruff Smith as seeking to locate inner awareness *within the respective primary awareness itself* is found where he is claiming that the conscious experiences that are involved in seeing this frog are "modified" by the character *consciously* (character_c).

This frog is a primary object of the visual experience. Character_c is a modal character of the experience. Being a part of the experience's modality, character_c is distinguished from the object-directedness of the experience. Though the experience apprehends itself as well, the experience is not a primary object of itself. Accordingly, frog and experience are not presented side by side. They do not *in this way* get apprehended together as a single unit or in relation to each other.

Admittedly there is a tendency to speak of inner awareness as though it were of a kind with having visual awareness of the frog or of a kind with having awareness in thought about the frog. But Woodruff Smith proposes inner awareness is, rather, like the intrinsic qualitative character of the experience.

Qualitativeness and Inner Awareness

Character_c (i.e., the character *consciously*) of a conscious experience is proposed to be made up of two modal characters. Its reflexive character corresponds to its inner awareness of itself, and its qualitative character corresponds to *the feeling dimension* that James ascribes in *The Principles* to all the basic durational components of his famous stream of consciousness, that is, to every state of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1998a).

Accordingly, each of your mental-occurrence instances that actually come into existence is a component of your stream of consciousness and in every instance a “thought” and a “feeling” at the same time. For James your stream is through and through both cognitive and a stream of feeling without exception of any state of consciousness whether or not such a state is as well an object of inner awareness. James’s claim that a mental-occurrence instance is a feeling does not imply that there is inner awareness of the mental-occurrence instance.

In Woodruff Smith’s account of inner awareness a similar view emerges with respect to the relation between the qualitativeness of a mental act and the inner awareness that is intrinsic to that act. His account differs from James’s appendage account but there are also similarities between them, as can be seen from this paragraph of Woodruff Smith’s.

Now, there is nothing in the phenomenal [i.e., qualitative] character of an experience that articulates an inner awareness of the act as such. My proposal is that there is a further *reflexive* character, the character “in this very experience” — or “herein” — that articulates awareness of the experience itself. But there is nothing in this reflexivity that articulates phenomenality [i.e., qualitativeness]; a mental act could intimate itself reflexively without yet being phenomenal [i.e., qualitative]. These two characters are interwoven in consciousness, in inner awareness, on the model at hand. Here lies inner awareness, in the form “phenomenally [i.e., qualitatively] in this very experience.” (p. 100).

The qualitative character of an experience (or mental act) is one of its modal characters. But it is distinct from the experience’s equally modal reflexive character, assuming the experience has in this instance both characters. The reflexive character of a conscious experience is what makes it conscious. James (1890/1950, p. 304) is justly understood to allow as follows.

Any component of James’s stream of consciousness that occurs and is *not* an object of inner awareness James would want to call “a state of sciousness” rather than calling it a state of consciousness. That state on this occasion remains cognitive (and also qualitative) but it is something less than conscious. For one would know of its occurrence only indirectly via an inferential process. Moreover, such an occurrence is intrinsically the same as it is whenever it is an object of inner awareness. Being an object of inner awareness is not among its intrinsic properties. Nor does its being an object of inner aware-

ness depend according to James on its having another intrinsic property, beyond its simply being when occurring on its own a state of consciousness.

In Woodruff Smith's view reflexivity and qualitiveness are characters instantiated by each of our conscious mental-occurrence instances. They make up character_c, and this character is an intrinsic character of every conscious mental-occurrence instance.⁶ In the paragraph I quote above from page 100 Woodruff Smith furthermore describes the two characters as being "interwoven" in inner awareness — although, in the absence of qualitiveness, inner awareness is not excluded.

Recall too a sentence I quote in the section titled "Specifying the Modality of a Mental Act." "The *form* of inner awareness consists in this reflexive character modified by the phenomenal [i.e., qualitative] character" (p. 84; original stress). This statement too seems to say that the qualia of a conscious mental-occurrence instance are woven into inner awareness of it. Both these ways of expressing the relation between the two modal characters would seem to imply inner awareness varies in a certain respect with qualitative character.

Concerning Inner Awareness of Qualitative Content

Is not the specific qualitative character of a conscious mental-occurrence instance revealed to inner awareness? Is that not how its qualitative character modifies a mental-occurrence instance's reflexive character? The answer to this question is not obvious and judging from considerations such as the numbered ones that follow here would seem to be from Woodruff Smith's perspective in the negative.

1. An experience's reflexive character "articulates awareness of the experience itself" *but it is said not to articulate awareness of the experience's qualitative character*. This would seem to say inner awareness is of the respective experience but not of its subjective quality. This kind of theoretical step might be taken to secure the non-qualitative character of inner awareness. For an inner awareness is proposed to be not a kind of awareness wherein its object the experience itself is presented. Inner awareness differs in this regard from the primary awareness involved in seeing this frog. This frog is a part of the "mode" of presentation in the experience as distinguished by Woodruff Smith from the modality of presentation in the experience.

⁶Maybe a reminder is useful at this point that the ongoing discussion in the text ignores Woodruff Smith's countenancing a kind of conscious vision (and the like) which does not involve any inner awareness. He introduces such mental-occurrence instances late in his chapter soon after he shifts topics from the phenomenology of inner awareness to the ontology of consciousness.

2. Woodruff Smith spells out the relation between the reflexive character and the qualitative character differently than in terms of inner awareness's revealing the specific qualitative character of a conscious experience. He describes the reflexive character as its falling within the "scope" of the qualitative character, which "modifies the form of the whole mental act" (p. 100). What is the sense of the following thesis? *Inner awareness indicates, or intimates, the mental act itself within a certain qualitative scope?* With respect to inner awareness what difference does a mental act's specific qualitative character make? Woodruff Smith states, "A mental act could intimate itself reflexively without yet being phenomenal [i.e., qualitative]" (p. 100; added insert). Does not this statement mean what it seems to mean? Is qualitiveness being held to be unnecessary for inner awareness?

3. The reflexive character of a conscious mental act falls under the "scope" of the qualitative character of the act. Perhaps this should be understood so that as used in this context the terms *scope* and *modifies* have the same reference. A mental act's qualitiveness modifies the mental act in its entirety and this includes of course the inner awareness that is an intrinsic feature of the act. These two characters belonging to the act are not to be understood as responsible for a further content. There is only the unitary content of the act in which this frog is presented, or a different primary object is presented. Neither character is rightly considered to be itself an act, an act within an act. Both of them are characters of "the way" a single mental act is "executed."

Does Tertiary Awareness Require Qualitiveness?

It is likely compatible with Woodruff Smith's account to say that the two modal characters under discussion help determine the mental act's *unitary content* — which *presents an object beyond the mental act itself* and *possesses in itself a certain specific qualitiveness* and is also, at the same time, *about the mental act itself*. To this list another item should be added, one also implicated in the relation Woodruff Smith is proposing between reflexive character and qualitative character. I argue in previous sections that the conscious mental acts must be as Brentano claims in a certain respect. According to my commentary regarding tertiary awareness each conscious mental act is an apprehension too of the modal feature of inner awareness belonging to the act.

Woodruff Smith mentions the latter apprehension in discussing the relation between the two modal characters comprising character._c He states that the reflexive character "is modified by (or falls within the scope of)" the qualitative character, and "in that way the inner awareness of the act is itself conscious and experienced or 'felt' in living through the act" (p. 100). He adds to this that the inner awareness therefore is not unconscious.

Thus, Woodruff Smith is alluding to an appendage theory of inner awareness — according to which inner awareness of a mental state is unconscious unless

a further inner awareness is added to the string that too is itself unconscious and is directed on the inner awareness having the first mental state as object. There seem to be two relevant implications of the important statement that is quoted in the preceding paragraph from Woodruff Smith's page 100.

1. One implication is *any mental act that intimates itself reflexively yet is entirely lacking in qualitiveness would not qualify as a conscious act*. The ingredient missing and thus preventing the act's qualifying as conscious would be the intrinsic modal feature of tertiary awareness. The inner awareness the mental act does involve would be unconscious because a tertiary awareness requires, it would seem, the kind of "modification" for which the qualitiveness of a mental act is responsible in those cases where there is inner awareness.

Already addressed here in the main section titled "Specifying the Modality of a Mental Act" is one of Woodruff Smith's bases for rejecting an appendage theory of inner awareness. Such theory considers a mental state to be conscious if directly apprehended by another mental state conscious in turn or not. Woodruff Smith objects as follows to this conception of consciousness. Given an unconscious appendage inner awareness would not be experienced. That is, one would not have an apprehension — without a further (unconscious) inner awareness (and so on) — of one's being aware of the mental act that is the primary object.⁷

2. Another implication of Woodruff Smith's statement on the role of the qualitative character in inner awareness seems to be *a non-cognitive character of the mental act somehow brings into existence a cognitive character*. Analogously, turning the light on in a completely dark room enables one to see. What explanation can be provided for a mental act's qualitiveness's having an analogous effect in respect to tertiary awareness? After all Woodruff Smith appears to allow that inner awareness of a mental act does not require that the mental act have a qualitative character. It is in the nature of some of our mental acts to be in every instance of their occurrence an inner awareness of itself. Why is qualitative character invoked to explain inner awareness's having itself as an object too (i.e., intrinsic tertiary awareness)?

Husserl's Model for Temporal Awareness Found Useful

Is Husserl's Conception of Inner Awareness, After All, an Appendage Theory?

In further developing his conception of inner awareness Woodruff Smith also puts to use an account that Edmund Husserl advances. He finds a basic part of Husserl's account consistent with his own. But he rejects the inclusion

⁷At that point in the section I contribute a further argument in support of the necessity of tertiary awareness.

of a secondary intentionality within a conscious mental act. In Husserl's case this secondary intentionality takes the form of a certain "constructed" awareness that is the mental act's self-awareness. In this respect it is rather James's (1890/1950) view of a state of consciousness's having the structure of a single, unitary awareness that Woodruff Smith's account resembles more. And indeed Woodruff Smith's further general notion might well have some appeal to James. Individual "acts," or states of consciousness, are variably "executed" and this is a matter of what their respective modal characters are.

Husserl's proposed solution in contrast does not conceive of inner awareness to be a modal character of a mental act though he too struggles to locate inner awareness within "the unified experience while keeping [inner awareness] from looking like a higher-order 'perception' of the experience that steps back and separately intends the experience" (p. 104). According to Husserl inner awareness is a matter of an experience's having "retentions" and "pro-tentions" as parts of it. These features respectively are retentive and anticipative awarenesses of (a) past and expected primary objects of the ongoing stream of experience and (b) those past and expected experiences whose objects those primary objects were or will be.

Woodruff Smith sums up Husserl's conception stating, "Inner awareness itself is thus reduced to *temporal awareness* of flowing consciousness" (p. 104; original stress). He does find Husserl's conception of temporal awareness acceptable but goes on to develop a non-reductive position that includes both inner awareness and temporal awareness in intimate relation to each other.

A reduction such as the one Husserl attempts of inner awareness to temporal awareness in effect leaves inner awareness out or at most puts off explaining it adequately. His attempt as described by Woodruff Smith leaves the impression that, notwithstanding Husserl's struggle to do no such thing, he advances in effect an appendage theory of inner awareness. Of course Husserl is cognizant of the problems which appendage theory brings with it. But he probably finds himself unable to model as he would like a unitary phenomenological structure for the conscious mental acts.

Consequently inner awareness takes place for Husserl *across experiences* rather than being a part of each one of our conscious experiences directed upon the experience itself. A theorist who does not want to leave the wrong impression — inner awarenesses in the form of experiences that are blind to themselves individually yet perceptive of past experiences in the stream — must give some guidance as regards how an experience reflexively accomplishes inner awareness.

The kind of guidance needed is not a mere counter-pronouncement to James's (1890/1950) "No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is something else" (p. 190). It is not enough to declare in opposition, "No conscious state, whilst present, is to itself as though it were not." And of

course a simple claim to the effect that inner awareness is *owed* to temporal awareness does not do enough either.

Nor does Woodruff Smith's following encapsulation help in reassuring that an intrinsic theory is in fact implicit in Husserl: "Our 'inner consciousness' of our passing experience — what I am calling inner awareness — *automatically falls out* of the structure of our consciousness of time: our temporally flowing consciousness of temporally flowing events both external and internal to our consciousness" (p. 101; italics added).

Assuming retentions and protentions are indeed among the features of each state of consciousness that constitutes our stream of consciousness in James's sense one still wants to know how such a state might be an awareness of itself. Otherwise one may suspect the state is not proposed to be an inner awareness of itself, just as James (1890/1950) insists it is not: "The present moment of consciousness is thus, as Mr. Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series" (p. 341).⁸

Based on Husserl's understanding of the temporal awareness that is involved in hearing a tone sequence Woodruff Smith ascribes to Husserl a view like James's on the stream's darkest moment.

On the Husserlian analysis that I am suggesting: my *inner awareness* of my experience of hearing that tone is *constructed* from this pattern of *secondary* retentions and protentions. Interestingly, there is a "blind spot" (or "deaf spot") in this inner awareness, as my experience includes no current awareness of hearing E [i.e., the tone heard in that experience]. (p. 102)

What Is the Relation Between Inner Awareness and Temporal Awareness?

Woodruff Smith does not reject Husserl's analysis of temporal awareness. He seeks to show that inner awareness can be cogently elevated as it were above Husserl's construal of it as a separate secondary awareness. What then is the relation according to Woodruff Smith's theory between inner awareness and temporal awareness? The rest of this article identifies some features of that relation as proposed by Woodruff Smith. In my discussion the term *inner awareness* has reference to Woodruff Smith's modal character whereas the term *temporal awareness* is used for the retentions and protentions Husserl speaks of.

For Woodruff Smith inner awareness is a modal character of the one and only awareness that constitutes any conscious experience, and thus inner awareness is not separate from (delayed, as it were) but an intrinsic feature of the conscious experience of which it is an awareness. He further proposes,

⁸See Natsoulas (2001, p. 47) for six relevant quotations from James (1890/1950) along with the corresponding page references.

My inner awareness, bearing [the] content ["in this very experience"], supervenes on my temporal awareness consisting in a pattern of retentions and protentions, but the content "in this very experience" does not decompose semantically into a content specifying the pattern of retentions and protentions . . . Accordingly, the contents that define respectively *inner* awareness and *temporal* awareness are distinct contents with different phenomenological tasks. (p. 105)

Since inner awareness supervenes on and has different content from temporal awareness is it not a reasonable surmise that the two kinds of awareness cannot be mutually identified? Does it not also follow that it is wrong to say as I do in this article and previously (Natsoulas, 2004a, 2004b) that according to Woodruff Smith's view there is no more than a single awareness and content involved in any mental act, experience or state of consciousness, where these terms refer to a single pulse of mentality, the experience of the moment or a momentary state?

My emphasis on a single awareness derives from an effort to understand Woodruff Smith's modal characters as not adding *distinct* contents to an experience but as determining what the single content of the experience is. Woodruff Smith's concept of supervenience therefore needs to be addressed with the following question in mind. Does the concept of supervenience serve to disunify with respect to each other the relata to which it is applied?

What Inner Awareness Is Awareness of Is Ongoing Experience

As a modal character of each of a succession of experiences (states of consciousness) inner awareness "supervenes" on the retentive and anticipative awarenesses that partly constitute each experience; and inner awareness "spreads holistically" over the stream whose basic components those experiences are. Woodruff Smith appropriates the concept of supervenience from work by philosophers on the mind-body problem. His inner-awareness chapter does not define nor does it discuss the concept but elsewhere in the book brief comment on supervenience is included which may help in grasping the relation proposed between inner awareness and temporal awareness.

We learn there that in the view of some philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists mental states are "supervenient" on physical brain states; and this relation is one of *dependence*: a certain mental state always occurs along with a certain brain state, and does not occur if that brain state does not take place. In the chapter of special interest Woodruff Smith attributes a similar relation. "The character 'in this very experience' itself *depends on* the temporal awareness of the ongoing experience. For, without that integral temporal awareness of the ongoing experience, I could not (as Husserl says) 'sense' the ongoing experience, albeit simply as 'this very experience'" (p. 105).

Note the use of the adjective *ongoing*. The “ongoing experience” is made up evidently of a number of experiential pulses. The ongoing experience’s being an awareness of itself would refer to having awareness all at once of more than a single pulse of experience. And so the “sensing” of the ongoing experience involves retentions and protentions whose objects are experiences preceding and following upon the experience of the present moment. The “sensed” experience is the ongoing stream and not simply the individual experience wherein a moment’s inner awareness occurs.

Thus, the temporal awareness — which is held to be intrinsic to each member of a sequence of experiences — makes possible awareness of the whole comprising that experiential sequence. This is what Woodruff Smith would seem to have in mind. It would help in making good sense of his following statement. “My inner awareness of my experience, in virtue of the modal character ‘in this very experience,’ *spreads holistically* over my temporally flowing experience of hearing ‘Yankee Doodle’ including the present tone” (p. 105; italics added). To the content of each of the pulses of auditory experience involved in hearing the tune inner awareness contributes the content “in this very experience.” Thus, the content belonging to the perceptual awareness of the music performed has reference not just to the performance but also to the ongoing experience of hearing it.

Returning to the concept of supervenience as Woodruff Smith is exercising it in the present context I continue to inquire into the relation that exists between the temporal awareness and the inner awareness supervening on it. Are these awarenesses distinct from each other or one and the same? The character of reflexivity, does it depend for its existence on retentions and protentions in the sense of their producing inner awareness? Or is inner awareness somehow constituted of temporal awareness as the thesis *that inner awareness is an ongoing experience’s being “sensed”* may tend to suggest?

When for the first time in his book Woodruff Smith brings the concept of supervenience into play it is while discussing *ontological dependence* defined as follows after Husserl: “A *depends* or is *founded* on B if and only if A could not by essence exist unless B exists, that is, necessarily, by virtue of essence, A exists only if B exists” (p. 32; original emphases). About the supervenience of the mental on the physical Woodruff Smith states that according to that doctrine the relation is one of ontological dependence of the mental on the physical. Some authors go further and propose that what supervenes does not involve any new entities not already existing at the level supervened on. But for Woodruff Smith ontological dependence does not entail that a relation of supervenience is never the case between distinct entities.

An Experience's Salient Content and Its Qualitative Content

By way of explication Woodruff Smith mentions an analogous relation to that between inner awareness and temporal awareness. The kind of visual experience that constitutes seeing this frog presents this frog in a visual-sensuous or visual-qualitative way which involves color, shape and texture. Yet "the salient structure" of the successive presentations of this frog is said to be "this frog," "this red tree frog" or the like. In other words something like this frog is that of which we have visual-perceptual awareness notwithstanding that for us to have this awareness this frog or the like must be presented in a visual-qualitative way. The content of awareness in the experience is of the frog and of its properties and not of the pattern of qualities of which the experience itself consists.

Modally the experience is not only visual but also reflexive, an inner awareness. But neither modality, neither of these two ways in which the one experience is "executed," involves an "articulation" of the qualities that are present therein. The qualities are present but not presented in the sense that this frog and its properties are presented. The salient content of the experience "supervenes" upon the visual detail instantiated by the presentation of the frog. Woodruff Smith's use of *salient* is not explained but the word surely signals his having in mind content that includes the contributions of the qualitative character of the experience, content in addition to what he is calling the "salient" content.

This brings Woodruff Smith's insistence to mind that inner awareness does not "articulate" an experience's qualitative character. Perhaps *to be articulated* merely means *to be made salient*. As it is used with respect to inner awareness perhaps *articulation* does not imply that only that which is made salient is part of the content of a conscious experience. Is there any doubt we have inner awareness of the primary object of a visual experience as presenting itself visual-qualitatively?

Is this qualitative inner awareness not implicit in my saying I *see* this frog? The qualities of an experience may not be presented in the experience in the same sense as the primary object is therein presented. It seems correct to say that we do not *see* the qualitative character of our experience nor any of its other characters. Our inner awareness is not a form of perceiving. But an intrinsic theory of inner awareness should not omit from the content of a conscious experience anything of which we have awareness simply by having that experience.

Analogizing the Relation Between Inner Awareness and Temporal Awareness

The relation of inner awareness to temporal awareness is proposed by Woodruff Smith to be analogous to the "supervenience" of perceptual aware-

ness upon the qualitative presentation in an experience. Thus, the contents of inner awareness would be distinct from the contents of temporal awareness. The content of the inner awareness has reference to *this experience* as the perceptual awareness has reference to *this frog*. The retentions and protentions that in part constitute the experience are supervened on by the inner awareness that articulates *this very experience of this frog* but does not articulate retentions or protentions although these are included in each of the successive experiences making up an episode of seeing.

But the question remains as to how inner awareness relates to temporal awareness when it “supervenes” upon the latter and “spreads holistically” over the respective stream of experiences. Furthermore, inner awareness is stated to *depend upon* temporal awareness. This connects with what Woodruff Smith states earlier by way of making Husserl more explicit on this very same point. “My *inner awareness* of my experience of hearing that tone is *constructed* from this pattern of *secondary* retentions and protentions” (p. 102; original emphases).

But Woodruff Smith rightly adds (a) that the positing of such a relation amounts to a reduction of inner awareness to temporal awareness, (b) that the proper form of inner awareness as such is not temporal awareness, and (c) that supervenience of inner awareness upon temporal awareness must therefore be something other than Husserl proposes. Hence, a distinct feature of consciousness is said to supervene and is described as “formal” by Woodruff Smith. His use of the term *formal* is so emphasized that it seems the key to what he would propose in place of the relation being-constructed-from. This formal feature is to be found higher up as it were, at the level of intentional activities “flowing above” the stream of sensory experience that instantiates the structure of Husserl’s temporal awareness.

Concluding Comment

The following paragraph is how Woodruff Smith leads into the topic of the two final sections of his chapter.

To develop the modal model of consciousness further, and so to add warrant to the modal analysis of inner awareness, we would need to explore the ontology of modality along with that of intentionality. With that discussion we would move from the phenomenology of consciousness — our present concern — to its ontology. (p. 108)

A modal analysis of inner awareness as we have seen does not assign to the respective mental act any object beyond its primary object (or objects). In other words inner awareness is not conceived of as a separate mental act (as it is in appendage theory) nor as a secondary mental act within the mental act of which it is the awareness (as it is in some intrinsic theories). Instead the modal inner-awareness character — as do the modal species character and the

modal qualitative character — “modifies” the one and only presentation in the mental act. This presentation is “modified” in such a way that the content of the mental act includes reference to the mental act itself. I would want to add to the end of the latter sentence “and to properties of it.” I have in mind at least both the mental act’s qualitative character and its reflexive character. Thus, the primary object of a conscious mental act is apprehended as being the object of, for example, this conscious visual experience. Woodruff Smith uses at one point the expression higher-order content. This should be avoided because his thesis is that the mental act has no second content and that phrase tends to suggest that there is.

Now how might ontology assist us in the effort to understand *the form* inner awareness has according to a modal kind of intrinsic theory? Ontology takes us well beyond phenomenology. It takes us beyond Woodruff Smith’s basic phenomenological conception of inner awareness, and it requires separate consideration in the present series of articles. As indicated at more than one point in the present article ontological considerations lead Woodruff Smith to modify further his earlier understanding of consciousness as requiring inner awareness in among other ways.

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